security through cooperation
Furthering Asia Pacific Multilateral Engagement

CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2007
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the region’s leading Track Two (non-official) organization for promoting cooperation and dialogue on regional security issues. CSCAP was established in 1993, and now has 21 national Member Committees and one Observer. (For more information about CSCAP, please visit www.cscap.org or www.cscap.ca.)

CSCAP thanks the Centre of International Relations (CIR) at the University of British Columbia and its Security and Defence Forum (SDF) program, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) for additional financial support of this publication.

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Cover photographs:
Chinese troops stand in formation during “Peace Mission 2007”;
Indonesian elementary school student wears mask as a precautionary measure against SARS.

The CSCAP Regional Security Outlook is a product of an editorial board established by CSCAP. While efforts were made to ensure that the views of the CSCAP membership were taken into account, the opinions and material contained in this volume are the sole responsibility of the authors and the Editor and do not necessarily reflect the views of CSCAP’s Member Committees, their individual participants, or the CRSO’s financial supporters. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of the Editor.
On behalf of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), I am pleased to present the first annual CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO): Security through Cooperation: Furthering Asia Pacific Multilateral Engagement.

CSCAP, with 21 Member Committees, is the Asia Pacific’s most inclusive, multilateral Track 2 institution. Through its Study Groups and General Conferences it brings together policy makers, officials (acting in their private capacities), experts and academics to advance regional security.

The CRSO is directed to this broad regional audience. Its mandate is to survey the most pressing security issues of today and to provide informed policy-relevant recommendations as to how Track 1 and Track 2, working together, can advance regional multilateral solutions to these issues.

The CRSO is being published in two formats. This hard-copy CRSO Executive Version presents summaries of the analyses of the Editor and eight prominent regional experts. These analyses are presented in full in the CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2007, available in digital form through the Internet (www.cscap.ca).

This CRSO highlights three key developments of Asia Pacific multilateralism over the last year. The first is the momentum in the Six-Party Talks process and the opportunities provided to create a new security architecture for Northeast Asia. The second is the refocusing of its form and purpose by ASEAN being formalized in the signing of the ASEAN Charter in November. The third is the need to come to terms with the expanding notion of Asia Pacific security—the increasing priority of “non-traditional” security threats posed by phenomena such as terrorism, climate change and pandemic influenza; and its widening geographic footprint extending to the zones of insecurity along Asia’s western and south Pacific margins.

Each CRSO chapter presents specific policy recommendations intended for consideration and debate at the official, Track 2 (non-official), and civil society levels. For CSCAP itself, these recommendations serve as a compass to ensure its activities sustain relevance to their Track 1 counterparts, while at the same time remaining attentive to the broader human security priorities of the peoples of the Asia Pacific.

The Editor has appreciated the editorial independence granted to him and to contributors to the CRSO by CSCAP’s Steering Committee. Accordingly, the views expressed in the CRSO do not represent those of any Member Committee and are the responsibility of the Editor. Thanks are due to many for their assistance in producing this volume, in particular to Ms Erin Williams who assumed the role of Associate Editor. Carolina Hernandez, Tsutomu Kikuchi, Wade Huntley, Diane Mauzy, Beth Greener-Barcham, Jon Tinker, Sam Bateman, Paul Evans, Yuen Pau Woo, and Avery Poole, among others, were generous with their time and advice.

Brian L. Job
CRSO Editor
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Two themes unite the chapters in this volume. The first is that the transnational nature of the threats confronting the Asia Pacific underscores the need for more robust multilateral cooperation. Principled acceptance of this is reflected in the profusion of multilateral bodies and the many agreements they produce. But this has yet to translate into significant cooperation. ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the two main regional bodies tasked with security issues, lack the institutional agility needed to respond quickly and effectively to threats. And multilateral cooperation, even on issues of acute vulnerability, is often hindered by the region’s prevailing noninterference norm. Finally, a leadership deficit has prevented many of the region’s multilateral forums from advancing beyond simply building confidence and sharing information.

The second theme emphasized here is that Track Two (unofficial) dialogue processes can bridge the gap between the desire for multilateralism and the actual capacity to carry it out. The informal and non-binding nature of these processes, at least in theory, permits innovative and proactive thinking about shared security concerns. And because Track Two forums typically convene stakeholders that bring a wide array of perspectives—official, expert, and civil society—to a particular issue, the fruits of their labor are thoughtful and well-researched policy options for how Track One (official) actors can eliminate or contain sources of insecurity. The chapters that comprise this volume represent a similar type of Track Two effort.

The current chapter is organized as follows: We provide a brief overview of the security concerns addressed in this volume: unresolved tensions in Northeast Asia, the region’s ‘nuclearization’ trend, the threat of terrorism and insur-

1

THE REGIONAL SECURITY PICTURE

The security outlook for the Asia Pacific is generally quite positive. Social, political, and economic transitions throughout the region have brought an unprecedented degree of stability and prosperity. Its governments and peoples have coped admirably with the tensions often arising from these types of profound change. In addition, relations between the region’s major powers—China, Japan, India and the U.S.—have been on a relatively even keel. In Northeast Asia, the major flashpoints on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits have not erupted into open conflict. And Southeast Asia’s terrorism threat, which in 2002 earned it the designation as the “second front” in the global War on Terrorism, has been managed more successfully than many originally anticipated.

This is not to say that the region is free of trouble spots.
The chapters that follow identify an assortment of evolving and emerging security concerns of roughly three main types.

1) The Evolution of ‘Traditional’ Threats
Historical animosities between Japan, China, and South Korea continue to feed a climate of suspicion and distrust in Northeast Asia. This climate makes it difficult for these governments to make progress on unresolved territorial and maritime disputes, such as the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute between South Korea and Japan, or the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between Japan and China. It also casts a worrisome tone over the China-Japan competition for regional leadership. One scholar notes that “it is difficult to think of an area of such size and significance [as Northeast Asia] that is more bereft of multilateral institutions.” Reflecting this concern, many other experts have suggested that the Six-Party Talks (6PT), the ad hoc multilateral mechanism for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, could serve as the starting point for a more comprehensive and robust Northeast Asian security mechanism. As Chu Shulong notes in Chapter 2, planning this institutional conversion does not necessarily need to hinge on prior resolution of the North Korea situation, as members of the 6PT have other issues that are in need of multilateral attention.

Beyond North Korea, the Asian continent is at the center of a broader ‘nuclearization’ trend. This trend has three main components. First, some Asian countries are either not signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (India and Pakistan), have withdrawn from it (North Korea), or are suspected of having violated its terms (Iran). Second, India and China are pursuing ‘vertical’ proliferation—the technological augmentation of their existing capabilities—which effectively extends nuclearization into the region’s surrounding seas and space. And finally, as competition over fossil fuels intensifies, more Asian countries are looking to the nuclear energy option as a way of alleviating concerns about future energy supplies. All of these developments are happening while the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the cornerstone of the world’s non-proliferation order, are coming under increased scrutiny. C. Raja Mohan argues in Chapter 3 that this nuclear order will need to be reconstituted in a way that reflects the changes outlined above, and that accounts for the interests of Asia’s rising powers.

2) The Emergence of Non-Traditional Threats
For the most part, regional reactions to non-traditional security threats have taken the form of ambitious declarations of multilateral cooperation that have failed to materialize into significant action. Rizal Sukma argues in Chapter 4 that in the case of counter-terrorism, many Southeast Asian states have been reluctant to engage in closer inter-state cooperation, partly out of sovereignty concerns, but also out of a belief that national-level responses have been more effective. However, he also emphasizes that the transnational dimension of Southeast Asia’s terrorism threat, centered on the Indonesia-based Jemmah Islamiyah and its network of regional affiliates, will require a more effective cooperative response.

On the issue of health security, the prospect of a pandemic outbreak of avian influenza, more commonly known as the ‘bird flu’, has policy makers and experts alike deeply concerned about a lack of preparedness. Some of Asia’s front-line states have made impressive overtures toward a deeper level of coordination and cooperation, both within the region and between the region and key international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO). But Mely C. Anthony stresses in Chapter 5 that the current pace of inter-state and inter-sectoral collaboration does not reflect the urgency of the problem, which could erupt with frightening rapidity and at only a moment’s notice.

In Chapter 6, Simon Tay notes that states throughout the Asia Pacific region are facing mounting scientific evidence of the devastating impact of climate change. They are also facing pressures from their own civil societies to be more proactive about treating its causes and effects. Both Asian and Western governments, however, continue to resist the notion that taking decisive and binding multilateral action to deal with climate change is no longer merely an option. It is now, he says, an absolute imperative.

According to Pierre Lizee, author of Chapter 7, one area in which Asia Pacific multilateralism has shown more promise is the steady increase in regional states’ participation in UN (and some non-UN) peace support operations (PSOs). ASEAN and the ARF have both introduced into their agendas the possibility of assuming a greater role in supporting these PSOs, including operations conducted within the Asia Pacific region itself. At present,
it is unlikely that these organizations will become as directly involved in international peacekeeping as their counterparts in other regions, but forward momentum for ASEAN and the ARF would still signal an important milestone in each organization's institutional maturity.

3) Zones of Insecurity along the Periphery
Domestic instability in Oceania's island states has not commanded much regional attention other than from neighboring Australia and New Zealand. But John Henderson says in Chapter 8 that this sub-region's natural resources and diplomatic leverage increasingly make it a stadium for strategic competition. The fragility of Oceania's political institutions require that external involvement be subject to transparency and scrutiny in order to avoid exacerbating the growing pains associated with political consolidation and economic globalization. As Henderson points out, weak and poorly governed Pacific Island states could easily become a breeding ground for transnational crime and infectious diseases.

Focusing on threats coming from the opposite side of the continent, Masashi Nishihara argues in the volume's final chapter that insurgencies in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan have at least three destabilizing impacts on the rest of the Asia Pacific region. First, their ideologies could spread to like-minded groups in Central Asia, a sub-region that is likely to become a more critical supplier of energy resources to Asia's economic powerhouses. Second, extremist groups in Southeast Asia could adopt these insurgents' tactics and ideologies and use them against their own governments. And third, opium production, which is increasingly funding Taliban operations in Afghanistan, could endanger populations living along Asia's narco-trafficking routes, as well as undermine regional government and justice systems by encouraging a climate of corruption.

THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF REGIONAL SECURITY
A bird's-eye-view of the Asia Pacific's multilateral arrangements would suggest that the 'architecture' for dealing with these threats is already in place (see Figure 1). But the growing number of these arrangements belies the fact that most states still do not consider multilateral cooperation as the major vehicle for advancing their own security. Over the past decade, many of them have
purchased weapons systems that are externally oriented and play no role in national defense other than waging inter-state war. These acquisitions contrast starkly with official statements that their major security concerns are terrorism, maritime piracy, and humanitarian disasters, all areas for which these military systems are irrelevant. Furthermore, joint military exercises, such as the U.S.-led Cobra Gold and Malabar and Chinese-led “Peace Mission”, exercises are as frequent and well-resourced as ever. While ostensibly undertaken for the sake of bolstering individual states’ security, these military acquisitions and joint exercises divide the region between participants and non-participants, and raise suspicions over who the targets are.

Multilateral activity in the Asia Pacific, to the extent that it has promoted confidence building, has helped to reduce some of these suspicions. But the fundamental need remains for a multilateralism that is more focused on solving the problems of a shifting security environment. Many of the multilateral groups depicted in Figure 1, however, are limited in at least one of three ways.

1) Reluctance and Inertia

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has not only been the wider region’s primary engine for security multilateralism, but in recent years it has also engaged in a remarkable process of self-reform. In 2003, Indonesia proposed the formation of an ASEAN Security Community (ASC), which included bold suggestions such as the formation of an ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Centre and an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation. A main achievement of this reform process to date has been the drafting and signing of the ASEAN Charter in November 2007. The Charter established ASEAN’s legal personality in its external relations and formally endorsed democratic practices and institutions, the protection of human rights, and the promotion of good governance. In brief, the Charter...
was meant to mark a watershed moment in the ASEAN’s institutional evolution. But this watershed moment, and ASEAN’s credibility, were both undercut in the months leading up to the Charter’s ratification. In September 2007, the government of Myanmar, ASEAN’s newest and most controversial member, responded to pro-democracy demonstrations with a violence that many in the international community found deeply unnerving. Although ASEAN condemned the crackdown with atypically strong language, it still looked to outside the region—the United Nations—to mediate a solution. This weak response left many feeling cynical about the depth of ASEAN’s commitment to democracy, human rights, and good governance, commitments which in any case were watered down in the Charter’s final draft. Critics noted that rather than being a “landmark” document, the Charter was simply a codification of existing norms, particularly that of noninterference in another state’s affairs. What’s more, many prominent Southeast Asians called for Myanmar’s expulsion from ASEAN, exposing a sharpening contradiction in two of the Association’s key priorities: enhancing its international legitimacy and maintaining the Association’s unity.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has found itself in a similar type of conundrum, albeit with far less international attention. On the one hand, positive institutional developments include more attention to cooperation on non-traditional security areas such as counter-narcotics, disaster relief operations, cyber terrorism, money laundering, and infectious diseases. And while it is less institutionalized than ASEAN, notable recent reforms include the establishment of a Secretariat (within ASEAN), granting the ARF Chair greater powers of initiative, and setting up a Friends of the Chair mechanism. On the other
hand, it has also been heavily criticized in recent years for failing to address key security issues such as tensions on the Korean Peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits, and for failing to advance beyond confidence building multilateralism and toward preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. Skepticism about the ARF’s ability and/or willingness to reform is so pervasive that many experts have warned that it will likely be sidelined in the not too distant future.9

2) Competing Visions of Who Constitutes ‘The Region’

The APT and EAS represent two different visions of a regional future. Generally speaking, states that prefer the APT—China and some of the Southeast Asian states—see such multilateral organizations as a means of reinforcing the norm of noninterference in another state’s affairs. On the other hand, those who favor the EAS, such as Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand, embrace the notion of “principled multilateralism”: multilateralism that builds support for shared norms of democracy, rule of law, and good governance.10 It is by no means a given that these two bodies are competitors for regional support. The fact that they present alternative visions, however, suggests that a near-term focus of Asia Pacific multilateralism may be a jockeying for power between China and Japan, rather than a concerted effort to fortify these organization’s capacities for substantive action.

3) Multilateralism of Limited Geographic and Topical Scope

Sub-regional and ad hoc forms of multilateralism are not in and of themselves obstacles to a more robust broad-based Asia Pacific multilateralism. Indeed, a limited membership and narrow focus are generally considered precisely the factors that facilitate multilateral problem-solving. Concerns about them arise when their motives are open to misinterpretation by those outside the group (in the case of sub-regional groups), or when their operating norms do not accord with more widely accepted norms (in the case of some ad hoc groups).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a sub-regional grouping of China, Russia, and four of the five Central Asian states, has been a matter of much international interest. This is partly because of the increasing importance of Central Asia for the larger Asia Pacific, but also because it demonstrates Chinese leadership of a regional security mechanism. In the summer of 2007, the SCO held “Peace Mission 2007”, a joint military exercise involving 6,500 soldiers from all six member countries. While counter-terrorism cooperation was the exercise’s stated purpose, some observers suggest that an important secondary purpose is that it served as a deterrent for non-SCO states.11

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), another sub-regional grouping, comprises 16 Oceania states, including Australia and New Zealand. The PIF has put forth in recent years ambitious proposals related to its member countries’ profound development challenges, but its success has been hamstrung by insufficient resources and by the political whims of Fiji, which hosts the PIF Secretariat. Unlike the SCO, the PIF’s challenge is not that it arouses regional suspicions, but rather than it lacks the necessary support to accomplish its objectives.

The shift towards ad hoc multilateralism intensified after 9/11, when the U.S. in particular came to see coalitions of the willing as providing more timely and less institutionally
constrained functional responses to immediate security concerns. The U.S.-orchestrated Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which aims to prevent the international transport of WMD-related material, is one such example. PSI claims to have assembled over 70 cooperating partner states, but the terms of partnership have not been entirely transparent, and in any case, support for PSI is weak among many Asian states that are in fact serious proliferation concerns. The Six-Party Talks (6PT) process is generally considered to be a more positive example of ad hoc multilateralism. At the same time, its ultimate success in denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula has yet to be fully demonstrated.

THE CASE FOR AN ENHANCED AND EXPANDED ROLE FOR TRACK TWO
To reiterate an earlier point, the expanding inventory of regional institutions reflects a growing acknowledgement of the value of multilateralism. An appraisal of these institutions’ actual security-providing capacity, however, tells a very different story; official reluctance (deriving mostly from strict adherence to the noninterference norm) and a dearth of regional leadership have all limited the tangible benefits of security cooperation. An additional consensus has therefore begun to emerge that the institutional reform and revitalization process must be even more vigorous, and that new institutions may have to be created if multilateralism is to be given any chance to work to the region’s maximum benefit.

Track Two organizations are especially well suited to stimulate and facilitate these processes. Their meetings serve as focal points for expert and innovative thinking. This thinking can be channeled into generating “trial balloon” policy proposals for consideration at the Track One level. The informal nature of their meetings, moreover, also allows for consultation with Track Three actors, namely, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In recent years, the lack of attention to civil society has been a growing point of contention, particularly among increasingly well-organized Southeast Asian civil society groups. And finally, Track Two can lead by example; when progress in discussions reaches an impasse, the parties can continue to find points of common interest and to press ahead in working through obstacles to cooperation.

Track Two initiatives have been somewhat of a growth industry since 2001, a trend that stands in sharp contrast to a decline in Track Two activity throughout the 1990s. Various factors have contributed to this increase in the recent years: the urgency of non-traditional security issues, the increased engagement of China in regional affairs, the impact of ASEAN and APT initiatives, and the perceived need to promote trans-regional and trans-cultural dialogue in the charged atmosphere of the ‘War on Terrorism’. However, two factors have limited the effectiveness of these processes. First, the expanding number of forums and dialogue processes has not been matched by a corresponding impact at the Track One level (See Chart x). Currently, only about one-third of Track Two meetings are linked with a specific Track One dialogue or institution. Second, many of these groups, at least those with widely inclusive memberships, have tended to self-circumscribe in a pattern reflective of what has happened at the Track One level. The CSCAP organization provides a case in point.

The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
CSCAP is the Asia Pacific’s most inclusive Track Two institution, with 21 national members and one observer (see Map 1). It is also one of the few Track Two organizations tied to a specific Track One organization, the ARF. Like ASEAN and the ARF, CSCAP has engaged in a process of self-reinvention as a way to retain its relevance and effectiveness. A cornerstone of this self-reinvention has been the reorientation of its Study Groups—the primary nodes through which the organization conducts its substantive work—in order to be more topically-focused and policy-relevant. This reorientation has yielded some notable examples of success: experts’ workshops focused
MEMBERS:
- Australia
- Brunei
- Canada
- Cambodia
- China
- Europe
- India
- Indonesia
- Japan
- DPR Korea
- Republic of Korea
- Malaysia
- Mongolia
- New Zealand
- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Russia
- Singapore
- Thailand
- United States
- Vietnam
- Pacific Islands Forum (Observer)

CSCAP MEMBER COMMITTEES

CSCAP Member
## INVENTORY OF CSCAP STUDY GROUP MEETINGS SINCE JUNE 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STUDY GROUP</th>
<th>STATUS</th>
<th>CO-CHAIRS</th>
<th>MEETINGS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Implications of Climate Change</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Australia Malaysia Philippines</td>
<td>TBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral Security Governance for Northeast Asia*</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>China Japan South Korea United States</td>
<td>October 2006, Berkeley, CA (USA) April 2006, Beijing, China October 2005, Seoul, South Korea April 2005, Tokyo, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Security</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>India Singapore</td>
<td>September 2007, Goa, India April 2007, Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy</td>
<td>Concluded</td>
<td>Singapore United States</td>
<td>October 2007, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>Concluded</td>
<td>Australia Indonesia New Zealand PNG Philippines Thailand</td>
<td>April 2007, Wellington, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Peacekeeping and Peace-building</td>
<td>Concluded</td>
<td>Canada Indonesia</td>
<td>December 2006, Delhi, India March 2006, Vancouver, Canada February 2005, Bali, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Terrorism</td>
<td>Concluded</td>
<td>Malaysia New Zealand Thailand</td>
<td>August 2005, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia April 2005, Bangkok, Thailand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXPERTS GROUPS**

**Export Controls**
(Sub-Group of Countering Proliferation of WMD Study Group)
Active
Korea (ROK) United States
February 2007, Tokyo, Japan May 2006, Beijing, China November 2005, Tokyo, Japan

**Malacca & Singapore Straits**
(Sub-group of Maritime Cooperation)
Concluded
Australia India Indonesia
September 2007, Jakarta, Indonesia

**Legal Experts**
(Sub-group of Maritime Cooperation)
Concluded
Canada New Zealand Singapore
March 2006, Phuket, Thailand

*The Multilateral Security Governance for Northeast Asia Study Group is a continuation of the Multilateral Security Frameworks for Northeast Asia Study Group, which temporarily suspended its activities in December 2006.*
on harmonizing export controls of dual-purpose technologies, memoranda on maritime cooperation protocols, studies on developing regional peacekeeping capacity, and consultations with the ARF on the concept and principles of preventive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{16}

Despite these accomplishments, several long-standing CSCAP members have warned that the organization risks falling into the same trap as ASEAN and the ARF. In a December 2006 memo, Ambassador Barry Desker highlighted what he felt were three troubling developments within CSCAP\textsuperscript{17}:

1) **Governments are increasingly driving the process.**
   The participation of government officials, both active and retired, has long been considered a major asset in CSCAP meetings. These participants can provide a valuable ‘insider’s perspective’. But the value of their participation has always been premised on the assumption that they act in an unofficial capacity, thereby allowing them to focus first and foremost on solving pressing policy issues. Instead, many of these participants are acting as mouthpieces for their governments. This essentially defeats the purpose of Track Two dialogue, which is to consider security issues through alternative lenses. Rather than simply echoing established positions of the Track One level, Track Two should be out in front of it, considering possible avenues of cooperation that are not currently being taken up by the region’s governments.\textsuperscript{“Rather than simply echoing established positions of the Track One level, Track Two should be out in front of it, considering possible avenues of cooperation that are not currently being taken up by the region’s governments.”}

2) **Outputs are not always suitably tailored to their intended audience.** Academic experts undoubtedly raise the intellectual quality of Study Group and General Conference discussions. Nevertheless, their use of scholarly language to draft meeting reports is not an appropriate format for their target audience of regional policy makers. Policy making communities are stretched thin in terms of the amount of time they can devote to any single issue area. CSCAP Study Group reports should therefore be brief and straightforward presentations of the most relevant insights and recommendations.

