The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is the region’s leading Track Two (non-official) organization for promoting cooperation and dialogue on regional security issues. CSCAP was established in 1993, and now has 21 national Member Committees and one Observer. (For more information about CSCAP, please visit www.cscap.org.)

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Shan State soldier, eastern Myanmar; Abu Bakar Bashir behind bars before his hearing verdict; Japanese man crying for his daughter after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.

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CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2012
Letter from the Editor

On behalf of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), we are pleased to present this CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2012 (CRSO 2012). Inaugurated in 2007, this is the fifth annual CRSO volume.

The CRSO is directed to the broad regional audience encompassed by CSCAP itself. The CRSO mandate is to survey the most pressing security issues of today and to put forward informed policy-relevant recommendations as to how Track One (official) and Track Two (unofficial) actors together can advance multilateral, regional security cooperation.

As in prior years, this volume of the CRSO reflects the exceptional professional service of Ms. Erin Williams, Associate Editor. Special thanks are due to the authors of chapters, updates, and Ms. Ashley Van Damme, who provided timely editorial assistance.

The CRSO is available in digital form on the Internet at www.cscap.org. A limited number of hard copies are available to CSCAP Member Committees. Copies of the CRSO will be distributed at the 26th Asia Pacific Round Table meetings in Kuala Lumpur in 2012.

HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE CRSO 2012

2011: A Year of Treading Cautiously
Rhetoric and confrontation were considerably reduced from 2010 levels. China and the U.S. looked to smoother relations; Burma and North Korea created less regional tension. (See Chapters 1 and 3, and Update, page 28)

9/11 Ten Years On
While terrorist acts, within the context of insurgencies, remain a concern, there are no signs of Southeast Asia's having become a 'second front.' (See Chapter 2 and Update, page 24)

Concerns Remain
Military buildups aggravate insecurity. Clashes continue in the South China Sea. Conflict and tension in South, Southwest, and Central Asia threaten spill over effects. (See Updates on pages 26 and 30)

Human Security Crises
Asian populations remain under severe stress, beset by natural disasters, food insecurity, and environmental damage. Significantly, the protection of populations through the RtoP received greater attention in 2011. (See Chapters 4 and 5)

Significant Challenges for 2012
■ Stabilization of the global financial system is essential for sustaining economic growth underpinning regional stability.
■ China and Asian states in the G20 must be given and accept greater roles.
■ Human security priorities—refugees, IDPs, people in poverty—demand attention.
■ Regional conflict prevention and conflict resolution capacities need to be bolstered.
■ Proactive leadership in regional institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, ARF and the EAS is needed.
■ Track Two deserves a greater role, and must move beyond current inhibiting institutional formats. (See Chapter 6)

Brian L. Job, Editor
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**ABBREVIATIONS**  
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The events of 2011 brought home the growing mismatch between regional economic and security developments and their respective institutional mechanisms.

The events of 2011 have been mostly missing in the Asia Pacific in 2011. Verbal sparring by states with claims or interests in the South China Sea has increased in both volume and frequency, but in other respects the momentum has shifted toward engagement rather than provocation. Notable developments include positive gestures by North Korea and Burma, warming relations between Washington and Beijing, and encouraging, if modest, steps in building a U.S.-India partnership.

But if 2011 was a year when the security pendulum seemed to swing in a more conciliatory direction, 2012 will be a reality check on whether these changes are fundamental or fleeting. There are good reasons for caution. In the case of North Korea and Burma, the response by the U.S. and other key interlocutors has been tepid. Improvements in major power relations may reverse course if the global economy goes into a tailspin. What’s more, even in what has been an otherwise ‘good’ year, the region’s leaders are confronted with human and non-traditional security threats of immense scale. These issues are considered below, followed by hard—and perennial—questions about whether regional multilateral organizations are capable of managing and minimizing tensions and crises.

Positive Signs in Trouble Spots

North Korea: The violent provocations that marked inter-Korean relations in 2010 were not repeated in 2011, as the North scaled back its military...
adventurism against the South. Leadership succession from Kim Jong-il to his son, Kim Jong-un, seems to have gone more smoothly than many observers expected. The elder Kim embarked on a “charm offensive” by reaching out to key supporters in China and Russia, and then expressing his willingness to re-start the Six-Party Talks process.

Pyongyang’s apparent change of heart may be driven by economic desperation, made worse by the drop-off in humanitarian aid by most donors except China (see Update, p. 28). Whatever the North’s motivations, Seoul and Washington were unmoved. The Lee Myung-bak government is sceptical and remains firm in its “proactive deterrence” policy, and the U.S. appears to be running out of “strategic patience” with the North. The two sides’ talks in Geneva on October 23-24 yielded little in the way of progress, and according to one analyst, the Obama Administration is not likely to “get sucked into a process...that fails to deliver denuclearization.”

Burma: The November 2010 elections, Burma’s first in over twenty years, ushered in a level of political change most observers did not expect. Although the leadership is still dominated by the military, it has been somewhat ‘civilianized’ with the inclusion of more technocratic and bureaucratic elements. Naypyidaw’s new self-confidence is palpable; it has taken multiple steps to loosen its internal grip, allowing for the formation of unions, releasing political prisoners, and meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi after releasing her from house arrest.

Internationally, the regime has shown interest in engaging the U.S. and Europe, both of whom have reciprocated verbally but stopped short of lifting sanctions. China and India continue to court Naypyidaw, mostly because of Burma’s natural resources and its geographic advantage for pipeline access for oil and gas shipments. Stewardship by these two regional powers, as well as by ASEAN, insulates the regime in the event that a fuller reciprocation from the U.S. and Europe is not forthcoming.

However, the breakdown of ceasefires with ethnic minorities has cast a pall over an otherwise positive picture of change in Burma (see Chapter 3). Joshua Kurlantzik recently raised the possibility that conditions in the northern and eastern regions could deteriorate further, describing these minority areas as “ungoverned zones of conflict.”

MAJOR POWER RELATIONS ON A MORE EVEN KEELED...”
particularly among those who focus more narrowly on points of bilateral tension, such as Pakistan, China’s deepening engagement in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, the Sino-Indian border dispute, China’s opposition to India face internal crises, as in Japan and Thailand, or are preoccupied with major leadership transitions or contests. In 2012, power in China will pass to the Xi Jinping government in a process that is preplanned and carefully choreographed, but nonetheless not free of uncertainty and learning curves. Elections in the U.S. next year also create distraction and uncertainty. In addition, U.S. pullout from Iraq and drawdown in Afghanistan may usher in a genuine “return to Asia,” but it is not clear whether that will improve or strain the U.S.-China relationship. More generally, one expert notes that the political gridlock and dysfunction that has gripped Washington is prompting Asian strategists to worry that the U.S. is losing its “bounce-back capability,” and what that might mean for its ability to lead.

The militarization of the region continues. Although weapons acquisitions by regional states may not be considered an “arms race” by any strict definition, those acquisitions may still be dangerous and destabilizing (see Update, p. 30). Many of the region’s long-standing crisis points—the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and China’s “Near Seas” (Yellow Sea, South China Sea)—are the focus of defence planners and procurement. In addition, jurisdictional disagreements over maritime territories and control of sea lane passages have encouraged a significant build-up of regional naval capacities. Regional experts have noted also that increasingly sophisticated weapons are more oriented to forward deployment, but also to technology frontiers in space and cyberspace, particularly in the case of China. Southeast Asian states, for their part, have been more active in joint military exercises and cooperation agreements with the U.S.

Natural disasters continue to plague large numbers of Asians. Although Japan is generally well-prepared for earthquakes, little could have been done to anticipate the destruction of the March 11 triple disaster, especially the tsunami, which in turn triggered the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Four aspects of this crisis merit regional attention:

1) The scale of natural disasters can overwhelm even the wealthiest and most well prepared states. Such disasters often have transnational effects and highlight state interdependence and the need for prior and subsequent cooperation among sub-regional actors.

2) The disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant does not appear to have significantly altered plans for nuclear power by regional states looking to diversify their energy sources (see Box 1). If these plans continue, the safety of these and existing facilities must reach the highest standard. To the extent that some in the region scale back their nuclear energy plans, as is the case in Japan, and
because full operation of planned facilities elsewhere is still years away, demand and competition for oil and gas supplies could intensify, thereby focusing attention on proven and possible regional energy sources in areas such as Central Asia and the South China Sea.

3) A significant, though under-reported, aspect of the Japan disaster was the role that military forces played as critical first responders. The Japanese Self Defence Forces, in its largest post-WWII response, mobilized up to 180,000 personnel in immediate response to the earthquake and tsunami. In addition, the U.S.’s military forward presence, as with the 2004 tsunami, utilized its multiple carrier task force capabilities to assist rescue efforts in inaccessible locations.

Japan’s triple disaster must be seen within a broader regional context where civilian populations are regularly subjected to the deadly consequences of natural disasters, as shown in Box 2. Almost all Asian states struggle to cope with the humanitarian, infrastructural and economic effects of these disasters. Although preparedness is generally improving, regional states should give serious contemplation to upping the level of multilateral coordination in this area.

Diplomatic maneuvering and defence establishments have had little impact on the lives of most Asians, for whom protecting, sustaining and improving their quality of life is of primary concern. Access to adequate food and potable water, safe environmental conditions, and relief from natural disasters is what ultimately matters. Events of 2011 reinforced the reality that all Asian states are challenged to meet the human security needs of their populations.

**Food insecurity is still pervasive in many parts of Asia.** For many Asians, food insecurity persists despite the region’s overall increasing prosperity. Environmental degradation of land, unsustainable land utilization practices, urban encroachment, growing food demand, and volatile markets for basic foodstuffs all contribute to the problem. Teng and Escaler also highlight in Chapter 5 the effect of concentration of Asian populations in mega-cities and point out that poor urban dwellers are not only incapable of producing their own food, but also vulnerable to diseases associated with malnutrition.

**State threats to human insecurity cannot be ruled out.** In certain circumstances, the state is active or complicit in threatening and attacking its own people. At the international systemic level, dilemmas of when and how to react to prevent or stop mass killing and related atrocities prompted the promulgation of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Asian states, prioritizing norms of non-interference, have resisted the acceptance and application of the RtoP, albeit less so since the RtoP’s sanction at the 2005 World Summit. However, as Lizee notes in Chapter 4, Asian states cannot avoid coming to terms with the RtoP, both in terms of extra-regional crises such as Libya, and in terms of confronting the histories and current realities of certain regional states’ treatment of their own populations. Increasingly, approval and response by regional institutions is envisaged as essential (along with UN sanction) before proceeding with RtoP ventures. Asian institutions, as Lizee argues, have only slowly begun to grapple with how they can and should respond to failing states and/or deal with strong repressive states that abuse their populations.

**Terrorism and insurgency remain regional concerns ten years after 9/11.** However, as Sidney Jones points out in Chapter 2, of Southeast Asia becoming a “second front” for global terrorism never materialized. Casualties from attacks by extremist groups have fallen and have been largely associated with insurgent movements in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. Several Southeast Asian states are credited with having adopted counter-intelligence and policing strategies that have effectively and selectively targeted individuals and groups, aided in part by populations who have been alienated by the indiscriminate victimization of civilians by terrorist attacks. In South Asia, threats of political extremism, state destabilization, and terrorism are still serious concerns, especially amid a possible regional spill over of the Afghanistan conflict.

“[U.S.-China] rhetoric softened in 2011…economic concerns will increasingly shape [this] relationship.”
has been ‘ASEANized’, as in the case of the ADMM+ forum for defence ministers; and the East Asia Summit, which convenes the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus Korea, China, and Japan), Australia, New Zealand, India and most recently Russia and the U.S. While these institutions mark regional players’ acceptance of ASEAN norms of dialogue, whether they move beyond the stasis that has come to prevail in established ASEAN-based institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), remains to be seen. Rigid norms of consensus decision-making and “non-interference” have kept disputes off multilateral agendas, even in the case of Track Two institutions such as CSCAP (see Chapter 6).

This is not to discount (a) the increase in Track One (official) and Track Two (unofficial) activities dealing with non-traditional security issues; (b) the tendency towards officially managed meetings involving experts (Track 1.5 meetings), usually concerning technical matters such as the spread of disease, food safety, national policies, as evidenced in the South China Sea or Korean Peninsula.

Second, the events of 2011 have brought home the growing mismatch between regional economic and security developments and their respective institutional mechanisms. Miles Kahler contends that Asia’s “thin institutional core” is insufficient, and that “the absence of links between economics and security is distinctive,” when compared to other regional contexts. Economists, such as Benjamin Cohen, argue that financial cooperation among regional players, now urgently required as the effects of U.S. and E.U. economic troubles take hold, is “constrained in practice by underlying security tensions.”

Historically, major changes in global and regional institutional architectures have been triggered by severe, exogenous shocks to the system, such as the failure of empires, the ending of world wars, or the collapse of global markets and economic systems. At present, there are indications that this could mean the slowing or halting of the economic growth that has been a key factor undergirding regional and domestic stability.

A closer look at the agenda of multilateral meetings highlights several key events of 2011 and foreshadows the importance of 2012 for creating meaningful synergy between global and regional, and economic and security, governance structures.

