Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

General Conference

Jakarta, December 7-9, 2003

REPORT

Introduction

“Strategic Security Outlook in the Asia Pacific” was adopted as the main theme of the Conference

The 2003 General Conference was held at Hotel Borobudur, Jakarta, from 7-9 December 2003. CSCAP Indonesia, along with AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada, and CSCAP Japan, co-organised and hosted the General Conference. “Strategic Outlook in the Asia Pacific” was adopted as the main theme of the Conference.

The 2003 General Conference was the first in the series. It was previously known as ‘CSCAP General Meeting’. The decision to change the term ‘General Meeting’ to ‘General Conference’ was agreed by all CSCAP Member Committees at its 18th CSCAP Steering Committee Meeting (Singapore, 9 December 2002). The main reason to replace the General Meeting with a General Conference is to put forth CSCAP views to a larger audience as well as integrate the participation of senior government representatives, academics, civil
society members, journalists, and business community with the work of CSCAP. It was felt that the General Conference, which would have no authority to make binding decisions on CSCAP, would be a better way in achieving the aforementioned objective. It is greatly hoped that the General Conference would raise the profile of CSCAP to a higher level in the future.

CSCAP Indonesia voluntarily proposed to host the first General Conference. Indonesia’s proposal to host the General Conference was welcomed and in fact supported by all CSCAP Members. Symbolically, the timing of General Conference itself coincided with the 10th anniversary of CSCAP, since its first Steering Committee was held in Lombok, Indonesia, in December 1993. Subsequently, three other CSCAP Member Committees, namely Australia CSCAP (AUSCSCAP), CSCAP Canada, and CSCAP Japan, agreed to co-organise the Conference, most notably in finding and securing some funds for the Conference, and also in inviting speakers and dignitaries from each respective member country. The three also symbolically represented three different geographical parts of CSCAP, namely North America, South Pacific, and Northeast Asia.

The Conference itself was considered as timely since the region is faced with a series of critical security challenges, most notably terrorism and anti-terrorist campaign led by the US. At the global level, the war in Iraq, problems in Middle East, and global concerns over Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) continue to draw major attention. The implications of these problems are very much felt in the Asia Pacific region, and attracted much of our attention.
As new security issues and challenges emerge, countries in the region are also compelled to deal with various existing security concerns, including the Korean Peninsula and growing threats of terrorism in Southeast Asia. There are now talks about the imperative to establish a closer security co-operation, and even new security architecture in the region and various sub-regions, as a better means to cope with those challenges. ASEAN, for instance, has adopted the ASEAN Security Community proposal as its new security strategy to strengthen its national and regional resilience and therefore to be better prepared for the new challenges in the next two decades or so.

Against the above background, as the second-track forum for security dialogue and co-operation in the region, CSCAP members strongly felt it necessary to openly discuss those various security challenges in the region. In so doing, the co-organisers worked and consulted closely to formulate a set of topics and speakers as well as strategy to proceed with the Conference.

In total, there were seven sessions and one special session on Timor Leste, and three special speeches or talks during the Conference, attended by more than 120 foreign participants from 18 countries, and about 100 Indonesian participants. Additional 100 participants from Indonesia (including foreign diplomats and journalists) also attended the Conference, which was also made open to public for a half-day on Monday, December 8.

All presentations, comments, and talks were delivered by distinguished scholars and government officials from both Indonesia and around the region. Among the Indonesian officials were H.E. General (Ret) Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono, Minister Co-ordinator for Political and Security Affairs, and H.E. Dr. N. Hasan Wirayuda, Minister of Foreign Affairs. From Australia, the Hon. Alexander Downer, MP, was also present and actively involved in the talks and discussion. The Conference was also benefited greatly from the presence of and presentations made by these following distinguished officials or former officials, namely: Honourable Dato’ Hishamuddin Tun Hussein, Malaysian Minister of Youth and Sports; The Hon. Cedric Foo, State Minister for Defence, Singapore, and last but not least; H.E. Jose Ramos Horta, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Timor Leste. Former ministers who participated in the Conference were Mr. Ali Alatas, former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, former Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Despite its tight and lengthy schedule, most of the participants showed great enthusiasm to the Conference, from the beginning until the very end of it. They actively engaged in lively, open and frank discussions and debates. All in all, it can be concluded that the 2003 CSCAP General Conference was a successful one, and there was a strong demand from participants that the event must be regularly held by CSCAP as its regular event and activity.