3) **Substantive activities risk losing their cutting edge nature.** CSCAP Study Groups have made impressive contributions to understanding policy options for issues such as the North Korean nuclear crisis and maritime security. Other Study Groups have drawn much needed attention to non-traditional security issues such as human trafficking. There is an emerging tendency, however, for CSCAP’s substantive activities to focus more heavily on some issues to the neglect of others. And many CSCAP discussions have taken on the tone of “UN-style debates” in which the same set of issues are rehashed, and predictable positions re-iterated, with the end result of not breaking important new ground in forging stronger and more effective multilateral cooperation.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

**For Track One:**

1. Encourage regional leadership by the US and others to promote the norms and capacities of regionally-inclusive (trans-Pacific) institutions.
2. Institutional collaboration across regional boundaries should be a matter of practice rather than merely a matter of discussion. This includes collaboration between core regional institutions, such as ASEAN and the ARF, and sub-regional groups such as the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), the SCO, and the PIF (see Chapters 8 and 9).
3. Seize the opportunity provided by the Six-Party Talks to explore possibilities for setting up a Northeast Asian security forum (see Chapter 2).
4. Take the necessary steps to make coordination of Track 1 and Track 2 processes more effective, and ensure that the agendas at both levels pay greater attention to civil society and human security concerns.
5. Turn rhetoric about multilateral responses to non-traditional security threats into realities (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6).

**For CSCAP (and other Track Two organizations)\textsuperscript{18}**:

1. Seek stronger and more regularized linkages with Track One counterparts, including with specialized meetings within the ARF.
2. Engage selected Track Three (civil society and NGOs) to share experiences and articulate concerns about particular issues.
3. Be willing to take on intra-state and other sensitive
**CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2003</td>
<td>The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led ad hoc multilateral group, holds its first meeting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2004</td>
<td>Regional states, with U.S. naval support, orchestrate a major multilateral humanitarian response after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean hits 12 countries, including Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Myanmar, and India.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2006</td>
<td>The joint EU-ASEAN Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) completes its mandate of monitoring and supporting the peace process between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2006</td>
<td>Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia agree to formalize coordinated anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Strait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2007</td>
<td>The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) marks its 40th anniversary. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) holds “Peace Mission 2007”, this security organization’s largest joint military exercise to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>The U.S., India, Australia, Japan and Singapore conduct Malabar 07-02, a joint naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>The 2nd Phase of the 6th Round of the Six-Party Talks results in North Korea agreeing to the “disablement” of its nuclear facilities and to the declaration of all its nuclear programs by the end of 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2007</td>
<td>ASEAN Foreign Ministers express “revulsion” over reports that the Myanmar government used violent force to suppress demonstrations in Yangon. They also supported the involvement of the Ibrahim Gambari as the UN’s Special Envoy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>The ASEAN Charter is unveiled, effectively establishing ASEAN’s ‘legal personality’.</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 2007</td>
<td>The East Asia Summit holds its third annual meeting in Singapore. The first and second meetings were held in December 2005 and January 2007.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>CSCAP holds its biennial General Conference, the sixth such gathering that convenes government, expert, and civil society stakeholders to discuss security and multilateralism in the Asia Pacific.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

issues. Simply ignoring them will not lessen their regional impact, and Track Two processes could contribute a lot to understanding how multilateralism could help to resolve some of these issues.

**About the Authors**

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11. Stanley Foundation and CSIS, “Building an Open and Inclusive Regional Architecture for Asia.”


15 Avery Poole and Nadine Harris, “Research Note: Accounting for Post-2000 Trends in Asia-Pacific Track II Activities,” Vancouver, Canada, Centre of International Relations, October 30, 2007.

16 The ARF has consulted with CSCAP on two occasions concerning Preventive Diplomacy (PD), first in 2001, and more recently at the October 2007 meeting of Inter-Sessional Support Group on PD.

17 Barry Desker, “CSCAP: Beyond the First Decade,” Memo Circulated to the 26th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting, Wellington, New Zealand, December 14, 2006.

18 These are based on the recommendations of the Desker Memo.
Northeast Asia has been an intractable environment for multilateral security cooperation, despite that region’s multiple sites of inter-state tension. While the North Korean nuclear crisis has been the nexus of these tensions, more broadly, regional tensions are fed by nationalistic rhetoric and confrontational policies which sustain territorial and historical disputes. The resulting crisis mentality among Northeast Asian states is especially troubling given that all of the region’s major powers either have nuclear weapons or rely on an extended nuclear deterrent.

Efforts to mitigate these tensions, specifically by constructing a security architecture around the Korean Peninsula, have thus far failed. The US’s forward presence and its bilateral alliances with Japan and South Korea have been the keystones of this security architecture. But despite their concerns that this US-centered arrangement is woefully inadequate, Northeast Asian states have not been able to generate lasting sub-regional mechanisms on their own. They have also looked to dialogue within ASEAN-driven regional institutional forums, but have found this option similarly lacking. In the end, as one scholar recently noted that “it is difficult to think of an area of such size and significance [as Northeast Asia] that is more bereft of multilateral institutions.”

The Six-Party Talks (6PT), the successor to the Four-Party Talks, has made some progress as a crisis management approach to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Inter-Korean dialogue process has also made some notable achievements. But can these two processes suffice in building a broader Northeast Asian peace and stability?

It is becoming more and more apparent that the region’s actors should not simply detach and focus on the at the expense of ignoring the wider context of Northeast Asian relations. Even if the nuclear issue can be resolved smoothly, other pressing regional security concerns will remain. These include the need to improve North Korea’s relations with the U.S. and Japan, and the need for dialogue among the region’s largest powers—China, Japan, and the U.S. Consequently, there has been a growing chorus of voices calling for either the creation of a new Northeast Asian security mechanism, or for the transformation of existing multilateral forums into a more enduring and comprehensive body. While the inter-Korean process is indispensable for resolving Peninsular security issues, other Northeast Asian states need a dialogue mechanism for addressing issues that are separate from the North Korean security issue. In brief, there is a larger stake in moving beyond crisis management and towards a more comprehensive and durable solution.

THE SIX-PARTY TALKS (6PT) PROCESS

The 6PT process, with its array of official and unofficial initiatives to resolve stalemates and vet new initiatives, has fallen into a pattern of ‘two steps forward, one step backward’. In spite of this pattern, the parties to the Talks have achieved ‘breakthroughs’, thanks in large part to shifting U.S. and North Korean attitudes and policies. Two such breakthroughs are notable. The first is the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement, in which North Korea agreed to give up its nuclear weapons program and re-join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the U.S. stated that it had no intention of attacking North Korea. The more
recent is the February 13, 2007 Agreement, in which North Korea agreed to shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor in exchange for fuel aid (with more aid dependent upon verification of the site’s disablement), and the U.S. pledged to begin the process of normalizing its relations with Pyongyang.

Although the 6PT are still on track, key challenges remain, such as improving North Korean-Japan and inter-Korean relations. The most recent development also illustrates just how easily positive momentum can be derailed; after several months of moving toward a “disablement” of North Korea’s three nuclear facilities, the Talks hit yet another roadblock in January 2008 when Pyongyang missed the deadline to declare all of its nuclear activities.

**INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS**

Over the long-term, the improvement of inter-Korean relations is clearly the most fundamental part of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula. The interests and dynamics that drive the inter-Korean relationship have become increasingly distinct from those of the region’s major powers. Whereas the other members of the 6PT are focused almost exclusively on the North Korean nuclear concern, inter-Korean strategic priorities extend well beyond that to include a desire for social and cultural linkages, including arrangement visits between families on both sides of the border. In addition, for the South, there is a strong imperative to promote the North’s economic development. Seoul’s humanitarian assistance to North Korea has been fairly consistent, despite brief interruptions to sanction the North’s provocative actions. Lee Myung-bak, the South’s newly elected president, however, is expected to hold the North to a tougher burden of proof with respect to its humanitarian aid.

At the October 2007 inter-Korean summit, Kim Jong Il and (then President) Roh Moo-Hyun agreed to work together towards “a permanent peace regime” and to consider military confidence building measures. However, there were no articulated linkages between these relationships and 6PT progress. The US, China, Japan and Russia must recognize and respect these agreements and arrangements as advancing inter-Korean peace and stability, and as providing an essential foundation for a larger multilateral security framework.

**A NORTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE**

The regional chorus calling for the establishment of a multilateral mechanism that addresses both the Korean Peninsula and other regional security priorities has recently been growing louder. This idea has been endorsed officially and/or unofficially by all other members of the 6PT. At the 13th ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that there was a need for “robust dialogue on Northeast Asian security.” And in October 2007, Christopher Hill, head of the U.S.’s delegation to the 6PT, proposed the creation of a Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism, which he said could be similar to ASEAN.

Similar suggestions are being voiced by experts on Northeast Asian security. In April 2007, the Atlantic Council convened a group of such experts to consider the question of what the appropriate framework might be for Northeast Asian—specifically Korean Peninsula—peace and security. The group authored a working paper that outlined the following five components that would be a required part of such a settlement. These components are:

- A Denuclearization Agreement must account for North Korea’s existing nuclear weapons and must establish protocols to ensure the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs;
- A Four Party Agreement (among China, the United States, North Korea and South Korea) that provides mutual security obligations and guarantees and establishes stable North-South boundaries should replace the 1953 Armistice;

**SIX-PARTY TALKS WORKING GROUPS**

As part of the February 13, 2007 Agreement, all members of the Six-Party Talks agreed to establish Working Groups to consider and formulate specific plans for implementing the September 2005 Joint Statement. The Working Groups will focus on:

1. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula
2. Normalization of North Korean-U.S. relations
3. Normalization of North Korean-Japanese relations
4. Economy and Energy Cooperation
5. Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism
There must be a US-North Korea Bilateral Agreement for diplomatic normalization and the establishment of trade relations;

There must be a Trilateral Agreement among the US, South Korea and North Korea on military confidence building measures and force dispositions; and

There should be an Agreement on a Regional Multilateral Organization for Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia. The multilateral security and cooperation forum that would result from this agreement “would significantly assist in developing a regional security community which could mitigate tensions, resolve disputes and engender all-important ‘habits of cooperation’. By fostering communication, promoting common interests and creating greater transparency, a multilateral forum would help manage inevitable crises and lessen the chance of military confrontation.”

Given this principled support for such a security architecture, how should the region proceed in building it? Will successful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through the 6PT be a prerequisite to moving toward a multilateral security mechanism? And given that bilateral relationships will remain a critical piece of this architecture, what should be the appropriate mix of bilateral and multilateral arrangements? Can existing Asia Pacific institutions accept this mandate or even provide building blocks? What is the role for Track Two and Track 1.5 processes?

THE SIX PARTY TALKS AND BEYOND

With North Korean denuclearization seemingly on the horizon, expanding the 6PT into an institutionalized framework for managing the Korean Peninsula’s long-term transformation is increasingly being vetted in official and unofficial (Track Two) settings. The logic is compelling in terms of the practical implementation requirements and as insurance against the process’s potential derailment. Participants in one recent Track Two meeting also noted...
that the 6PT has built up a track record of generating legitimacy for Northeast Asian diplomatic ententes and faith in the process itself.\(^6\)

Some have cautioned, however, that these developments should not get ahead of the 6PT, presumably to keep attention and pressure focused on the nuclear issue. This appears to be the U.S.’s official position.\(^7\) Others, sensing the urgency of establishing a stable Northeast Asian multilateral framework, have called for immediate discussions among a broad range of government, international institution, NGO, and expert stakeholders.\(^8\)

A critical question is who should be included in a post-6PT regional mechanism. Should its institutional footprint encompass the ‘North Pacific’ thus bringing on board Canada and Mongolia? Should it extend to other regional countries with significant interests in Northeast Asia, such as Australia, as Christopher Hill recently suggested? For its part, South Korea has favored developing a ‘Six Plus’ arrangement, understandably seeking like-minded parties so as to avoid isolation in a forum dominated by major powers.

**EXISTING REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

Asia Pacific regional institutions provide little footing for a Northeast Asian security mechanism. As East Asia’s only official region-wide multilateral security mechanism, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has a broad mandate and wide membership. But it has played no appreciable role in helping to resolve Northeast Asia’s security crises. While most Asian countries, including China, are satisfied with the ARF as a dialogue mechanism, significant organizational changes would be required to transform it into a more robust institution. ASEAN’s leadership by itself has been insufficient. Yet the conundrum is that it is only within the broad but weakly institutionalized ARF “umbrella” that Northeast Asian states are brought into an inclusive multilateral setting.

While APEC has been adopting more and more of a security agenda, it remains fundamentally an economic dialogue body with a “trans-Pacific” mentality. And while Chinese leaders characterize the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) as “the major channel for Asian regional cooperation”, there is little indication that any of the “Plus Three”—China, Japan, or South Korea—regard it as an appropriate institutional vehicle for resolving Northeast Asia’s traditional security issues.\(^9\)

**A FIVE-PARTY PROCESS?**

One of the pitfalls of focusing on the 6PT as the foundation of a future peace and security mechanism for Northeast Asian security cooperation to a halt, the remaining five powers should consider proceeding with a ‘Five-Party’ process, in which North Korean nuclear and missile issues could still be discussed, but so too could issues such as terrorism, energy and environmental security, maritime borders and sea lanes of communication, and military transparency. In short, Northeast Asian security cooperation need not be the hostage of North Korea. Although at an earlier point China would have likely been opposed to this, after North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test, its position shifted and China became more willing than before to join the other four parties in participating in a five-party multilateral security mechanism.

**BILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL MECHANISMS: A TRILATERAL INITIATIVE?**

US-Japanese, Sino-US, and Sino-Japanese bilateral relationships will be a critical part of a regional security framework. But bilateral mechanisms alone will not satisfy national goals or regional problems. They also tend to lead to misunderstandings and suspicions about third parties. Today, the US-Japan relationship remains strong, the post-9/11 Sino-US relationship has also been positive, and the Sino-Japanese relationship, while tenuous at times, has shown recent improvement. Nevertheless, none of these bilateral relationships are adequate in dealing with regional matters such as the North Korean nuclear issue.

To ensure that rapid and dynamic changes in China, Japan, and the rest of Asia promote peace and stability, the US, China, and Japan need a stable, long-term mechanism for managing their relationships and regional issues. One prominent US scholar commented: “Multilateralism clearly helps defuse nationalism, which lies at the heart of Sino-Japanese tensions, by blurring zero-sum bilateral rivalries. Given both rising strategic dangers and political uncertainties— involving Japan and China, while transcending them—a broad Northeast Asia Strategic Dialogue is very much needed.”\(^10\)
TRACK TWO’S POSITIVE TRACK RECORD

Throughout the 1990s, Track Two processes played an important role in confidence building, socialization, and promoting official security cooperation initiatives such as the ARF. Key among them was the CSCAP North Pacific Working Group, which for several years was the only inclusive security dialogue in operation. As the nuclear issue came to preoccupy regional attention, these Track Two efforts lost momentum. At the same time, forums devoted to non-traditional and human security issues have been increasing. Of particular note is the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a Track 1.5 initiative established in 1993 to bring together officials and civilian experts in their institutional roles. The NEACD has functioned in parallel with the 4+2 and 6 party official processes, but never reached the necessary level of regional acceptance and thus failed to develop into viable official level talks.

CSCAP will also revisit the question of how best to approach building peace and security in Northeast Asia. A recently proposed Study Group will consider how to create de facto security multilateralism, not by forming a single multilateral institution, as many others have proposed, but by more effectively linking and coordinating the various bilateral, multilateral, regional and global institutions. The rationale, according to the Study Group’s proponents, is that because Northeast Asian security issues extend well beyond the North Korean nuclear issue, each of these issues will require a different composition of participants and different commitments.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

- Planning a Northeast Asian security mechanism should not be contingent upon the success of the Six-Party Talks. Incremental implementation of a multilateral framework for economic, social, and security cooperation and development will enhance rather than undermine the 6PT process.
- Membership in this security mechanism should extend to extra-regional states that are engaged and could make a potential contribution to Northeast Asian security. This may include the US, Canada, Mongolia and possibly Australia.
- The financial and human resources of international financial institutions, major donor states, and key NGOs will all be required to facilitate a smooth transition on the Korean Peninsula. These actors should be jointly engaged in any planning process.
Track Two processes can play a key role in motivating regional security cooperation and institutionalization. National and international foundations and think-tanks have become particularly active. CSCAP should take advantage of its regional scope and build upon its earlier record of positive contributions to regional security dialogue. In particular, it should focus its attention to issues concerning Northeast Asian security architecture.

About the Author
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1 This chapter considers Northeast Asia as a “security complex” including North and South Korea, China and the Taiwan Straits, Japan, Russia and the United States.
5 The Atlantic Council: 25.
7 Ker and Filmon.
11 See Dialogue and Research Monitor, ttp://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/.
Coming to Terms with a Nuclearizing Asia:
Restoring and Reorienting the Non-Proliferation Regime

C. Raja Mohan

Although Asia was marginal to the global debate on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the first nuclear age, it has become a critical factor in the evolution of the “second nuclear age”. Not only is Asia the principal theatre of WMD politics in the 21st century, but it could emerge as the very pivot of a new global nuclear balance. Concerns about a Pakistan-centered nuclear black market, the July 2005 U.S.- India civil nuclear initiative, the North Korean nuclear tests of October 2006, and the plans across the region for expanded use of civilian atomic energy have altered Asia's nuclear landscape. Meanwhile, the U.S. promotion of missile defense, counter-proliferation, and promotion of civilian atomic energy has begun to redefine the global template of arms control and has compelled Asia to adapt to the new elements of the evolving non-proliferation regime.

To better understand the unfolding nuclear dynamic, we must look beyond the traditional presentation of Asian nuclear developments as a “deviation” from the “non-proliferation norm”, the temptation to see them in separate sub-regional compartments, and attempts to explain them in terms of a uniquely dangerous “Asian nationalism”. Instead of focusing on a presumed “Asian strategic culture”, we must focus instead on the rapid expansion of Asia’s military and civilian nuclear capabilities in terms of the changing distribution of power on the continent. Three dimensions of the unfolding nuclear dynamic in Asia are noteworthy:

1) **The relationship between nuclear spread and regional balance of power.** Much of the literature focuses too narrowly on the danger of horizontal spread of nuclear weapons in Asia. Factoring the changing balance of power and the vertical proliferation of existing nuclear arsenals, however, are equally important in assessing the changing structure of Asia’s WMD politics.

2) **The relationship between Asia and the changing global non-proliferation order, specifically the importance of accommodating rising Asian powers as partners in the management of the non-proliferation regime.** Asian powers must take more responsibility for writing and implementing the rules of a new nuclear order. Asia’s regional organizations, moreover, can no longer insulate themselves from the broader nuclear dynamic by embracing simplistic notions like “nuclear weapon free zones”. They will have to consider more active arms control measures.

3) **The need to create of new Asian institutions to manage the expanded use of civilian nuclear energy in Asia.** This would necessarily involve a voluntary abstinence from the development of closed nuclear fuel cycles, a right theoretically provided under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Asian states and institutions should focus on building regional fuel cycle centers and negotiating cooperative regional arrangements for the safe and secure use of nuclear energy in the region.

**ASIA IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE**

The concept of a “second nuclear age” captures many of the fundamental post-Cold War changes in global nuclear politics. In his insightful examination of the structure of the second nuclear age, Paul Bracken identified “Asian roots” as a factor that distinguished it from the first nuclear age. Other factors that define the second nuclear age, according to Bracken, are the multiplicity of players in the new nuclear game (as opposed to the two-power game in the first nuclear age), the special role of the state, the constraints posed by the extant nuclear order, the inability of new nuclear players to build costly command and control...
systems, and the “second mover advantage” that reduces the burden of reinventing the wheel. To that list of factors we could also add the rise of non-state actors and the renewed importance of civilian nuclear power in addressing the energy security requirements of major powers and the consequent difficulties of building a firewall between peaceful and military uses of the atom.

Bracken rightly emphasizes that the dramatic expansion of Asian military capabilities, including weapons of mass destruction, is part of a historic change in the global distribution of power. He also captures, if unwittingly, the Western strategic community’s difficulties in coming to terms with the unfolding structural change. In a reflection of enduring ethnocentrism in the West, Bracken insists that the “nationalism” driving Asia’s nuclear spread is “ludicrous and dangerous” and juxtaposes it against the Soviet-American nuclear rivalry, which he interpreted as a consequence of philosophical differences over the implementation of their shared “enlightenment” project.

Nationalism was certainly an important factor, however, in the nuclearization of Britain and France, both of which were looking to preserve their prestige in the post-War period. Nor was nationalism absent in the nuclear policies of Moscow and Washington. Indeed, nationalism remains an enduring factor in the current Russian emphasis on nuclear weapons. Bracken’s argument that nationalism drives Asian states into “absurd behavior and strange decisions” applies equally well to the United States; the U.S. debate on the “missile gap” at the turn of the 1960s and the surreal deliberations on the “window of vulnerability” at the turn of the 1980s are cases in point.

Bracken’s argument that the use of nuclear weapons is “shaped by strategic culture” and that the “Asian versus Western cultural divide is important” is equally problematic. Asian nuclear behavior is driven more by power politics than it is by a presumed “Asian strategic culture”. While national peculiarities and cultural specificities matter in Asian security discourses, much of their nuclear behavior has in fact involved rational choices. China’s search for a national nuclear deterrent, for example, was driven by its sense of destiny in the world, and more importantly by the need to redress the military imbalance with Washington and Moscow.

Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons was not a response to India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, but a failure of the regional balance of power system to protect its territorial integrity in 1971. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that Pakistan’s nuclear program was driven less by India’s 1974 nuclear test than it was by New Delhi’s vivisection of Pakistan. As India, backed by the Soviet Union, divided Pakistan, the U.S. and China failed to stand up for their ally in Islamabad. Arguing that a non-nuclear Pakistan might never be secure against India’s superior conventional power, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ordered a crash program to build nuclear weapons in early 1972. It did not really matter to Pakistan whether India had nuclear weapons or not; Pakistan believed it needed them to balance India and to preserve its nationhood. Considerations of balance of power (against India) were also part of China’s active assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program in

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**ASIA’S NUCLEAR POWER reactors as of October 17, 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Operating</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Proposing</th>
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<td>India</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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the 1970s and 1980s and the missile development program in the 1990s. It was an interest in balancing the Soviet Union, finally, that made the U.S. turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclearization in the 1980s.

India’s 1974 nuclear test was in many ways a delayed response to China’s nuclear weapons program, which was signaled by its first nuclear test in 1964. Yet a noteworthy feature of India’s nuclear policy was its reluctance to weaponize its option despite the 1974 test. This may have been related to India’s security alliance with the Soviet Union, which was unveiled in the 1971 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Cooperation. The Treaty gave India confidence that a balance against the U.S. strategic cooperation with China and Pakistan had been established. The strong economic, military and political partnership with Moscow reduced India’s incentive to acquire its own nuclear weapons, despite the fact that China, its rival in Asia and the Third World, was a fully recognized nuclear weapons power. It was only after the Soviet Union collapsed, the Cold War ended, and global balance shattered, that pressures on India to exercise its nuclear weapon option mounted. India was thus compelled to recast its strategic framework after it lost its only international ally and the major source of its military equipment, was confronted with a rising China, and was unable to build a new partnership with the sole superpower. Its decision to become an overt nuclear weapon power in 1998 was thus a consequence of the fundamental change in the balance of power around India.