**On the security front:**

The ADMM+, launched in May 2011, was the first meeting of regional defence ministers and a relevant counterpoint to the foreign ministerial meetings of the ARF. However, whether or not the ADMM process can sustain momentum between its currently scheduled triennial meetings is uncertain.

At the July 2011 ARF meeting, participation by the U.S. and China was generally quiet and scripted. Leaders touted Beijing-ASEAN agreement on guidelines to implement the 2002 Declaration of Conduct on
the South China Sea. (This multilateral gesture, however, has not deterred Chinese bilateral actions in these waters, which continue to be marked by confrontations with the Philippines, Vietnam, and India.) On other matters, ARF members hued to their traditional reluctance to confront tough issues or pursue new avenues towards preventive diplomacy. Indeed, some analysts see signs that the ARF is morphing into an instrument of multilateral strategic diplomacy between the U.S. and China, “a showcase for [their] soft competition … in Southeast Asia.”

On the economic front:
It is too soon to say whether or how global economic governance structures will be reformed in response to the unfolding European crisis. Suffice it to say that China has emerged with a significant yet uncertain role, effectively cementing the shift of global economic centre of gravity to Asia. The G20, with its inclusion of the BRICS and key Asian states such as Indonesia, aspires to become a critical component of global governance. But there are no strong signals of effective leadership emerging to bridge the divergence of interests in its North-South membership. The November 2011 APEC leaders meeting may be an important venue for continuing discussion among regional leaders, but its viability is increasingly in question; regional states have prioritized bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and other multilateral institutional settings. At the same time, the prospects for a next-generation multilateral regional economic institution, as represented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are uncertain. Analysts see negotiations starting in 2011 as critical in determining whether or not “rhetoric can be translated into reality.”

What do these developments portend for continued ASEAN and ASEAN leadership, (“in the driver’s seat”) of regional architecture? Signals are mixed. Within its own sub-regional context, ASEAN unity and the solidarity of ASEAN norms are under stress. The resort to military force between Thailand and Cambodia is a symbolic renunciation of ASEAN’s principles of peaceful dispute settlement (see Update, p.24). While ASEAN showed initiative in seeking to resolve the conflict, these efforts yielded few demonstrable results, and one senses an increasing divergence of interests for institutional change between (democratized) Indonesia and the Philippines on the one hand, and the (authoritarian) Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos on the other.

With ASEAN’s current proactive Indonesian Chair about to cede this role to Cambodia (2012), Brunei (2013), and Burma (questionable, but likely in 2014), one can not anticipate institutional advancement from this organization at what looks to be a critical regional turning point.

Internal tensions and difficult economic times have slowed ASEAN’s momentum towards its aspirations for an ASEAN Community 2015. Surin Pitsuwan has retreated to characterizing the movement towards economic, socio-cultural, and political-security community as “a work in progress,” with 2015 as a “target,” and “not an end-date”—a more realistic, but sobering statement regarding Asian regionalism.

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The dominant story line in Asia over the past few decades has been the region’s tremendous economic growth. But alongside the positive news has been the devastation caused by natural disasters. According to the 2010 World Disasters Report, 85% of those affected by natural disasters are in Asia and the Pacific. The situation in 2011 has been just as frightening; flooding in the Philippines earlier this year affected 4.3 million people, and the havoc currently wreaked by floods in Thailand has killed 381 people and affected at least two million. What’s more, even after the flood waters start to recede in these and other flood-prone countries, fears about the spread of malaria and water-borne diseases start to set in.

The March 11, 2011 9.0-magnitude earthquake, tsunami and nuclear reactor meltdown that struck Japan’s northeast coast provided painful evidence that even the region’s most developed country is not spared. As of April, the disaster had claimed 14,063 lives, injured 5,302, and left 13,691 people missing and 136,000 evacuated. (For more on the broader consequences of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, see Box 1, this chapter.)

The 2011 “Hyogo Framework Agreement Progress in Asia-Pacific” report notes some improvements in the region’s disaster risk reduction, but also notes that the region still has far to go to reduce the devastating human and financial impact of natural disasters.


THE FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR DISASTER: CAUSE FOR RECONSIDERATION?

The March 11, 2011 tsunami that hit Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant badly damaged four of that facility’s six reactors. The subsequent radiation leak and difficulties in containing the problem rapidly prompted “soul searching” among many within and beyond Japan regarding the safety of their nuclear facilities and the soundness of their reliance on nuclear energy.¹

More specifically, the crisis exposed the inherent dangers of nuclear power, and in particular the vital need for strong regulatory structures. Whereas some countries in South and Southeast Asia may rethink or delay existing plans to build reactors in the future, the overall trend in the region is to move forward with construction plans, particularly in China, India and South Korea, albeit with greater attention to operational safety.² The table below highlights the steep trajectory of building planned by India and China.

According to James Goodby of the Brookings Institution, the Fukushima Daiichi incident has demonstrated the need for tighter cooperation in Northeast Asia around nuclear safety. The sub-region already hosts a high concentration of reactors, and is poised to grow even higher in the coming years. Moreover, given the region’s vulnerability to natural disasters (see Box 2, this chapter), “it would be prudent,” he says “to consider whether additional safety measures are called for” and how concerns might be addressed multilaterally.³ Goodby notes two possibilities: the Nuclear Security Summit, which will be held in Seoul in 2012; and the Six-Party Talks.

Others have echoed Goodby’s suggestion about the Nuclear Security Summit, saying that the Japan disaster has demonstrated the need to broaden the Summit’s focus from issues of nuclear security, fissile materials and concerns about nuclear terrorism to include safety concerns.⁴

With the Six-Party Talks, Goodby suggests that the working group on economy and energy could be tasked with looking at issues of nuclear safety. “Although the main target...should be urgent development of a regional energy safety system,” he says, “in the longer run what should emerge is a fully developed energy system...a Northeast Asian Energy Development Organization” that would work function as a provider of nuclear fuel services for both Koreas, Japan, China and Russia.⁵

⁵ Goodby, “The Fukushima Disaster.”

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TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, THE
Southeast Asian countries with home-grown jihadists—Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia—have handled the problem reasonably well. The region never became terrorism’s “second front,” despite widespread fears after the 2002 Bali bombing, and both the size and capacity of jihadi groups have steadily diminished. Indonesia continues to face major challenges as religious intolerance rises and provides an enabling environment for the emergence of new groups, but casualties from terrorism over the last five years have been low. Thailand and the Philippines face a different problem—the need to find political solutions to armed insurgencies, some of which use terror tactics. But after seven years of war, insurgents in southern Thailand show no interest in joining the global jihad, and foreign jihadis in the Philippines, while dangerous, are few in number and increasingly constrained in their operations.

The Bali bombing focused world attention on Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a regional terrorist group that had established links to al-Qaeda. Bali also marked the height of the group’s influence—JI has been on the decline ever since. Founded in 1993 as a breakaway group from an old Indonesian Islamist insurgency called Darul Islam, JI built a hierarchical organization that extended to five countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Australia. Many men who went on to become JI leaders trained on the Pakistan-Afghan border before the split with Darul Islam; JI’s Malaysian branch, led by Indonesian nationals,
organized a second round of training in Afghanistan after the Taliban took power, with a cell in Karachi that provided logistical support for South-east Asians to travel there. A JI training academy in the Philippines, set up in 1994, ran parallel to several smaller camps of Indonesians from other extremist groups, working in tactical alliance with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

A powerful local driver for jihad was provided in 1999 and 2000 with the outbreak of bitter fighting between Muslims and Christians in two parts of Indonesia: Ambon, Maluku; and Poso, Central Sulawesi. Local Muslims dying at Christian hands allowed extremists to put these local conflicts in the framework of a global jihad, and recruitment soared. The first jihadi bombs in Indonesia were aimed at local Christians in response to Ambon and Poso. It was only after 9/11 when the United States declared its war on terror and invaded Afghanistan that local jihadi attention turned toward foreign targets.

By 2002, Southeast Asia looked like it had serious potential to become a terrorist hub. But there were many reasons why this did not happen:

1. **Good law enforcement.** From late 2001 in Singapore and Malaysia and after the Bali bombing in Indonesia, local police, with generous international support, moved forcefully against jihadi networks, arresting key members, in many places smashing local cells and disrupting chains of command. Singaporean and Malaysian security forces were already highly skilled; the most dramatic improvement came with Indonesia’s creation of a police counter-terror unit called Detachment 88 which over time grew in confidence, professionalism and achievement.

2. **Peaceful regional environment.** Unlike South Asia or the Middle East, where interstate rivalries and hostilities provided fertile ground for terrorist growth, no state in Southeast Asia had any interest in encouraging attacks on its neighbors, and there were strong incentives for regional cooperation. If the latter did not always work as well as desired, it had as much to do with bureaucratic obstacles as deliberate obstruction. In particular, militaries generally talked to militaries, police to police, and intelligence to intelligence. However, information-sharing did not always work smoothly when the lead counter-terror agency in one case was the military, as in the Philippines, but in other cases was the police, as in Malaysia and Indonesia. But border security improved and it became more difficult for Indonesians trying to get to or from Mindanao to transit through Malaysia without getting caught.

3. **No real interest in a regional Islamic state.** JI leaders, particularly those operating out of Malaysia, hoped that they could generate interest in an archipelagic Islamic state, comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, southern Philippines, and southern Thailand. But the idea never took off, nor did JI’s efforts, in 1999 and 2000, to form a regional Mujahidin League from a nucleus of Afghanistan-trained “alumni” that would include representatives of all of the above, along with the Rohingya from Myanmar. The priorities of different groups varied too widely from country to country, and many were not comfortable with the use of violence against civilian targets. Leaders of local ethno-nationalist rebellions in particular did not want to confuse agendas by adopting the al-Qaeda line.

4. **Resolution of Indonesian conflicts and peace talks in the Philippines.** Indonesian government initiatives in the two communal conflict areas produced peace agreements, in Poso in December 2011, and in Maluku in February 2002. One-sided violence by extremists continued, particularly in Poso,
but the communal conflicts gradually waned, taking away an important local driver for jihad. In the Philippines, the MILF expelled a militant JI contingent in November 2005 in the interest of pursuing peace talks with the government. This pushed some of the most notorious jihadis, including Bali bombers Dulmatin and Umar Patek, into the arms of the Abu Sayyaf Group, but it further narrowed the terrorists’ room for movement.

5. Rifts in the movement. The growing number of arrests produced divisions within the jihadi movement. Police cooptation of jihadi prisoners generated mutual suspicions and recriminations, especially in Indonesia after prisoners, many of whom were given light sentences, were released. In Malaysia and Singapore, where prisoners were held under their respective Internal Security Acts (ISA), no one was brought to trial. And while many were eventually freed, it was only after intensive counselling and with tight surveillance after release.

There were also differences across the region over tactics and strategy. One of the most important was between qital nikayah and qital tamkin. The former was associated with indiscriminate violence against civilians—in Iraq, the brutal tactics of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; in Southeast Asia, the Jakarta and Bali bombings by Malaysian national Noordin Mohammed Top, a JI member who had fled to Indonesia to escape the late 2001 crackdown and who by 2004 had established a separate organization. Qital tamkin, by contrast, was based on a longer-
term strategy of establishing an Islamic state where attacks would only be used in support of that goal. Many JI leaders came to see Noordin’s tactics as counter-productive and argued the need to focus energies on rebuilding the organization through religious outreach (dakwah) and education.

Another rift was between those who believed the clandestine nature of jihadi organizations should be maintained and those who believed an above-ground front working for the establishment of Islamic law was desirable. Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir fell in the latter category, first with the establishment of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in 2000, then after he fell out with MMI in 2008, the creation of Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) in 2008. JAT tried to operate on both levels, with clandestine military training combined with public protests and demonstrations in collaboration with hard-line Islamist civil society organizations.

6. Lack of local support. In Singapore and Malaysia, there was little support for terrorist attacks to begin with; what little there was in Indonesia as a result of Ambon, Poso and U.S. policies after 9/11 evaporated with the deaths of Muslims in many of Noordin’s bombings. In Iraq, Palestine, Chechnya and Kashmir, it was possible to build on hatred of an occupier. In large parts of the Middle East, one could build on hatred of a repressive government. In France, Australia, Germany, Spain and the U.S., recruiters could appeal to the idea of an alienated minority. These drivers were mostly not present in Southeast Asia. The alienated minority aspect was a factor in Singapore, but there was no critical mass to build a movement, particularly under the tight political control of a security-conscious city-state.

THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES
All of these factors contributed to the decline of JI, but several other factors kept terrorism in the region alive. Southern Thailand erupted in January 2004 with militant attacks on police posts and an army arsenal, and again in April with synchronized attacks on police posts and a bloody confrontation at the Krue Se Mosque in Pattani. This was followed in October 2004 by the incident in Tak Bai, Narathiwat, where 78 protestors arrested by police and piled several layers deep into trucks suffocated en route to an army base for questioning. These incidents gave new fuel to a decentralized Muslim Malay insurgency which has routinely used homemade bombs to kill informers, Muslims working for the government, and Thai Buddhists. The fear that the insurgency would find common cause with the al-Qaeda or regional jihadi organizations has never materialized, although there have been offers—politely rejected—from Indonesian jihadis to join forces, in Manila or involved in power struggles closer to home; they are mostly not interested in a broader Islamic struggle. Indonesian and Malaysian jihadis, however, see both the Philippines and Thailand as struggles of intense interest, not least because there are guns and combat experience to be had there. As of 2011, a trickle of Indonesians from various jihadi factions was managing to find its way through to Mindanao; members of a Darul Islam faction were arrested at a port in East Java in July 2011 trying to bring in state-of-the-art weapons that they had purchased from corrupt police in Zamboanga.

DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA
From a counter-terrorism perspective, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines remain particular headaches, Indonesia especially due to its size, shape, and political system.
remains a particular headache, especially due to its size, shape, and political system. The last major jihadi bombing in Indonesia with civilian casualties was in July 2009 when a team loyal to Noordin Top bombed the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in an attack that seemed to be aimed at Western businesses. Noordin was tracked down and killed shortly thereafter.

Several developments have taken place since then. A short-lived training camp in Aceh, Sumatra, broken up by police in February 2010, led to the arrest of more than 100 people and the recognition that the constellation of jihadi groups had changed. The group in Aceh called itself Al-Qaeda for the Veranda of Mekkah, (a traditional appellation for Aceh) and constituted an alliance of some six or seven groups who were critical of both JI, for having abandoned jihad, and Noordin Top, for having no strategy. The break-up of this group proved to be a gold mine for police and led to a new wave of arrests.

Since then, a host of small groups, harder to detect but with less well indoctrinated or militarily trained cadre than the old JI, have emerged, with their attacks aimed at local targets. The only people killed by terrorists in Indonesia is 2010 were ten police officers. The only people killed in 2011, aside from suicide bombers themselves, have also been three police, although several bombs placed at churches failed to explode. One development that has taken place has thus been a shift in target away from foreigners, although the focus could always shift back.

The reasons have been several. First, ideological influences from the Middle East, especially from the Jordanian scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, have suggested that the more important enemy is at home and that the focus should be on removal of obstacles to an Islamic state. Second, it is easier to recruit people for attacks on police for several reasons: the police have been the lead agency arresting and sometimes killing “mujahidin” in operations and revenge is a potent motive; because at a local level, they are often corrupt and abusive; the police have weapons; and police are relatively easy targets, particularly in remote areas. Third, many jihadis found that appeals to the persecution of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan or Palestine did not resonate in the larger population; local targets had more of a chance. This in turn has led to the merging of agendas in Indonesia between thuggish...
but non-terrorist organizations like the Islamic Defenders Front, which has led the fight against the Ahmadiyah sect and the construction of Christian churches, and groups like JAT which and by whom convicted terrorists were radicalized has led to huge wastage of resources on ineffective programs. There are unquestionably terrorists from poor backgrounds, but known as Wahabism, has certainly contributed to religious intolerance. But Wahabism and salafi jihadism, the ideology behind the global jihad, are diametrically opposed, with Wahabis see in these issues as an opportunity for recruitment.

DERADICALIZATION AND COUNTER-RADICALIZATION Singapore and Malaysia have had reasonably successful counselling programs for prisoners accused of terrorism, although it is difficult to know whether the ‘success,’ in terms of released prisoners not returning to violence, has more to do with tight surveillance than with changes of mind-set in the individuals concerned. Indonesia has had a problem with recidivism, in part because its prisons are so corrupt. There is also poor data management and virtually no post-release monitoring program. Despite being praised for its deradicalization program, there is, in fact, no systematic program in place, but rather a series of ad hoc efforts aimed largely at a small group of cooperative “Afghan alumni” and some other JI members.

Neither Indonesia nor the Philippines has anything remotely approaching an effective counter-radicalization strategy aimed at preventing vulnerable youth from getting drawn into extremist circles. There remains a widespread assumption, which is demonstrably false, that the main driver of radicalization is poverty. If this were true, the majority of recruits would be the urban poor. Failure to do the research to understand how, where economic status does not explain why they, rather than other men from the same villages, were drawn into the radical net.

If the thesis that poverty leads to radicalization is one of the most popular false assumptions about terrorism in Southeast Asia, there are two others. One is that draconian laws are a panacea. Some officials in Indonesia argue that the reason for the lack of serious attacks in Singapore and Malaysia has been the ISA, whereas the looser laws in Indonesia and the Philippines allow more scope for extremist activity. Singapore is so small, its security system so tight and its vigilance so high, that the ISA is hardly the only factor keeping terrorism at bay. Malaysia, which in September 2011 announced the lifting of the ISA, is a regional transit hub which allows all Muslims to enter visa-free and which in the heyday of JI was that organization’s cash cow. There was never any rationale for attacks in Malaysia, regardless of the strictness of its laws. Some Indonesian officials appear to see more draconian anti-terror legislation as a silver bullet for a complex problem that they need to address at its roots; a new law will not miraculously make terrorism go away.

Another false assumption is that Saudi funding has been a major factor in the spread of extremism. The Saudi brand of ultra-puritan Islam, generally seeing the more politically focused jihadists as heretics. In Indonesia, physical clashes have broken out between the two camps.

CONCLUSION

Ten years after 9/11, terrorist groups have evolved and mutated. The ideology of salafi jihadism is not going away any time soon. It is disseminated through religious meetings (taklim), books, radio and the Internet, and has an appealing black-white clarity. But public revulsion at bombings of soft targets, the lack of outside enemies, absence of influential backers and increasingly professional and effective police work ensure that the scope of terrorism in Southeast Asia will remain limited. The onus is on governments to allocate the resources and put in the time to develop effective strategies to counter extremist teachings, improve prison management, restrict access to guns and explosives, offer alternative youth activities in problem areas and generally recognize that the problem goes a long way beyond law enforcement.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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“ Ten years after 9/11, terrorist groups have evolved and mutated.”
After two decades of unrelenting doom and gloom, a hopeful mood has started to color commentary about Burma since the election of November 2010.

The understandable excitement that greeted pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s release from house arrest has been followed by suggestions that the country is finally poised for meaningful and positive political change.

Burmese democrats and their supporters see cause for optimism. In September and October 2011, the government’s decisions to release political prisoners and suspend the controversial Myitsone dam project were greeted by widespread acclamation.

With this taste of more responsive government, and the prospect of greater and more radical reform, many Burmese now openly dream of a peaceful and democratic society where the bloodshed and horrors of the country’s postcolonial decades can fade into memory once and for all. Nobody wants Burma to struggle through more years of poverty, calamity, violence and heartbreak.

Internationally, there is also more of a mood for change and action than ever before. Old policy debates about sanctioning the country’s ruling elite, prosecuting military commanders for human rights abuses and calling the top leaders to account for alleged war crimes now vie for precedence with new plans for investment, engagement and interaction.

Polite conversation with Burma’s new quasi-civilian government, headed by a former general, President Thein Sein, is widely considered the
The sins of the past are, at this moment, increasingly dismissed as ancient history.

1988-2010: A PRECARIOUS BALANCE
Favorable receptions of recent political events in Burma should not, however, distract attention from the country’s broken balance.

That balance—predicated on a nationwide set of ceasefire agreements with ethnic armies—was the defining strategic ploy of the military dictatorship that ruled from 1988 to 2010. The balance was designed to limit the number of ethnic armies that remained actively hostile to the dictatorship and its plans. Under these arrangements, infrastructure projects, impossible to consider while the wars raged from the 1940s to the 1980s, sprang up on old battlefields the length and breadth of the country. Dams, mines, pipelines, bridges and roads proliferated; and new wealth followed.

Over those two decades tens of thousands of anti-government fighters were incrementally taken out of the security equation as their leaders enriched themselves on the spoils of officially sanctioned “development.” To their great frustration, however, Burmese government negotiators failed to deliver final truces in ethnic regions. Most of the country’s ethnic armies, perceiving their vulnerability if they ever agreed to disarm, resisted final political settlements where their self-determination was not guaranteed.

Stalemates followed. Then, from 2008 the Burmese government ratcheted up the pressure. Some of the smaller ethnic armies eventually capitulated to government demands but the most formidable fighting forces—the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), and the Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA)—all held to their ceasefires without accepting the government’s demands.

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These groups worried that if they accepted transition to government-controlled Border Guard Forces (BGF) they would be slowly forced into redundancy and ultimately left impotent in the face of any future security contingencies. Powerful ethnic leaders voiced their scepticism and held to the view that any final agreements should recognize their custodianship of their ethnic areas and their leadership of ethnic political causes.

VIOLENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 2010 ELECTION
With no such final agreements, Burma’s 2010 election was marked by tension, resentment and fear in ethnic areas. Some ethnic leaders were barred from participating and candidacies with the faintest association to ethnic nationalism were declared invalid.

Unsurprisingly the aftermath of the election has been punctuated by eruptions of violence; the balance that prevailed during the ceasefire years has finally broken.

In November 2010 units from the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), a long-time government ally, attacked the Burmese government-controlled towns of Myawaddy and Phya Thonzu (Three Pagodas Pass). After seizing these strategic outposts, and declaring their dissatisfaction with the political process, they retreated under the threat of government counter-attack.

Then the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which through years of negotiation had never agreed to a final ceasefire with the government, abruptly increased its operational tempo. Its fighters have now been joined by around 3,000 troops from the DKBA who no longer want to challenge their ethnic Karen “brothers”.

The fighting in Karen State is not, however, the main factor determining the dangerous tilt of the broken balance between ethnic armies and the Burmese government. It is, instead, the new wars in the Shan and Kachin States that make Burma a far
forces resumed on June 9, 2011. The proximate cause was a dispute over security at the Tapain hydro-electricity project near the China-Burma border.

That dispute joined a long list of other government provocations, including the now suspended construction of the dam at Myitsone. The KIA conflict must also be seen in the context of the breakdown in communication over transformation to a Border Guard Force.

In the new war the death toll is high. By October 2011, there had been hundreds of combat deaths, with government forces reportedly taking the heaviest losses.

While government forces have directly attacked KIA bases with their artillery, infantry and armor, they have been confronted by nimble guerrilla ambushes and sabotage deep in government-held territory. Kachin squads, roaming far from their bases, have destroyed road and rail infrastructure, blown up bridges and fortified compounds, obliterated government re-supply boats, and also struck at Myitkyina, the Kachin State’s capital and symbolic heart of Burmese government control.

As the new war has escalated, the KIA has executed devastatingly effective attacks on government convoys. In a number of single engagements, dozens of Burmese troops have been killed.

Elsewhere in Burma’s destabilized ethnic areas, such as the Shan State, the fighting is just as fierce. The Shan State Army-North, which agreed to a ceasefire back in 1989, has now been fighting since March 13, 2011 and has re-grouped with its former allies in the Shan State Army-South. The war in Shan areas is similarly punctuated by government offensives and guerrilla counter-attacks.
Some Burmese army commanders are reportedly unhappy about the scale of their losses in these new wars. In recent years the most complete casualty figures have come from the Karen State where the Burmese government has remarkably sustained Killed In Action ratios of 60:1 and Wounded In Action of 100:1, or more.¹

The new war in the Kachin State appears to be reproducing these heavy government losses. Notwithstanding the inevitable misgivings about such a one-sided casualty count, the new government is clearly prepared to fight.

It does so at a time when shares of power and profit within the country’s ruling elite are freshly contested. Senior General Than Shwe’s elevation to less active roles means that the quasi-civilian political leaders, many of whom are former generals, are jostling for control alongside the military leadership.

Senior military leaders—wary of losing prestige, influence and resources—are reportedly motivated to continue demonstrating the essential value of the military to national survival. The renewed ethnic wars are perfect for their purposes.

FOUR AREAS WARRANTING CRITICAL ATTENTION

Burma clearly faces numerous political challenges but it is the disjuncture between positive political moves and the resumption of ethnic hostilities that requires the most attention. In this context, can we understand Burma’s broken balance in ways that still offer hope for meaningful and positive change?

To answer this question we see four areas where the changes that are occurring require critical scrutiny.

1) New Ethnic Conflicts

The main ceasefire agreements made between 1989 and 1995 bought relative stability to interactions between ethnic armies and the Burmese government. The three main non-ceasefire armies—the Karen National Liberation Army, the Shan State Army-South and the Karenni Army—survived because of convenient resupply and respite provided by supporters in Thailand, and because many of their battle-hardened fighters remained unprepared to surrender without total victory.

Burma’s other ethnic armies opted to enjoy more peaceful relations with the government but they never managed to develop mutually agreeable terms for final political settlements.

The renewed wars mean that over the months and years ahead, the prospect of ever escalating violence needs to be seriously considered. New humanitarian emergencies are emerging, and flows of refugees to Thailand, and also to China, India and Bangladesh, cannot be ruled out. More violence in border areas will, if history is any guide, also mean a spike in

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¹ The new war in the Kachin State appears to be reproducing these heavy government losses. Notwithstanding the inevitable misgivings about such a one-sided casualty count, the new government is clearly prepared to fight.

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TIMELINE: SIGNIFICANT POST-2007 EVENTS

September/October 2007:
Large-scale protests by Buddhist monks and others; these protests are known as the “Saffron Revolution”.

