Introduction

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 5th General Conference was convened at Hotel Borobudur, Jakarta, Indonesia, from 6 to 7 December 2005. CSCAP Indonesia as the host committee, along with AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada and CSCAP Japan, co-organised the General Conference which adopted “Addressing Emerging Security Challenges in the Asia Pacific Region” as the main theme.

The 2005 General Conference was actually the second of the series of CSCAP General Conference. The first three meetings were known as the CSCAP General Meeting. The decision to change the term ‘General Meeting’ to ‘General Conference’ was agreed by all CSCAP Member Committees at the CSCAP 18th Steering Committee Meeting in Singapore, 9 December 2005. The main reason behind this change is to put forth CSCAP views to a larger audience as well as integrate the participation of senior government representatives, academics, civil society members, journalists, and business community with the work and activity of CSCAP. The General Conference is
considered to be a better way to achieve these objectives, and is hoped to raise the profile of CSCAP to a higher level in the future.

With this decision, the 2003 CSCAP General Conference, which is referred to as the 4\textsuperscript{th} General Conference as a subsequent to the previous three General Meetings, was held also in Jakarta. CSCAP Indonesia voluntarily proposed to host the 4\textsuperscript{th} and 5\textsuperscript{th} General Conferences, and its proposal was welcomed and supported by all CSCAP Member Committees. Subsequently, three other CSCAP Member Committees, namely CSCAP Australia (AUSCSCAP), CSCAP Canada and CSCAP Japan, agreed to co-organising both conferences, most notably in finding and securing funds and inviting speakers and dignitaries from each respecting member country. The three co-organisers also symbolically represent three different geographical parts of CSCAP, namely North America, South Pacific, and Northeast Asia.

Commenced by a session on a new paradigm of security in Northeast Asia, contemporary security challenges for the Asia Pacific region were the main topic for discussion in the 5\textsuperscript{th} General Conference. The region is faced with a series of crucial security challenges, most notably terrorism, human trafficking, the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), maritime security threat, natural disaster, and the recent threat of infectious diseases in the region. The increase of non-traditional security threats in the region has been greater than previously predicted, thus posing serious challenges to regional stability and security. The impacts of these threats are suffered by all states in the Asia Pacific region, and must be responded to with the region’s most serious efforts.

The conference also took into its main concern efforts of regional cooperation to address these issues. It is widely acknowledged that regional cooperation on countering proliferation and addressing other contemporary security threats would provide the best vehicle for the region in overcoming the
ongoing problems. Calls for the establishment of closer security cooperation and the formation of new regional security architecture are re-emphasised during the conference.

With the objective to create a conducive forum for an open second-track dialogue, the co-organisers worked and consulted closely to formulate a set of topics and speakers. Despite its tight and lengthy schedule, all sessions succeeded in creating lively, open and frank discussions and debates.

All presentations, keynote speeches and comments were delivered by distinguished scholars and government officials from around the region. Among the officials were H.E. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono (Minister for Defence, Republic of Indonesia), The Hon. Alexander Downer, MP (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Australia), H.E. Datuk Azalina Othman Said (Minister of Youth and Sports, Malaysia), H.E. Zainul Abidin Rasheed (Minister of State, Singapore), Mr. Stephen G. Rademaker (Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation, the United States), Dr. Kiyohiko Toyama (Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Japan), and Mr. Dao Viet Trung (Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam). The conference also benefited greatly from distinguished former ministers and former government officials.

All things considered, the CSCAP 5th General Conference was successful. There is a common understanding and enthusiasm among all CSCAP Member Committees that the event will be regularly held in order to put forth CSCAP views to a larger audience, which in the longer run is hoped to contribute greatly to the regional security.
General Observation and Assessment

Participants and Role Players. Around 120 foreign participants from 18 countries in the region and over 180 Indonesian attended the conference. This number exceeded the initial expectation as the co-organisers expected about 200 attendants – with preparation for 250 people at the most. Last minute arrangements were made in response to this. The co-organisers, whilst in a way overwhelmed by such a big number of participants, were contented as the condition proved the high level of attractiveness of the CSCAP General Conference.