For North Korea, the acceleration of its nuclear weapons program, which culminated in its October 2006 nuclear test, could also be attributed to East Asia’s changing balance of power and the imperative of regime survival. Pyongyang’s withdrawal from the NPT was a response to seeing Seoul draw closer to Moscow and Beijing, and to concerns about its own survival as a state.

**ASIA’S NUCLEAR SPREAD**

Issues relating to the distribution of power remain a major source of further nuclear spread—both horizontal and vertical—in Asia. First, it was no accident that India named the threat of a rising China as the justification for its May 1998 nuclear tests.2 India’s rise was also an unstated but equally important factor in the Bush Administration’s decision seven years later to resume civilian nuclear cooperation with India despite New Delhi’s refusal to abandon its nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration tried to explain its India initiative in terms of energy security and the gains for the non-proliferation regime, but Washington’s willingness to invest enormous political capital in changing the domestic non-proliferation law and global nuclear rules in New Delhi’s favor must be seen as part of the proclaimed desire of the U.S. to “assist” India’s rise as a power. (The nuclear deal has encountered significant obstacles in recent months due to domestic political opposition in India, leaving the agreement’s future uncertain.)

Second, corresponding to its status as an emerging global power, China’s nuclear doctrine has begun to evolve away from minimum deterrence.3 As China improves the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal, New Delhi will want to prevent the nuclear gap between itself and Beijing from widening. Not surprisingly, India has ruled out a freeze on its capacity to produce nuclear

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**THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)**

“The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty’s significance.” (http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html)

Five NPT members currently have nuclear weapons: the United States, China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France. The four nations that are not signatories to the NPT are India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea. India and Pakistan have openly declared and tested their nuclear weapons, while Israel has been ambiguous about its nuclear capabilities. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. According to the September 2005 Agreement, reached through the Six-Party Talks process, North Korea will return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards, provided the Talks remain on their current course.
weapons in its recent agreements with the U.S. While the rest of the world sees India's nuclear arsenal merely in terms of its rivalry with Pakistan, for India itself, nuclear equivalence with China is an important national strategic priority.

Third, the expansion of Asia's nuclear arsenals would increasingly involve the maritime environment. Both Beijing and New Delhi recognize that the credibility of their deterrent ultimately rests on developing an effective sea-based nuclear deterrent. Although India is quite far behind China in deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the development of such a capability remains one of India's important long-term strategic goals. Meanwhile China, India and Pakistan are making advances in developing sea-launched cruise missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear weapons. India also has plans to emulate China in the acquisition of nuclear powered submarines. This includes leasing two “Akola” class nuclear submarines from Russia, as well as building its own. The new emphasis on sea-based nuclear weapons will increase China's and India's incentives to seek a variety of access arrangements far from their shores and to build nuclear related infrastructure around the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific littoral.

Fourth, despite Chinese protests, the U.S. and its allies, especially Japan and Australia, are moving ahead with plans to deploy missile defense systems in Asia. India, initially ambivalent about missile defenses, conducted its first test of a missile defense interceptor in November 2006. It is also stepping up cooperation with Israel and intensifying dialogue with the U.S. on missile defense. The international debate on missile defense has focused on the potential for an offense-defense arms race in nuclear and space weapons. Yet recent developments, especially the Chinese test of an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007, point to an entirely different kind of a space race.

Fifth, the idea of additional nuclear powers in Asia following the North Korea's threats of nuclearization has been debated over the years. That Tokyo, Seoul and Taipei have long had significant nuclear interests, capabilities and motivations is not really questioned. But responses throughout the region are likely to vary. Since the October 2006 North Korean nuclear tests, the nuclear debate in Japan has become more explicit. While the broad consensus is against the acquisition of nuclear arms, the principal factor remains the credibility of the extended deterrence and the centrality of its alliance with the U.S. South Korea's response to nuclear spread in the region, especially in North Korea, is likely to be more ambiguous. That Seoul was actively seeking a nuclear option in the 1970s might be less important than the unpredictable direction in which Korean nationalism might evolve in the coming years. In general, however, political constraints against further nuclearization of East Asia remain strong.

Sixth, contrary to the non-proliferation literature that is resigned to a slow but steady expansion in the number of nuclear weapon powers, history is also dotted with examples of nations that have “denuclearized”. South Africa in the early 1990s and more recently Libya are both notable examples. There is also a major diplomatic effort underway to denuclearize North Korea and bring its nuclear facilities under international control. If the argument that nuclear weapons are not necessarily an end in themselves for the so-called “rogue states”, it stands to reason that security assurances and other political incentives could help roll back some of these arsenals. While the jury is out on the North Korean case, the hopes for an eventual denuclearization have never been as high as they are currently in late 2007.

The prospect for denuclearization is not entirely absent in the case of Pakistan. Conventional wisdom suggests that Pakistan's nuclear weapon program is irreversible and deeply embedded in the structure of its rivalry with India. That raises the question of whether reconciliation between the two, amidst a rather hopeful peace process since 2004 involving a settlement of the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, would reduce the political salience of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. Equally important are

'Issues relating to the distribution of power remain a major source of further nuclear spread—both horizontal and vertical—in Asia.'

Beijing's test marks more than simply a reversal of its own long-standing position against space weapons; It underscres a new Chinese emphasis on developing a “counter-space” strategy that challenges U.S. supremacy in outer space, a supremacy which has become critical for the U.S.'s conventional and nuclear superiority. The U.S., in turn, is likely to accelerate the development and deployment of its own space weapons. Other Asian powers such as Japan and India have also focused more and more on military uses of outer space. The new relevance of outer space as an adjunct to the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the Asia Pacific's major powers would also involve building technical support facilities in far flung areas and would reinforce the imperatives for forward military presence.
the possible U.S. responses to the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of jihadi groups given Pakistan’s current political instability. While it is by no means certain that the crisis will culminate in state “failure”, the Bush Administration since 9/11 has talked of “securing” Pakistani nuclear assets from extremist forces.\textsuperscript{5}

**NUCLEAR ENERGY AND ASIA**

As Asian governments come under pressure to consider alternative energy sources to hydrocarbon fuels, nuclear power has acquired increasing political and economic traction. In its Cebu declaration on energy security in February 2007, the Second East Asia Summit (EAS) recognized that “that renewable energy and nuclear power will represent an increasing share of global supply”. The EAS also highlighted the urgency of reducing the “dependence on conventional fuels through intensified energy efficiency and conservation programs, hydropower, expansion of renewable energy systems and bio-fuel production/utilization, and for interested parties, civilian nuclear power”.

The insertion of the phrase “for interested parties” before “civilian nuclear power” in the Cebu declaration is a clear indication that not all of the 16 nations in the EAS process are persuaded by the case for expanded use of atomic power generation. Not only has nuclear power varied in the emphasis it is given in different national energy strategies, but it also generates deeply divisive debates within several of them. The expansion of nuclear energy use has generated several concerns at both the popular and official levels: the potential for accidents, such as the July 2007 leak in Kashiwazaki (Japan), the world’s largest nuclear energy plant; the dangers of material and technology leaks to terrorists and other non-state groups; and the necessity of building and reinforcing ‘firewalls’ between civilian and nuclear power use. Amidst the nuclear confrontation with Iran, the U.S. and many European countries believe non-nuclear states can no longer be allowed to develop full nuclear fuel cycles in the name of peaceful use. They insist that critical parts of the fuel cycle, such as enrichment and reprocessing, should now be explicitly barred. At the same time, they promise to provide reliable assurances on the supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful programs. A long-standing proposal has been the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank, run by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to monitor and manage civilian nuclear fuel use. Such an initiative, however, is hampered by a lack of big power leadership.\textsuperscript{6}

As of May 2007, Japan operates 55 nuclear power reactors with an electric power generation capacity of 47,587 Mew, 30 per cent of its total electric power generation. South Korea has 20 reactors with total capacity of 17,454 Mew. Its share of electric power generation stands at 38 per cent. China, a late starter in us nuclear energy for commercial purposes, has unveiled in recent years a massive plan for generating atomic electricity. It hopes to build 40,000 Mew of nuclear generation capacity by the

### THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR ENERGY PARTNERSHIP (GNEP)

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) is U.S.-led initiative that is to provide the world with a reliable nuclear energy supply. The key selling points of the GNEP are the safe and secure storage of spent nuclear fuel and taking steps to minimize the risks of proliferation. A condition of GNEP membership is the processing and disposal of spent fuel from other states. The U.S., China, Russia, France, and Japan have all agreed to this condition. However, Canada and Australia, which together produce half the world’s uranium exports, have not. Australia joined the GNEP in 2007, but sought a special deal to exempt it from accepting other states’ nuclear waste. Canada has ‘observer’ status in the GNEP, but has so far opted not to become a full member.

**GNEP Partners**

(As of September 16, 2007)

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\textsuperscript{5} The new relevance of outer space as an adjunct to the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the Asia Pacific’s major powers would also involve building technical support facilities in far flung areas and would reinforce the imperatives for forward military presence.
year 2020. Nuclear energy has become a crucial component of China’s energy security strategy.

The rest of the Asia Pacific region had tended to keep away from nuclear power. That dynamic now appears to be changing, with several regional countries hoping to develop civilian nuclear power programs. Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand, among others, have announced plans of varying intensity and commitment to the greater use of nuclear power generation in the coming years. The political case for adopting nuclear power has been contested especially in Indonesia by civil society groups. Many observers suspect that Burma’s somewhat unexpected interest in building nuclear research capability may have less to do with energy security and more to do with regime security.

TOWARDS A NEW NON-PROLIFERATION ORDER

The nuclear non-proliferation regime that has underpinned the global nuclear order for four decades has been challenged from several directions. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the regime’s centerpiece, is currently suffering a ‘crisis of legitimacy’, not least of all by North Korean and Iranian proliferation. Moreover, U.S. unilateral and ad hoc multilateral initiatives to fill the NPT’s perceived gaps are further undermining the non-proliferation norms that support the broader non-proliferation regime. For the international community, the available alternatives are as follows:

1) **One is to disband the NPT, given its perceived failure to prevent proliferation of weapons of nuclear weapons.** There are few proponents, however, of this extreme proposition. Pragmatists familiar with the NPT’s origins argue that the Treaty was never meant to completely halt nuclear proliferation, but rather was aimed at slowing it down. In that respect, the NPT has worked remarkably well since it came into force in 1970.

2) **The second option is to revise the NPT system.** This is easier said than done; given the complexity of developing a international consensus around a new Treaty or modifying its terms, such an exercise is not in the realm of possibility.

3) **The third approach calls for a vigorous defense of the current order centered on the NPT, irrespective of its flaws and weaknesses.** Literal interpretation of the NPT is no longer possible because there is a greater awareness of the possibilities of misusing its provisions by certain states.

4) **The fourth is to change the Treaty’s interpretation to make it more effective.** Despite the desire of many to uphold the NPT in its current form, the very policy practice as it evolved since the end of the Cold War has underlined the importance of changing the interpretation. As a result, important changes have begun to take place in the implementation of the NPT. For example, most supporters of the NPT today argue that the Article IV, which promises comprehensive civilian nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon states party to the Treaty, must not be treated as an unconditional right. Given the threat of the misuse of Article IV provisions, there is a growing consensus that it can only be considered within the broader political context. The calls for restricting the transfer of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies, which are critical for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, have gathered considerable political support. Along with the proposition for circumscribing the interpretation of Article IV, considerable effort in the last few years has gone into strengthening the Article III, which is about verifying the obligations of the non-nuclear states under the NPT. Recognizing the weaknesses of the IAEA safeguards system and the potential for states to cheat on it, the international community has transformed the entire technical and operational basis of the verification mechanisms since the end of the Cold War. A number of other provisions of the NPT such as total abolition of nuclear weapons (Article VI) and for international cooperation in the use of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (Article V) have long become irrelevant.

From a practical perspective, the world would be unwise to abandon the existing structure of the NPT or to see revision as a feasible option. What the world needs is the construction of new non-proliferation arrangements as well as strengthening related institutions such as the IAEA, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The emphasis must necessarily be on the non-proliferation ‘regime’ rather than the NPT itself.
THE U.S. FACTOR IN SHAPING THE NEW NUCLEAR ORDER

The U.S. has meanwhile adopted a different approach to strengthening the non-proliferation system. Many in the U.S. establishment have lost faith in the power of arms control treaties. Within this context, the argument that states will cheat on treaties, and that the U.S. therefore needs a whole range of unilateral methods and ad hoc multilateral arrangements to prevent states from acquiring nuclear weapons, has acquired a new salience in Washington. Many of these approaches go beyond the terms of the NPT. While the U.S. sees these approaches as a way of supplementing the NPT, others find it deeply disconcerting that the Washington is adopting a strategy that might ultimately place the entire non-proliferation system in jeopardy.

Among these strategies is missile defense, which fundamentally redefines the nature of nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence was premised on the centrality of offensive nuclear forces. U.S. policy now demands the introduction of defenses into the nuclear calculus. While the U.S. insists that defenses are necessary to maintain deterrence against “rogue states” and terrorist groups armed with WMD, critics fear a renewed arms race among major powers.

Both the Clinton and Bush Administrations underlined the importance of “counter-proliferation”. This strategy presuming the ineffectiveness of treaties in preventing proliferation and the need to therefore have military capacities to deal with the spread of WMD. This involves the unilateral development of military capacities to deal with WMD use on the battlefield, as well as multilateral efforts, like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), to interdict illegal traffic in WMD materials between states. Many Asians have argued that counter-proliferation initiatives are a recipe for disaster, and PSI receives only weak regional support.

In its National Security Strategy document of September 2002, the Bush Administration went further in suggesting the importance of “pre-emption” in neutralizing the WMD capacities of rogue states and terrorist groups. Its argument that Washington cannot wait for nuclear threats to materialize before it deals with them, however, has generated a storm of protest within and beyond the U.S.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS: ASIA’S ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGES

The success of the emerging non-proliferation order,

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the regime’s centerpiece, is currently suffering a crisis of legitimacy, not least of all by North Korean and Iranian proliferation.”

The Bush Administration has also emphasized “regime change” in dealing with WMD proliferation. Underlying this is an important argument that the nature of the regime is more important than the technical features of proliferation in a particular state. Its nuclear deal with India—one of only three states not to have signed the NPT—is a case in point. Critics of the deal argue that the “singular exception” made for India could open a “floodgate” for other states to demand similar privileges. Others insist that drawing India into the regime would help to strengthen the global nuclear order.

Even as it introduced new approaches to non-proliferation, the Bush Administration also sought to change global thinking on the relationship between nuclear energy use and proliferation. Since the mid-1970s, the bipartisan consensus in the United States was to discourage the use of nuclear energy for electric power generation both at home and abroad. Reversing this approach, amidst rising oil prices and growing concerns about global warming, the Bush Administration has come out strongly in favor of expanded use of nuclear power. This includes promoting nuclear power abroad, albeit within a new framework.

This new framework supports the development of nuclear technologies to reduce the risk of proliferation through international cooperation, a new commitment to reprocess plutonium for commercial use under international safeguards, limiting the transfer of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies, and assurances of fuel supply to nations interested in developing nuclear power. Although all the new non-proliferation initiatives from the United States have been controversial, they have moved forward at varying speeds and some of them, such as PSI, have garnered considerable international support. Put simply, irrespective of the current debate, the global non-proliferation order has already undergone considerable change and has begun to look very different from the accepted international consensus three decades ago.

LOOKING AHEAD

In the coming year, several developments will shape the Asia’s future nuclear landscape. These include final approval of the U.S.-India nuclear deal, the accomplishment of planned North Korean de-nuclearization, and the continuing deployment of missile defense systems in the U.S., Japan, and Australia, and new missile defense tests in India.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS: ASIA’S ARMS CONTROL CHALLENGES

The success of the emerging non-proliferation order,
especially in Asia, depends on several factors.

1) This new order must meet the aspirations and interests of all the great powers, both current and rising. Despite fundamental trans-Atlantic disagreements over the future of arms control, a broad consensus has indeed begun to emerge among the traditional powers regarding the next steps towards non-proliferation. NATO has already accepted many, if not all of the new American precepts on non-proliferation, and Russia has supported some new non-proliferation measures while still remaining opposed to missile defense. Moscow has also differed on the tactics to be used in dealing with such proliferation threats, for example, in Iran.

2) Asia’s rising powers must be integrated as stakeholders in the construction and implementation of the new nuclear order. For far too long, the debate on nuclear non-proliferation has been conducted within an American framework, and in recent years, in a more Atlantic-centered framework. Asia has largely been marginal to these debates. The U.S. and Europe have tended to be the demandeurs and the Asian powers the repondeurs. Since the early 1990s, China has steadily become a part of the non-proliferation system and has begun to modify some of its earlier cavalier non-proliferation policies. Although deeply concerned about missile defense and suspicious about the PSI, China has recognized the importance of cooperating with the other powers in preventing further proliferation of WMD. The Bush Administration has taken a big step in bringing India, one of the three important non-signatories to the NPT, into the non-proliferation order through the July 18, 2005 nuclear agreement. Under the deal, India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear programs and to place the former under international safeguards. It has also agreed to undertake a number of binding non-proliferation commitments. India is also debating the terms and conditions under which it could join some of the new non-proliferation arrangements such as the PSI.

3) If new technologies hold the key to managing the second nuclear age, the role of Asian powers as both consumers and generators of technology will have to be factored in. China, and to a lesser extent India, are in a position to influence nuclear technology flows to non-nuclear countries. As a consequence, they also influence the prospects for WMD proliferation. The technological capabilities of both states will continue to expand in the coming years. Their full participation in drafting the rules and not merely in adhering to them is therefore important.

4) The role of collective security arrangements in preventing the threat of non-proliferation should be approached carefully. Many have argued that the creation of a security community is the key to stability in Asia. Others, however, insist that collective security is a mirage and Asia must remain focused on constructing a stable balance of power system. It should be remembered that such collective security arrangements could lead to a dilution of the existing alliances and a weakening of the extended deterrence...

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**CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS**

- **October 2002**
  - In response to U.S. allegations, North Korea admits to having a secret nuclear weapons program.

- **April 2003**
  - North Korea becomes first state to withdraw from NPT.

- **May 2003**
  - U.S. Launches Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a program for interdicting transport of nuclear materials.

- **February 2004**
  - Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan confesses to having shared nuclear information with North Korea, Libya, and Iran.

- **July 2005**
  - U.S. and India sign Civilian Nuclear Energy Agreement.

- **February 2006**
  - U.S. announces GNEP, with China, France, Japan, Russia and the U.S. are original members.

- **April 2006**
  - Sixth Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise Pacific Protector 06 takes place in northern Australia stimulating air interception of WMD.

- **October 2006**
  - North Korea conducts underground nuclear test.

- **January 2007**
  - China tests hit-to-kill anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon.

- **July 2007**
  - An earthquake in Japan causes leakage at the Kashiwazaki plant, the world’s largest atomic energy plant.

- **September 2007**
  - At GNEP meeting, Australia becomes a partner, but still refuses nuclear disposal requirement. Canada and South Korea remain at observer status.

- **September 2007**
  - Indonesian government announces plans to build a nuclear power plant in earthquake-prone Java.
and a consequential encouragement to national nuclear deterrents. For example Japan is deeply apprehensive that plans to turn the current Six-Party Talks on North Korea into a collective security arrangement for Northeast Asia might undermine its bilateral alliance with the U.S. A multilateral framework for arms control in Asia might not necessarily substitute the necessity for substantive bilateral negotiations among major powers whose rivalries are at the heart of Asia’s current nuclear spread. Any successful stabilization of the region must necessarily include the mitigation Sino-U.S., Sino-Japanese and Sino-Indian military rivalries by incorporating arms control as a major element of their bilateral engagement.

The importance of alliances, old and new, does not lessen the necessity of region-wide cooperative arrangements on a range of issues, especially on civilian nuclear energy. Nuclear accidents in one country will have an impact on the neighbors and suspicious nuclear activity in one could generate a competitive dynamic among others. In the past, several ideas for greater regional cooperation on nuclear energy in Asia have been suggested. These include proposals for a region-wide organization like “ASIAATOM” or “PACATOM”, modeled after the EURATOM that was set up in 1957 to promote greater coordination among the nuclear energy policies of the European nations. CSCAP has been promoting greater nuclear transparency in the region through such confidence building measures as information exchange. The times may now be ripe for going beyond these ad hoc initiatives and consider a more comprehensive framework for dealing with both the opportunities and threats arising from the greater use of nuclear power in Asia.

5) Finally, the region will have to look beyond traditional regional approaches to arms control and non-proliferation and find more effective mechanisms for cooperation. In the past, the smaller Asian nations had sought to merely insulate themselves from the larger dynamic of the nuclear arms race through such mechanisms as “regional nuclear free zones”. The effectiveness of such arrangements has always been in doubt and will be even less credible with the sources of the current nuclear dynamic deeply embedded in Asia itself. Many nations of the region will be sucked into the unfolding nuclear/space rivalries among the major powers of Asia. Instead of being simply reactive to the larger nuclear developments, many regional actors, states and multilateral organizations, will have to accept a larger role for themselves in the new arrangements that go beyond the NPT framework and involve for example interdiction of illicit transfers of WMD material and the prevention of terrorists from gaining access to sensitive material. Equally important, many non-nuclear nations of Asia must be prepared to accept a revision of the political bargain under the NPT. Instead of emphasizing the right for unrestricted access to civilian nuclear technologies, non-nuclear nations of Asia must focus, in their own interests, to avoid the further development of full nuclear fuel cycle within the national boundaries of any nation and promote regional fuel cycle centers. That would facilitate expanded use of nuclear energy without raising suspicions about the intentions of any state in the region.

CSCAP ROLE

Issues concerning weapons of mass destruction have been a long-standing priority of CSCAP. The CSCAP North Pacific Working Group regularly engaged the DPRK in dialogue concerning nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia. Currently, CSCAP’s Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and its subgroup, the Export Controls Experts Group, have considered peaceful nuclear energy use and strengthening and devising more effective export controls. The CSCAP Handbook and Action Plan for Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific is expected to be complete in 2008.

About the Author

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Southeast Asian governments face a stark predicament in conducting their counter-terrorism strategies: they must be aggressive in combating terrorist threats, but must do so in a way that does not inflame public opinion. In Indonesia and Malaysia, the popular perception is that the U.S.-led ‘War on Terrorism’ is not only counter-productive, but it is also a means of creating divisions both within the Islamic world, and between the Islamic world and other societies. Within this public opinion climate, many Southeast Asian governments are reluctant to place their counter-terrorism efforts under the U.S. counter-terrorism umbrella. Moreover, these governments are concerned that closer cooperation with the U.S. or other regional states will provide a pretext for foreign interference into their internal affairs.

In the absence of comprehensive and deep regional cooperation, national-level responses have therefore become the cornerstone of Southeast Asia’s battle against terrorism. By and large, these national-level responses have yielded impressive results. However, there is still an intra-regional dimension of terrorism in Southeast Asia, centered on Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and its network of regional affiliates. This transnational dimension must be addressed by a concerted regional approach. Regional governments should thus consider whether successful aspects of their respective national approaches can be regionalized into an effective regional counter-terrorism strategy.