May 2008:
Cyclone Nargis leaves the Ayeyarwady Delta region devastated and around 140,000 people dead.

May 2008:
Constitutional referendum.

November 2010:
Nationwide election, the first in 20 years.

November 2010:
Aung San Suu Kyi released from house arrest.

January 2011:
New parliament convenes for the first time.

Early 2011:
Renewed conflict in Karen and Mon areas.

March 2011:
Renewed conflict between the Shan State Army-North and the government.

June 2011:
Renewed conflict between the Kachin Independence Army and the government.

August 2011:
The United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights visits Burma for the first time in over a year.

August 2011:
Aung San Suu Kyi undertakes a political tour and also travels to Naypyidaw to meet with President Thein Sein.

September 2011:
The Burmese government suspends the development of the controversial Chinese-backed dam at Myitsone in the Kachin State.

October 2011:
The Burmese government announces an amnesty for almost 7,000 prisoners with about 200 of those thought to be political prisoners.
human rights abuses. While claims of crimes against humanity in Burma are difficult to verify, escalation of the current conflicts is likely to see violence and retribution on a hitherto unforeseen scale.

But alleged criminality is not the monopoly of the government alone. These conflicts also influence the regional markets for narcotics. The United Wa State Army, in particular, used the ceasefire years to fund and arm its troops with profits from the drug trade.

Floods of amphetamines have washed down from Wa areas in the Shan State since the late 1990s and made a long-lasting impression on Southeast Asian drug consumption, especially in Thailand. Even after brutal Thai government campaigns to cripple the amphetamines market, it remains as robust as ever. Over the past decade there have been consistent reports of at least 800 million amphetamines pills being trafficked across the border to Thailand each year.²

2) Choices for the Neighbors
The unpredictable pace of change in Burma, and the resumption of ethnic conflict, means governments in the immediate region now face the gravest choices. While Burma’s neighbors may find the new wars inconvenient, and any waves of refugees will be unwelcome, their standard approach is to ignore the realities of Burma’s ethnic wars.

The non-interference codified by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) discourages regional activism, especially on issues as potentially sensitive as ethnic conflict. At the same time the two regional powers with opportunities to exert independent influence, China and India, have shown no willingness to make any new moves.

3) Multilateral Responses
Given the relatively obscure character of Burma’s ethnic wars, the wider international community may not be inclined to suggest their own suite of multilateral responses. Some ethnic leaders embroiled in the new conflicts hope that international trouble-

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### TABLE 1: MAJOR ARMED FORCES IN BURMA, OCTOBER 2011³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Estimated Strength</th>
<th>Estimated Combat Strength</th>
<th>Ceasefire Agreements</th>
<th>Arsenal and Weaponry</th>
<th>2011 Combat Fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Around 24 agreements</td>
<td>Heavy plus Air Force</td>
<td>Likely more than 1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Wa State Army</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachin Independence Army</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>Broken</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
<td>Around 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan State Army -South</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shan State Army -North</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Broken</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen National Liberation Army</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Around 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Karen Buddhist Army</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Partly broken</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon National Liberation Army</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Tentative</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karenni Army</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border Guard Force</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Splinter groups</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Light</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
shooters can be invited to help broker new truces. They distrust Burmese government authorities and feel that outside mediation is required. For its part the Burmese government has remained reluctant to accept any international assistance and, as such, immediate moves towards multilateral peace-making are unlikely.

4) Democratization

Aung San Suu Kyi remains a wild card with respect to the ethnic conflicts. She is arguably the only person in Burma that the ethnic armies would trust to broker a new set of ceasefire agreements. But that is also unlikely. Indeed the primary hope across Southeast Asia and the rest of the world is for peace and stability, with only modest ambitions for genuinely democratic rule. Even those countries that have been most critical of Burma, such as Indonesia and Thailand, seem prepared to indulge the new government. For their part, the United States, European Union and Australia remain committed to democratic change in Burma and have each sought to influence developments in that direction. Nonetheless they are hesitant to make abrupt moves while the future trajectory of political development is unclear.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

It is under these conditions that recent decisions by Burma’s new, quasi-civilian government are especially intriguing. On the one hand, the new ceasefires. The re-ignited conflicts could now last for many years. But, on the other hand, many of the government’s recent moves are based on the unprecedented embrace of compromise and reform. They appear serious about building a more respectable international reputation and incrementally steering the country towards greater openness and democracy.

The decision to suspend the Myitsone dam project in the Kachin State is the most notable in this regard. It followed a campaign from some of the country’s small number of civil society groups. That decision may signal that the government has the necessary capacity to broker compromises in ethnic areas. Such capacity is essential if the government hopes to motivate peaceful resolutions to Burma’s civil wars.

The challenge for the new government is surely to find a new balance to replace the broken one. Such a balance will require reformist instincts to be mobilized in ethnic areas across the entire country. It will not be easy. New ceasefires, to say nothing of final peace agreements, will require compromise and conciliation. To maximize its chances of success Burma’s government may also need to rely on the charisma and status of Aung San Suu Kyi. She could prove crucial in negotiations with ethnic armies if the government expects to stop the current trend towards disintegration, decimation and despair.

While Burma’s neighbors may find the new wars inconvenient, and any waves of refugees will be unwelcome, their standard approach is to ignore the realities of Burma’s ethnic wars.”

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1 These statistics have come to the authors from sources in the Karen National Liberation Army. They are also considered reasonably reliable by others with good access to conflict zones in eastern Burma.


3 The source of this table is the authors’ own long-term field research in ethnic areas of Burma.
The results of Thailand’s much-anticipated national election in July 2011 present a mix of opportunities and challenges to the country’s three low-level crises: pronounced political divisions between the two main political factions, the protracted insurgencies in the Deep South, and the Preah Vihear temple border dispute with Cambodia. Yingluck Shinawatra, who leads the new five-party coalition government, is the country’s first female prime minister and the sister of Thaksin Shinawatra, one of Thailand’s most popular yet polarizing figures. The latter fact is almost certain to prolong the country’s political conflict. Furthermore, the status quo is likely in the insurgencies in the Deep South, while the border dispute with Cambodia, despite warming bilateral relations, is also expected to remain unresolved.

Electoral Politics: Thai voters have shown an unprecedented level of support for the democratic process, but the recent electoral results re-emphasized Thailand’s deep political divisions between pro-Thaksin regions and their adversary, the Democrat Party. More importantly, a small minority of conservative forces as well as some anti-Thaksinites have brought down popularly elected governments in past. Forces opposing the ruling Puea Thai have already begun trying to annul the election and dissolve the new governing party.

The battle of colors—between the Red Shirts, Thaksin’s electoral base, and the Yellow Shirts, who support the Democrat Party—in part centers around Thaksin, who was ousted in the 2006 coup. The mass demonstrations led by the Yellow Shirts since 2005 sought to expel Thaksin, whom they regard as highly corrupt, manipulative and authoritarian, and a major threat to the country’s democracy, monarchy and national security as a whole. The Red Shirts, the majority of whom formed Thaksin’s electoral base, saw the ousting of their much beloved leader as unjust, illegitimate and a clear regression of democracy. As such, Yingluck’s Red Shirt-aligned Puea Thai government suggests Thailand’s future prospects for national reconciliation remain bleak. Any move towards bringing Thaksin back from exile will create a major uproar among the anti-Thaksin forces. Likewise, any measures taken to dislodge the Puea Thai government, such as party dissolution, disqualification of Yingluck as prime minister, or worse, another coup, could push the nation to the brink of civil war. Even though the majority of Thais have demonstrated their commitment to democracy through their ballots, the minority of conservative forces, as well as some anti-Thaksinites, have shown in the past their ability to bring down an elected government against the popular will.
Southern Insurgencies: The new government will be reluctant to take any sweeping measures to counter the protracted insurgencies in Thailand’s three southernmost provinces—Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat—partly because of the unpopularity of Thaksin’s past policies and partly because the powerful military will be wary of drastic changes. In addition, Yingluck’s campaign promise of greater autonomy for the south under the proposed “Pattani Metropolis” plan lacks clarity. The fact that the Deep South, which once voted for Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party, more recently voted for the opposition, removes any motivation for the Yingluck government to give the plan serious consideration. The opposition will also fight hard to maintain their dominance in the region by opposing any major policy changes to the south coming from the government. Prayuth Chan-ocha, the army chief, had made clear that he is against any administrative decentralization plans for the Deep South.

Thai-Cambodia Border: More optimism is warranted on Thailand’s border row with Cambodia. It’s an open secret that Thaksin and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen are “good friends” and Hun could barely hide his enthusiasm when Yingluck won the election. Both countries have vowed to improve bilateral relations, which will remain the cornerstone of resolving this highly politicized dispute. But this is not enough, and multilateral measures through ASEAN, UNESCO and the UN Security Council have not only been ineffective but in fact have worsened the situation.

In addition, there are major stumbling blocks to resolving the dispute within Thailand itself, with nationalistic domestic pressure groups, most notably the powerful anti-Thaksin forces, who may view better ties with Cambodia as a step towards amnesty for Yingluck’s exiled brother. The Thai army also has been wary of intervention from the international community. The previous government, led by the Democrats, has also left the temple dispute in such disarray, especially its decision to pull Thailand out of the UN World Heritage Convention, that it would take more than a friendly Hun Sen to make any progress.

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Over the past year, a series of aggressive incidents involving Chinese patrol boats interspersed with soothing Chinese official statements left many analysts puzzled. The incidents included cutting seismometer cables of two Vietnamese-sanctioned survey ships exploring Vietnam’s claimed continental shelf, and threatening a Philippines-sanctioned survey vessel and Philippine fisherfolk in the Philippines-claimed Reed Bank area.

China responded to frenetic protests from Vietnam and the Philippines by warning that any exploration in the Spratly area without its consent is a violation of its jurisdiction and sovereignty—as well as the agreed 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Despite China’s attempts to reassure, some ASEAN nations, genuinely alarmed by China’s contradictory behavior, began to explore closer cooperation including the setting up of hotlines.

These incidents and the run up to and including the Bali summits in July 2011 provided fascinating diplomatic theater. Ultimately, ASEAN and China agreed on “guidelines” for implementing the DOC, but negotiations were difficult. The guidelines reveal more by what they do not say than by what they do. Indeed, they lack specifics, timelines, and enforceability; their practical focus is on ‘soft’ security issues. While some viewed the guidelines as a first step towards a binding code of conduct, others saw them as a façade for failure.

The agreement was significant because there was a lot at stake. ASEAN and China both needed to show that they could manage regional disputes more or less by themselves. They also needed to demonstrate that the South China Sea is safe for commerce. Weighing heavily on ASEAN—and Indonesia as the current Chair—was the recent, earlier failure to resolve the violent border dispute between members of Cambodia and Thailand. In short, the capability, credibility and relevance of ASEAN security forums were at risk.

Although Philippines’ and Vietnam’s public protests and appeals to ASEAN and the international community called attention to the problem, the main characters in this shadow play were China and the US. Their rivalry drove the issues forward but also created pressure to make some progress.

China had long resisted the draft guidelines and made a major compromise by agreeing to them. Perhaps it feared that the disputes were pushing ASEAN toward the U.S. ASEAN also
compromised by agreeing to drop a clause that would mandate that it form a unified ASEAN position before dealing with China on South China Sea issues. China’s position was that it should only have to deal with rival claimants on a bilateral basis—Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Whatever the impetus, China—through its rhetoric and behavior—succeeded in reducing tension, at least for the time being.

But this may only be temporary. China’s “charm offensive” has begun to unravel. Beijing has complained—to no avail—that Vietnam and the Philippines are violating the DOC by unilaterally exploring for hydrocarbons in areas claimed by China. China’s leadership appears to be losing patience with its Southeast Asian neighbors. Since the Bali meetings, it has warned darkly of “due consequences” if challenged in the South China Sea, and has told Vietnam that with respect to their particular dispute, it will “take whatever measures are necessary.” However, more Vietnamese and Philippines-sanctioned surveys and even exploratory drilling are planned in areas claimed by China. So far, it has used only maritime police to enforce its claimed jurisdiction. But this could change.

The Philippines and Vietnam publicly have sought and gained support from the U.S. Having confronted China and injected itself into the South China Sea via U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech at the ARF Foreign Minister’s meeting in Hanoi in July 2010, which cleverly conflated the disputes with freedom of navigation issues, Washington was only too happy to assist the ASEAN claimants. This included both verbal support and joint military cooperation through exercises and port visits. Just in case China had not gotten the full message, at the end of the 2011 Bali summits Clinton laid the U.S. cards on the table.

First, she proclaimed that the U.S. has a national interest in freedom of navigation, peace and stability and respect for international law in the South China Sea. Second the U.S. opposes the threat or use of force by any claimant to advance its claims. Third the U.S. supports a multilateral diplomatic process for resolving the disputes. Fourth, the U.S. “calls on parties to clarify their claims in the South China Sea in terms consistent with customary international law, including as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. Consistent with international law, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features.” These were all challenges to China.

Thus concluded Act One. The stage is now set for Act Two.