General Observation and Assessment

Participants and Role Players. As stated previously, the Conference was fully attended by well over 120 foreign participants from 18 countries in the region, and about 100 Indonesians. The big number of full participants to the Conference was beyond the initial expectation, as the co-organisers expect about 150 people, both foreign and local, to attend the event. However, this may well reflect the level of attractiveness of CSCAP General Conference to the people in the
region. All foreign participants bear their own airfare and accommodation, but CSCAP Indonesia facilitated their bookings and local transport arrangement with the hotel. Most of the participants were academics and government officials, who attended the Conference in their private capacity. There were also journalists and activists of civil society organisations among them.

Since CSCAP General Conference is primarily aimed at introducing and bringing CSCAP to a wider audience, CSCAP Indonesia proposed to have a half-day conference open to public. This public session was held on Monday, 8 December, and attended by additional 100 participants, mostly foreign diplomats and journalists (especially from CSCAP member country) from major international media stationed in Jakarta. Some Indonesian diplomats, journalists, academics, politicians, and officials, including officials from the Ministry of Defence were also invited to attend this public conference. In sum, more than 300 people attended the half-day Conference on 8 December.

The co-organisers specifically asked and invited 50 distinguished individuals—mostly members of CSCAP national committees, to participate and play various roles in the Conference, namely as chairs, speakers, and commentators. All of them accepted the invitation and participated in the Conference, except one from the US, whose health problem had prevented him from attending. Initially, a number of important figures such as Dr. Paul Wolfowitz of the US and Vice Minister Wang Yi of China were also invited. However, their tight schedule and program had prevented them from attending the Conference.

Furthermore, having consulted with other members of CSCAP, the co-organisers also invited some non-CSCAP members as speakers. The selection was made primarily based on their known-track record and expertise in certain topic e.g. Islam, China, or issue of terrorism.

The presentations made by these distinguished speakers were top-class in quality. They were sharp and candid in sharing their minds on various topics assigned to them. Led by able chairs, it successfully stimulated a lively and scholarly debate and discussions among the audience. The credits should also go to the commentators, whose comments were equally thought provoking and eventually elevate the quality of each session.
**Selection of Topics and Flow of Discussion.** One of the greatest challenges for co-organisers at the preparatory stage of the Conference was to formulate a set of topics that would not only attract the attention of audiences, but would also cover most of the current security concerns and issues of the region. Although a full mandate and liberty was invested upon the co-organisers to decide the topics, yet, decision on and formulation of topics was primarily based upon a wide consultation with as many members of CSCAP as possible. It was believed that such a mechanism would help ensuring the involvement of other CSCAP members, and accommodate as many ideas as possible.

CSCAP Indonesia had gone through two stages of preparation in drafting an agenda for the General Conference. At the first stage, CSCAP Indonesia closely consulted with AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Secretariat and CSCAP Co-chairs in preparing the first set of proposals. It was agreed that emphasis should be given on security in the Asia Pacific, specifically terrorism and its related aspects as well as other pertinent issues. The initial agenda was then further discussed at the second stage, in which more members of CSCAP were involved. The draft agenda was improved upon and circulated to all Member Committees for amendments or agreements.

In the end, seven main topics were agreed upon, namely: (1) The Rise of China and Its Impact on the Asia Pacific; (2) Developments on the Korean Peninsula; (3) The World After the Iraq War; (4) Comprehensive Measures to Counter Terrorism; (5) Islam in the Region; (6) Security Challenges in Southeast Asia and South Pacific, and (7) the Way Forward: Practical Proposals on Terrorism and Non-Terrorism Issues. In addition to these topics and sessions, there was also a Special Session on Security Challenges for Timor Leste. An After Dinner Talk on Islam in Indonesia was also presented by Professor Syafii Ma’arif, a leading Moslem scholar in Indonesia, where Minister Downer served as commentator. There were also special speeches during meals on: (1) the Indonesian Defence White Paper; (2) Japan and the Security of Asia Pacific, and; (3) the campaign against terror.

Many participants found that the above broad range of topic and agenda was very comprehensive and stimulating, and satisfactorily meet their curiosity and expectations about what has been going on in the region today, especially on security issues e.g. terrorism. The selection of topics, especially on Islam in Southeast Asia, and particularly Indonesia, were clearly useful in bringing new understanding among participants from the other parts of the region.
about the nature of Islam in Southeast Asia, which were partially or inaccurately understood so far.

In order to have an effective communication and encourage more discussions among participants, each speaker and commentator was allotted very limited time to present their views on each topic. Each speaker was given 10 minutes, and 8 minutes for commentator. Chairs of each session were given the liberty to remind the speakers about their time limits, and this mechanism was introduced to and agreed by all speakers prior to official opening of General Conference. However, these speakers were not absolutely obliged to provide a written paper. Moreover, to ensure the open, frank and friendly atmosphere for discussion, the Chatham House rules were strictly applied, and the participants, especially journalists, were frequently reminded to observe this rule.