**Southeast Asia and the U.S.-led ‘War on Terrorism’**

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Southeast Asia was dubbed the “second front” in the U.S.-led War on Terrorism. But the close counter-terrorism cooperation that the U.S. had hoped for has been elusive, or at least inconsistent throughout the region. Concerns about links between Al Qaeda and Muslim insurgents in the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines have prompted closer bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation between Washington and Manila. At the same time, the JI-orchestrated Bali Bombings of October 2002 and October 2005, as well as the perceived light sentences given to the convicted bombers, have raised American concerns about Indonesia as a weak link in global counter-terrorism cooperation.

For many Southeast Asian governments, the difficulty of cooperating with the U.S.’s “with us or against us” approach to counter-terrorism cooperation is that their publics feel that the ‘War on Terrorism’ is in fact a war against Islam. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the mistreatment of prisoners in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons, and persistent pressures on the Iranian government, for example, have all undermined American credibility in the eyes of many Southeast Asian Muslims. Many Indonesians, and to a lesser extent Malaysians, Thai, and Filipinos, see the U.S. exploiting 9/11 as a pretext to undermine and dominate the Muslim world and to establish a pax-Americana. Moreover, many, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, have also felt that the militarized approach of the War on Terrorism actually generates new instability, endangers innocent civilians, and breeds in Muslim populations a stronger and deeper anger that can be exploited by ideologies of terrorism and violence. Given this public opinion climate, an aggressive counter-terrorism policy, if carried out under the U.S. umbrella, could be easily construed as simply a way of currying favor with Washington.

Nevertheless, despite the low level of regional cooperation, Southeast Asia as a whole has been relatively successful at countering the terrorism threat. And the region’s states have done by pursuing primarily national-level approaches. This includes Indonesia—once dubbed the region’s “weak
“For many Southeast Asian government, the difficulty of cooperating with the U.S.'s "with us or against us" approach to counter-terrorism cooperation is that their publics feel that the 'War on Terrorism' is in fact a war against Islam.”

NATIONAL-LEVEL SUCCESSES

Malaysia and Singapore: In the early post-9/11 period, the Malaysian and Singaporean governments acted quickly to deal with their respective terrorism threats. Malaysia arrested several members of Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), who were suspected of having helped coordinate a meeting of some of the 9/11 hijackers and of having forged ties with other regional extremists groups, such as JI and another Indonesian-based group, Laskar Jihad. Singapore’s effective counter-terrorism approach was its ability to move swiftly to disrupt its own local JI network. In December 2001, the government of Singapore arrested 13 members of a JI cell, and in August of 2002 made another significant round of arrests. The key to the lasting success of its counter-terrorism efforts, however, has been a comprehensive and multi-pronged approach, of which two initiatives are notable.

1) In April 2003, the Singapore government formed a Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). The RRG’s objectives were to closely examine JI’s ideology and to provide experts’ understanding of JI misinterpretation of Islam. The RRG has also produced counter-ideological materials and has edited the public, specifically Singapore’s Muslim community, on religious extremism. This Group includes a Counsellors Panel of local Muslim scholars who work on a voluntary basis to provide religious counseling to JI detainees. This service has also been extended to the detainees’ families.

2) The government also facilitated Muslim organizations in providing financial assistance to the families of detainees. This was to ensure that the offspring of these detainees did not become socially alienated—and thus also susceptible to extremist ideology—thereby breaking the cycle of radicalization.

Indonesia: Indonesia’s counter-terrorism strategy began to take more coherent form after the Marriott and Australian

INTERPRETING THE NUMBERS:

INCIDENTS, FATALITIES, AND INJURIES

Indonesia: JI’s incidents in Indonesia have caused a high number of fatalities and injuries. The 2002 Bali Bombing killed 202 and injured 300. The 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel killed 13 and injured 149. The Australian Embassy bombing in 2004 killed 9 and injured 182. And the 2005 Bali bombing resulted in at least 20 deaths and 116 injuries.

The Philippines: The 2003 decline in incidents is due to a peace process between MILF and Manila. The number of incidents rose in 2004 because of renewed New People’s Army (NPA) attacks, which on average have resulted in one fatality per attack. Abu Sayyaf’s ratio has been higher; its 2004 ferry boat explosion killed 118 and injured 9.

Thailand: The pattern here has resembled other situations of localized communal and sectarian conflict. Several bombing incidents have targeted local businesses but result in few casualties. At the same time, a pattern is emerging of firearms being used to target random victims, a behavior that is consistent with terrorism.

TKB defines a terrorist incident “by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take.” The data used to inform this chart are separated into ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ incidents. Although most of JI’s attacks have occurred in Indonesia, they are represented here as a separate line.

Source: Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism’s (MITB) Terrorism Knowledge Database (www.tkb.org).
embassy bombings in August 2003 and November 2004, respectively. From Jakarta’s perspective, pursuing a primarily national-level strategy offers at least three advantages. First, reaching a regional consensus on how to define terrorist acts and actors could be a tremendous obstacle to moving forward expeditiously. Narrowing the decision-making scope to the domestic level allows the Indonesian government to proceed decisively and in a relatively unencumbered manner. Second, by devising and pursuing its own counter-terrorism strategy, the government avoids the public impression that it is merely following the U.S.’s agenda. This favorable impression fosters a more positive domestic political context in which to work. Third, Jakarta has determined that a key to its success is reaching out to and working closely with the country’s moderate Muslim population. By operating from a national level gives it greater freedom of movement with which to do this.

Like the Singaporean approach, Indonesia’s current counter-terrorism strategy has two notable components:

1) Jakarta has employed a law enforcement approach rather than a military approach to identifying and prosecuting terrorists.

2) High-level politicians have encouraged moderate Muslim leaders and scholars to publicly condemn terrorist acts as unequivocally ‘anti-Islam’. This partnership between government and Islam has been effective in undermining one of JI’s ideological recruiting tools.

According to a recent International Crisis Group report, JI, in response to Detachment 88’s successful operations, has entered a rebuilding and consolidation phase. This is not to say that it will cease carrying out violent attacks, but rather that it was alter its tactics. Specifically, many experts believe that JI will try to foment sectarian violence in vulnerable areas as a way to create conditions it feels will be favorable for recruitment. The use of targeted assassinations and kidnappings is also likely to increase during this phase.7

JI’S REGIONAL THREAT: THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND

In addition to its operations in Indonesia, JI has also tried to be Southeast Asia’s ringleader for terrorist activity through its network of affiliates. According to a recent Rand report, the “militant space” available in Southeast Asia has narrowed, with the crux of JI’s “operational and logistical activities” now limited primarily to two main zones: Mindanao in the southern Philippines and southern Thailand, both of which are plagued by sometimes violent insurgencies.8 Nonetheless, the distinctions between JI and most Philippine and Thai insurgent groups are not insignificant. JI’s goals and organization are international in scope. Their long-term goal remains establishing an Islamic caliphate that extends over the predominantly Muslim areas of Southeast Asia. Most of the insurgent groups in the Philippines and southern Thailand, by contrast, are far more akin to separatists with localized concerns and organization. In addition, unlike JI, which typically targets defenseless civilians, the targets of many of the Philippine and Thai groups are often government soldiers or other representatives of the state. Nonetheless, the concern for Southeast Asia’s governments is that JI may try to exploit the frustrations and ambitions of these insurgent groups for their own purposes, or to co-opt disaffected elements within them.
The Philippines government, like Jakarta, has embraced both hard and soft approaches to combating terrorism. Their strategy is manifested in Civil-Military Operations (CMO), which aims to deprive terrorist groups of mass support by improving local conditions. The CMO includes initiating a range of aid projects, improving public infrastructure and facilities, and providing community services. Manila’s strategy has produced positive results, as indicated by the overall decrease in the number of terrorist incidents since 2001. And the government’s negotiations with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have hit stumbling blocks, but are still mainly on track.

Two areas, however, remain a concern for Manila and for the wider region:

1) **Disaffected and renegade MILF elements** have maintained relations with JI elements assigned to the Mindanao operational area. The ‘Sulawesi-Mindanao arc’—the Celebes and Sulu Seas and the surrounding land—has been identified as an important “logistical and transportation hub” for JI and the MILF to exchange equipment, explosives, and to forge stronger networks.

2) The **Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)**, Mindanao’s most radical in terms of goals and tactics, is now looking to replenish its depleted ranks, which are currently estimated to be around a few hundred. After a key leadership loss in 1998, the group degenerated into violent criminal activity and high-profile bombings. Many experts believed that the ASG has become increasingly isolated from other separatist and terrorist groups. In 2007, the year after the death of leader Khadafi Janjalani, ASG selected Yasser Igasan to lead the group. Igasan is a Middle East-trained religious scholar, which suggests that the group is looking to demonstrate its serious commitment to waging global jihad. Closer affiliation with JI could also boost ASG’s ideological credentials, which could help in attracting new recruits.

Thailand has faced an increasingly bloody insurgency in the predominantly Malay-Muslim southern provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. The current phase of the insurgency, which began in 2004, has produced an identifiable pattern of violence, with killings happening on nearly a daily basis, and with insurgents specifically targeting “those who represent the Thai authorities, such as security personnel, community leaders, monks, and teachers.” The conflict, however, is rooted far less in radical Muslim ideology than it is in localized grievances.

Although not much is yet known about the insurgents or their specific motives, observers generally believe that the violence is a result of failed state integration of this Malay-Muslim population, and from the fact that these three provinces are among Thailand’s poorest and have high rates of unemployment, especially among young Muslim males. Furthermore, the already low education standards in these southern provinces appear to be getting worse as teachers, who have been targeted for assassination, have begun fleeing the area. The poor quality of education means that these Malay-Muslims are often unable to pass entrance tests for government and other types of service jobs.

Bangkok has repeatedly stressed that the southern conflict is domestic in nature. Many experts concur, emphasizing that the fundamental issues are ethnic, political, and developmental and that the insurgents’ motivations do not dovetail with JI’s more ideological and regional-level ones. However, the increasing sophistication of the attacks may suggest that sympathetic foreign groups—namely, JI—are becoming more active in the region. The insurgents’ ability to “systematically produce and deploy bombs” for example, has reportedly continued to gather pace.

**REGIONAL COOPERATION**

Although these governments have largely preferred to deal

**TRENDS OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTHERN THAI INSURGENCY**

In April 2007, Ian Storey of the Jamestown Foundation reported that a series of attacks in the southern Thai provinces “seemed to reinforce disturbing trends in the ongoing insurgency”. According to Storey, these trends include the following:

- The insurgents’ bombing attacks are becoming more frequent, sophisticated, and deadly.
- Women and children represent an increasing number of the casualties.
- Revenge attacks are on the rise, reflecting the increasingly pronounced sectarian nature of the violence.
- The south’s Buddhist population is growing frustrated by the government’s inability to protect them, and have started forming self-defense militias.
- The violence has begun to spread beyond Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and has moved into the neighboring province of Songkhla.
- The Thai security forces are still seemingly incapable of identifying the groups that are responsible for the violence.

with their terrorism and insurgency problems at the national level, JI’s regional strategy, albeit somewhat hampered by the region’s various counter-terrorism successes, necessitates that there be some attention to the intra-regional manifestation of JI’s goals. What is the state of Southeast Asian regional counter-terrorism cooperation, and where are there opportunities or requirements for further multilateral responses?

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Southeast Asian governments did indeed feel that it was a collective necessity to respond to the threat of terrorism. Within the regional framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), at the 7th Summit in Brunei in November 2001, ASEAN leaders signed the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. The Declaration acknowledged that terrorism “is the profound threat to international peace and security” and poses “a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realisation of ASEAN Vision 2020.”

The Declaration calls for closer cooperation among law enforcement agencies, early signing/ratification of or ascension to all relevant anti-terrorist conventions, exchange of information and intelligence on terrorist organizations, and development of capacity building programs to enhance members’ abilities to investigate, monitor, and report on terrorist acts.

While the Declaration specifies what needs to be done, it provides little insight on how these things should be achieved, specifically through multilateral cooperation. This clearly suggests the difficulty among ASEAN countries to agree on how the War on Terrorism should be carried out at the regional and global levels. The Declaration’s wording clearly acknowledges that despite the need for “concerted action” to combat terrorism, such intention was still framed with two important qualifications. First, the Joint Communiqué makes it clear that “the sovereignty, territorial integrity and domestic laws of each ASEAN Member Country shall be respected and upheld in undertaking the fight against terrorism.”

Second, the Declaration affirms that “at the international level the United Nations should play a major role in combating terrorism.” The latter point in particular signifies differences among ASEAN countries regarding the role of the U.S. in the War on Terrorism.

After the Bali bombing of October 2002, the pace of regional counter-terrorism cooperation began to accelerate. At the 8th ASEAN Summit in November 2002, ASEAN leaders condemned the bombing and declared that they were “determined to carry out and build on the specific measures outlined in the ASEAN Declaration.” They also promised to intensify their efforts, both collectively and individually. However, intra-ASEAN cooperation remains limited to areas that have been agreed to previously by member states, mainly in the forms of information and intelligence exchanges, training, seminars, and law enforcement cooperation.
enforcement cooperation.

Overall, ASEAN's initiatives for regional counter-terrorism cooperation have included little in terms of concrete mechanisms. Instead, intra-ASEAN cooperation is largely ad hoc and focused more on cooperation with extra-regional powers such as the United States and to a lesser extent Australia. One area where regional counter-terrorism cooperation has been successful, however, is bilateral and informal multilateralism, namely the region's law enforcement agencies conducting joint training programs. And the lack of an effective ASEAN-wide counter-terrorism framework, however, has been supplemented by sub-regional frameworks such as the trilateral agreement signed initially by Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia in May 2002, and later joined by Thailand and Cambodia. This agreement provides concrete initiatives such as sharing airline passenger lists and combined operations to hunt terrorists.

**POLICY IMPLICATIONS**

- **The key challenge for Southeast Asian countries is how to develop effective regional collective mechanisms for combating terrorism and violent insurgencies.** National-level successes and experiences could form the starting point for a more effective regional strategy. Indeed, the January 2007 ASEAN Convention on Counterterrorism includes two elements of national-level strategies: the Fair Treatment guarantee to those taken into custody (Article 8); and sharing the best practices of member states’ Rehabilitative Programmes (Article 11)—as the elements of a regional counter-terrorism strategy. While the Convention is a welcome sign, however, there are uncertainties regarding the extent to which member states are ready and willing to implement it.

- **Bilateral and trilateral cooperation** could also be useful in addressing the threats emanating from the ‘Sulawesi-Mindanao arc’. Indonesia and the Philippines conduct coordinated patrols under “Corpat Philindo” exercises. Malaysia and the Philippines also have a similar arrangement called Ops Phimal in the same area. But to be fully effective, participating states, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, need to build up counter-terrorism capacities and such operations need to be conducted more frequently.

**About the Author**

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2 Terrorism Knowledge Base, Group Profile, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), http://www.tkb.org/Group.jsp?groupID=4401.
3 Hassan and Pereire: 461.
7 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
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17 Chow, “ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation”: 309.
Infectious Diseases and Pandemics in Asia: Waiting for the Next Shoe to Drop

Mely C. Anthony

The 2006 World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Risks report placed the outbreak of pandemic influenza among the most critical issues confronting the international community. Most believe the catalyst will be H5N1, a virus more commonly known as avian influenza or the ‘bird flu’. If history is any guide, the results could be catastrophic; the last major outbreak of a deadly pandemic was the 1918 Spanish flu that within the span of one year killed at least 20 million people worldwide. Although medical technology and public health infrastructure have improved greatly since then, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that a full-fledged bird flu outbreak could result in 2-8 million deaths, a number that rises to 20-40 million in the event of a worst-case scenario.

While a pandemic influenza is by no means a certainty, if it does occur, Asia is likely to be “ground zero” in the outbreak. The SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) epidemic of 2002-2003 gave the region a taste of the human and financial costs of such infectious diseases. Within five months, SARS infected 8,300 people in 26 countries and resulted in an estimated loss of $60 billion to East and Southeast Asian economies. As the likely ‘first line of defense’ in a pandemic outbreak, has the Asia Pacific region learned the necessary lessons from the SARS experience and achieved an adequate level of preparedness?

Many experts say the answer is ‘no’. Among the reasons cited are insufficient investments in public health infrastructures in many critical countries and inconsistent responses to different assessments of threats. As a starting point in reaching an adequate level of preparedness, the region’s governments should make their health policies reflect two realities. The first is that the infectious disease threat is no longer an exclusive concern of health ministries. Instead, it needs to be treated as a security issue whose management involves more efficient inter-agency coordination. The second is that infectious diseases defy unilateral remedies and their prevention and containment should therefore be treated as a global public good (GPG). This will mean deeper and more meaningful inter-state cooperation than presently exists. Better multilateral and multi-sectoral will be needed not only for addressing the bird flu threat, which is increasingly commanding international attention, but also for dealing with other infectious diseases that continue to plague particularly the Asia Pacific region’s less developed countries.

THE THREAT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASE

In a 2003 Rand report, Jennifer Brower and Peter Chalk stated that “the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by infectious pathogens are greater today than they have ever been in the past, developments in modern science notwithstanding.” There are two reasons for such an assessment:

1) New and Reemerging Diseases: According to the World Health Organization (WHO), new diseases are emerging at an unprecedented rate of one per year. Notable recent examples include Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever in Africa, the West Nile virus pulmonary syndrome in the U.S., and the Nipah Encephalitis in Southeast Asia. In addition, established diseases once thought to have been effectively contained are re-emerging with more virulent strains that are resistant to available first-line antibiotics. We are currently in the “7th pandemic” of cholera, with the disease having resurfaced in Peru in 1991 and in India in 1994. Tuberculosis has also returned with a more virulent strain that has been dangerous patients also infected with HIV/AIDS.
2) The Multiplier Effect: A second reason for the persistence of infectious diseases is the facilitating role played by disease “force-multipliers”.  

- **Globalization** has increased the scale, speed, and extent with which peoples and goods, including agricultural products, move across state borders. According to the WHO, the SARS epidemic was instructive in that it “demonstrated that the risks and dangers to health arising from new diseases have indeed been increased by the ways in which nations and their populations interact globally.”

- **The misuse and overuse of antibiotics** has contributed to a process of “pathogenic natural selection” which has allowed microbes to adapt and become more resilient and powerful. In the event of a bird flu outbreak, antiviral medicines would be a critical tool in preventing or slowing the disease's spread, at least for the approximately six months that it would take to develop a vaccine. Because of their misuse and overuse, however, their effectiveness against rapid spread of the bird flu can not be taken for granted.

- **The increasing migration from rural to urban areas is creating ‘megacities’** where humans not only live in close physical proximity to one another, but many also have areas where clean water, sanitation, and adequate hygiene, all of which favor a disease's spread, are sorely lacking.

- **Climate change** is expected to facilitate the spread of communicable diseases in two ways. First, rising average temperatures will expand the geographic and temporal range favorable to diseases that thrive in warm weather. Second, a higher incidence of storm-induced floods (now widely recognized as a consequence of global warming) could expose millions of people to yellow fever, dengue fever, malaria, and other insect-borne illnesses.

- **Social and behavioral patterns** such as frequent air travel and ‘sex tourism’ are also conducive to infectious disease transmission. Air travel is cited as an important contributing factor to the transcontinental spread of SARS, and it is no surprise that Cambodia, Thailand, and India, all of which have sizable sex industries, also have high rates of HIV infection.

**SARS AS A WAKE-UP CALL FOR A POSSIBLE BIRD FLU PANDEMIC**

As the first new severe disease of the 21st century, “SARS defined the features that would give a disease international significance as a global public health security threat: it spread from person to person, required no vector, displayed no particular geographic affinity, incubated silently for more than a week, mimicked the symptoms of many other diseases, took its heaviest toll on hospital staff, and killed around 10% of those infected. These features meant that it spread easily along the routes of international air travel, placing every city with an international airport at risk of imported cases.”

The H5N1 strain of the bird flu is even more threatening than SARS not because of what it currently is, but rather because of what it could become. Although the disease has been primarily found in bird populations, scientists and policymakers are deeply concerned about the evolution of two transmission paths. One is animal-to-human transmission that has already impacted those who have close contact with poultry. Of the confirmed cases of humans infected with bird flu, 80% of those cases have occurred in Southeast Asia and China. Two-thirds of these cases have resulted in death.

The more frightening possibility, however, is if the H5N1 strain of the bird flu virus evolves in a way that allows for human-to-human transmission. To date, there have been no confirmed cases of this, but many say that what stands between the possibility and reality of a pandemic is essentially coincidence: If a human infected with human

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**DISEASES OUTBREAKS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, JULY 2004-JUNE 2005**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avian influenza</td>
<td>Dengue Fever</td>
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<tr>
<td>Measles</td>
<td>Cholera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infectious Hepatitis</td>
<td>Mumps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nipah Virus</td>
<td>Acute Neurological Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meningococcal disease</td>
<td>Japanese Encephalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Poliomyelitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetanus</td>
<td>Leptospirosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub typhus</td>
<td>Typhoid Fever</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Combating Emerging Infectious Diseases in the South-East Asia Region, World Health Organization Southeast Asia (2005).*
influenza is also exposed to bird flu, the two diseases could mix genetic codes within their human host and produce a ‘novel’ flu strain. Since humans will have had no previous exposure to this strain, they will have no natural immunities to defend against it.

**WHAT HAS THE REGION DONE?**

In 2005, the WHO warned that as the epicenter of a possible pandemic, Southeast Asian governments need to put in place emergency plans and effective surveillance systems. Nonetheless, in ASEAN and other Asian states, much of the information about national-level disaster preparedness, response, and capability has been sketchy. As shown in the SARS crisis, while Singapore and Hong Kong were able to deal with the health crisis in a reasonably effective manner, other countries such as China and Vietnam experienced a range of challenges in coping with the problem. Moreover, aside from the national-level difficulties, such as contingency planning and coordination among state agencies, there has also been very little institutionalized regional cooperation in the area of public health policy. This is particularly true among ASEAN states.

There are, however, some notable recent initiatives that provide the frameworks and solid starting points for further cooperation. The **ASEAN Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Task Force** was formed in December 2004. At its first meeting, the Task Force identified eight core activities to be divided among ASEAN’s five original members:

1. Develop disease surveillance and alerting systems for prompt detection and reporting (Thailand);
2. Create effective containment measures, including quarantine, border and movement control (Malaysia);
3. Devising a strategic vaccination plan to minimize infection (Indonesia);
4. Strengthen diagnostic capabilities for quick and accurate diagnosis (Thailand);
5. Establish disease-free zones in order to preserve export capacity (Malaysia);
6. Design a system for information sharing for regional epidemiological study in order to assist with decision making and planning (Singapore);
7. Draw up emergency preparedness plans to enable rapid response to bird flu outbreaks (Malaysia);
8. Raise public awareness and communication (Philippines).

At the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) level, the **Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) Programme** was introduced to focus on strengthening disease surveillance and developing early response mechanisms. In late November 2007, the APT will also hold a Regional Experience Sharing Workshop on Exercise Management in Bangkok. There are also collaborative programs organized through wider regional forums such as APEC and EAS. Measures include establishing information sharing protocols among countries and multilateral organizations and effective, timely, and meaningful communication before or during a pandemic influenza outbreak.