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1 They included principally the meetings of ASEAN-China Senior Officials, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, ASEAN plus China, ASEAN plus Chiria, Japan and South Korea, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.
In 2010, the Korean peninsula experienced one of its worst security crises since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Military tensions rose following the March 26 sinking of the South Korean corvette, Cheonan, and act that killed 46 seamen and was attributed to a North Korean torpedo. Tensions reached a peak the following November 23 with the North Korean artillery attack on South Korean marines conducting practice artillery exercises on Yeonpyong Island. As the first physical attack on South Korean territory since the Korean War, the shelling, which killed two marines and two civilians, elicited an immediate response from Seoul, including the complete severance of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, the mobilization of international pressure, and the adoption of a proactive deterrence policy based on offensive preemption.

These events marred the seeming pursuit of a peace offensive by the North, which began with a New Year’s joint editorial calling for the unconditional resumption of all levels of talks with the South. Although official meetings discussing possible inter-Korean summit talks took place, the sincerity of Pyongyang’s efforts was questioned given its resolute denial of responsibility for the Cheonan incident and of any wrongdoing in the Yeonpyong attack, which it viewed as an act of self-defense against South Korea’s shelling of its territorial waterways.

North Korea’s ‘dialogue’ offensive has also extended to the United States. In addition to a series of economic delegations sent to the U.S. seeking private investment, the North accepted South Korea’s three-stage approach involving North-South talks, North-U.S. talks, and Six-Party Talks, in order to enter direct talks with the U.S. A meeting between DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan and his U.S. counterpart, Steve Bosworth, on July 27 gave some signs of progress. The North called for the unconditional resumption of Six-Party Talks, reiterated its willingness to denuclearize, and pledged a moratorium on additional missile and nuclear testing in return for food aid and suspension of sanctions. U.S. and North Korean officials met in Geneva in October for “exploratory meetings” regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear program, but these meetings failed to create much notable progress.

“With a collapsing economy and chronic food shortages, economic recovery has become the most urgent issue, particularly for a smooth political succession.”
Meanwhile, as international sanctions continue to strangle its economy, North Korea has sought significant assistance from China and economic ties between the countries are closer than ever. China’s share of North Korea’s total trade rose from 24.8% to 88.1% in 2010 and the two countries have agreed to several joint economic development projects. North Korea has also been noted for strengthening its ties with Russia, most recently at the August 24 summit talk with Medvedev, and for seeking more diversified sources of aid and investment, especially from Europe.

These moves appear closely aligned with Kim Jong-il’s pledge to achieve a ‘strong and prosperous great nation,’ ‘Gangsung Daeguk,’ by 2012. North Koreans believe the country has attained status as a ‘strong nation’ with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but the task of creating a ‘prosperous nation’ has proven problematic. With a collapsing economy and chronic food shortages, economic recovery has become the most urgent issue, particularly for a smooth political succession. 2010 also heralded the political debut of Kim Jong-un, the third son of Kim Jong-il, who was declared a ‘four-star general’ and elected Vice Chairman of the Korea Workers Party Central Military Committee. Kim Jong-un has since firmly established himself as the ‘number two man’ in North Korea, having accompanied his father on more than 100 public occasions and even briefly ruling in his father’s stead during travel absences.

In the coming year, North Korea will likely seek more active diplomacy with the outside world and desperate economic needs could lead to concessions on the nuclear front. However, the international community’s failure to engage could result in renewed possibilities of missile and nuclear testing. Finally, the likelihood of social and political unrest resulting from succession politics appears low, as Kim Jong-un is currently protected by three layers of supporting forces: immediate family members in the ruling elite, the Korea Workers’ Party and cabinet, and the military.

**ABOUT THE AUTHOR**

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**ANNUAL FOOD AID (IN METRIC TONS) TO NORTH KOREA BY MAJOR DONORS, 2001-2010**

![Graph showing annual food aid to North Korea by major donors from 2001 to 2010, with data sourced from World Food Program’s International Food Aid Information System (INTERFAIS) database.]

This table is updated from the Congressional Research Service Report on “Foreign Assistance to North Korea” (July 1, 2011) by Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth Nikitin.
2011 was a noteworthy year for military modernization in the Asia Pacific. China sent its first aircraft carrier (the ex-Soviet Varyag) off on its initial sea trials and conducted the first flight of the J-20, a prototype of a fifth-generation fighter jet. Beijing also commissioned its second Type-071 LPD-type amphibious assault ship, as well as two new frigates and one new destroyer.\(^1\) It was also disclosed that China’s new antiship ballistic missile had achieved “initial operating capability.”\(^2\)

Other countries in the region have been equally busy recapitalizing their militaries. Japan commissioned its second Hyuga-class helicopter carrier, while Australia launched the first of its Canberra-class amphibious assault ships. Thailand received its first Gripen fighter jets from Sweden, and Singapore and South Korea continued to take delivery of F-15 combat aircraft. India announced that it would buy 126 fighters, either the French Rafale or the Eurofighter Typhoon (a final decision is expected in late 2011 or early 2012.)

These arms acquisitions raise the question: Is the Asia Pacific in the grip of a regional arms race? On the surface, it might appear so given the growth in arms acquisitions over the past 10-15 years (see Table 2). More than the numbers of arms being acquired, increasingly the types of weapons being acquired—fourth-generation fighter aircraft, modern submarines, naval vessels armed with advanced antiship cruise missiles, etc.—constitute a “racheting-up” in the quality of arms flowing to regional militaries, leading to an increase in military capabilities. These recent weapons purchases have been accompanied by a significant rise in regional defense spending (see Table 1), which has enabled the arms buildup.

Certainly these developments could be interpreted as pointing to a rather disturbing trend in the regional security calculus. As countries in the Asia Pacific add new capabilities for war fighting—including stand-off precision-strike, long-range airborne and undersea attack, stealth, mobility, and expeditionary warfare—any conflict in the region, should it occur, is likely to be faster, more intense, more lethal, and therefore perhaps more devastating in its effects.

If the Asia Pacific is truly in the midst of an arms race that could have such undesired consequences, then it makes sense to consider limiting arms transfers to the region or to encouraging governments to practice self-restraint when it comes to defense acquisitions. But is it accurate to describe recent patterns of arms acquisitions in the Asia Pacific as a genuine “arms race”? In fact,

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this is unlikely, as most of these arms purchases do not meet the strict requirements of an arms race, as laid out by leading theorists (see Box1). Very few countries in the region, for example, are in an overtly hostile relationship; India-Pakistan is certainly one, but the same cannot be said of Korea and Japan, or of Singapore and Malaysia, despite historical enmities; and Japan is still loath to label China an outright threat.³

Even where there are mutual animosities, the bilateral competitions often do not display the kind of reciprocal arms acquisitions manifest in a typical arms race. For example, the Philippines and Vietnam may clash with China over the Spratlys, but they can hardly hope to seriously compete with China in any tit-for-tat arms buildup.

Finally, the present process of arms acquisition in the region can hardly be described as “rapid” or “extensive.” Some arms deals have taken years to be consummated, while others have been frequently postponed or even cancelled outright. In terms of numbers, too, many Asia Pacific nations are hardly buying out the store; most countries in Southeast Asia, for example, are purchasing only relative handfuls of advanced conventional weaponry.

Rather than an arms race, we may be witnessing more of an arms competition, or an “arms dynamic” occurring in the Asia Pacific.⁴ While an “arms competition” is still a process of reciprocal arms acquisitions, it is dedicated to maintaining the status quo, rather than seeking dominance (although China, of course, may be the exception here). In other words, these purchases seek to preserve the balance of power in the region, not disrupt it.

Even if just an arms competition, however, these arms acquisitions can be worrisome and potentially destabilizing. In particular, they may contribute to a classic “security dilemma”—a situation whereby such arming, ostensibly undertaken to maintain regional stability could actually undermine that very security due to misperception and over-reaction. In the long run, therefore, it may not matter whether the current arms buildup is an arms race or “simply” an arms competition.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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### TABLE 1: DEFENSE SPENDING IN THE ASIA PACIFIC, 2000-2009
(in billions of constant 2009 U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Increase (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China*</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>-350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1.2**</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures for Chinese defense spending are based on officially released figures (current dollars); real growth, 2000-2009, is based on author’s estimates.
** Author’s estimate.

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Military Expenditure Database (http://milexdata.sipri.org)
**TABLE 2: RECENT MAJOR ASIA PACIFIC ARMS ACQUISITIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>SURFACE COMBATANTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRALIA</td>
<td>Building 3 <em>Hobart</em>-class Air Warfare Destroyers, equipped with Aegis combat system, SM-2 air-defense missile; could be upgraded to MD capability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CHINA | 6 Type-051C/-052B/-052C destroyers  
4 Russian-built *Sovremenny*-class destroyers  
8+ Type-054/-054A frigates |
| INDIA | Building 3+ Type-15A *Kolkata*-class destroyers |
| INDONESIA | Acquiring 4 Dutch-built *Sigma*-class corvettes |
| JAPAN | Building 4 *Hyuga*-class Helicopter Destroyers (DDH); could be upgraded to LHD or STOVL-type aircraft carrier  
6 *Kongo*- and *Atago*-class destroyers, equipped with upgraded Aegis combat system and SM-3 missile for MD |
| SOUTH KOREA | Building 3+ KDX-III destroyers, equipped with Aegis combat system, SM-2 air-defense missile; could be upgraded to MD capability  
3 KDX-I and 6 KDX-II destroyers |
| MALAYSIA | Acquiring 2 British-built *Lekiu*-class frigates, but program uncertain  
6 German-designed, locally built MEKO A100 OPVs; plans to acquire 6+ indigenous littoral combat ships |
| SINGAPORE | 6 French-designed *Formidable*-class “stealth” frigates |
| THAILAND | 2 Chinese-built Type-053 frigates |
| VIETNAM | Acquiring 2 Russian-built *Gepard*-class frigates |

**GLOSSARY:**

- **AAM:** air-to-air missile
- **AGM:** air-to-ground munition
- **ASCM:** antiship cruise missile
- **LACM:** land-attack cruise missile
- **LHD:** landing helicopter dock
- **LPD:** land platform dock
- **MD:** missile defense
- **MRL:** multiple-rocket launcher
- **SSM:** surface-to-surface missile
- **STOVL:** short takeoff/vertical landing
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS/ AIRCRAFT CARRIERS</th>
<th>SUBMARINES</th>
<th>COMBAT AIRCRAFT</th>
<th>MISSILES &amp; OTHER SYSTEMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building 2 <em>Canberra</em>-Class LHDs</td>
<td>6 <em>Collins</em>-class diesel-electric submarines</td>
<td>24 F/A-18E/F</td>
<td>AAM: AMRAAM, ASCM: Harpoon, AGM: JSOW, Popeye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ex-<em>Varyag</em> (may build additional indigenous carriers)</td>
<td>20+ <em>Song</em>-class submarines</td>
<td>300 Su-27/30 fighters (some Su-27s locally produced)</td>
<td>AAM: R-77, PL-12, ASCM: 3M-54E/E1 Sunburn, 3M-80E Moskit, YJ-83, LACM: DH-10, SSMs: DF-11/-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Type-071 LPDs (may build more in class)</td>
<td>12 Russian-built <em>Kilo</em>-class submarines</td>
<td>Building 300+ J-10 fighters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May build LHD-class vessel</td>
<td>2+ <em>Shang</em>-class nuclear-powered attack submarines, 2+ Type-094 ballistic missile submarines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquiring 6-12 French-designed <em>Scorpène</em>-class submarines; later submarines could be AIP</td>
<td>Acquiring 240+ Su-30MKI fighters (some locally produced)</td>
<td>AAM: R-77, ASCM: Exocet, <em>Brahmos</em>, SSMs: Prithvi, Agni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Launched first nuclear-powered submarine in 2009</td>
<td>Building up to 260 locally produced <em>Tejas</em> fighters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement for up to 6 submarines, acquisition uncertain</td>
<td>Plans to acquire 126 foreign-built fighters, either Rafale or Eurofighter Typhoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring 4 Korean-built LDPs</td>
<td>Requirement for up to 6 submarines, acquisition uncertain</td>
<td>10+ Su-27/-30 fighters</td>
<td>AAM: R-77, ASCM: YJ-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 <em>Osumi</em>-class LPDs</td>
<td>Building 9+ <em>Soryu</em>-class submarines (AIP-equipped)</td>
<td>Approx. 100 F-2 fighters</td>
<td>AAM: AMRAAM, AAM-5, ASCM: Harpoon, AGM: JDAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquiring 2 French-built <em>Scorpène</em>-class submarines</td>
<td>Plans to acquire 5th-generation fighter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building 2+ <em>Dokdo</em>-class LPDs</td>
<td>9 German-designed Type-209 submarines, acquired 1990s</td>
<td>61 F-15K fighters</td>
<td>AAM: AMRAAM, ASCM: Harpoon, <em>Haesung</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building 3+ German-designed Type-214 AIP-equipped submarines</td>
<td>160 F-16 fighters</td>
<td>LCM: Hyunmoo-IIIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plans to acquire 5th-generation fighter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiring 4 <em>Endurance</em>-class LPDs</td>
<td>4 ex-Swedish A-12 submarines</td>
<td>18 Su-30MKM fighter</td>
<td>AAMs: R-77, ASCM: Exocet, MRL: ASTROS-II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 ex-Swedish A-17 submarines</td>
<td>Plans to acquire 18 additional fighters, type undecided</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Spanish-built STOVL aircraft carrier, equipped with AV-8A STOVL fighters (most inoperable)</td>
<td>Requirement for 2+ submarines</td>
<td>6-12 <em>Gripen</em> fighters</td>
<td>AAM: AMRAAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquiring 6 <em>Kilo</em>-class submarines</td>
<td>12 Su-27 fighters</td>
<td>AAM: R-77, ASCM: Kh-35/SS-N-25 Switchblade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquiring 12+ Su-30MK2V fighters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Compiled by author.*
THERE ARE INCREASING SIGNALS that the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is now becoming a global norm. In the years since its inception in 2002, with the release of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report, RtoP has been portrayed by many Asian states as an attempt to justify, in law and in practice, interventions that are defined by Western values, interests, and priorities, and then imposed on the rest of the world.