As expected, the discussions went on very well, despite the cancellation of two speakers and one commentator at the very last minutes. It was observed that the degree of participants’ enthusiasm was high, despite the tight and hectic schedule. They all engaged in lively debates, especially on some sessions such as North Korea, Terrorism, and Islam. As noted by one of the participants, one of the strengths and successes of this particular Conference is its ability to bring together people who well know their materials as shown in the case of North Korea. The presence of both participants from North Korea and South Korea, had helped the participants to understand better the situation in the Peninsula. It also applies to other issues, especially on Islam in Southeast Asia.

### Highlights of Debates

In his Keynote Address, Indonesian Minister Co-ordinator for Political and Security Affairs acknowledged CSCAP as the important second-track forum by stating that ‘CSCAP has distinguished itself as a vibrant forum to dwell on important issues as it has established an excellent reputation and its recommendations have always been valuable to the governments.’

However, he raises his concerns over current security uncertainty facing the world and the region. He further poses five stimulating and strategic questions. First, will Iraq stabilise or destabilise? Second, how will the war on terror affect security relationships in our region? Third,
On the Rise of China, one speaker highlighted the new shift or changing trend in China’s security and foreign policy, especially when it comes to the relations. Unlike in the past, China is now seen as being more cooperative, which was manifested in the signing of the Bali’s Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. It was also observed that China’s economic growth would eventually improve the country’s welfare and ease domestic political transition. However, the development of China’s maritime power around the South China Sea remains the key security issue in East Asia. Another concern was on China’s possible reaction to the Taiwan’s intention to declare independence. In this regard, the region would like to see China consolidating its gains by ensuring stable conditions that would allow its rise as regional major power to remain undistorted.

On the international dimension of China’s rise to power, another speaker argued that this is not China’s first rise as great power. Yet, it is considerably the most comprehensive rise ever, which include political, economic, scientific, technological, intellectual and cultural development. The rise of China has certainly pose implications globally. Yet, the question on how China integrates itself into the region remains in place.

Discussions on China were filled with optimism as well as pessimism. Attention was also given to the current domestic problems in China, especially growing poverty and inequalities, which may halt and even reverse the whole development in the country. There was also concern over the conditions under which China can be accepted as the regional leader.
On the issue of Development on the Korean Peninsula, the Conference benefited from the presence of distinguished speakers from the two Koreas, and a commentator from the US. The issue of Korea was considered as a perennial part of the security issue in the region. As reminded by Chair of Session II, two main subjects need to be thoroughly discussed, namely: (1) the prospect of the current six party talks and the multilateral process towards the resolution, and; (2) The relationship or alliance arrangement between South Korea and the US.

One speaker acknowledged that situation in the Korean Peninsula is experiencing changes, especially since 1998 when President Kim Dae Jung promoted the “Peace and Prosperity” policy towards North Korea. The dialogue process between the two had been more institutionalised since the past few years, and had also been made more frequent. Yet, the North Korean nuclear issue causes the military tension still to be high. This is the main obstacle for the improvement of relations. It was reckoned that the future of the talks remains unpredictable because each side has its own version of how to solve the problem.

Nonetheless, as pointed out by speaker from North Korea, Pyongyang would continue to regard the South Korea-US relation as an essential issue that must be given proper understanding to reach a solution to the conflict. In the view of the North Korean leaderships, the resolution is hard to achieve as long as the US still carries out a hostile policy towards the North Korea. In the later developments, North Korea was forced to take defence measures as a response to the US policies.

The debate continued to be focused on the US policy in Korea, and as predicted, the nuclear issue. One suggestion made by the participant was noting the potential deadlock of the 2nd stage of six-party talks, the discussion should then be aimed at making some productive contributions to the official level. Participants should produce ideas of what should be the principle for future settlement. A list of important issues that needs to be discussed is as follow: (1) how to ensure a non-nuclear status; (2) how to meet legitimate security concerns of all parties; (3) how to ensure favourable external conditions for the settlements. All participants were also reminded that peace could also be possibly reached through negotiation and co-operation in other fields such as economic and social.
On the second day, which was open to public for half-a-day, critical issue such as the Worl d after the Iraq War was heatedly discussed. All speakers concurred that the Iraq War posed tremendous challenges to the global as well as regional security. As reckoned, there were debates whether or not the US and her allies should have taken another peaceful option to settle the problem in Iraq. Yet, most of the participants expressed their greater concerns about the future scenario, because as reckoned by many, the war in Iraq is not over as yet. What need to be done by now is formulating a policy for reconstructing and re-building Iraq. This must include the transformation of Iraq into a democratic country. As everybody well realised, this cannot be undertaken overnight.