One of the key areas targeted by these collaborative programs is the development of a regional rapid containment strategy.

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**ASIA’S CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF CONFIRMED HUMAN CASES OF AVIAN INFLUENZA REPORTED TO THE WHO (AS OF NOVEMBER 12, 2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>2004 cases</th>
<th>2004 deaths</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
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<td>272</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

plan to stem the first signs of a pandemic outbreak. An important agenda in this regard is conducting periodic simulation exercises at the national and regional levels to test the readiness of regional countries to contain a possible pandemic. The first attempt to develop a region-wide exercise was held in Cambodia in March 2007. The exercise, “Panstop 2007”, was coordinated by the ASEAN Secretariat, with the assistance of the WHO, the Japanese government, and the Japan International Cooperation System. It was slated to be the first in a series of tests in the Asia Pacific region.¹⁶

WHAT STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE?

Although the regional initiatives described above reflect a greater level of mobilization to address gaps in the region’s preparedness, these initiatives are still quite limited in their application. For example, far more needs to be done to involve ASEAN’s less developed members. For example, the HPAI Task Force did not involve Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. All of these states are not only possible outbreak sites, but they also have critical vulnerabilities in their health systems that make early detection, reporting, and containment difficult. It should also be noted that

“...established diseases once thought to have been effectively contained are re-emerging with more virulent strains that are resistant to available first-line antibiotics.”

many of the proposed initiatives under APEC and the EAS frameworks still need to be implemented. And given the lack of resources allocated to improving public health systems, national and regional-level capacities to respond to transnational health crises remain inadequate.

ASEAN officials themselves have acknowledged that pandemic preparedness is insufficiently funded and they are thus looking to their richer regional dialogue partners—Japan, China, and South Korea—to assist in supplementing this.¹⁷ The pandemics agenda has also been elevated to the larger forums such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the East Asia Summit (EAS).¹⁸ At its inaugural meeting, the EAS adopted the East Asia Summit Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response.¹⁹ One of the measures included in this Declaration is establishing information sharing protocols among countries and multilateral organizations and effective, timely, and meaningful communication before or during a pandemic influenza outbreak.²⁰

THE GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS APPROACH TO DISEASE THREATS

Moving toward a more comprehensive strategy to contain future pandemics is to abandon conventional approaches to managing public health and to explore non-conventional, eclectic approaches in order to generate alternative policies that address the complex challenges of global health security. One way to proceed is to complement the ongoing securitization of infectious diseases with the more inclusive global public goods (GPG) approach in order to provide for a more efficient and sustainable system for the prevention and containment of infectious diseases. In this way, the wider international community can be involved in immediately responding to crisis situations, while also attending to the deeper structural issues and problems of ensuring health security to the wider community, both rich and poor.

The main thrust of the GPG approach is to highlight the need for countries to work together to attain these public goods, and to help countries that face constraints in securing these goods on their own. Inge Kaul of the UN Development Program’s Office of Development Studies pointed out that “as the fate of many nations has become increasingly intertwined, transforming what were once national policy issues into regional issues—and regional issues into global ones... so too should they bring together as partners in appropriately reformed public policy making.”²¹

The U.S. has been one of the major external actors that has taken a keen interest in this issue of pandemic preparedness, and was one of the largest donors to the global Avian Flu fund that was set up at the January 2006 International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Pandemic Influenza, co-organized by China, the European Commission, and the World Bank. To date, the U.S. has pledged a total of $392 million to the total fund of $1.9 billion. Much of these funds had been allocated to the development of stockpiles of health supplies and international research.²² Moreover, through the APEC framework, the U.S. has initiated the establishment of a Regional Emerging Diseases Intervention (REDI) Centre, in partnership with Singapore. Formally launched in 2003 after the SARS outbreak, REDI would assist Asian countries in “tracking, controlling, and researching emerging infections with appropriate resources and expertise.”²³ It is envisaged that the REDI Centre would also be open to participation by other Asia Pacific countries.

OTHER INFECTIOUS DISEASE THREATS

While bird flu is the most likely culprit in an Asian-based
pandemic, the region also faces challenges in containing the spread of other communicable diseases, namely, HIV/AIDS. In a recent report, it was revealed that across the developing world, only 15% of the estimated treatments on AIDS had been met.

This finding is particularly significant to Asia given the grave situation in the spread of AIDS in the region. It had been estimated that there are about 8.6 million people living with HIV at the end of 2006, including 960,000 people who became newly infected in the past year alone and about 630,000 deaths from AIDS-related illnesses.

In China, for example, it is estimated that approximately 650,000 people were living with HIV at the end of 2005.

And with HIV spreading rapidly from most at-risk populations to the general population, the number of HIV infections in women is also growing. In 2004, women already accounted for 39% of reported cases, compared with 25% two years earlier. In India, the WHO’s estimates placed HIV infections in the country at 5.7 million, although current reports from New Delhi’s AIDS charity group, Naz Foundation, placed the figure closer to 15 million.

However, the WHO also reported that the highest national infection levels of HIV/AIDS in Asia are found in Southeast Asia “where combinations of unprotected sex, paid sex, and sex between men, along with unsafe injecting drug use, are fueling the epidemics in most countries.” The prevalence of HIV/AIDS is particularly high in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Vietnam. There are some 40,000 persons being infected with HIV in Vietnam annually, while in the case of Myanmar, infection rates are highest in the ethnic minority areas, and, more specifically, in the mining areas where drugs are more readily available. In fact, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), an estimated 24% of all intravenous drug users in Myanmar are infected with the disease.

Such alarming scenarios had prompted a WHO official to designate Asia as the next possible frontline in the AIDS pandemic.

Despite these alarming figures, securitizing AIDS appears to have a long way to go for many of these countries. Aside from the lack of funds allocated to combat the diseases, the social stigma that has come to be associated with the disease has been a significant obstacle in getting political actors to put forth a case for aggressively responding to it.

Moreover, despite the advocacy on fighting AIDS carried out by NGOs and international organizations, this agenda...
has yet to be mainstreamed into the security agenda of states in the region.

THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL SURVEILLANCE MECHANISM

It is noteworthy that in Southeast Asia, infectious diseases account for approximately 40% of the 14 million annual deaths and 28% of the global burden of infectious diseases. Better monitoring networks are essential to risk-preparedness and crisis management in pandemic outbreaks. But in many parts of developing Southeast Asia, poor health infrastructure seriously impact on building local capacity to support these surveillance measures. For example, reporting about human cases of bird flu is often hampered by lack of epidemiological expertise in the region. After a fact-finding mission to Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, US Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavitt observed that the task of creating a sufficient network of surveillance was daunting and that “the chances of that happening [were] not good.”

In this regard, much work still needs to be done to boost national and regional preparedness of the region through:

- creating mechanisms for effective production and distribution of vaccines and other medicines;
- promoting effective prevention and treatment
- building credible and effective national and regional surveillance systems for monitoring infectious diseases
- focusing on rapid response by providing additional human resources and financing

Against the needs to boost regional resources, potential partners like the Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (with its range of financing mechanisms like the proposed Global Health Research Fund) should be engaged. Within the GPG framework, the private sector, particularly in developed countries, can help to pool resources at the regional and even global levels to build up much needed research and development funds. National and regional surveillance networks would also require assistance in building linkages with other networks outside the region and in interfacing with the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN).

POOR PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE

With regard to improving the state of national health systems among the poorer countries in the region, international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) can certainly do more
to assist these countries. In particular, most of these countries need financial and technical support in strengthening their epidemiological surveillance systems for both animal and human infections. With significant support and coordination, these financial institutions can greatly assist poor countries in the vaccination and culling of animals. In this regard, the International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Influenza that was held in Beijing in January 2006, which raised $1.9 billion, is a good start in this direction, especially in filling in the gaps in disease control at all levels.\(^{37}\) One hopes, of course, that these pledges will be speedily translated into actual financial contributions while there is still momentum. Moreover, as with contributions for any international disaster, there also needs to be a framework for efficient donor coordination that clearly identifies the needs and gaps and at the same time defines the respective roles of different partners.

**MANAGING THE POLITICS OF CRISIS HEALTH MANAGEMENT**

The so-called politics of crisis health management—a salient issue that has emerged in the handling of the bird flu outbreak—is the uncoordinated responses of different agencies. The inevitable competing claims often reflect the traditional mindset of most agencies and bureaus that are slow to adopt new operational mandates that extend beyond their area of responsibility. The unfolding avian flu crisis has shown that it is both a human and animal problem and thus requires further inter-agency collaboration to strengthen the animal and human epidemiological systems.

Moreover, there is also the political-economy dimension of the problem. It has been observed that one of the factors for the slow response to H5N1 crisis is that some sectors of the economy, like the poultry industry, in many countries see the problem as an economic issue more than a health issue. One example to this is the compensation for culled birds. In Indonesia, where H5N1 is now endemic, enforcement measures such as culling and vaccination of poultry and other animals had been hampered by the government’s inability to provide adequate compensation to farmers in Java.\(^{38}\) The same difficulties regarding compensation of poultry owners apply to Vietnam.\(^{39}\)

Finally, there is the contentious issue of the production of antiviral drugs for avian flu. Apart from the monopoly for in the production of antiviral drugs like Tamiflu, supplies are also heavily concentrated in developed countries despite the fact that the disease is concentrated largely in Asia.\(^{40}\) When news broke out of the first avian flu case in Europe, European countries were in a rush to stock-up on antiviral drugs. The monopoly in “drug manufacturing has also seen orders coming in faster what production can fill.”\(^{41}\) In the event of a pandemic, a WHO official had estimated that 300,000 to 1 million people would immediately need antivirals, but given the limited stock, there is concern that the richer nations may dominate vaccine supply.\(^{42}\) This is major issue for several developing countries in East Asia that do not have enough resources to stockpile these kinds of expensive drugs.

In brief, more can be done to enhance international cooperation in responding to the immediate problems of stockpiling antiviral drugs in developing countries. Although the WHO is prepared to supply large quantities of the antiviral drug when a pandemic starts, the organization could certainly benefit from the support of the international community and the multinational drug companies to intensify efforts in vaccine development. It is noteworthy that amidst the call for stocking up on drugs, other scientists have raised concern about the efficacy of current drugs given the uncertainty as to whether an emergent pandemic strain would respond to the usual regime.\(^{43}\) Hence, sharing of knowledge and expertise by the epistemic communities who are best placed to stimulate innovative thinking and research are even more critical now. Their intervention in providing more information and sharing research findings on epidemiology, among others, is an integral part of the global approach for global health. As Inge Kaul has argued, “merely upholding patent rights over people’s rights to a decent life is no longer a feasible policy option. People today increasingly expect efficiency, equity, growth and human development.”\(^{44}\) Thus, one possible option that needs to be explored is allowing countries with the capacity to manufacture drugs and vaccines to negotiate with big multinational drug companies and assist them with technology transfers, especially during national health crises.

Against the daunting challenges to combat new and re-emerging infectious diseases, the message that is coming across is for the international community to find new ways to address the complex problems of providing global health security, hence, the argument for adopting the global public goods (GPG) approach.

*Although … regional initiatives … reflect a greater level of mobilization to address gaps in the region’s preparedness, these initiatives are still quite limited in their application.*

\[\text{—— 41 ——}\]
CONCLUSION: BRINGING BACK HEALTH AND HUMAN SECURITY

The previous discussion points to a salient issue that needs to be highlighted if the international community were to adopt the GPG approach: facing up to the challenge of putting health and human security in the security agenda of states. Health issues are no longer just “medical” concerns but also a security concern. The artificial distinctions between ‘health’ and ‘security’ are no longer valid. Unless the hurdle is crossed from “medicalizing” infectious diseases to “securitizing” them, not much progress can be made to push this agenda forward.

More importantly, beyond a change in mindset is also the need to adopt a more comprehensive—more global approach—to address some of the critical tasks ahead in fighting against infectious diseases. Three challenges were cited above. One was the importance of building a good mechanism for regional disease surveillance mechanism, which also needs to be plugged into global body like the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network initiated by the WHO in 1997 and maintained by Health Canada.

The second challenge is the centrality of providing good public health system for the protection of the people. In this regard, something must be done to improve the record of primary health care in many parts in Asia and this is an endeavor that requires not only multilateral but also multi-sectoral cooperation. And, third was the important need to address interrelated issues of the politics of crisis health management—i.e. re-thinking operational procedures to allow for more interagency collaboration in stemming the spread of infection, paying attention to the political-economy of production and distribution of anti-viral as well issues of economic compensation for affected farmers in the culling of birds and/or other animals.

In conclusion, beyond the securitization of infectious diseases, it is therefore crucial that regional and international cooperation must be improved in order to address many of the challenges highlighted above. That said, much of course would still depend on the will of states and other international agencies to cooperate and act decisively on these measures. The interlinked factors discussed above inevitably raise the question of enhancing governance at the national, regional and international level. Hence, while securitization has attracted the attention of policymakers and has placed the issue of infectious diseases prominently in the global agenda, advancing the cause of health and human security needs to be complemented with multi-dimensional, multi-level, and multi-sectoral initiatives. Addressing the threats and challenges of infectious diseases is therefore a global concern that needs no less than a global, integrated response.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS:

■ Make production and distribution mechanisms for vaccines and other medicines more effective and efficient. This may include setting up local production facilities rather than relying on supplies from developed countries. As developed countries also have high stakes in preventing a pandemic, they should assist in building up developing countries’ stockpiles.

■ Build credible and effective national and regional surveillance systems for monitoring infectious disease outbreaks. ASEAN’s less developed countries, for example, will need targeted assistance in developing core capacities in their public health bureaucracies. National and regional surveillance networks should also build linkages with other networks outside the region and interface with the Global Outbreak Alert Response Network (GOARN).

■ Bolster the region’s early reporting and rapid response capabilities by committing the necessary financing and human resources. Where national-level resources fall short, international institutions such as the World Bank and ADB should be approached to assist in providing technical support and training for vaccinating and culling animals.

■ Provisions for compensating those who stand to lose most from aggressive culling measures must be included in any contingency plan. Otherwise, Asian governments cannot expect full societal cooperation.

About the Author
Dr. Mely C. Anthony is the Secretary General of the Non-Traditional Security Studies program at RSIS in Singapore, where she is also an Associate Professor.


5 See, for example Mary Kay Kindhauser, ed. Global Defence Against the Infectious Disease Threat (Geneva: WHO, 2003).

6 Brower and Chalk: 14.


8 Brower and Chalk: 17-18.

9 Ibid.


15 See for example, APEC Action Plan on the Prevention and Response to Avian and Influenza Pandemics, 2006/AIPMM/014; and East Asia Summit Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response, at http://www.aseansec.org/18101.htm.


17 Ibid.


19 East Asia Summit Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response Available from: http://www.aseansec.org/18101.htm.

20 Ibid.


27 WHO/UNAIDS Section on “Asia”, p. 27.


29 See WHO UNAIDS Fact Sheet, updated December 2006.


31 For example, “Indonesia on Cusp of AIDS epidemic: UNAIDS Chief”, Channelnews Asia, 28 November 2005. In the report Mr. Peter Piot, UNAIDS chief had warned that given the increasing number of people in Indonesia infected with HIV, the country could be on the brink of an AIDS epidemic, and thus urging authorities to act quickly to fight its spread.


37 Leading the list of contributors were the World Bank with $500 million and ADB with $470 million. Among the leading state and regional contributors were the United States with $334 million, EU with $260 million, Japan with $159 million and China with $10 million.


40 Tamiflu is the only flu vaccine approved in the United States, which makes the antiviral drug shortage even more severe.

41 In October 2005, the United States called for a stockpile to treat 20 million Americans, yet only had enough supply to treat 2.3 million. Meanwhile, it is reported that it will take Roche two years before it can complete the United Kingdom’s stockpile order to treat 14.6 million of its citizens. See “The Battle for Bird-Flu Profits,” The Nation, 6A, 3 October 2005.


The world is finally waking up to the very serious security challenges caused by climate change. The 2007 assessment of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has helped to bring this security dimension into sharper focus. However, the region as a whole—whether ASEAN or the wider East Asia—has neither agreed on the nature of the problems caused by climate change, nor has it devised shared strategies to deal with these problems. The region needs strong leadership because climate change is not only about sudden natural phenomenon such as typhoons and floods, but also involves long-term trends like the deterioration of land and water resources for food production, and the increased spread of disease.

**Causes:** Many Asia Pacific states have tried to avoid committing to obligations under any climate change regime. This approach will have to change for every state in the region, including developing states. Citing the need for economic growth as a justification for not taking action is no longer a valid economic argument. The 2006 “Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change,” for example, stated that failing to act on climate change could result in a global loss of 5% of GDP per year. Some estimate the losses to reach as high as 20%⁴ Governments are not the only actors who need to take action; societies, including the private sector, must change behavioral and consumption patterns to make them consistent with conservation goals.

**Effects:** In tandem with efforts at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and wasteful consumption, the Asia Pacific region must also address a side of climate change that tends to be ignored: the profound insecurities caused by climate change. Based on the IPCC report, we can expect to see at least the following four impacts:

### 1) THE COMING STORMS
Natural disasters such as cyclones, typhoons, hurricanes, and floods are becoming more frequent and more severe. Recent weather-related crises in Southeast Asia are a case in point. In December 2006, Typhoon Durian killed 1000 people in the Philippines. The following summer, a tropical storm there displaced 32,000. More recently, flooding in Vietnam killed at least 100 people and forced the evacuation of 17,000 more. And in late 2006 and early 2007, the Malaysian government had to evacuate nearly 200,000 people because of what some said was the worst flooding in a century.⁴

Vulnerability to natural disasters is by no means limited to Southeast Asia; East Asian and South Asian coastal areas will also be affected. Many of these coastal areas are home to some of the region’s most economically vibrant cities. Therefore, in addition to the humanitarian consequences, there could also be a steep economic price to pay for climate change. Dr. Kansri Boonprakob, currently the Vice Chair of the IPCC’s Working Group 1, estimates that between 1989 and 2002, natural disasters cost his

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### COUNTRIES MOST HIT BY NATURAL DISASTERS – 2005

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**Source:** United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 2005 Disasters in Numbers.  
native Thailand $3 billion. As weather events grow in severity and frequency, their ability to disrupt Asia’s economic growth will become a greater and greater matter of concern.

2) TOO MUCH WATER
Rising Sea Levels Are Making Some Areas Uninhabitable. Inundation, ‘storm surge’, and coastal erosion are being felt most acutely in low-lying Pacific island states. Vanuatu, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, and island groups within Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands are most at risk. The Papua New Guinea government has already begun evacuating residents from its Carteret Islands. For Tuvalu and Kiribati, the reality is equally stark: some experts estimate that they could be almost completely submerged by the mid-21st century. Re-locating coastal populations and infrastructures within these states will be a near-term solution for some of these islands. But their small landmasses and the extent of sea level rise could require longer-term solutions involving permanent resettlement in other countries.

Rising water levels will also affect heavily populated “mega-delta” areas of Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Asia. The World Bank reports that southern Vietnam will be especially vulnerable, particularly the Mekong and Red River Delta areas that supply half of Vietnam’s rice.

3) NOT ENOUGH WATER
The supply of fresh water is shrinking while the demand for it is growing. Population increases and higher standards of living in many parts of Asia are putting unprecedented pressures on the region’s fresh water supply. At the same time, two factors are reducing the total amount of water available:

1) higher average temperatures are causing drought and desertification;
2) contamination from industrial pollution and higher rates of salinity are making much fresh water unfit for consumption or irrigation.

The water shortage crisis is not limited to developing countries—Australia has now endured several consecutive years of drought—but northern China and Mongolia are expected to be especially impacted. Moreover, some observers warn that water scarcity could act as conflict catalyst both within and between countries.

4) NOT ENOUGH FOOD
Natural disasters, land erosion, and water scarcity will all impact Asia’s capacity to feed itself. In a 2006 Lowy Institute report, Alan Dupont and Graeme Pearman list four ways in which climate change will adversely affect the region’s food supply:

1) Several basic crops could become ‘sterile’ in response to rising temperatures.
2) Agricultural production will be disrupted by extreme weather events.
3) Desertification and soil erosion could make currently productive land unproductive, particularly as rainfall patterns continue to change.
4) As sea levels rise, fertile coastal land will be flooded and unusable. In addition, altered ocean currents could disrupt fish breeding grounds. This will be especially troubling for Southeast Asians, who currently consume between 25% and 50% of their protein from fish.

WHO IS MOST VULNERABLE?
The region’s less developed countries (LDCs) will be most vulnerable to climate change. This is not to say that developed countries are immune; in 2005, Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that even wealthy countries suffer from critical gaps in disaster management. But many Asia Pacific LDCs have much weaker infrastructures and response capabilities for dealing with issues such as evacuating populations during a natural disaster. In addition, many LDCs’ economic activity is concentrated in areas that are particularly climate-sensitive, such as agriculture and fish farming.
The climate change impact on low-lying areas such as the Pacific islands poses a different kind of challenge. Some have argued that these migrants should be granted official refugee status and allowed to resettle in other countries. But there are legal complications with the notion of “climate refugees”, as the current refugee conventions do not extend to individuals fleeing climate-induced situations. Moreover, resolution of the climate refugee problem is complicated by finding states which are willing to accept them. New Zealand has made some arrangements with these populations, but the number of climate refugees is likely to be too large for one state to absorb.

LOOKING AHEAD

The 13th ASEAN Summit in late 2007 could be a critical venue for regional actors to address climate change. Whether the security consequences, as well as possible regional mitigation and adaptation strategies, are a part of that discussion remains to be seen.

The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (AP6), formed in 2005 by Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. (and later joined by Canada) will be another initiative to watch. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, this agreement does not impose on its members mandatory cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Critics say that its agreements are therefore ineffectual. Proponents, however, note that the AP6 could encourage China and India, neither of which faces mandatory cuts under Kyoto, to reduce its emissions through market mechanisms.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Prior to its 12th Summit in January 2007, climate change was not a focus for ASEAN. This seems to be changing, however, partly in response to shifts in international opinion. For the wider Asian region, the 2nd East Asia Summit, also in January 2007, may be seen as a marker of change; its participants took a significant step forward on the issue of climate change, at least within the context of energy security. The region’s commitments to dealing with the security dimensions of climate change discussed here, however, have lagged behind. These commitments should pursue at least the following three areas.

■ Develop Regional Capacity to Respond to Natural Disasters. In July 2007, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) considered creating a rapid-response group that would be available to the region in emergencies. Management of natural disasters should clearly be an area of priority for this group. This could also be forum for the region’s states to exchange best practices in disaster management.

Strengthen Water Management Strategies between and within States. The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), comprising China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar, is one such area that will require careful management.

Pursue Investment and Innovation in New Technologies. In recent years, the processes for treating and recycling water have been transformed and tested in several countries. The region should pursue these new technologies, as well as technologies for using water more efficiently.

About the Author
Dr. Simon Tay is Chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and a law professor at the National University of Singapore. He is also the Chairman of the National Environment Agency for the Singaporean government.