However, the intervention in Libya, authorized by the United Nations Security Council, might be changing all of that. The most crucial component of the discussions that led to the mid-2011 operation against the Gadhafi regime was the idea that the operation could not proceed without the endorsement of Libya’s neighbors.

This approach, and the fact that regional endorsements by the Gulf Cooperation Council and Arab League were indeed forthcoming, were seen as the demonstration that key non-Western actors are now supportive of RtoP. Moreover, China, once one of the fiercest opponents of the concept, chose to abstain rather than veto at the UN Security Council, allowing the Libya operation to go forward. Is there, in all of this, increasing global approval of the RtoP? Has a tipping point been reached, and are we witnessing in real time the development of a new, and truly global, norm to which Asian states subscribe?

As RtoP gains global legitimacy, Asia Pacific states will have to reconcile it with their own security discourse and conflict resolution mechanisms.
occur? However far back in time one might wish to go to answer that question, in the changes of the past few decades in global politics, or possibly even all the way to the debates and choices which informed the construction of the post-1945 global order, one crucial difference quickly comes to light: Asia’s rise gives it a growing influence on the norms and practices that drive international politics. This shift points to what might be the most striking element in the ongoing debate about the RtoP: it is a debate that quite simply cannot proceed without Asia. The region’s voice is being heard much louder than before in debates about development approaches and models of economic and financial reforms—the G20 provides evidence of this change. Now the region is also called upon by the debate on the RtoP to engage in formulating the norms and methods that will underlie the evolution of global approaches to conflict and conflict resolution.

This is why the ongoing debate about the RtoP matters so much for Asia. More often than not, in the past most Asian regional actors have chosen to bypass discussions about the concept. This approach is no longer possible, as questions about the RtoP increasingly need answers. The Libya operation is the most recent example in a series that dates back to Kosovo. Asia will figure, in one way or another, in these answers. A regional debate on the RtoP, then, must be set in motion. As the RtoP is arguably gaining global legitimacy, the Asia Pacific states will have to reconcile it within their own security discourse and conflict resolution mechanisms. This will not be unproblematic; debates about global norms require a response from the region.

A significant step in this direction was taken when in 2009 a CSCAP Study Group was established to examine these issues. After three meetings within the region, the Study Group’s report was made public in mid-2011. The Group found that many regional states are in fact quite willing to engage in the current global debate about the RtoP. This willingness to discuss the implications of the RtoP for Asia also stems from broader changes in the way proponents of the concept have outlined its logic and ramifications. The Libya operation only serves to highlight the underlying questions and dilemmas inherent in RtoP discourse.

At one level, proponents of the RtoP at the UN and in other international circles have gone to great lengths in recent years to emphasize how the concept is focused on the prevention of conflict—the “responsibility to prevent”—much more than on forceful intervention once violence has erupted—the “responsibility to react.” Mention is often made of the three so-called pillars upon which the implementation of the RtoP should rest:

1) the responsibility of the state to protect its population from the four crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing) as agreed upon in the World Summit Statement 2005;
2) the responsibility of the international community to help the state in this process; and,
3) only if the state fails to protect its population, the responsibility of the international community to respond.2

What matters most in this logic, the proponents of the RtoP argue, is the idea that the state retains the primary responsibility to ensure the protection of its population. This responsibility entails, before anything else, the creation of sustainable and legitimate models of politics anchored in global standards of human rights and law, but also in the concrete conditions of development in which states around the world find themselves.

This is where regional states in Asia find a first compelling point of entry into the series of debates surrounding
Security in Asia has always been about connecting development, conflict resolution, and political progress, and in a way that reflects local circumstances and conditions. Positioning the RtoP in a way that is consistent with these priorities, as has been the case now for some time, is allowing the concept to gain new converts in the region.

At another level, proponents of the RtoP have also emphasized that the implementation of the RtoP should give priority to regional actors. For example, the Joint Office of the Special Advisers to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, the key structure at the UN charged with developing the means and process through which the RtoP is to be implemented, is promoting dialogues with regional groupings around the world. The goal is to set up consultation and dialogue mechanisms that could be triggered in cases of egregious violence and thus calling for an RtoP response. The emphasis on dialogue and consultation indicates that any RtoP operation in the region would not proceed without extensive prior consultations with regional actors. This also makes for greater comfort with the concept in the Asia Pacific.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRACK ONE:**

The crucial challenge at the moment for Asian states is to act upon this new interest in the RtoP, and to set in place the mechanisms through which it will help implement the concept both intra-regionally and more globally. To advance these goals, action could be targeted in four areas, as outlined in the CSACP RtoP Study Group report:

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**BOX 1**

**HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL’S REPORT “THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND SUB REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT,” JUNE 27, 2011**

- The responsibility to protect is a universal principle. Its implementation, however, should respect institutional and cultural differences from region to region. Each region will operationalize the principle at its own pace and in its own way. I would urge that an intraregional dialogue on how to proceed be held among Government officials, civil society representatives and independent experts, such as the Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. Regional, as well as global, ownership is needed. (p. 3, para 8)

- Preventing mass atrocity crimes is the legal responsibility of the State. Meeting this responsibility, however, requires partnering with civil society, such as women’s and civic groups, clerics, the private sector, academia, and the media, among others. Parliamentarians can give voice to the moral imperative. The constituencies and stakeholders committed to prevention and protection are diverse, dispersed, and frequently transnational in scope. (p. 4, para 12)

- Without sustained public understanding and support, the responsibility to protect will remain unfinished business. We look to the NGO and academic communities, as always, for fresh ideas and information, for comparative case studies and empirical research, for accessible materials and media outreach, for innovative public programming and for well-informed commentary on how we could do better. (p. 5, para 16)

- Regional and sub-regional arrangements can encourage governments to recognize their obligations under relevant international conventions and to identify and resolve sources of friction within their societies before they lead to violence or atrocity crimes. There are many such examples of neighbours helping neighbours. The launch in 2009 of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, as part of an ongoing effort to develop a more people-oriented ASEAN, complements longer-standing regional human rights bodies in Latin America, Africa, and Europe. (p. 5, para 17)

- [We] are confident that the surest path for advancing the responsibility to protect is through global-regional-sub-regional partnership. (p. 13, para 44)

1) The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as the region’s inclusive Track Two regional security institution, should take the lead in establishing a Regional Risk Reduction Centre. This Centre would devote its work to early warning assessments related to the four crimes intended to be addressed by the RtoP (war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide). It would also provide expert advice to regional policy-makers and would help develop the response mechanisms that would be triggered if egregious violence did erupt in a regional state. Early warning assessments and, more generally, the prevention of violence before it erupts through national and regional efforts, represent crucial elements of the RtoP. In this sense, the creation of a Regional Risk Reduction Centre would give concrete expression to Asia’s interest in the concept and the new thinking it could instill in regional security frameworks.

2) Better use should be made of the Joint Office of the Special Advisers to the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and the RtoP. One of the Joint Office’s main goals at the moment is to establish frameworks of dialogue and cooperation with regional organizations to bring together global and regional actors in the implementation of the concept. Regional states and institutions such as the ARF should seize this opportunity and establish regular consultations with the Joint Office.

3) Asian states should identify structures and individuals within their governments whose role would be to pursue current regional and global discussions about the RtoP. These could serve as the points of interface between their regional governments and the UN Joint Office on the Prevention of Genocide and the RtoP. Additionally, they could also help raise the understanding of the nature of the RtoP within their own bureaucracies.

4) Track Two actors in the region should also engage more directly the current global debate about the RtoP. Track Two actors have been crucial in the promotion and implementation of the concept, most notably serving as conduits towards the new understandings of security and sovereignty upon which the RtoP rests. The ICISS, which set out the first expression of the RtoP more than a decade ago, underscored this need to find spaces of mobilization outside the usual channels of inter-state diplomacy. In the years following the release of the ICISS report, faced with resistance on the part of governments who viewed the RtoP as entailing an erosion of national sovereignty, Track Two actors found little traction in moving acceptance of the concept forward. However, after the 2005 World Summit, the language surrounding the RtoP has been much more about prevention than intervention, and much more about dialogue with regional actors than intrusion from the outside. Consequently, Track Two actors are in a position to reengage discussion about the RtoP and to propose realistic ways of moving it forward, such as with the CSCAP RtoP Study Group.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRACK TWO

Two types of activities should be undertaken in this regard. Track Two groups should provide support to the activities of regional governments intended to set in motion the implementation of the RtoP in Asia. Developing a Regional Risk Reduction Centre, for instance, will require a lot of exploratory work concerning the exact ways in which the Centre would function, where its funding would be found, and how its mandate would connect to other regional security mechanisms. Track Two groups—chiefly among them the ARF Eminent and Expert Persons Group (EEP’s)—could focus on this exploratory work.

A broader agenda for Track Two groups should involve raising awareness in the region about the RtoP and, conversely, mobilizing support for the concept within a coherent and sustained agenda of implementation addressed to regional governments. A number of constituencies within...
government, civil society, and expert groups, need to be brought together if the implementation of the RtoP is to move forward in Asia; Track Two groups are ideally suited to do precisely that. The implementation of the RtoP needs to be integrated into the context of the region’s evolving security architecture. Asia must learn to make the RtoP its own. Regional actors must come to understand how the concept will help Asia deal with its own security threats, and in a way that corresponds to its own approaches to peace and security. Track Two groups, because their role is to spur new thinking on regional approaches to conflict and security, are in a good position to take up that task.

Indeed, CSCAP has done this through the establishment of its Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect. Its final report has set in motion an array of discussions within the region and beyond. For example, in his report entitled “The role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect,” the UN Secretary-General noted: “Context matters. The responsibility to protect is a universal principle. Its implementation, however, should respect institutional and cultural differences from region to region. Each region will operationalize this principle at its own pace and in its own way. I would encourage intra-regional dialogue among government officials, civil society representatives, and independent experts, on how to proceed, such as the Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Regional, as well as global, ownership is needed.”

**BOX 2: RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND TRACK TWO: AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY**

The CSCAP Study Group on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) made twelve recommendations for implementing RtoP in the Asia Pacific region (see http://www.cscap.org/uploads/docs/RtoP/CSCAP%20Study%20Group%20on%20RtoP%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf, page 4). Some of these recommendations require additional consideration and elaboration in order to more precisely determine what is required and how it will be delivered. CSCAP or other Track Two bodies are well placed to assist with this type of assessment, possibly through the formation of new study groups. Four important areas of future RtoP-oriented Track Two work include:

1. **Examining the key issues relating to early warning and assessment**, especially: 1) working towards the development of a shared methodology for early warning and assessment; and 2) examining the modalities for strengthening cooperation between the region and the United Nations in the field of early warning and assessment.

2. **Developing a proposal for a Risk Reduction Centre.** The [CSCAP Study Group on RtoP] report identified some of the principal tasks that would be fulfilled by a Risk Reduction Centre, but many questions remain concerning its function and role, working practices, institutional situation, and funding. A follow-on study could be tasked with developing more specific proposals relating to the establishment of a Risk Reduction Centre.

3. **Establishing a register of Track Two mediators and teams of experts.** This register could be made available to Track One and Track Two actors seeking assistance with mediation. Additional study is also needed of the practical feasibility and operating procedures for establishing a register of small teams of experts on matters such as ceasefires, power sharing arrangements, election design and monitoring, human rights protection and promotion and constitutional reform to provide expert advice when requested. A CSCAP Study Group on Early Warning and Assessment could convene a one-off experts-level meeting to examine the feasibility of establishing a register and bring forward recommendations.

4. **Standing capacity for preventing and responding to the RtoP crimes.** The Study Group recognized that early warning and assessment is only part of the equation and that it was equally important to ensure that the region had the capacity to act to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity when necessary. Given the enormity of the task of establishing a standing capacity along the lines recommended in the [CSCAP Study Group on RtoP] report, the Group recommended that any subsequent Track Two study of the modalities of implementing RtoP in the Asia Pacific region focus on the specific requirements entailed in building a standing capacity.