The Iraq War, as many concurred, has inevitably made the World and global politics more complex. We need to balance the various national interests with changing environment, where religious community and ethnicity were now parts of determining factors.

At this point, one speaker contended that linking terrorism with the religion would be counterproductive. Instead, we must foster global and regional co-operation to achieve peace and development. Another speaker stressed the importance of UN as a genuine multilateral body, which seemed to be undermined by the current trends of unilateralism. The major challenge ahead is then to formulate and adopt the best strategy in revitalising the UN.

The impact of Iraq War on the regional security of Asia Pacific was also thoroughly discussed. While everybody expressed their concerns over the so-called dividing Trans-Atlantic alliance between the US and Europe, all participants concurred that countries in the Asia Pacific must strengthen its way to build up a sense of regional community.

The next stimulating topic debated among participants was on Comprehensive Measures to Counter-Terrorism. One solid agreement among participants was

Comprehensive Measures to Counter Terrorism
that strategy to counter-terrorism must be comprehensive, which include the measures to uproot its fundamental causes such as poverty and injustice. The session on Terrorism was basically meant to draw a major lesson from the experiences of three specific countries in countering terror, namely Malaysia (historical experience in countering insurgency), India (on the sub-Continent), and Indonesia (with the recent case of Bali Bombings).

On the historical experiences, one major lesson that could be learned was that the success of campaign against insurgency or terrorism is largely determined by the strategy of winning the heart and mind of the people. In the current context of war against terror, which was often juxtaposed with radical Islamic groups, the idea of Islamic radicalism must be discredited in order to win the war. We need to avoid the regeneration of the idea of radicalisms. It was suggested that in order to defeat the idea of religious radicalism, we must do the following: (1) be propaganda-minded; (2) encourage the involvement of moderate religious scholars to help subduing the ideas of radicalism, and; (3) exploit the political oxygen created by the radical groups e.g. moral feeling of the foot soldiers against their radical clerics who live luxuriously etc.

Another speaker categorised two groups of terrorism, namely domestic and international terrorism. Insurgency in Kashmir for instance, was regarded by New Delhi as domestic terrorism. The speaker agreed that engaging radical groups would be useful through dialogue and proper consultation to convince that those groups would not win their causes (e.g. separate from India). Yet, response from the audience on the need to distinguish the domestic from the international terrorism was rather critical, as one participant raised question on the purpose of making such a distinction.

Another highlight of this session was a discussion on the Investigation of the Bali Bombing. As clearly stated by the speaker, the bombing incident that occurred on 12 October 2002 was a dreadful tragedy and humanitarian disaster, which affected the Indonesian people and the international community. Hence, it was fully admitted that the success of the investigations was due to a totality of efforts and action by various parties, namely: the Indonesian Police and several other police forces from friendly countries, most notably Australia and FBI; government agencies; social institutions; and the general public.
On a practical side, the investigations were conducted through four stages: (1) providing first-aid for the survivors, and identification of the dead right after the incident; (2) mobilising the police investigators and organising those who involved into a joint investigation team; (3) search and pursue the suspects, who were identified by a joint team; (4) strengthening the co-operation with international investigation team.

It was also noted that the war against terror is still far from end. Realising that terror could be triggered by many factors and motives including radicalism due to frustration, injustice and cumulative marginalisation, simply using the law enforcement measures is not enough. Any attempts must also include: (1) winning the hearts and sympathy of the religions community; (2) revitalisation of the role of traditional, moderated and intellectual religious (Moslem) figures.

In all, it was widely reckoned that there is a need for a long-term perspective on fighting terrorism, and a sole military approach could not solve the problem. Another measures must also be implemented, including the use of soft power in removing the root-causes of terrorism. There was also a discussion on the relationship and linkage between various terrorist groups and trans-national crimes organisations, which must also be fought at the same time.

The topic on Islam in the Region had definitely been very much attractive to most—if not all of the participants. Yet, as reminded by the Chair of the session on Islam, the discussion pursued on this topic must be on Islam in a wider perspective, and not about terrorism.

One speaker highlighted two major points that need to be discussed when talking about Islam in the region: (1) Islam in Southeast Asia is undergoing a period of resurgence, and such a resurgence should be the beginning for analysis, not the end of analysis; (2) since we are in the fluid situation, we would need more time to understand the wider context of Islam in the region.