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Three series of developments have thrust issues of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction at the center of security discussions in Asia. First, many Asian countries are exhibiting a growing eagerness to participate in international peace operations. Second, Asian regional institutions’ approaches to matters of security and conflict resolution have been evolving and now include more specific attention to peacekeeping and post-conflict resolution. Third, changes at the United Nations, such as the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine will force regional actors to consider the implications of these developments for their participation in UN peace missions.

ASIA’S GROWING PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

China, Japan, and Vietnam have recently joined countries with much longer histories of involvement in international peace operations, such as India and Malaysia. For China, this is an opportunity to demonstrate that it is a responsible power in international affairs, an assertion that is also supported by its deeper involvement in global and regional multilateral frameworks. For Japan, participation in these operations is part of its effort to ‘normalize’ its international role. This effort was signaled by the announcement that international peace operations would constitute one of its Ministry of Defense’s key responsibilities. The ongoing debates in Japan about the constitutionality of possible military roles in such operations, and the current ambivalence about the country’s role in Afghanistan, are also part of this broader picture. And for Vietnam, this type of involvement is part of its opening up to the outside world, and coincides with its recent election to the UN Security Council as a Non-Permanent member for the coming two years.

Asian countries’ growing involvement in international peace operations will raise questions of coordination and management at the UN, regional, and national levels. At the UN level, it will reinforce Asia’s role in peacekeeping. Asia Pacific states contribute approximately half of all troops and nearly a quarter of all police deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. South Asia’s contribution is especially notable; Pakistan, Bangladesh, India and Nepal are the UN’s four largest troop contributing countries (TCC). To put it succinctly, without Asia, there would be no UN peacekeeping. China’s and Japan’s expanding presence in UN peace operations will further shift the centre of gravity of these operations toward Asia. This shift could exacerbate tensions between the Security Council, which approves and frames the mandates on UN peacekeeping missions, and the Asian TCCs, who are tasked with implementing these mandates on the ground but have no direct input into their initial formulation. China’s role, as the only Asian Permanent Member of the Security Council and as a contributor of UN troops, will be critical. It will also be watched closely by India, which is a key player in UN peacekeeping missions, yet is excluded from Security Council discussions on these missions’ mandates.

At the regional level, growing Chinese and Japanese involvement in international peace operations corresponds
with broader shifts in their respective security doctrines. In both cases, these shifts facilitate deeper engagement in regional multilateral frameworks. This is especially true in China’s case. Their participation also opens up the possibility of expanded military-to-military contacts between Asia’s three giants—India, China, and Japan—in the context of joint training for international peace operations.

At the national level, the increased participation of new Asian TCCs raises questions of what impact this participation will have on civil-military relations in each of these countries. Will national peacekeeping centers provide an adequate formation for Asia’s future peacekeepers? This speaks to a number of issues ranging from the need to develop programs able to ensure adequate knowledge of current peacekeeping doctrines to much more pragmatic questions of language training. The lingua franca of international peace operations is often English. Will China and Vietnam have sufficient English-speaking officers to contribute fully to such operations? From a wider perspective, participation in international peace operations also resonates within changing civil-military relations at the national level. For example, the Chinese and Vietnamese militaries may be called upon, in the context of international peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction, to promote democratic governance abroad. How will this influence the way these militaries look at themselves and how they relate to civilian authorities and democratic movements at home?

WHAT ROLE FOR ASIAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?

A second series of developments concerns changes in the way Asian regional institutions approach matters of security and conflict resolution, specifically the growing attention to peacekeeping and post-conflict resolution. ASEAN has established peacekeeping and “post-conflict peacebuilding” as focal points of its security discourse by placing them within the overall agenda of developing an ASEAN Security Community (ASC). The initial proposal for the ASC also contained a proposal for the creation of an “ASEAN Peacekeeping Force.” While the project was admittedly optimistic, it did force a debate on the issue, and now seems to have moved toward the more likely establishment of an ASEAN Regional Peacekeeping Centre. The Vientiane Action Plan, promulgated in 2004 to spell out the different “strategic thrusts” ASEAN would pursue as part of the implementation of the ASC, proposed, in that regard, “utilizing existing and planned national peacekeeping
centers in some ASEAN Member Countries to establish regional arrangements for the maintenance of peace and stability,” and “undertaking joint conflict management and resolution research studies and exchanges among ASEAN centers of excellence on peace.” As part of the development of strategies of post-conflict peacebuilding, the document also stated that over time, ASEAN should “strengthen humanitarian assistance by providing safe havens in conflict areas,” and should “work towards the establishment of an ASEAN humanitarian crisis management/assistance centre.” Finally, the ASEAN-ISIS network has more recently suggested the creation of an ASEAN Peace and Reconciliation Council to provide the Association expert advice on matters of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has also become concerned with issues of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. The greater weight now given to the pursuit of “preventive diplomacy” within the ARF has led it to consider ways in which peacekeeping could promote regional peace and security. The first “ARF Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting” was held in Malaysia on March 7 – 9, 2007 and the Co-Chairs’ Report noted, quite significantly, that “some ARF participants were already carrying out peacekeeping exercises on a bilateral basis, and that the ARF could look into the possibility of joint training/capacity-building measures and joint deployment for peacekeeping operations in the future.”

For both ASEAN and the ARF, a two-fold rationale justifies building Asian capacities to engage in peace operations. First, the persistence of conflict, humanitarian crisis, and threatened social collapse within Asia, demands that the region be prepared to offer some kind of constructive response. Second, ASEAN and the ARF have reached critical junctures in their organizational evolution. Both must now demonstrate that they have reached a level of maturity permitting them to tackle these kinds of tough situations. Overcoming the institutional inertia that has beset both ASEAN and the ARF will be a first step in creating new mechanisms and doctrines that will pave the way for more meaningful regional involvement in international peace operations.

CHANGES AT THE UNITED NATIONS
The September 2005 World Summit set in motion the establishment of a new UN Peacebuilding Commission, which eventually took concrete form in mid-2006. The Commission is intended to provide a mechanism through which long-term consultations and exchanges of views can take place between the different international parties involved in operations of post-conflict reconstruction. According to Catherine Guicherd, this new structure provides welcome institutional support at the UN for these operations, but this says little about how it will be used, including by Asian countries. The Peacebuilding Commission brings together in its Organizational Committee, China, which can use its position at the Security Council to undercut the Commission’s deliberations, Japan, which is one of the top financial contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget, and India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, the three largest contributors to UN peace operations. How each of these countries will bring different agendas and perspectives to bear on the work of the Commission, and the extent to which Asia’s ‘voice’ will be heard in its deliberations, are all open questions at this point.

The UN has also endorsed the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). What remains to be seen are the concrete operational consequences of this endorsement. Discussions of new norms of international intervention have proved extraordinarily controversial in Asia, and there is little prospect that this will change in the near future. R2P provides, however, a central axis of debate surrounding the formulation and implementation of international peace operations. Asian countries will thus have little choice but to engage themselves seriously in those debates if they want to increase their visibility and influence in UN operations.

NEXT STEPS
What are the concrete policy initiatives that should follow from these various developments? The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) created a two-year Study Group to answer that question, and its deliberations provide indications of the best way forward. The Study Group was co-chaired by Jusuf Wanandi from Indonesia, and Pierre P. Lizée from Canada, and also included three notable experts: Lieutenant General Satish Nambar (Retd) from India, who was the first Force Commander and Head of the United Nations Forces in the former Yugoslavia and a member of the 2003-2004 High Level Panel on UN Reform set up by the UN Secretary General; Ambassador Omar Halim from Indonesia, who was the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General to Armenia and Azerabaijan on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh, and to Cameroon and Nigeria on the question of the Bakassi Peninsula; and Brigadier (Retd.) Roger Mortlock from New Zealand, who was Regional Commander with the United Nations in Angola, in 1992-1993, and Commander of the initial Truce Monitoring Group in Bougainville in 1997 – 1998.

In this Study Group’s meetings, previous peace operations in the region—in Cambodia, Aceh, and Timor Leste—were studied, as were the approaches and doctrines of the UN and regional actors regarding international peace operations. Three main policy proposals emerged out of its work.’

1) Develop Regional Networks of Peacekeeping Training Centers
Mechanisms must be developed at the regional level to facilitate the sharing of peacekeeping experiences and best practices. Joint training programs should be established between national peacekeeping centers so that information on national technical and doctrinal approaches to international peace operations can benefit all regional actors involved in such operations. In the first instance, a network connecting the various national peacekeeping training centers in Asia within the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centers (currently headquartered at the United Service Institution of India Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping (USI-CUNPK)) could be established. In parallel, ASEAN should pursue its efforts to develop an ASEAN Regional Peacekeeping Centre that draws on the expertise now in place in national peacekeeping centers in Southeast Asia. The ARF could build on these programs and networks to establish its own joint training programs.

Joint training programs between national peacekeeping centers could be quite easily established if there is sufficient political will to do so. This would entail, after all, sharing information that is quite technical nature but would still yield significant benefits. These programs would also provide a structure through which interaction between Asian countries participating in international operations, both within and outside the region, could become a regular and uncontroversial affair. Asian countries that are now in the process of developing national peacekeeping centers could utilize the expertise that joint training programs would offer. The programs could also provide direct points of contact between the wide array of regional actors involved in UN peace operations and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices Unit.

WHERE ARE ASIA PACIFIC COUNTRIES SUPPORTING UN MISSIONS*?

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* These numbers do not include military observers. (For information on Asia Pacific states’ involvement in non-UN missions, please see Chapter 8 and Chapter 9.)

African missions include: MINURCAT (Central African Republic and Chad), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIS (Sudan), UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), MONUC (Democratic Republic of Congo), UNMEE (Ethiopia and Eritrea), and MINURSO (Western Sahara). Middle East missions include: UNDOF (Golan Heights), UNIFIL (Lebanon), and UNTSO (Middle East). Latin American missions include: MINUSTAH (Haiti). European missions include: UNIFICT (Cyprus), UNOMIG (Georgia), and UNMIK (Kosovo). Asian missions include: UNMIT (Timor-Leste) and UNMOGIP (India-Pakistan). UNAMA (Afghanistan), UNOSIL (Sierra Leone), and BINUB (Burundi) are political missions and those numbers are not reflected here.
2) Develop a Peacebuilding Program within the ASEAN Secretariat.

It is within ASEAN that discussions on possible regional responses to regional conflicts have been pushed the farthest. The Association, as noted above, has considered the creation of an ASEAN Regional Peacekeeping Centre and an ASEAN Humanitarian Crisis Management/Assistance Centre. ASEAN now has a powerful model of regional cooperation in matters of post-conflict reconstruction: the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). The AMM, an EU-led civilian crisis management mission, included monitors from five ASEAN member states: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Brunei. The AMM deployed in September 2005, exactly one month after the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia reached a peace agreement that was encapsulated in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The AMM’s mandate was to monitor the implementation of the MoU. Specifically, this meant the demobilization of GAM and the decommissioning of its weapons, the redeployment of non-organic TNI (Indonesian military) and police, and the reintegration of GAM members into Acehnese society. It was also tasked with monitoring the human rights situation and legislative change in Aceh, ruling on disputed amnesty cases, and investigating violations of the terms of the MoU. The AMM experience has demonstrated ASEAN’s ability to deploy a multi-national contingent in the heart of Southeast Asia, in a long-term peace operation combining civilian and military personnel in a mission involving issues as diverse as decommissioning and reintegration of ex-combatants, development of the rule of law, and the promotion of post-conflict economic development.

Strengthened by the AMM experience, and moved by the interest with which many in the region are looking at the further involvement of ASEAN in regional peace operations, the Association’s Secretariat should establish an ASEAN Peacebuilding Program. The goal would be to provide ASEAN with an administrative structure that would allow it to coordinate the different elements of response in a conflict situation in the region—aid in cases of humanitarian crises, for instance, involving large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), or the long-range economic support that it could also offer. The Peacebuilding Program would also make available to ASEAN a coordinating and consultative mechanism that allows it to gauge the nature and scope of its involvement in possible regional humanitarian and peacebuilding missions. It would permit political discussions on the possibility of such mission to proceed on the basis of better knowledge of resources, management, and strategies, all of which are likely to play a role in the unfolding of these missions. Finally, the Peacebuilding Program would provide a channel of interaction within the ASEAN Secretariat for the ASEAN Regional Peacekeeping Centre now being discussed in regional circles, and for the ASEAN Peace and Reconciliation Council proposed by ASEAN-ISIS. In both cases, the objective would be to ensure that the views of regional military, academic, and civil society experts, on possible regional humanitarian or peacebuilding operations are part of ASEAN’s more formal debates on these issues.

The notion of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force is still undoubtedly a bridge too far, as many in Southeast Asia have resisted it to such an extent that it will remain unrealistic in the near term. A Peacebuilding Program might therefore be a feasible and beneficial next step. It would allow the Association to build on the success and lessons of the AMM and to develop a set of regional guidelines and doctrines to direct its involvement in other operations of post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding in Southeast Asia. And it would offer a channel through which expert advice coming from a variety of settings in the region could inform ASEAN deliberations on these issues.

3) Advance Regional Discussions within the ARF

The ARF constitutes the logical end point of regional discussions on an increased Asian role in international peace operations. Efforts by China and Japan to develop their roles in international missions, for instance, have implications for the security outlook of both countries. These implications should be discussed in a regional setting, and the ARF provides the most suitable framework. The current attempt to develop an agenda of discussion within the ARF on issues of peacekeeping and peacebuilding is thus welcomed. As noted above, the ARF Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting has gone further than this, and invited the members of the Forum to “look into the possibility of joint training and capacity-building measures, and joint deployments.” This raises the possibility of pan-regional discussions on some form of Asian mechanism to support on-the-ground regional peace initiatives in Asia. The agenda of discussion just initiated by the ARF could thus
have extremely wide-ranging implications.

Precisely for that reason, however, progress on these discussions is likely to be slow and measured. If it is not possible to know exactly where they will lead, the elements necessary to any significant movement forward can be readily identified. These elements need to be a focus of action at this early stage of discussions within the ARF. Only if they are addressed now will substantive progress be forthcoming later on.

1) ASEAN Leadership: Any agenda of change requires a champion able to continue pushing it forward over the long term. Given its position within the ARF, and the importance that issues of peacekeeping and peacebuilding are gaining within its security agenda, it is incumbent on ASEAN to play such a role. However, ASEAN must first establish within itself a greater degree of unity on these issues than is presently the case.

2) A Renewed Regional Security Agenda: Any discussion within the ARF on the “the possibility of joint training and capacity-building measures, and joint deployments” will quickly raise larger issues that relate to the very basis of regional security in Asia. These discussions will in all likelihood include consideration of new forms of military-to-military contacts in Asia and the broader security benefits which could be drawn from such models of enhanced regional military cooperation. Furthermore, a new vision of multilateral regional security in Asia will be at stake in these discussions. Attention will need to be given to the extent to which Asia’s main military powers are willing to commit themselves to new forms of multilateral conflict management in the region. Unless these larger questions are handled with finesse and with a certain degree of consensus, progress on the more technical measures contemplated thus far is unlikely.

3) The China-India-Japan Triangle: A third and more fundamental question is to what extent Asia’s three giants will involve themselves in these discussions and feel bound by the regional arrangements they might produce. As noted earlier, each of these countries brings differing, and somewhat contradictory, perspectives to any discussion of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. China is the only one sitting among the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council, where mandates for international peace missions are most often hammered out; India is a major troop contributor to these missions, though it is excluded from that decision-making process; and Japan, although it is the second largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget, is also marginalized in the formulation of mandates because of its absence at the Security Council.

Discussions that involve these three countries is bound to run quite quickly into rather sharp debates about who decides, who pays, and who fights on the ground, when an international peace mission is set in motion. Where this will play in the ARF is in the fact that these different perspectives will certainly influence what each country has to say about regional developments in matters of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. Certainly, at a minimum none of them will endorse at the regional level arrangements which could undermine agendas and positions that they might want to defend, for example, within the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This is perhaps where the leadership of ASEAN and others will prove most decisive: by balancing the global concerns of these three countries against the benefits they each could draw from new forms of pan-Asian regional cooperation in matters, for instance, of post-conflict reconstruction.

**FUTURE CHALLENGES**

For the region’s political leaders, connecting more closely the activities of national peacekeeping centers, developing an administrative structure within ASEAN to focus to its discussions about regional post-conflict reconstruction, and building on those measures to add to the momentum of ongoing ARF talks about possible joint regional peacekeeping and peacebuilding mechanisms in Asia, all seem feasible and logical in the present context. In the short term, some energy and momentum can be expected on all these fronts. In the longer term, however, there will be other challenges. These challenges will not necessarily halt this momentum, but they will need to be addressed by the region eventually. Only then can the new approach to the pursuit of peace in Asia that is contained in current regional talks and activities come to fruition.

_The first and most important challenge relates to current developments at the United Nations. All discussions in Asia about a possible regional peacekeeping or peacebuilding capacity begin with the caveat that any initiative should be, in the language of the UN Charter, “consistent with_
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” Advocates of regional initiatives argue that the Charter allows, and indeed encourages, the creation of “regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action” but also that these initiatives should always respect the legal and political principles established by the UN. There is, in current regional discussion on these issues, a concern with embedding any possible regional mechanism in the global norms and practices represented by the UN. There is also quite often a more strategic agenda. China, for instance, undoubtedly insists that the main decision-making processes regarding international peace missions should remain in the hands of the UN Security Council because it is advantaged as the Council’s sole Asian Permanent Member.

The problem, however, is that the norms and practices of the UN are themselves somewhat ambiguous at the moment.

As already noted, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has become part of the UN vocabulary, though the exact operational meaning of the concept is still in need of clear definition. And the precise functions of the new Peacebuilding Commission are also still being determined. Asia must be involved in the debates on both of these issues; its importance in the conduct and financing of international peace missions makes this unavoidable. This also means, however, that the region must now reengage in debates surrounding R2P. Previous regional discussions on the concept have shown the main regional players’ reluctance to endorse it in any form. Now that the UN gave its backing to R2P, modalities will need to be defined and new practices established. It is on the basis that the region must now return to the entire debate about R2P. The tangle over Darfur, including China’s views, does not lend itself to optimism on the issue. Nonetheless, taking up the question again in a regional setting cannot be avoided. Moreover, the course of these debates is bound to have an impact not only at the UN, but also at a regional level, within the initiatives proposed here.

Beyond all of this looms a central issue: what should be status of regional initiatives vis-à-vis the UN? A set of regional precedents is now emerging with regard to the AMM and other operations led by regional actors. A clear example of this is the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) led by Australia and New Zealand. (See Chapter 8 for a wider discussion of RAMSI.) And several initiatives are now under way which will give greater impetus to developing regional expertise and a set of regional experiences in matters of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. The goal should not be to completely replace the UN when it comes to providing peace operations in Asia. Instead, it should be to provide additional and perhaps more flexible and rapidly available resources, and to put the region at the heart of the doctrinal and operational discussions entailed by such operations. The point is important because it speaks to the ability of the UN to set in motion such operations. Too often, the notion is advanced at UN Headquarters that “the UN cannot be everywhere,” and that it can thus be forgiven for not intervening in situations of dire conflict and violence. Another argument is that regional actors should take the lead as a way of absolving the UN of its responsibilities. The creation of regional capacities for peacekeeping and peace-building in Asia should counter these arguments rather than support them. These regional capacities, in other words, should facilitate the UN’s involvement, and to convey that if it does get involved, regional actors and regional capacities will become part of the equation and will facilitate the development and implementation of operational mandates. A modus operandi and ultimately a sense of balance must be found between the UN and regional actors in Asia. This will be the central challenge in the coming few years.

The point underscores a crucial dilemma at the UN. As scholars such as Brian Job and Andy Knight have noted, the UN has put forward different models to guide its consideration of the possible roles of regional organizations in international peace operations. Discussions surrounding the Agenda for Peace, for instance, noted alternative possible models defined as “consultation, diplomatic support, operational support, codeployment, and joint operations.” Beyond all this vocabulary, however, is the search for a grand bargain. As Job remarks, the UN wants to provide legitimacy to international peace operations, in return for which regional organizations will then have to put forth the resources necessary for these operations, both in terms of personnel and financial support. This speaks to a profound ongoing debate about who can give legitimacy to international operations and who has the responsibility to conduct them. Asia has not been part of that debate so far because its regional organizations have not involved themselves directly in peace operations. This
stands in contrast, for instance, to what has been happening in Europe with NATO. Nonetheless, the Asia Pacific region, because the reasons mentioned here, is now bound to become a central interlocutor in that debate. What will be decided here will matter not only for the region itself, but also for the very way in which questions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding are considered at the UN.

This is the angle from which the region must now consider current discussions at the UN regarding the future functions of the newly created Peacebuilding Commission. One should not expect from the Commission grand pronouncements on the underlying principles of international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Its role will be more one of defining pragmatic mechanisms of implementation and cooperation in the conduct of these

Currently, the most notable UN peacekeeping mission in the Asia Pacific region is UNMIT, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste. As of October 2007, 41 countries were contributing civilian police officers to the mission. Among the top ten contributors are Malaysia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Portugal, Philippines, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Australia, and Zimbabwe. Some have suggested that it could be a near future focus of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. UNMIT was preceded by two other UN missions: UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor), from October 1999 to May 2002; and UNMISET (UN Mission of Support in East Timor), from May 2002 to May 2005. Because of the recent volatility of East Timor’s security situation, the new country has been suggested as a possible focus of future UN Peacebuilding Commission attention.

UNPOLICECOMMITMENTSTOUNMIT(EASTTIMOR)

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UNMIT TIMELINE

August 25, 2006
UN Security Council Resolution 1704 establishes the United Nations Integrated Mission to Timor-Leste (UNMIT), citing ongoing security threats to the newly independent country.

September 1, 2006
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expresses concerns about rising violence in Timor-Leste.

September 14, 2006
UN Police (UNPOL) assumes command of Timor-Leste’s national policing.

September 27, 2006
The first group of Timor-Leste police return to work under a UN monitoring scheme. They had been relieved of duty when violence broke out in the capital city of Dili earlier in the year.

October 25, 2006
The UN police force intervenes to halt fighting between gangs and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

December 7, 2006
Rodolfo Aser Tor of the Philippines becomes UNMIT’s new Police Commissioner.

February 5, 2007
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warns that the security situation in Timor-Leste remains volatile.

February 22, 2007
The Security Council decides to extend UNMIT for one year, to February 2008, and to increase its mission strength by 140 police officers.

March 21, 2007
The UN reports that while the overall level of violence in Timor-Leste appears to be on the wane, the number of IDPs in Dili continues to rise.

June 27, 2007
The UN envoy to Timor-Leste commends that country’s political parties and the Timorese people for the mostly peaceful manner in which political campaigning for parliamentary elections had been conducted.

August 11, 2007
A UN convoy is attacked with stones and reported gunshots.

September 27
Timorese President Jose Ramos-Horta asks the UN to extend its engagement in Timor-Leste in order to assist with strengthening its institutions and supporting its democratization.