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PROSPECTS FOR MOVING FORWARDS ON RtoP

Will this attention to and progress on RtoP continue to move forward in 2012? In the coming year, two elements of context will certainly influence how Asia will move forward in the implementation of the RtoP. One will be the way in which the lessons of Libya are identified in the immediate and longer term, both globally and regionally. A threshold has certainly been crossed in Libya, but to what effect? What will be the ‘lessons learned’ by Asian states from the conduct of the Libya operation? Indeed, the recent vetoes by China and Russia of a UN response to the crisis in Syria suggest that not all these “lessons” will be positive.

Any discussion of RtoP raises questions of capacities and divisions of labor. Asking whether interventions of the type conducted in Libya should take place again in the future also entails asking, in fact, who can conduct such operations, and with what exact means. This points to a crucial dilemma in the implementation of the RtoP: the concept calls for a global endorsement of responses to violence, and yet the distribution of power in the global system is such that only a few powerful states can actually engineer these responses.

Does this bring the discussion back to the idea that the RtoP will remain an instrument of the powerful, to be deployed only when specific and limited interests are in play? Asia should not let the discussion go in that direction. The region, on the contrary, must demonstrate through concrete developments within the sorts of initiatives proposed here that it will participate in the implementation of the RtoP, and that it will have the means and the will to do so over the long term. The debate about the lessons of Libya which will take place over the next few months does lend an urgency on Asia’s part of the need to act.

The second crucial element of context in the coming year will be China’s evolving attitude toward the RtoP. China has always been fundamentally important in efforts to push the implementation of the concept forward. Its position at the UN Security Council, for example, puts it at the center of any discussion about RtoP operations. In this context, a significant turn of events might develop over the next year. China abstained on the resolution to approve the UN authorization of the Libya mission, waiting to see how the situation would progress and wanting to reserve its options depending on the success or failure of the international intervention there. Now that this operation is in its end state, and turning to the rebuilding of the Libyan state, how will China choose to interpret its lessons? And how will its interpretations and responses to RtoP situations connect to China’s rising global influence and its efforts to be seen as a responsible power on the world stage? These are important and immediate questions which lend urgency to the need for regional actors in Asia to engage in dialogue at both Track One and Track Two levels.

In light of the events that will unfold in 2012, Asian states need to engage in a sustained discussion about the implementation of the RtoP. Beyond the immediacy of this need, the region must also consider the broader stakes of this discussion. For Asia, the RtoP is also about the region’s role in the formulation of the norms which will guide international politics in the future. This is why the region must act, and act now.

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3 See Report of the (UN) Secretary-General on the Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (UN Document A/65/877-S2011/393), 27 June 2011 (emphasis added).
INTRODUCTION

Asia’s food security challenges are formidable, to say the least. The region has over 60% of the world’s population, as well as some of its fastest growing economies, but only 34% the world’s arable land and 36% of the world’s water resources. What’s more, emerging trends occurring globally and regionally are further threatening Asia’s ability to feed itself. In order to maximize the potential of Asia’s agricultural sector to improve food security in the region and beyond, governments must embark on a multi-faceted and integrated strategy, one that is broader in scope and adapted to these dynamic challenges.

FOUR EMERGING TRENDS AFFECTING ASIAN FOOD SECURITY

Asia’s food security is under significant pressure from a variety of factors that include population growth and urbanization, the declining performance of agriculture, natural resource constraints, climate change, high and volatile food and oil prices and the rapid transformation of supply chains.

First, between now and 2050, the world’s population is expected to increase by 2.4 billion, from the current 6.9 billion to 9.3 billion with Asia capturing the lion’s share. At the same time, the population living in urban areas is projected to gain 2.9 billion, passing from 3.4 billion in 2009 to 6.3 billion 2050 with most growth concentrated in the cities and towns of the less developed regions.
Asia, in particular, is projected to see its urban population increase by 1.7 billion with China and India alone accounting for about a third of the total increase. One predictable outcome of this massive population shift is urban poverty. Already, Asia accounts for over half the world’s slum population. Today, Asia has eleven megacities, which are defined as cities with over 10 million inhabitants. By 2025, the number of megacities is expected to reach 29, with Asia gaining another five. Urbanization, in combination with rising incomes, will increase food demand and accelerate the diversification of diets. As incomes rise, diets will come to include more resource-intensive food products, such as meat, dairy, eggs, fruits and vegetables, thus unleashing a rapid increase in demand for raw agriculture commodities.

Second, agriculture’s performance in the region has declined over the last few decades, with its share of gross domestic product (GDP) falling from 43% to 18% between 1961 and 2009 in South Asia, for example. The number of people working in agriculture has also steadily declined from 70% to 55% between 1980 and 2010, and is projected to further fall to 49% in 2020. This is largely due to the fact that farmers are getting older across Asia.

A more worrying trend is the fact that annual growth in productivity, measured in terms of average aggregate yield, has been slowing over the years. Global aggregate yield growth of grains and oilseeds averaged 2.0% per year between 1970 and 1990, but declined to 1.1% between 1990 and 2007. Yield growth is projected to continue declining over the next ten years to less than 1.0% per year.

Third, many of the world’s agro-ecosystems being used as food production systems are already showing worrying signs of degradation. Climate change will put additional pressure on natural resources and food security through higher and more variable temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, and increased occurrences of extreme weather events. According to recent projections by the International Food and Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Asia’s production of irrigated wheat and rice will be 14% and 11% lower, respectively, in 2050 than in 2000 due to climate change.

Fourth, international prices of major food commodities have risen sharply in recent months, only a few years after the 2007–2008 food crisis. Since June 2010, international maize prices have more than doubled, and wheat prices have almost doubled. Domestic food prices in many countries in Asia have also increased rapidly. For example, between June 2010 and May 2011, domestic rice prices in Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, and Vietnam have risen in the range of 13% to 46%.

The rising costs of fuel, fertilizer and transport production further contribute to fluctuations in the price of food and rising fuel costs and also result in the expansion of biofuel production and its competition with food crops for available land. Biofuel production based on agricultural commodities increased more than three-fold from 2000 to 2008. Various policy measures driving the rush to biofuels, as well as tax incentives and import restrictions in developed countries, have been the main driver of this development.

Lastly, in just two decades, Asia has witnessed a rapid transformation of its supply chains which has changed the way food is being produced, processed, packaged, transported and distributed. The fast diversification of diets towards high-value agricultural products associated with urbanization and increasing incomes, and the rapid rise of organized retail in food, have resulted in a “supermarket revolution.” Over the past two decades, counties like China, India and Vietnam have...
seen the share of supermarkets in food retail reach 5-20% of the market, thereby experiencing the fastest supermarket spread in history. This rapid transformation has obvious implications for food security. While supermarkets may provide higher quality and cheaper produce for urban consumers, market participation by poorer farmers is lower.

**INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ASIA**

With more and more Asians living in cities, urban food security will play an increasingly important role in maintaining peace and stability. The food crisis in 2007 – 2008 and the resulting food riots that occurred in cities all over the world not only exposed the vulnerability of the global food system, but more importantly, highlighted the increasing problem of urban food security. Food supply, food consumption, and food stability in cities are very different from traditional rural patterns, as some governments, (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia) have learned to their cost. As Ruth Oniang’o, the first woman Nutrition professor in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa and a current MP in Kenya rightly pointed out during a recent symposium on global agriculture and food security in Washington, D.C., “hunger is really devastating… a hungry person with low blood sugar is a very angry person—virtually ungovernable.”

In the context of increasing pressure on global and regional food security the urban environment presents unique challenges which potentially render its residents more vulnerable to disruptions in the global food supply chain and to price fluctuations.

First and foremost, urban residents have to purchase almost all of their food as well as other goods and services. For the millions of urban poor who spend 50% to 70% of their income on food, soaring prices may mean going from two meals a day to one, or at worst, to no food at all. Urban residents face more threats to their economic access to food compared to their rural brothers.

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**BOX 1: 2011 GLOBAL HUNGER INDEX, FACT AND FINDINGS: ASIA**

- South Asia has the highest regional 2011 Global Hunger Index* (GHI) score—22.6.
- The 2011 GHI score fell by 25% in South Asia compared with its 1990 score, and the 2011 GHI score in Southeast Asia decreased by 44%.
- The South Asia region reduced its GHI score by more than 6 points between 1990 and 1996, mainly due to a large decline in underweight in children under five. But the rapid pace of progress was not maintained; South Asia has lowered its GHI score by only one point since 2001, despite strong economic growth. Social inequality and the low nutritional, educational, and social status of women, which is a major cause of child under-nutrition in the region, have impeded improvements in the GHI score.
- Bangladesh and Vietnam saw large gains in improving their GHI score between the 1990 GHI and the 2011 GHI. Vietnam reduced its score by 56%, and Bangladesh reduced its score by 36%.
- In Bangladesh, a country where 25% of the population is ultra-poor (living on less than USD $0.50 a day), only about 7% of the population has access to social protection or safety net programs.
- The GHI score for North Korea increased by 18% since 1990. A weak economy, high military spending, weather-related crop failures, and systematic problems in the agricultural sector have hampered progress.
- Cambodia is the only country to improve from an “extremely alarming” to “serious” level of hunger since 1990.
- Bangladesh, India, and Timor-Leste have the highest prevalence—more than 40%—of underweight in children under five.

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* 3 factors contribute to the GHI: mortality rate for children under five, the prevalence of underweight children, and the proportion of undernourished.

Second, due to increased incomes in towns and cities, the basket of food which households depend on for their existence has become more varied and more diverse in origin. Thus, the urban poor may be more vulnerable drastically with limited capacity to produce their own food.

Fourth, because urban areas are centers of economic opportunity, there are more women working outside the home which may mean industrialization. Thus the determinants of nutritional status go beyond income alone. Food availability is not enough for good nutrition, a reality which tends to impact city-dwellers more than their rural counterparts.

Third, many urban residents are also more vulnerable to global economic events since they depend on overseas remittances, exports, employment, and foreign direct investment. As the most recent food crises demonstrated, urban households can be among the hardest hit as they see their purchasing power decline

Fifth, the urban poor live in crowded living conditions with poor quality housing, poor to non-existent garbage disposal systems, unsafe drinking water, and non-functional or non-existent sewage systems—thus affecting their nutritional status. It is not enough that an individual is getting what appears to be an adequate quantity of food if that person is unable to consume the food because he or she is always falling sick. For the urban poor living in slums, their living conditions

“Cities, with their unique features, must be included on the agenda of food and agriculture policy makers, planners and institutions and conversely, food security and agriculture...”

than their rural counterparts to variations in the international market since many of their food items tend to be internationally traded.

Third, many urban residents are also more vulnerable to global economic events since they depend on overseas remittances, exports, employment, and foreign direct investment. As the most recent food crises demonstrated, urban households can be among the hardest hit as they see their purchasing power decline

could affect their nutritional status in the form of malnutrition and poor health.

Lastly, jobs of the urban poor are casual, insecure, uncertain, low-paying and vulnerable to outside forces such as macroeconomic policies, social security programmes, and of course, the availability of food through its impact on supplies in the market, and therefore on market prices.

**THE CHALLENGES AHEAD**

Feeding and nourishing a larger, more urban and increasingly affluent Asian population sustainably and equitably will be an unprecedented challenge that will require a more holistic approach to address food security more effectively. The more obvious solution of increasing food production is only one among many strategies needed to meet this challenge.

While rural areas currently hold most of the world’s poor and hungry and will continue to do so for many years to come, the urban dimensions of food security merit distinct attention and focus from national governments. As it is, the world is already witnessing the shifting of poverty and the food insecure to cities with most of the poor being absorbed into life-threatening slums. Factors of production, technologies, employment and indeed policies which were predominantly aimed at rural populations must now adapt to address urban situations. Specific attention needs to be given to the links that connect urban and rural communities, shape the economic relationships between them and determine how resources can be shared and used sustainably.

Cities, with their unique features, must be included on the agenda of food and agriculture policy makers, planners and institutions and conversely, food security and agriculture must be integrated into the agenda of city planners and local urban authorities. By addressing urban-rural linkages from social, economic and environmental perspectives, a more coherent and holistic approach can be developed.

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**FIGURE 2: INFLATION AND FOOD INFLATION RATES IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES**

![Bar chart showing food inflation above overall inflation rates in selected Asian countries](chart)

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3 FAO, 2011.


A BRIEF HISTORICAL NOTE

Engaging officialdom through Track Two activities has a notable performance record in the Asia Pacific, whether it is through the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN ISIS) or the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Popularized in the 1990s, Track Two engagement of Track One has met with modest successes, including the provision of the seminal idea behind the region’s pre-eminent security dialogue mechanism—the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—by individuals and institutes that later played a central role in the establishment of CSCAP in 1993. It is noteworthy that the ARF, having been fostered by a number of regional Track Two actors, is now the Track One mechanism with which CSCAP seeks to engage through its activities, particularly through its study groups (see Box 1 on current and recent CSCAP study groups).

Building engagement between Track One and Track Two, however, has proved to be a challenging task. This is not only because of the high degree of diversity in perspectives and readiness for engagement among Track One actors, but also because these features are equally shared by Track Two actors, including those active in CSCAP. Yet engagement between these tracks is essential if only to enrich the pool of useful and relevant knowledge that may inform decisions, but also because Track Two should promote a degree of flexibility in outside-the-box thinking that can lead to creative and effective management of policy issues not usually available to officialdom.
This article addresses the basic question of why it is challenging to engage officialdom especially in the Asia Pacific region, before sharing highlights of CSCAP’s engagement with Track One during the past year.