One interesting point raised during the presentation, and subsequent discussion, was on the fact of widening gap of perception about Islam in the region. It was observed that since September 11, two groups have provided assessment of the Muslim world of Southeast Asia: (1) terrorist and security experts; and (2) Islamic scholars and social scientists researching Muslim societies. Yet, despite all conferences and
seminars, and publications in the last three years, the knowledge gap between them is widening, and this is having a negative impact on our ability to formulate proactive, broad-based, policies to combat terrorism in the region. The reasons are: (1) the views of the first group—terrorist experts—have been popularised in the press and have come to dominate the public discourse on the global war on terrorism; (2) the two groups seldom attempt to engage in dialogue with each other. As a result, after 911, Islam as a religion is being understood more frequently through security studies lenses.

Therefore, the key to building the bridge between the two groups is to focus on the policy arena, as there needs to be a review of the stock of knowledge on Islam in Southeast Asia, and converging on the design of policies to counter terrorism.

Like the discussion on terrorism, which was widely based on the specific country experiences, the discussion on Islam also followed the same pattern, which was drawing lessons from specific country experiences of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, with a comment made by a speaker from a non-Southeast Asian country (the United States).

Most speakers concurred with general observation as mentioned earlier. Yet, in Malaysia, where the process of Islamisation and adjustment had been taking place, the problem was not very much on the gap of knowledge between terrorist experts and Islamic scholars. The problem is not about Islam per se, but rather about politics. It is more about the ability of the various forces of politics, Islamic and government alike, to deliver goods and prosperity for the people. Unlike in Indonesia, where Islamic organisations have been playing a significant role as civil society groups, local Islamic scholars in Malaysia have failed to address and acknowledge the role of civil society groups in democratisation and modernisation of Malaysia.

It is important to note that political Islam, whose objective is modernity itself, is seen as the main feature of modern Islam. Some groups, known as part of religious movement, often adopt a very modern approach for their movement. Therefore, we need to share their perspective on modernity although the language might be different. Unfortunately, the discussion of political Islam has not been so advanced, as yet. One speaker even suggested that the moderate groups of Islam must understand that they needed to approach people at the grass root level. So far, the moderate and/or the liberal groups only targeted people in
big cities, which in the end made these groups detached from the large number of people in the rural areas and unable to send the message of modernity to their own people.

Like Malaysia, it was also noted that Indonesia had gone both the emergence of radical Islamic movement, and tension. The tension particularly aroused from the fact that although Indonesia was regarded as the largest Muslim nation in the world but it has never acknowledged Islam as state religion. Despite the fact that Muslims constitute the largest single majority of the Indonesian total population, Indonesia is not an Islamic state, nor a secular one in a strict sense of the term. Instead, Indonesia is a Pancasila state, which places religions—including Islam—in an important position.

Furthermore, one common question frequently posed by Muslims in Indonesia was on the extent to which Islam or the Muslims becomes a factor in both domestic and foreign policies, and how Muslims could influence Indonesia’s foreign policy in order to play a greater role in the Islamic world. Basically, it was noted that the government has traditionally or conventionally disregarded Islam as a factor in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies. Despite the fact that Indonesia generally remains on good terms with Muslim states in the Middle East, Indonesia has tended not to associate itself with Islam. Therefore, it is important to make it clear that if Indonesia extended its supports to certain Middle East countries or groups of Muslim people like Palestinians, the support is basically not on the ground of Islam, but rather as a sign of solidarity for those who struggle for independence and justice.

The fact that Indonesia has no agenda to pursue a greater role in the Islamic world has a lot to do with the nature of Islam in Indonesia. The Indonesian Islam has a number of distinctive characters vis-à-vis Middle East Islam. The Indonesian Islam, by and large, is a moderate, accommodating kind of Islam, and the least Arabicised Islam.

Moreover, the existence of hardliner, militant, radical, or even “fundamentalist” Muslim within Indonesian Islam that are so obvious recently and have been regarded to have taken the centre stage of Indonesian Islam in the aftermath of 911 and Pentagon terrorist attacks, is actually not new. Yet, It was argued that the increase of radicalism recently was primarily caused by the government’s failure to enforce law and order, and solve a number of acute social ills such as continued ethno-religious conflicts, marked increase of crimes, rampant
corruption at all levels of society, and so forth. It was further exacerbated by the demoralising of the military and police forces that really undermined their capacity to play their role properly in maintaining security and order, and political fragmentation as Indonesia enters a new era of political liberalisation. The keys to address the radical Islam are: (1) strengthening the state in a sense of a strong democratic state; (2) strengthening the law enforcement agencies; (3) empowering civil society groups including the group of Moslem people, and Islamic boarding schools.