October 3, 2007
The Timor-Leste police arrest Vicente da Conceicao, a suspect in provoking the violence that resulted in 37 deaths and 155,000 IDPs in May 2006.

November 8, 2007
UNMIT releases a report that shows progress in promoting human rights, but also warns that the gains are still fragile.

November 26, 2007
UNMIT and Timor-Leste police officers, with help from the International Security Forces (ISF), complete a weapons recovery operation in Dili.
operations. It remains the case, however, that it will be through these more pragmatic considerations that new frameworks for setting in place practices and roles for regional organizations are most likely to be established. The region would then have every advantage in ensuring that it is most forcefully involved in the discussions which will unfold at the Commission in the coming months and years.

Two other perhaps more challenges will also need to be addressed. The first concerns civil-military relations in Asia. Discussions about peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction are at the same time discussions about models of development and legitimacy: bringing peace to a society and rebuilding it after a conflict revolves around choices about the most appropriate political, economic, and social institutions for sustaining stable and legitimate governments in post-conflict settings. If Asia’s militaries engage themselves in the discussions proposed here, such as in the context of an enhanced interaction between national peacekeeping centers, these issues will thus need to be tackled. Civil society organizations—NGOs, aid agencies, and the like—will also want to engage the militaries from the region on these matters. This could lead to valuable exchanges between regional NGOs, civil society organizations, and regional militaries, and perhaps, to new forms of collaboration between them. However, these exchanges could also bring about divisive confrontations over political beliefs and traditions. The challenge for the region will be to ensure that it is the first scenario, rather than the second one, which prevails.

Finally, the evolving American position on issues of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction will need to be considered. Needless to say, the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have given rise to harsh debates on these questions in the US. Though some form of retrenchment can be expected in the next presidential administration, American foreign policy imperatives are such that the US is bound to remain a key player in any debate on the future of international peace operations. Evaluating the likely evolution of these positions and their possible impact on Asia should thus be a priority for the region—for instance, in the context of the UN debates on the “Responsibility to Protect,” or even more so within current ARF talks on areas of possible cooperation in peace missions.

**About the Author**

Pierre P. Lizée is a Professor and the Chancellor’s Research Chair of Global Issues at Brock University in Canada. He also Co-Chair of CSCAP Canada.
1 The most detailed statistics on current UN peacekeeping missions can be found in the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

2 The remark has been made by many observers. See, for an eloquent consideration of that point, the presentations of Lt. Gen. (Retd) Satish Nambiar at the first and third meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Asia, at: http://www.cscap.ca

3 One should note, in that context, the recent establishment by Japan of a peacekeeping training center, and the creation of programs intended to train civilians to participate in peacebuilding operations. See: “Defense Ministry to Establish PKO Training Center,” Asahi Shimbun, 12 March, 2007, and “Requests Pour in for Peace Training,” Asahi Shimbun, 16 August, 2007.

4 The Vientiane Action Plan can be found on the ASEAN website: http://www.aseansec.org/.

5 The Co-Chairs’ Report of the First ARF Peacekeeping Experts’ Meeting, Port Dickson, Malaysia, 7-9 March 2007 can be found on the ARF website: http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/.


7 The reports on these meetings, as well as the lists of participants, can be found at: http://www.cscap.ca.

8 One of the notable successes of the AMM was its ability to deploy just 18 days after the EU made the decision to form the mission. For a more detailed description and analysis of the AMM, see Kirsten E. Schulze, “Mission Not So Impossible: The Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons Learned for the EU,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung International Policy Analysis, July 2007, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/04786.pdf.

9 It is Ambassador Omar Halim from Indonesia who first put forward this proposal in the deliberations of the CSCAP Study Group on Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding. See “ASEAN Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Program,” http://www.cscap.ca/Peacekeeping_Peace-building_SG.html.

10 Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations deals with “Regional Arrangements.” Article 52 of that Chapter reads in full: “Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.”


13 Job, “The UN, Regional Organizations, and Regional Conflict,” 230-231.
When the Fijian military staged a coup against that country’s democratically-elected government in 1987, it was a significant moment in two respects: first, it marked the “loss of innocence” for South Pacific democracy; and second, it gave regional policymakers a preview of the next twenty years of Oceania politics. Coups, counter-coups, and other types of conflicts have since become such a recurring theme in Fiji and other Pacific Island Countries (PICs) that some observers have characterized the region as a collection “failed states” that form an “arc of instability” around northern Australia.

Such rhetoric about state “failure”, however, is both alarmist and a misdiagnosis of the sources of Oceania’s internal conflicts. These conflicts are not “failures” of consolidated state structures or the collapse of their societies, but rather a product of state emergence. Many PICs have received their independence only in the past two or three decades. Tension between introduced state institutions and indigenous authority structures is therefore a natural by-product of this state emergence. Many of these PICs also have subsistence-based economies that are struggling to survive increased exposure to international market-based economic arrangements. The combined effect of these two things—being in an early stage of the political consolidation process and having economic vulnerabilities—has been a tendency toward internal instability.

As the Pacific becomes a new stadium for strategic competition, both the competitors and those with ringside seats will be increasingly attentive to opportunities and threats arising from the Oceania region. For reasons outlined below, PICs have been attracting increasing attention from close neighbors such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as from larger Pacific Rim states such as China, the US, and Japan, and to a lesser extent Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Korea. The actors engaged in this competition must ensure that the nature of their engagement does not destabilize PICs’ fragile governance structures, as this instability has security consequences that could ramify to the surrounding regional states.

OCEANIA AND ITS SUB-REGIONS DEFINED

Oceania, as it is understood here, is defined by the membership of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), more commonly known as ‘the Forum’. The Forum is Oceania’s principal regional organization. Its membership comprises 16 independent and self governing states, including Australia, New Zealand, and two associate members, the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia. It does not include, however, the two conflict-prone neighboring states of recently independent East Timor and the Indonesian territory of West Papua, both of which are considered part of the Asian rather than ‘Pacific’ or Oceania region.

Oceania is divided into three sub-regions. Melanesia, Australia’s main area of concern, includes Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji. Polynesia comprises New Zealand and the small island states of Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Cook Islands, Niue, Tokelau, and French Polynesia. (The Cook Islands and Niue are in free association with New Zealand, while Tokelau remains a New Zealand territory.) Micronesia, where the U.S. is most actively engaged, includes the freely associated states of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), Palau, and the former British territories of Kiribati and Nauru. Guam, Northern Marianas and American Samoa are US territories and have no formal links with the Forum.

WHAT IS AT STAKE IN OCEANIA’S STABILITY?

Oceania’s significance to larger regional players stems primarily from the growing value of its natural resources,
its location astride important shipping lanes and in militarily advantageous areas, and its voting power (which is disproportionate to its geographic, demographic, and economic size) in international forums.

**Natural Resources:** One of the largest incentives for external involvement in Oceania is its natural resources:

- **Melanesian states** have timber which has attracted buyers in Korea, China, and Malaysia; New Caledonia is an important supplier of nickel; PNG has significant oil and gas reserves; and gold is mined in Fiji, PNG and the Solomon Islands. Furthermore, PICs’ 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) gives them control over sea bed minerals and fisheries whose value will increase for many of the region’s growing economies.

- **Shipping Lanes and Military Bases:** Although small in terms of population and land area, Oceania covers a large sea area of approximately 15% of the globe. For example, Kiribati, with a population of around 100,000, spans a sea area roughly equivalent to the land area of the continental U.S. French Polynesia makes up the world’s second largest EEZ. These PICs straddle important shipping lanes whose security could potentially impact vital oil supplies en route to China and Japan.

While Polynesia and Melanesia have little military strategic significance to outside powers, this is not the case with Micronesia. The US is in the process of vastly increasing the number of US troops stationed at its military base in Guam. This troop movement is partly to support its future deployments to western Asia and a reflection of the U.S. growing concern with China’s expanding presence in Oceania. The U.S. also has an important missile testing facility on Kwajalein atoll, a component in its “star wars” anti-missile defense capability.

China had a missile tracking facility in Kiribati until a new Kiribati government ordered it closed in 2000. Although China claimed the station had no military functions, it was staffed by military personnel, was believed to have links to their space warfare program, and was conveniently located for keeping an eye on US activities on Kwajalein.

**Political Clout:** With its 14 independent and self-governing states, Oceania is a useful voting bloc in international forums. Tuvalu, with a population of just 12,000, carries the same voting power within the United Nations as heavyweights such as China, India, and the U.S. The value of Oceania’s votes therefore makes PICs a focus of diplomatic competition between competing political actors. This is especially notable in the case of diplomatic competition between Beijing and Taipei (discussed below).

Political instability in Oceania poses primarily three types of dangers to the rest of the Asia Pacific region:

- First, a lack of strong and effective governance in the PICs has allowed transnational criminal activity to flourish in some parts of Oceania. The problems that have been traced to the region read like a laundry list of transnational crimes: money laundering, identity fraud, passport sales, and trafficking in drugs, guns, and people.

- Second, the poor state of public health infrastructures in many PICs has led to an inability to contain the spread of infectious diseases. HIV/AIDS has reached “alarming levels” in PNG, which borders the Indonesian state of West Papua. Another factor enabling the spread of communicable diseases is that many of these states are popular tourist destinations for many in the region.

- Finally, although the risk of terrorism is low by international comparisons, regional states who have participated in the Iraq or Afghanistan wars have been concerned that they will be targets of extremists. New Zealand has troops in Afghanistan, and Australian troops are engaged in both conflicts (although with the election of a new government, they are now set to withdraw from Iraq). Fijians have participated in the Iraq War through enlistment in the British army and as private security forces, and Micronesians have served in these conflicts as part of the US military. The more likely terrorism threat is

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**UN: PAPUA NEW GUINEA’S AIDS EPIDEMIC “NOW IN FULL SWING”**

- Papua New Guinea (PNG) accounts for 75% of Oceania’s people living with HIV. UNAIDS has called PNG “one of the most serious HIV epidemics in the entire Asia-Pacific region.”

- UNAIDS also notes that PNG is the Asia Pacific region’s fourth country to have a generalized HIV epidemic, after Thailand, Cambodia, and Myanmar.

- Studies suggest that HIV prevalence in PNG’s urban areas could be as high as 3.5%.

- Young women in PNG are considered especially vulnerable to HIV infection.

**Sources:** UNAIDS Fact Sheet: Oceania (2006); UNAIDS Country Situation Analysis, Papua New Guinea
that lax border controls and weak law enforcement make PICs a convenient location for illegally moving people, laundering money, and selling fake passports. All of these activities have been identified as potentially playing a supporting role to terrorist activity carried out elsewhere.

THE CAUSES OF OCEANIA’S INSTABILITY AND CONFLICT

Western aid donors have been perplexed as to why rising foreign aid payments have not led to better economic performance, the ability to deliver basic government services, and internal stability in Oceania. Many have concluded that this ‘Pacific paradox’ can only be explained by the PICs’ failure to adhere to the principles of ‘good governance’. In fact, ‘governance’ has become an over-used term that originated as a polite way for aid donors to criticize aid recipients for being corrupt. The term has now expanded to cover a wide range of matters relating to the process of government, business and civil society.

In 2000, the Forum adopted the Biketawa Agreement, which defines good governance “as the exercise of authority in a manner which is open, transparent, accountable, participatory, consultative and decisive, but fair and equitable.” In effect, this meant adhering to Western styles of government, with a focus on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and a free press, and applying Western business practices such as free market economics. Western aid donors have increasingly made their aid payments conditional on meeting these types of good governance provisions. The assumption that informs this line of thinking is that it is poor governance that gives rise to instability and conflict in developing countries, and that the blame for poor economic performance is therefore seen to rest with the aid recipients.

Many of Oceania’s governments resent these ‘good governance’ impositions and have pointed to other causes of political instability, such as the poor fit between traditional and modern political systems. Western liberal forms of democracy, they say, are a “foreign flower” that is unlikely to take root in the post-colonial Pacific environment. In other words, the political systems inherited from the colonial powers are seen as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Moreover, they say, the national boundaries drawn during the colonial era have contributed to current problems; colonialism produced small, weak, non-viable, and artificial states which largely ignored local custom, and there is little or no sense of nationalism to bind the populations together as cohesive state units. These regional governments therefore argue that what has “failed” is not the new state, but rather the political system that was bequeathed to them by the departing colonial power. Several observers have noted that while PICs’ capital cities may occasionally descend into chaos, at the village level life continues as usual.

Many of these explanations given by PIC governments can be criticized for being overly simplistic, and in any case unhelpful in resolving current problems. The redrawing of national boundaries is impractical, and the appeal to custom and tradition is often used as a curtain to shield corrupt or autocratic practices. Nevertheless it is important to recognize that there is another side to the governance issue that puts into a wider context the generally accepted causes of conflict such as ethnicity, land, resources and economic inequalities.

‘NEW SECURITY’ THINKING ON OCEANIA

‘New Security’ thinking on Oceania’s instability emphasizes that the factors that ferment conflict are more fundamental than the ‘poor governance’ explanation often cited by Western governments and aid donors. Three factors are especially significant in the context of PICs.

Ethnic Divisions: Ethnic fragmentation is especially pronounced in Melanesia with the dividing lines cutting two ways: between tribes cohabiting in newly formed states, and between indigenous populations and colonial immigrants. The Westminster parliamentary systems that were imposed by former colonizers have tended to accentuate rather than minimize the effects of this fragmentation.

Unsustainable Development: In many PICs, the extraction of natural resources has been carried out in unsustainable and environmentally harmful ways. In addition, the distribution of economic benefits from these exports has been inequitable, with many of the profits going not to locals but to multinational companies. The forests of Melanesia are being logged at unsustainable levels, mining operations in several Oceania states have caused serious conflict, and fisheries are being depleted.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of unsustainable development is Nauru, which has been essentially mined out of existence now that its phosphate sources have been depleted. Within just two decades, Nauru moved from the status of the super rich to the ranks of the poverty. The culprits include a variety of regional actors—European,
Urbanization and Unemployment: Younger and more urbanized populations have contributed to two troubling social crises, particularly in Melanesia. First, a ‘youth bulge’ in population, combined with high unemployment rates in urban areas, creates prime recruiting conditions for urban gangs and militia. Second, the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS is accelerated by higher concentrations of people in cities.

In the future, rising sea levels and coastal erosion due to climate change-induced weather patterns are expected...
to be an additional source of profound internal instability. For low-lying atoll states in Micronesia and Polynesia, this is becoming a matter of survival as their land lies only a few meters above sea level. Papua New Guinea has already begun evacuating residents from the Carteret Islands because of precisely these concerns. If the effects of climate change make large parts of these island states uninhabitable, their resettlement to other countries will become a pressing issue for other regional states. (See Chapter 6 for a more specific discussion of the problems of displacement due to climate change.)

**REGIONAL INVOLVEMENT**

Summitry is becoming a major form of diplomacy in the region. Pacific leaders are invited to several summits a year, and are usually well rewarded with aid. Japan has been hosting triennial meetings of Pacific leaders since 1996 (the so-called PALM meetings.) This has enabled Japan to claim a leadership role and to protect its extensive fishing and tourist interests.

In 2006 China followed Japan’s example and hosted a Pacific summit in Nadi, Fiji. That same year, France hosted a summit in Paris. The US Secretary of State recently met Pacific leaders in Washington, DC. The U.S.’s renewed interest in Oceania extends well beyond its traditional links with Micronesia. The US State Department has referred to 2007 as “the year of the Pacific.” In part, this is a response to China’s increased role in the region. It also is a return to long term Pacific concerns that have been diverted by the war in Iraq.

China’s increased interest and presence in Oceania is the most significant regional development over the past decade. When linked with Japan’s long standing involvement it has been viewed as a sea change with Oceania moving from the European to Asian sphere of influence.

While Oceania’s growing political and strategic significance has increased the volumes of aid, two particular types of international involvement have tended to have a destabilizing effect on PICs.

**Australian Interventionism:** After the Bali bombing of October 2002, Australia appointed itself the guardian of Pacific law and order. Its new activism is exemplified by the Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). Two observations can be

In many PICs, the extraction of natural resources has been carried out in unsustainable and environmentally harmful ways.

**RAMSI TIMELINE**

**Mid-1998:**
Violence erupts in the Solomon Islands between groups from the two largest islands, Guadalcanal and Malaita. The Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), an indigenous Guadalcanalese militia, initiates a movement against Malaitan settlers in and around the capital city of Honiara. In response, Malaitans form the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF). The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP) is implicated (siding with the MEF). Conflict over the next two years results in approximately 250 deaths, human rights abuses, and the displacement of around 20,000 mainly Malaitan settlers fleeing Honiara. The Solomons government becomes almost entirely dependent upon logging and foreign aid.

**June 2000:**
The MEF seizes Honiara in a coup and forces PM Bartholomew Ulufa’al to resign. Manasseh Sogavare assumes office and promises compensation to Solomon Islanders for their losses during the conflict.

**October 2000:**
The Townsville Peace Agreement is brokered by Australia and New Zealand at the request of former PM Ulufa’al. It is negotiated by combatants from both MEF and IFM, as well as representatives from the national and provincial governments. The Agreement focuses on the cessation of hostilities and formal dissolution of militias, and creates the Solomon Islands Peace Monitoring Council and the International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). The IPMT, an unarmed civilian-led team, commences operations with personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Vanuatu and the Cook Islands. It removes over 1000 weapons; however, lawlessness and disorder continue. Tensions persist over the compensation payments mostly ex-militants and politicians, corruption and dissatisfaction with the government.

**June 2003:**
The Australian government, having rejected earlier requests for assistance, agrees (upon the request of PM Allan Kemakeza) to lead a regional intervention supported by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Australian PM John Howard states that the Solomon Islands is at risk of becoming a ‘failed state’ and ‘could pose a significant security risk for the whole region’.

**July 24, 2003:**
The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) is established and commences Operation Helpem Fren. Personnel are mostly from Australia and New Zealand, but also from Fiji, PNG, Vanuatu, Tonga, Samoa, Cook Islands, Nauru, Palau, and Kiribati. In contrast to other peacekeeping missions, RAMSI is police-led, and is based (initially) on a 335-member Participating Police Force (PPF). It is led by an Australian Federal Police (AFP) officer, who is sworn in as Deputy Commissioner of the RSIP. The police are initially supported by a substantial military contingent of approximately 1800 personnel, but these numbers have been gradually reduced. In addition, Australian public servants hold positions in the Departments of Treasury and Justice, as well as other government agencies. The original RAMSI force comprises 2225 personnel in total. Phase I of this mission focuses on the restoration of law and order through the establishment of the PPF throughout the Solomon Islands, disarmament, and the arrest of militaries.

**By November 2003:**
More than 3,700 weapons are seized, and 733 people are arrested. Among those arrested are several members of the RSIP who are charged with criminal misconduct.

Cont.
gleaned from the RAMSI experience. First, when Australia determines that its own security is threatened by conflict Melanesia, it will intervene first and seek regional consent later. Second, RAMSI, now in its fourth year, lacks a clear exit strategy. Such open-ended deployments leave Australia open to erroneous accusations of seeking to re-colonize Oceania.

Beijing-Taipei 'Dollar Diplomacy': For Chinese Taipei the PICs are viewed as a crucial bloc of support in its diplomatic rivalry with China. Taipei has been especially vigorous in playing the “dollar diplomacy” game to outbid Beijing for diplomatic recognition by these small aid-dependent states. This dollar diplomacy game has had three deleterious side effects. First, it has divided the Pacific Islands Forum, the only regional organization through which PICs exercise any kind of collective voice. Second, corruption allegations against politicians who accept these ‘donations’ have ruptured public trust in Oceania's fragile multiparty democracies. Third, it diverts attention from the Western focus on aid for “good governance” and sustainable development. China, for example, has a very different definition of good governance, with the emphasis on the government’s provision of basic services such as health, housing, education and the development of the transport and communications infrastructure to encourage economic growth.

Within Oceania itself, the Forum meets annually at the Heads of Government level and has a permanent Secretariat headquartered in Suva, Fiji. The Forum has extensive contact with other regional and international bodies concerned with developments in the Pacific and in Asia. As the home of the Forum Secretariat, Fiji’s political fate tends to also impact the Forum’s health. Fiji’s most recent military coup, carried out in December 2006, has divided the Forum. Australia and New Zealand favored imposing sanctions on Suva, while the other members wished to offer Fiji a ‘helping hand’.

An important recent sub-regional development has been the strengthening of the sub-regional Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG’s development is partly a response to the Forum’s weakness and partly because these states feel more comfortable dealing with sensitive issues within this grouping. The MSG is in the process of establishing a permanent headquarters and secretariat in Vanuatu. It has

**China’s increased interest and presence in Oceania is the most significant regional development over the past decade.**

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>December 31, 2003:</td>
<td>Phase II commences, focusing on the rule of law, economic development, and reforming institutions.</td>
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<td>May 2004:</td>
<td>Australian Justice Minister returns from a two-day trip to the Solomon Islands and reports that 1489 people have been arrested, including two deputy commissioners of the RSIP. Four hundred members of the RSIP have been sacked.</td>
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<td>December 22, 2004:</td>
<td>An Australian Protective Services officer is shot and killed while on pre-dawn patrol. An emergency army response unit is deployed by the Australian Defence Minister ‘to send a clear message to the thugs…that we will not tolerate the murder of our police officers’. However, police in Honiara say they are unsure whether the shooting was an opportunistic criminal act, or premeditated by opponents to RAMSI’s presence. Kamakeza states that the murder reinforces RAMSI’s need to remain in the Solomons.</td>
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<td>December 31, 2004:</td>
<td>Phase III commences, with a similar focus to Phase II, but with particular emphasis on economic development and capacity building.</td>
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<td>February 2005:</td>
<td>Australian police arrest the Minister for Police, National Security and Justice on a charge of stealing $20,000. He is the most senior political figure arrested by RAMSI thus far. The arrest followed an investigation by the Corruption Targeting Task Force, which found an overpayment of $20,000 into an account controlled by the Minister.</td>
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<td>July 2005:</td>
<td>The PIF Eminent Persons Group releases a report entitled A Review of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands. According to the RAMSI Special Coordinator, the report commends RAMSI for its achievements in restoring law and order, strengthening institutions and the government’s capacity to undertake reform. It also recommends that no timeframe should be set for RAMSI, but also that the Solomon Islands Government should take a greater role.</td>
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<td>April 18, 2006:</td>
<td>Riots erupt for two nights in Honiara in reaction to the election of Snyder Rini as Prime Minister. The city’s Chinatown and ethnic Chinese are specifically targeted, partly due to allegations that Rini’s victory was backed by funds from Beijing and Taipei. Both the outgoing PM, Kemakeza, and Rini, his heir apparent, had been implicated in corruption and poor administration, and the riots revealed resentment of ties between Chinese business owners and government leaders. In response to the riots, additional Australian defense and policy personnel are sent to restore calm. The riots are a shock to Australian and international observers, who had been previously optimistic about the mission’s prospects.</td>
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<td>April 26, 2006:</td>
<td>Rini resigns, prompting celebrations on the streets of Honiara. Rini claims that he did not resign in response to protests, but rather because four members of his ruling group had suddenly made deals with the opposition ahead of a non-confidence vote and resigned.</td>
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also endorsed the concept of a Melanesian security force which ideally should render outside intervention unnecessary. In practice, this is unlikely to happen for both financial and logistical reasons, although China, in what many feel is an effort to upstage Australia, has offered to provide some funding to the MSG. The MSG’s significance will likely continue to grow as its members’ political, economic and security ties increase.