THE CHALLENGES OF ENGAGING OFFICIALS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

There are a number of possible explanations for why Track Two engagement of Track One is so challenging. These include related if somewhat different arguments such as: (1) the Asia Pacific’s broad geographical expanse has implications for its coherence; (2) the diversity of perspectives poses difficulties for reaching consensus and decisions; (3) the region hosts the world’s key strategic actors whose interests not only diverge, but in some cases are opposed; (4) the mutual suspicion among Track One and Track Two actors in key countries in the region; and (5) the financial costs and independence involved in engaging Track One. Each of these is considered further below.

The Region’s Broad Geographical Expanse

On the economic dimension, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) geographic footprint includes member economies from Northeast Asia (China, Hong Kong, Chinese Taipei, Russia, Japan, South Korea), Southeast Asia (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), Australasia (Australia and New Zealand), and the Americas (Canada, Chile, Mexico, Peru and the United States). The APEC forum in the future might embrace the other three ASEAN member states (Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar) who are currently not members, as well as Timor-Leste (a likely future ASEAN member state), and others from North and South Asia (North Korea, Mongolia, and Sri Lanka, which was almost an original ASEAN member state, and India whose interests include freedom of navigation of the great bodies of water such as the Pacific Ocean). On the Track Two security dimension, CSCAP’s membership is equally broad, constituting 21 member committees. CSCAP is more regionally inclusive of Asian states than the APEC in that it includes North Korea, Mongolia, and India, without extending to Latin American states (see Figure 1: Asia Pacific Regional Architecture).

Engaging officials from such a broad section of the world can be a challenge in and of itself even in the limited sense of putting them all under a single mechanism with which Track Two can engage.

Diversity of Perspectives

Related to the region’s broad geographic spread is the various countries’ diversity of perspectives. Fraught with differences regarding history, culture, geographic features (mainland-island; littoral-land-locked; isolated-integrated, climactic systems, etc.), security and strategic concerns, political regimes, and attitudes towards Track Two, the region’s foreign policy and defense officialdoms often adopt different perspectives on key political, strategic, economic, and other issues. Engaging them collectively can be frustrating, with little or no success in the offting of achieving acceptable consensus on coordinated, cooperative policy responses, given the rigidity of certain national, strategic positions.

Diverse and/or Opposing Interests

Diversity of regional perspectives also tends to create diversity or opposing interests among the regional powers. The issue of generating a code of conduct to promote maritime security, for example, is bound to create divergence rather than consensus among Track One (and also Track Two) actors. In this case, Track Two attempts to wade through these diverse and opposing interests are bound to face serious hurdles that would inhibit policy inputs from the unofficial.
track. In these circumstances, unofficial inputs from Track Two come to reflect statements of the lowest common denominator. Consensus-based decision making in Track One institutions like ASEAN and the ARF, as well as in Track Two in CSCAP, yields outcomes that reflect the comfort level of the least ready among the members. Thus, critical issues are not dealt with in security dialogue for; indeed, in Track One institutions, these issues are kept off of agendas altogether.

**Mutual Suspicion between Track One and Track Two Actors**

The burden of responsibility in the task of engagement between Tracks One and Two actors is shared by both sides. Despite over a decade of interaction, mutual suspicions between these actors have continued. Questions of representation arise for both Track One and Track Two. On the one hand, an issue raised by certain Track One players is the lack of political legitimacy of Track Two actors—often couched in questions such as, “Who elected you?” or “Whom do you represent?” — the concern being that individuals in Track Two may be either simply government representatives who parrot official lines or representatives of special interests, out of tune with current attitudes of their country’s population. On the other hand, there are divisions on Track Two over the wisdom and efficacy of engaging Track One, including on the issue of whether and to what extent Track Two efforts do make any real difference in the making of official policy.

**Expense Considerations and Independence of Track One**

The rationale for Track Two is its independence to advance ideas and policy options apart from, and indeed beyond the comfort level of, official Track One positions. There are two aspects to this issue, a key one being financial.

Track Two engagement with Track One is financially costly. Since CSCAP member committees have variable funding sources and fund-raising capacities, in practice, member committees that are able to fund their activities participate most actively in the study groups. Consequently, CSCAP member committees that are well-funded by their governments are capable of being more active than others and have the ability to sponsor and shape study group activities and topics. Naturally, they tend to reflect their respective government’s interest on a given issue. This raises the question of what the value-added by Track Two deliberations is if there is no real difference between Tracks One and Two policy positions and perspectives.

Thus, there is more behind the funding issue than meets the eye. Until the financial sustainability of...
Track Two is assured across the spectrum of member committees, the variability of Track Two engagement with Track One will remain. But Track Two reluctance to challenge Track One can be complicated. In many instances, it must be acknowledged that Track Two actors (often those with prior, senior diplomatic careers in their home countries) tend to be more cautious than some Track One actors when it comes to embarking on unknown or politically-sensitive terrain. This is the case of “being more popish than the Pope,” which effectively inhibits Track Two’s important role of pushing the limits of the politically-feasible, or testing the political waters in the search for innovative and effective policy options that Track One might consider adopting. A further, related issue is one of relevant expertise on highly technical issues (e.g. epidemiology of the spread of disease) or highly security-sensitive topics (e.g. terrorism). On such questions, Track One officialdom has the capacity, either within its own ranks or through the commissioning of international experts, to move more quickly than an institutionalized Track Two entity like CSCAP.

The burden of responsibility in the task of engagement between Tracks One and Two actors is shared by both sides.

CSCAP engagement with the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2010-2011

Against these ongoing challenges to regional Track Two engagement of Track One, however, there have been clear signals of growing partnership based on mutual confidence and cooperation between the ARF and CSCAP over the last several years, and especially during 2010-2011. Following the Hanoi Plan of Action to implement the ARF Vision Statement 2020 whereby the ARF is encouraged to work with Track Two organizations, the CSCAP Co-Chairs have been invited to the meetings of the ARF Inter-Sessional Group on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and Preventive Diplomacy (PD), which are held twice a year. The ISG meeting is the highest official level where the agenda of the ARF is debated and adopted. It is, therefore, the most appropriate venue to submit reports by the CSCAP Co-Chairs and CSCAP memoranda for maximum impact on the ARF.

Kwa Chong Guan of Singapore’s CSCAP Member Committee represented the CSCAP Co-Chairs at the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD held in Bali in December 2010. Kwa reported on the work of four CSCAP study groups, which were set to submit CSCAP memoranda on (1) Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), (2) Significance of the Existence of Regional Transnational Crime Hubs in the Asia Pacific Region, (3) Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific, and (4) Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations. Copies of the CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) 2010-2011 and Assessing Track 2 Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region: A CSCAP Reader co-edited by Desmond Ball and Kwa Chong Guan were also circulated at the meeting.

CSCAP Co-Chair Kim Dalchoong was invited to the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD held in Sydney in April 2011. In his presentation of the CSCAP Co-Chairs’ Report, Kim stressed CSCAP’s genuine desire to work closely with the ARF and to hold CSCAP study group meetings back-to-back with the meetings of the ARF Inter-Sessional Support Group (ISG) or Inter-Sessional Meetings (ISM) for more effective dissemination of CSCAP research to the ARF.

In fact, such back-to-back meetings that originated much earlier in CSCAP’s lifespan are now being organized more frequently. The CSCAP Study Group on Naval Enhancement in the Asia Pacific met in Auckland in March 2010 back-to-back with a meeting of the ARF ISM on Maritime Security. The meeting of the CSCAP Study Group (SG) on Countering the Proliferation of WMDs in the Asia Pacific also met in Las Vegas in February 2011 back-to-back with the ARF ISM on Nonproliferation and Disarmament.

At the ARF ISG on CBMs and PD meeting held in Sydney, it was observed that the ARF is moving rapidly on a wide range of functional cooperation in Non-Traditional Security (NTS) issues, from Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HAA/DR) to Cyber Security, as well as the implementation of UNSCR 1540, which imposes an affirmative obligation on all member states to take active
measures to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. CSCAP Co-Chair Dalchoong Kim introduced seven CSCAP SGs in areas that CSCAP believes are directly relevant to Asia Pacific security and the concerns of the ARF. Copies of the latest CSCAP Memorandum, “Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations” (Memorandum No. 16, dated January 2011) and the CSCAP Regional Security Outlook (CRSO) 2011 were distributed to all ARF participants. For the fourth successive year, CSCAP has produced a CRSO report which addresses major security challenges in the region, indicating the kinds of emerging security issues CSCAP thinks are ripe for ARF-CSCAP cooperation.

Reciprocal arrangements had also been made to enable the attendance by the Co-Chairs of the ARF ISG at CSCAP Steering Committee Meetings (SCMs) to promote dialogue with members of CSCAP. The attendance of the ARF representatives at the CSCAP SCMs shows the commitment of the ARF towards the widening and deepening of Track One and Track Two interaction and cooperation.

The Chair of the ARF Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) for the period of January-December 2010, presented by Tran Ngoc An, Deputy Director General of the ASEAN Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, made a briefing at the 34th CSCAP SCM in Manila in November 2010. He focused on how the ARF is reaching out to CSCAP at the Track Two level. Tran highlighted the positive results of the work of the ARF ISG/ISM that took into account the innovative ideas of CSCAP. He urged CSCAP to be more deeply involved in ARF ISG/ISM deliberations. He also recommended that CSCAP interact more often with the ARF Chair and the ARF Unit at the ASEAN Secretariat to be updated on ARF’s activities and priorities and to provide these ARF officials timely inputs.

At the 35th CSCAP SCM in Kuala Lumpur in June 2011, Ambassador Hazairin Pohan pointed out that the ARF could be further enriched by the knowledge and studies of CSCAP on conflict management and resolution as well as the peaceful settlement of disputes so that the ARF could then

![Diagram of Asia Pacific Regional Architecture](source: Adapted from earlier editions of the CRSO.)
incorporate such studies in finalizing the ARF Work Plan on Preventive Diplomacy.

CSCAP is prepared to continue briefing the ARF and its ISG/ISM on its activities as well as to submit to the ARF its policy memoranda coming above. When daunted by these challenges, CSCAP needs to recall its original commitment to supporting ARF’s mission for comprehensive security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region to inspire it to move forward.

The regular attendance of CSCAP out of the work of the CSCAP study groups. The latest draft CSCAP Memorandum from the SG on the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) has now been approved by all the CSCAP member committees, and will be soon submitted to the ARF. The UN Secretary-General has already made some favorable and encouraging remarks recently on the work of the CSCAP Study Group on RtoP in one of his reports to both the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council (A/65/877 and S/2011/393, p.3). (For more on this, see Chapter 4.)

From these recent experiences of CSCAP with the ARF, as well as the recognition extended to the work of the SG on RtoP by the UN Secretary-General, it is worthwhile to consider extending the distribution reach of CSCAP’s policy research to also include other Track One institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) without losing sight of the policy concerns of its principal Track One partner which is the ARF.

LOOKING FORWARD

CSCAP finds an increasingly close working relationship with the ARF based on accumulated confidence and trust, in spite of the challenges in its engagement with the ARF discussed Co-Chairs at ARF ISG meetings has been practically institutionalized. And also, the reports of the CSCAP Co-Chairs have been well received by the ARF participants. CSCAP needs to continue making substantive presentations at ARF ISGs with ARF-relevant recommendations.

CSCAP looks forward to more detailed feedback and evaluation from the ARF on its various policy outputs especially in the form of the various CSCAP memoranda it has sent to the ARF, as well as the issues analyzed in the annual CRSOs. In order to make optimal use of its limited financial and human resources and to provide guidance to the policy research priorities of its SGs, CSCAP should seek a more specific direction from the ARF in regard to the direction of the latter’s future work. It is also desirable that the ARF request or direction would come with some form of funding support to encourage and enhance the work of the various CSCAP SGs.

In addition, CSCAP hopes to expand the study group Co-Chairs’ briefings at the ARF ISM on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, Counter Terrorism, Transnational Crime, Non-proliferation and Disarmament, and Maritime Security.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMM+</td>
<td>ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN ISIS</td>
<td>ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>BGF</td>
<td>Border Guard Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>Confidence Building Measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>DKBA</td>
<td>Democratic Karen Bhuddist Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEP</td>
<td>Eminent and Expert Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>HA/DR</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
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<tr>
<td>HGA</td>
<td>Hyogo Framework Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFPRI</td>
<td>International Food and Policy Research Institute</td>
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<td>ISA</td>
<td>Internal Security Acts</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>(ARF) Inter-Sessional Support Group</td>
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<td>ISM</td>
<td>(ARF) Inter-Sessional Meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td>JAT</td>
<td>Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid</td>
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<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>Karenni Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>Kachin Independence Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>KNLA</td>
<td>Karen National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>Mon National Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTS</td>
<td>Non-Traditional Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Preventive Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>RtoP</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCM</td>
<td>(CSCAP) Steering Committee Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOM</td>
<td>(ARF) Senior Officials Meeting</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSA</td>
<td>Shan State Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWSA</td>
<td>United Wa State Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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