In Thailand, like everywhere, Islam was the driving factor behind independence movement (e.g. in Southern Thailand), which could be regarded as political resurgences of Islam as well. Yet, unlike in the past when purification process of religious understanding came from the local interpretation, today’s purification process came from and was being driven by the Middle East, along with the returns of Southeast Asian students from that region. Having tipped a delicate balance between the state and religion, these students felt that the political system does not belong to them and unmatched their religious expectation, which might lead to tensions. Poverty, inequality and unemployment in certain areas of Thailand that have a significant Moslem population exacerbated the problem. The two issues certainly increased the feeling of alienation that was vulnerable for radicalisation.

In the end, the central of debate was very much on the possible reconciliation between the process of Islamisation and secularisation, and how Muslim communities could help subduing the growing uneasiness created by and aroused from this tension. There was also question on how to pursue the modernity among Muslim communities in regard with current wave of globalisation. However, as one speaker noted it, Islam also had its own perspective on modernity and we needed to share the perspective although the language might be different.

Discussion and talk on Islam continued in a special After-Dinner Talk with the Chairman of Muhammadyah, one of the largest Moslem organisations in Indonesia, and Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The speaker presented his views on radicalism and the predicaments of Indonesian Muslims. It was observed that since the September 11 incident in the US, Islam has been the centre of attention, in greater focus than ever. Questions were then raised about Islam, especially those relating Islam to violence. Some people resort to simple answer: Islam is the problem and therefore has become a suspect in this regard.
In Southeast Asia, Islam has also become a subject of suspicion, especially with the rise of radicalism in several countries, including Indonesia. It is argued that radicalism is the result of desperation, of those unable to face modern life and its challenges. They are unable to respond to these challenges in a sophisticated way, and view that the world has deviated too far. When the pressure grows stronger for the deprived, they feel confused and alienated.

When the government does not come to their defence, they feel abandoned and become angry. This anger finds its expression in many forms, some though violent means. If this happens on a collective basis, then you have a fertile ground for radicalism. Here, the state comes in as catalyst for the deprived to resort to violence.

In Indonesia, millions of Muslims continued to live in extreme poverty, and for them the reality was an unpleasant one. Corruption is no longer an exception. Meanwhile, people are presented with new way of life on the regular basis, and millions of Muslims in Indonesia cannot understand why hedonism and consumerism, with all its consequences for morality continue to flourish. Indeed, radicalism must be understood as a response to these concerns.

Within the Muslim community in Indonesia, some believe there is a global conspiracy of the West to undermine the Islam life and the Muslim community. Globalisation, the ongoing problem of the Palestinians, and the sad events in Iraq flourish this belief. There are two factors why the Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere have difficulty in understanding the lack of progress in their society:

1. The pre-occupation to a historical exercise to reject modernity, including democracy, human rights and nation-state. Argument: Islam is not compatible with democracy.
2. The obsession with the glorious past of Islam. A sense of identity crisis and helplessness ensue in the contemporary world.

It was also noted that the way we approach this problem would depend on what the Muslims do within their own community, and how others approach and interact with the Muslim community around the world: (1) the Muslims have to put their thinking straight and recognise own weaknesses; (2) Islam cannot be understood in the context of terrorism, as it will be easily misunderstood and distorted. Islam and the rest have been having difficulty in building understanding since the September 11 incident. A comprehensive understanding of Islam requires
constructive engagement with the Muslim communities themselves. Suggestions proposed in this session are:

1. Working together to eliminate injustices, poverty, prejudices, and practices of discrimination at national and global levels. It should begin with awareness to emphasise similarity rather than differences.
2. Plurality and civil ways in managing differences would demonstrate the true meaning of civilisation.
3. A better way towards the future lies in our willingness to move beyond the current impasse in understanding each other.

On the topic of Security Challenges in Southeast Asia and South Pacific, which also includes presentation and discussion on ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Proposal, much of the discussion were focused on the current security and strategic outlook in both sub-regions.

It was noted that in Southeast Asia, the widely accepted knowledge is that peace and security in the region depends on a wider global security framework. It was also noted that in Southeast Asia, the discovery of local terrorist groups linked to Al-Qaeda is a wake up call for the region. The rise of radical Islam makes the situation more complex. Given the complexity of the threat, there is a requirement for international community to respond to the threat together. Countries must engage in close dialogues among each other. The fact that the threat is so imminent and we cannot wait until the terrorist network consolidates before actions are taken. Trans-national nature of the threat means that sustained and closed relationship is needed. In that regard, it was acknowledged that forming a (new) regional security architecture is felt imperative and necessary to ensure the security of Southeast Asia.