Another important regional body is the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), formerly known as the South Pacific Commission, based in Noumea, New Caledonia. The SPC generally avoids dealing with political issues and instead concentrates on technical assistance. It maintains close ties with the Forum, but has resisted moves to merge with it and form a single regional organization.

**THE PACIFIC PLAN**

Much of Oceania’s current regional attention is centered on the ‘Pacific Plan’ for closer regional cooperation. The Pacific Plan has four goals: good governance, economic growth, sustainable development and security. Security is the weakest link in the Plan, as the member states are very sensitive to outsider involvement in a state’s internal affairs. This explains why proposals for a regional peacekeeping force have not progressed. The Biketawa Agreement provided for intervention on the understanding that it was requested by the state in trouble, and was agreed to by the Forum. For example, Biketawa provided the authority for the 2003 RAMSI intervention into the Solomon Islands, and the same agreement was used to justify the Forum’s response to Nauru’s economic collapse known as Pacific Regional Assistance Nauru (PRAN).

The weaknesses of the Pacific Plan are first, that it risks being undermined by movements toward sub-regionalism in Oceania. Second, the Plan also lacks a Pacific ‘champion’ to infuse it with inspiration. This type of ‘champion’ would be a welcomed contrast to the bureaucratic planning approach of Australian and New Zealand donors and the Australian-led Forum Secretariat. Third, major regional interventions have been endorsed rather than initiated by the Forum. New Zealand was responsible for starting the Bougainville peace process (1997-98) and RAMSI was an Australian creation. UN and other involvement from outside the region has been minimal, and Australia prefers to keep it that way.

**RAMSI TIMELINE CONT.**

**May 2006:** Manasseh Sogavare is elected as PM, which some feel indicates growing opposition to RAMSI. Sogavare promises to ‘review’ RAMSI and nominates an individual who, as Minister of Police, had previously been arrested for his part in inciting the riots.

**May 2006:** Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson announces that Australia will begin pulling troops out of the Solomon Islands, cutting back its force from 400 to 140. He says that the additional troops sent in response to April’s riots had quickly restored calm, and that the remaining personnel would be sufficient.

**September 2006:** Sogavare expels Australia’s High Commissioner, Patrick Cole, who had expressed concerns about the integrity of a government-appointed commission of inquiry into the April riots. Cole was concerned that the inquiry would undermine the cases against two MPs accused of inciting the riots.

**September 30, 2006:** An Australian lawyer and newly appointed Solomon Islands Attorney-General, J Julian Moti, is arrested at the request of the Australian Government on alleged child sex offence charges. The arrest is expected to lead to further tensions between Canberra and Sogavare, who had appointed Moti, a personal friend.

**October 2006:** Howard tells the PIF leaders’ retreat that RAMSI provides a good model for future interventions that may be needed elsewhere. This contrasted with Sogavare’s presentation to the meeting of a plan to ‘de-Australianise’ RAMSI.

**February 2007:** The PIF announces that it will conduct a review of RAMSI, and in so doing will address the issue of an exit strategy. The Solomon Islands Foreign Minister, states that this inaugural review is a welcome indication that the PIR is taking the lead on RAMSI.

**July 11, 2007:** RAMSI’s Acting Special Coordinator tells a meeting of civil society groups that RAMSI believes much more work must be done before the RSIP can be rearmed. He states that RAMSI’s position has not changed since the PM told Parliament in February that he would not go ahead with rearming the police force. He also argues that there must be further development of its professional capacity, leadership and discipline and notes that “We continue to receive regular feedback from communities across the country that they do not want the police rearmed at this stage.”

**September 2007:** The Australian National University (ANU) with the assistance of the Solomon Islands National Statistics Office conducts a survey as part of the annual review by the Solomon Islands government and RAMSI. It finds that 90 percent of Solomon Islanders support the continued presence of RAMSI, and 80 percent fear the return of violence if RAMSI were to withdraw. However, in response, PM Sogavare questions the integrity of the survey, stating that it was held without the sanction or involvement of his government and that it included only a small segment of the population. Moreover, he claims that the National Statistics Office was not involved in any substantial way, but merely provided advice on the logistics of conducting the survey.

**“RAMSI, now in its fourth year, lacks a clear exit strategy.”**
CONCLUSION

While the Oceania region has been through a difficult period during the past two decades, it is important not to exaggerate the negative aspects. It is still a relatively peaceful part of the world and most PICs have avoided serious conflict. Where conflict has erupted it has been contained relatively effectively: Bougainville is an example of successful conflict resolution, and law and order has returned to the Solomon Islands. Apart from Fiji, elections in Oceania generally take place on time and have resulted in peaceful changes of government.

Looking ahead, some improvement can be expected from this past period of low level instability and internal conflict. But it is unrealistic to expect calm to return to a peaceful Pacific. Furthermore, some instability is not necessarily a bad thing, and indeed is inevitable in the process of political change.

What will change is the greater involvement of outside powers in Oceania. China’s importance will continue to grow. The attraction is mutual. The Pacific islands look “north” to Asia for new opportunities and friends, and China and other Asian states look to the Oceania for resources and for recognition of their growing status. If this takes a competitive form it may generate further conflict. A cooperative approach is in the interests of both the large and small countries of the Pacific.

About the Author

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2. ‘Oceania’ will be used here to refer not to Australia and New Zealand (although they are Forum members), but the 14 additional Forum states.

3. The CRSO follows the CSCAP convention of referring to “Chinese Taipei”.

In the early post-Cold War period, Asia’s major flashpoints—the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and the South China Sea—suggested that it was the continent’s eastern rim that would be the likely site of regional conflict. Instead, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the ensuing armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the potential for these conflicts to spread to neighboring countries, have shifted Asia’s center of gravity westward. Although conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and increasingly Pakistan will be the primary focus of this chapter, they are by no means western Asia’s only sources of instability: Iran’s international showdown over its nuclear program, while at the moment in abeyance, will continue to concern western governments; politics in Bangladesh have been destabilized by Islamic extremism; Nepal is beset by a Maoist insurgency; ethnic conflict and secessionist violence have spiked in Sri Lanka; and ruling regimes in Central Asia remain vulnerable to Islamic insurgencies.

Several factors in these conflicts—terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and vital oil and gas resources—make western Asia a site of critical strategic importance for other Asia Pacific states.

**Escalation**

In August 2007, the UN Department of Safety and Security reported that the situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate at a constant rate. The report also noted that the nature of the insurgents’ attacks had changed; in what many believe is an effort to capitalize on the international community’s war-weariness, the Taliban is now increasingly targeting humanitarian and development workers in order to accelerate their withdrawal from Afghanistan. In fact, in the month prior to the release of the UN report, 23 South Korean missionaries were taken hostage by the Taliban. Two of these hostages were killed by their captors. The remaining 21 were released, but only after Seoul agreed not to extend the mandate of the 210 army medical corps who had been sent to support Afghanistan’s reconstruction mission. Similar attacks have made countries participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for Afghanistan increasingly vulnerable.

**Spillover**

The spillover of the Afghan conflict moves the instability and violence to the doorstep of two of Asia’s economic powerhouses: India and China. At the moment, the most
Pressing spillover concern is Pakistan. Since 1999, the Pakistani military, headed by President Pervez Musharraf, has officially held an anti-Taliban position, in large part because of pressure from Washington. After the September 11 attacks, Pakistan came to be seen by the U.S. as its key ally in the ‘War on Terrorism’. The Pakistani military has played a dual role, however, in that it has also maintained a lenient attitude toward religious schools where Islamist extremism is taught.

The past year 2007 has dealt Musharraf several political setbacks. In March he tried to oust a Supreme Court justice on trumped-up charges of corruption. The incident provoked massive protests by lawyers. In July, Musharraf’s handling of the attempt to end the jihadis’ control of the Red Mosque was an embarrassment and “highlighted how little the military government has done to control extremism.”2 On November 3rd, Musharraf declared martial law and suspended the constitution.

On top of the domestic political crisis, Islamabad has failed to maintain control over tribal areas in the north-western border area where the Taliban has in effect set up a “mini Taliban state”. This area has become the training site for over 80% of suicide bombings carried out in Afghanistan. These suicide bombings have increased sevenfold between 2005 and 2006, and are on track to increase even further.3 Pakistan’s worsening political crisis is lowering the morale of troops stationed along the Afghan border and is creating a political vacuum that has allowed extremism there to grow and spread.4 A series of misguided deals to appease the Pakistani Taliban in the FATA have come undone, in effect ceding the strategic region bordering on Afghanistan to radical Islamists.”5

According to one analyst, “Taliban forces and their sympathizers are becoming entrenched in the [Pakistan-Afghan border] region and are aggressively expanding their influence and operations.... A lethal combination of Musharraf’s political predicament and declining public support, a significant rise in suicide attacks targeting the army and the reluctance of soldiers deputed in the area to engage in tribal gangs militarily further exacerbates this impasse.”6

For the international community, concern over Pakistan’s current political crisis is especially acute given its Pakistan’s record as being the center of a nuclear black market. The Pakistan-based A.Q. Khan network, exposed in 2004, is believed to have been responsible for secretly passing nuclear technology to Libya, Iran, and North Korea. Although Libya gave up his nuclear programs in December 2003, there are grounds to suspect that North Korea, or now more likely Iran may smuggle nuclear technology to terrorists. North Korea, a main beneficiary of its Pakistani connections, conducted a nuclear test in October 2006. And an equally nightmarish scenario is that Pakistan’s bombs may fall into the hands of groups such as the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

**Contagion**

Weakening international resolve to bring stability to Afghanistan and Iraq raises the likelihood that the Taliban and Al Qaeda affiliates could declare victory in their respective conflicts. The ‘contagion’ effects of such a development would be primarily ideological and tactical. For example, terrorist groups in Central and Southeast Asia could draw inspiration from this turn of events to attract new recruits and sources of funding.7 It is also possible that Central Asian and Southeast Asian-based groups could adopt terrorist tactics that have been used extensively in Afghanistan and Iraq, such as Improved Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombings, and use them against governments in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and even Australia.8

**AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION AT UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS... AND HEADING EAST**

In August 2007, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that Afghanistan’s opium production had increased 34% over the previous year, making that

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**NON-U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN**

Non-U.S. Forces in Afghanistan include: Canada, 2, 500; Australia, 970; New Zealand, 107. South Korea is expected to withdraw its 210 non-combat troops by December 2007. Non-UN Forces in Iraq include: Australia, 1,575; South Korea 1,200; Mongolia, 120. New Zealand, the Philippines and Thailand withdrew their troops in 2004, and Singapore withdrew in 2005. Japan’s current role in both missions is to provide refueling assistance to ISAF, and airlift support to Coalition forces in Iraq.

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country the source of 93% of the world’s opiates. To emphasize the severity of the situation, the report’s authors noted that the “amount of Afghan land used for opium is now larger than the corresponding total for coca cultivation in Latin America (Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia combined).”

The implications for Asia Pacific states are two-fold. First, the Taliban has used revenue from the opium trade to purchase weapons and pay militia members, thereby further fueling violence in Afghanistan. Second, Afghan opium is increasingly trafficked through China, India, Pakistan, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. Some of this is to feed demand in those countries (especially China), but much of it is also transited through Hong Kong before reaching Western countries. Many believe that these trafficking routes are replacing the steady downturn in opium cultivation from Myanmar and Laos.

WEST ASIA’S CENTRALITY IN NORTHEAST ASIAN ENERGY SECURITY
As Anthony Bubalo and Mark Thirlwell have suggested, the fates of East and West Asia are becoming increasingly intertwined around the issue of energy security. This is particularly true for Northeast Asia, and increasingly for India. In 2005, the Middle East accounted for 35%, 70%, and 73% of the oil imports of China, South Korea, and Japan, respectively. Middle Eastern oil figures especially prominently in fueling China’s growing economy over the next twenty years.

Heavy competition over energy resources has also attracted these and other major powers to the comparatively unexploited resources of the Caspian Basin, specifically Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. According to Kent Calder, “Central Asia has particular attraction for India and China, due both to proximity and to the in-escapable geopolitical reality that pipelines from Central Asia reduce their dependence on sea lanes from the Middle East currently dominated by the United States.” Like the Middle East, however, an important risk associated with dependence on Central Asian energy resources is the possibility that hostile non-state actors could physically destroy the means of energy production or delivery.

COMPETITIVE ENGAGEMENTS BY BIG POWERS IN THE WESTERN PERIPHERY
Among the issues treated so far, the most serious issue that the western periphery presents for big powers is terrorism. The big powers claim that they share the crucial need to contain Islamist terrorism. However, in the name of
containing terrorism, they also attempt to accomplish other strategic objectives: to expand their influence and in some cases to contain anti-government and/or dissident movements.

The United States has invested the most in Asia’s western periphery. As of November 2007, it has poured $126 billion into the war in Afghanistan, and nearly $450 billion into operations in Iraq. Its current troop deployments include 25,000 soldiers in Afghanistan and 150,000 in Iraq. It also has two aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea. In addition to these operations, the US also has expanding interests elsewhere in the region. For example, as noted above, Pakistan is generally considered a key ally in its ‘War on Terrorism’. And as part of its ‘War on Terrorism,’ the U.S. codified military basing agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, hammered out a deal with Kazakhstan for overflight rights and material transshipments, and acquired contingency use of the national airport in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The military base in Uzbekistan was forced to close, however, in 2005 by the Uzbek government. The US-India agreement on civilian nuclear power cooperation (for more information, please see Chapter 3) is also designed to strengthen the US presence in India and to offset China’s and Russia’s influence in that country.

Russia has been trying to regain its influence over its former republics in Central Asia. It is believed to have had a hand in forcing out the American base from Kazakhstan in 2005. While China works together with Russia in suppressing Islamic fundamentalist activities in Central Asia, its main concern is the secessionist movement of the Uyghurs, a Muslim ethnic minority active in China’s western province of Xinjiang and in neighboring Central Asian countries. China considers Uyghur secessionists to be Islamist ‘terrorists’ and one of its primary objectives in working Central Asian governments is to hunt down suspected members of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement.

One of the most prominent expressions of this common Chinese-Russian purpose is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), formed by China in 1996 as the Shanghai Five. The SCO’s members include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. For China, the SCO is seen as a multi-lateral mechanism for fighting terrorism. Its main goals “are to stabilize Central Asia, which is turning out to be a potentially important source of oil and gas for its growing economy, and to get the support of the region’s governments in its fight against the Uighur separatists, specifically to deny them cross-border funding, equipment, or sanctuary.”

Through the SCO, Russia and China conduct joint military exercises. In August 2007, they held a nine-day military exercise called “Peace Mission 2007” in Xinjiang province and in Chelyabinski in central Russia. 2,700 Russian troops and 1,700 Chinese troops, participated in this exercise. This was the first time all six SCO member nations participated. While the SCO is not officially a military alliance directed against any particular external state, “leaders in both China and Russia have been united in a strategic partnership since 1996 against what they see as U.S. ‘hegemonism’ and ‘unipolarity,’ and they aim to maintain their joint sphere of influence in Central Asia.”

At the same time, however, China and Russia are competitors in seeking greater access to oil and natural gas resources. While Russia was in political and economic turmoil during the immediate post-Soviet years, China was active in gaining its influence in Central Asia. In 2006 President Hu Jintao visited Central Asia, promising large amounts of aid and trade. China in particular has invested a huge amount of capital in Kazakhstan and has been working on a pipeline that sends Kazakhstan oil directly to China. Beijing also has obtained an agreement from Kazakhstan to build a second pipeline by 2011.

India is becoming more actively involved in Asia Pacific affairs. It has strong economic and strategic interests in Southeast Asia and Japan, in part to counter China’s
growing influence in East Asia. India is also interested in gaining access to Sakhalin's natural gas resources, and it is concerned about the safety of the sea lanes in the Western Pacific as it conducts over 40% of its rapidly expanding trade through the Malacca Strait. Its security concerns centered on Pakistan are serious, deploying one third of its army of 1.1 million to the disputed Kashmir region. And as Muslims constitute 14% of India's population, it is concerned about Islamist terrorism not only in Kashmir but also in other heavily Muslim areas within its borders.

Following President Bush's visit to New Delhi in March 2006, President Hu Jintao and President Vladimir Putin went to India, respectively in November 2006 and January 2007. Putin offered to India, among other things, nuclear reactors, India's participation in global positioning system, and the Russo-Indian joint development of military transports and jet fighters. Despite this competitive courting by Russia and China, India today seems to attach the most important strategic importance to the relationship with the United States and has sought no more than observer status at the SCO.

Japan is also becoming active in Asia's western periphery. Soon after the September 11 attacks, its Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) were deployed to the Indian Ocean in order to provide fuel and water for multinational naval ships participating in the Operation Enduring Freedom. Tokyo has also supported the Karzai government in Afghanistan with substantial financial assistance. In January 2004 its ground troops and air force were dispatched to Iraq for rehabilitation and humanitarian support missions.

Japan's presence in Central Asia is still limited, but in 2004 the government organized a meeting with the region's foreign ministers. Its second meeting took place in Tokyo in June 2006, and two months later, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Japan has shown a strong interest in jointly developing their uranium resources for peaceful purposes.

Recent ties between Japan and India are yet another indication of Japan's growing strategic interests in Asia's western periphery. Mutual visits by the two countries' military personnel have intensified since 2006. Prime Minister Singh visited Tokyo in December 2006, and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reciprocated with a visit to New Delhi in August 2007. Abe offered, among other things, several large infrastructure projects including the construction of a high-speed freighter railroad between Delhi and Mumbai. Abe was hesitant, however, to commit his support to the aforementioned Indian-US civilian nuclear power agreement.

The Abe government expressed Japan's strategic concerns about the periphery through a new diplomacy called “the arc of freedom and prosperity” along the periphery of the Eurasia. This was first pronounced by Foreign Minister Taro Aso in November 2006. According to this new diplomacy, Japan seeks to build strong relations with young democracies in East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. The objective is to build a stronger regional base for universal values such as political freedom and human rights and for economic prosperity. It appears that the “arc of freedom and prosperity” may serve as an effort in counterbalancing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, whose member nations are more or less authoritarian. This policy will likely be regarded by China as one of encircling China.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have significantly impacted Japan's outlook on its own participation in international security. The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, enacted after 9/11, officially allows Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in overseas operations to support to the military forces of the U.S. and other countries working to achieve UN goals to eliminate the threat that international terrorism poses to peace and security. Support operations to both missions were the first time that Japan has participated in international
security operations in Asia’s western periphery, although it confined its role to non-combat operations.

This support reached a turnabout on July 29, 2007 when the government coalition parties lost heavily. After Prime Minister Abe stepped down, the new Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, showed his determination to sustain the MSDF’s Indian Ocean refueling activities. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has taken the position, however, that these Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean are unconstitutional as they have not been specifically endorsed by the UN Security Council. According to Akio Watanabe, the “ad hoc” legislation permitting support for the Afghanistan and Iraq wars still leaves Japan “uncertain about its international obligations.” Furthermore, he says, “The existing treaty with the United States is unusable as a legal instrument to justify overseas SDF missions in situations such as Afghanistan and Iraq. As conveyed by the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law... Japan adheres to UN Security Council resolutions as the legal justification for participation in multinational efforts for peace and security.”

After the DPJ refused to extend the refueling and assistance missions, Japanese ships left the Indian Ocean in late November 2007. These operations could resume if the Diet votes to extend the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law. Nonetheless, the absence of Japanese support in the interval period could damage international perceptions of its reliability.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICTS ON THE WESTERN PERIPHERY FOR ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY

Despite the differing interests of each of the major powers discussed above, many of them have worked together in the context of reducing the threat of North Korea’s nuclear program. By contrast, however, their interaction is more competitive when it comes to the western periphery, such as gaining access to oil and natural resources in Central Asia or driving American influence out of the region. Both Russia and China cooperate with the U.S. in the Six-party talks, while at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) they take an openly anti-US position.

The United States and Japan seek closer ties with India, as the latter approaches to the Japanese-US alliance for strategic purposes as well. The growing presence of India in East Asia is manifest in several aspects. India is a member of several Asia-Pacific regional institutions, including the...
ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit. The Indian navy conducts many joint exercises with some Southeast Asian navies, particularly the Singaporean navy. In April 2007 India operated a joint naval exercise with the Japanese and United States counterparts off the Bay of Tokyo. This was a new development in trilateral relations.

The tremendous strategic importance of this region to East Asia’s future dictates that the region will need to be more actively involved in ensuring a consistently stable West Asia. Yet an institutional void at the multilateral level leaves the region without a clearly defined "an institutional void at the multilateral level leaves the region without a clearly defined multilateral dialogue mechanism that could serve as a starting point for minimizing the impact of western Asian instability." dialogue mechanism that could serve as a starting point for minimizing the impact of western Asian instability. While there has been much talk about building a new Asian regional security architecture, progress has been slow. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Plus Three, and ASEAN Plus Six have all shown interest in settling regional security issues in varying ways. However, these organizations do not deal with the issues on the western periphery. Informal contacts between the existing regional institutions in the Asia Pacific region and the western periphery such as that between the ARF and the SCO could be useful, particularly as the SCO is the only Asian regional security organization that deals in any direct way with conflicts along Asia’s western periphery.

The coming year will be a critical turning point in many of the conflicts in Asia’s western rim. International commitment to the stabilization and rebuilding of Afghanistan appears to be on shaky ground. Several countries are looking to withdraw their troops and aid workers, even though by most estimates that Afghanistan is years away from being able to provide for its own security. Moreover, the ‘Talibanization’ of Pakistan could continue and its internal political crisis could become more acute. The extent to which these western periphery developments impact the rest of the region remains to be seen, but policy makers are likely to recognize that there is a growing need for more significant multilateral engagement over these issues.

About the Author
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5 Ibid.
8 Ibid, 148.
19 Ibid: 10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6PT</td>
<td>Six-Party Talks</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
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<td>AMM</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>APPCDC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (also known as AP6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APT</td>
<td>ASEAN Plus Three</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>ASEAN Security Community</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>Enhanced Cooperation Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEP</td>
<td>(ARF) Experts and Eminent Persons</td>
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<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>EID</td>
<td>Emerging Infectious Disease Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPG</td>
<td>(ASEAN) Eminent Persons Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNEP</td>
<td>Global Nuclear Energy Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPG</td>
<td>Global Public Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>HPAI</td>
<td>(ASEAN) Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPCC</td>
<td>(UN) International Panel on Climate Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>J I</td>
<td>Jemmah Islamiya/Jaamah Islamiyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDC</td>
<td>Less Developed Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSG</td>
<td>Melanesian Spearhead Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTCR</td>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEACD</td>
<td>Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>Pacific Island Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum</td>
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<td>PNG</td>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Proliferation Security Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SARS</td>
<td>Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>(UN) World Health Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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