On the ASEAN Security Community, there are two reasons why ASEAN needs to form ASC. Firstly, so far the relationships among countries in ASEAN have been too much based on economic co-operation. This makes ASEAN like ‘walking with one leg’. The establishment of ASC is expected to balance the economic nature of relationship by providing another leg, which is security co-operation. Secondly, the establishment of ASC provides ASEAN with a rare opportunity to renew its commitment. It will be like establishing a new
ASEAN. Hence, it could remove the gap between the new and older members.

Moreover, as countries in Southeast Asia were also faced with a growing threat of transnational crimes in all its aspects, closer co-operation was therefore critically needed. Yet, efforts to having a closer co-operation in security were often hampered by the issues of sovereignty and non-interference principle, which clearly reflect the degree of sensitivity among countries in the region. It was strongly expected that a renewed commitment and a higher degree of confidence as proposed and reflected in the ASC proposal could help overcoming those barriers to closer security co-operation.

On the issue of South Pacific, it was noted the security nature in this sub-region was probably different from that of the Southeast Asia, especially when it comes to the issue of terrorism and radical Islam. Yet, like many other regions, problems and challenges faced by South Pacific remained the same, including: 1) historical dispute among countries and nations, 2) poverty, 3) pollution and environmental degradation, 4) transnational crimes, 5) rising prices and cost of living, and 6) aid dependency, especially to the Australian and New Zealand aid.

Yet, it was felt that discussion on the security outlook in South Pacific was rather left behind compared to other regions. It was then urged that CSCAP should promote more discussion on the security of South Pacific, especially through the South Pacific Dialogue Forum that had been established within CSCAP framework.

On the Way Forward, the chair stressed that the goal of this particular session and topic is to concentrate only on some of the previous sessions, for example, some practical ideas proposed which were to be taken up by CSCAP into its program.

One important point and suggestion made in that particular session is the region must find a delicate balance between the governments of Asia Pacific countries and their people. In that regard, it was strongly believed that the Asia Pacific population, including civil society must be engaged in order to combat the issue of terrorism. In this regard, the
role of track-two institution is of crucial importance as it can sustain a security dialogue, which must be inclusive for the whole region.

Yet, it was reminded that the track-two institution must avoid being captured by the track-one or governments. The balance between track one and two, and also with track one-and-a-half, is critically important. Nonetheless, it was critically felt that CSCAP should contribute to the process of security dialogue in the region, for instance, by providing initiatives and proposals to the officials.

With regards to the issue of terrorism, it was firmly believed that CSCAP must help dealing with the issue. As a non-governmental body, CSCAP could approach the issue from the root causes perspectives that in many times had been neglected by the state approach. It was reckoned that the policies and measures taken sometimes even become the source for aggravating the problem of terrorism.

Other speaker argued that the discussion during the Conference had suggested us not to approach the issue of terrorism from the narrow military measures or perspectives. Instead, we needed to find a deeper understanding about the region, such as more understanding and devoting more time to study about Islam in the region. In the view of many, Islam in the region had so far been understood from the lens of terrorism experts, and not from the lens of social scientist or non-security perspectives. Therefore, it was recommended that we needed to understand Islam from social science approach, since Islam is so complex and Moslem communities are not monolithic in nature.

In the future, as one speaker envisioned, CSCAP must focus its energy on three efforts: (1) CSCAP ought to open up a dialogue with track-one (through ARF) by holding regular meetings in between ARF SOM; (2) CSCAP should be engaging track-three, meaning involving the NGOs and civil society; (3) CSCAP should work on the area of security co-operation and security (confidence) building measures.

On the General Conference itself, one speaker maintained that an even like CSCAP General Conference could provide contributions for the ARF and even APEC, which had also discussed security implications besides economic issues. The Conference series should be able to complement other forums such as the Asia Pacific Roundtable and the Shangri-La Dialogue.
Participants supported most of the ideas presented during the last session. In the end, it was felt and concluded that CSCAP must package the projects in a way to be accepted by the policy makers, and CSCAP normal agenda must always reflect the new issues talked about in the forum, in order to maintain its relevance. Yet, there were also debates over the institutional reform within CSCAP and possible that could be adopted in order to have a closer dialogue between CSCAP and the various governments. One of the most important issues discussed was on attracting more young scholars to get involved in the CSCAP process since it would determine the institutional sustainability of CSCAP in the future.

In addition to those topics above, the Conference was also greatly benefited from presentations and speeches made by official and ministers from Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and Timor Leste. They covered various issues, most notably the Indonesian Defence White Paper, security challenges facing Timor Leste, the role of Japan, and the campaign against terrorism.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Timor Leste, for instance, shared his views on the critical security challenges facing the country. There are nine inter-related factors that critically affect the security of Timor Leste: (1) the lack of economic development; (2) interdependence and globalisation; (3) environmental changes; (4) transportation and communication links; (5) ensuring balanced demands for justice and peaceful reconciliation; (6) ability to promote the rule of law and internal law and order enforcement; (7) land and maritime border agreement with the neighbouring countries; (8) threats of terrorism and transnational organized crime, and; (9) the traditional or militaristic challenge.

The next boiling question was what sort of policy Timor Leste should pursue to meet these challenges. As clearly pointed out, Timor Leste needs to make creative use of multilateral diplomacy to complement traditional bilateral relationships, such by becoming an active member of the United Nation, the CPLP, the Non- Aligned Movement, etc, to securely anchor its security concerns within the international order. There was a hope that Timor Leste could be admitted as a full member of ARF.

In his illuminating speech, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs clearly stated that the multi-dimensional campaign against terrorism is not at all a war against Islam. He then shared some of his country’s
experienced in nurturing inter-religious tolerance and harmony, especially with Muslim communities. The Minister then reiterated the imperative of defeating terrorist groups through the effective use of law enforcement, intelligence, and security capabilities to track and arrest terrorists, and to disrupt terrorist networks. In so doing, international co-operation must be enhanced. It was further observed that Muslim and non-Muslim countries had already shown they could be effective allies in the fight against terror.

However, there was also a reminded that we need to keep our counter-terrorism in perspective. There is a need to maintain some balance in the bilateral relationships, and not view them exclusively through the prism of the campaign against terror. As every effort must be undertaken in a multi-dimensional framework, common efforts to defeat terrorism should not define bilateral relationships between Australia and her neighbours. While expressing his slight disagreement or scepticism over the effort to up-lift the root-causes of terrorism, the Minister proposed three suggestions: (1) there is a need to breakdown mistrust and misunderstanding between Muslim and non-Muslim societies; (2) working with the developing world to grasp the economic opportunities afforded by globalisation is imperative and will help us win the battle of ideas with the extremist, and; (3) the Muslim mainstream must not cede the agenda to the terrorists.

**Conclusion and Recommendation.**

The 2003 CSCAP General Conference has considerably scored a major success, not only in terms of attracting a large number of audience and huge media coverage, and or a lively and open debate, but also in introducing and putting forth the CSCAP and its activities to a wider public and governments in the region. After all, that was the primary objective of having the General Conference in the first place, and it has been partially fulfilled through the Conference.

As the first of the series, 2003 CSCAP General Conference has successfully created an open and co-operative
atmosphere for closer interaction between the officials whom are responsible in making and executing security and foreign policy, and people or public who concerns with the security environment and issues, especially in the region. It has set a new good precedent for exchanges of ideas among people and governments in the region, which finally might contribute significantly to the improvement of security condition in the Asia Pacific.

As requested by many participants, and as also agreed by CSCAP, the General Conference should be held regularly—preferably on a bi-annual basis. Furthermore, the tradition to having two or more CSCAP National Committees as co-organisers should be maintained in order to improve and strengthen a sense of co-operation and solidarity among CSCAP Member Committees, which in the end will be benefit the improvement of CSCAP as regional second-track forum. CSCAP Indonesia was proposed to host another General Conference in the next two years to come.

Acknowledgement

As the host of the 2003 CSCAP General Conference, CSCAP Indonesia wish to express its deepest gratitude and appreciation to other Co-organisers, namely AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada, CSCAP Japan, and also to CSCAP Co-Chairs, and CSCAP Secretariat, for the quality of co-operation and support rendered in organising the Conference, and for securing the funds for the Conference.
On behalf of other Co-organisers, CSCAP Indonesia wish also to thank the Governments of Australia, Canada, and Japan for their financial contributions and supports to the Conference.

Furthermore, the appreciation also goes to all other CSCAP Member Committees for their commitments, continuous supports, and assistances extended to the Conference. Some of the Member Committees were very much instrumental in promoting the Conference so that it could attract a large number of participants. The presence of some of key and distinguished speakers were also made possible because of the great efforts showed by numerous CSCAP Member Committees.

The Co-organisers wish also to thank the speakers, commentators and chairs for their excellent quality of presentation and leadership, which greatly benefited the participants. Their presentation and views presented at the Conference had been stimulating, and successfully encouraged a lively, open and frank discussion to take place.

Participants also deserve a credit for the success of the Conference. The Co-organisers would like to thank them for their active involvement in the discussion from the beginning until the very end of program.

Finally, the Co-organisers were appreciative of the invaluable support and assistance given by and the commitment made without hesitation of the large number of individuals and parties who involved in the organisation of the 2003 CSCAP General Conference.

Jakarta, 30 January 2004

CSCAP Indonesia