Aside from CSCAP members, the conference participants also include activists, journalists, academics, and diplomats. All participants attended the conference in their private capacity.

After thorough consultation among co-organisers and with other CSCAP members, 51 distinguished individuals were invited to participate and play various roles in the conference, namely as keynote speakers, panelists, commentators, and chairs. The presentations given by the keynote speakers and panelists were sharp and candid. The way they shared their minds on their assigned topics showed the high quality of their presentations.

Each session commenced with a Keynote Speech, which gave an opening and introduction to the audience about the topic of the session. The sessions were then followed by presentations from the panelists, who were all experts in the topic of discussion, to create comprehensive discussions. The role of the chairs was pivotal in the success of each session, as they stimulated lively and scholarly debates and discussions.

Selection of Topics and Flow of Discussion. At the preparatory stage, one of the big challenges - if not the biggest - for the co-organisers was to draft
the programme of the conference. This, of course, included formulating a set of topics that would not only attract the attention of the audience, but would also cover all contemporary security challenges in the region. Although full mandate and liberty has been given to the co-organisers to decide the topics, wide consultation was made with as many members of CSCAP as possible. In addition to this, experience from the previous CSCAP General Conference also contributed to the consideration.

Primarily, CSCAP Indonesia closely consulted with AUSCSCAP and CSCAP Secretariat to prepare the first set of proposals. It was then decided that the focus of the conference should be on the contemporary security issues in the Asia Pacific, particularly on WMD proliferation and regional cooperation. The initial agenda was then further discussed at the next stage, in which there were involvements of all CSCAP Member Committees. The draft agenda was improved accordingly, and circulated to all CSCAP Member Committees for amendments or approval.

After going through such process, seven main topics were chosen, namely: (1) Northeast Asia: New Paradigm for Security; (2) Countering Terrorism; (3) Human Trafficking; (4) Current WMD Developments; (5) Countering Proliferation: International Arms Control Activities; (6) Maritime Security; (7) Prospects for Regional Cooperation in East Asia. In addition to sessions on these seven particular topics, there were two Keynote Speeches on the topic of Countering Proliferation, namely: Keynote Speech on Countering Proliferation; and Keynote Speech on Regional Cooperation on Countering Proliferation. There were also special speeches during meals on: (1) A Grand Strategy for East Asia; (2) Maritime Security: New Challenges for the Region; and (3) U.S. Policies on Countering Proliferation. Last but not least, the final session of the conference portrayed specific cases in regional cooperation, namely cases of disaster prevention, regional peace-keeping and peace-building, and infectious diseases.
Such broad range of topic was considered comprehensive and stimulating, and succeeded in putting forth CSCAP views to the large audience – which, as mentioned earlier, is an objective of the general conference. The topics were absolutely constructive in bringing new understanding among participants, who came from various backgrounds and countries from around the region, about the real concern of the region during this particular time.

In order to create effective presentation and encourage more discussion among participants, each Keynote Speech was given 15 minutes, while panelists were given 10 minutes each to present their views on their respective topics. Chairs of each session were given the liberty to remind the speakers about their time limits, and they were giving the task to be interventionist – clarifying points, relating the views of one speaker to those of another, bringing panelists into conversation with one another, identifying other conference participants with expertise on the matters under discussion, keeping the focus on key issues and if necessary asking questions to the panelists.

To ensure open, frank, and friendly atmosphere for discussion, the conference was held under the Chatham House Rule. All participants were repeatedly reminded to observe to this rule. However, the Opening Session – with H.E. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono’s speech – and Session Four – with The Hon. Alexander Downer, MP’s speech – were exceptions.
Highlights of the Debates

**Opening Speech.** In his Keynote Address, the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, H.E. Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, presented an overview of the Indonesian perspective of the current regional security and defence issues. He emphasised that for the coming ten years, defence sector would be the key factor for economic and political improvement in Indonesia.

Indonesia, although known as the largest economy in Southeast Asia, is still weak in many aspects of economic growth. This, of course, undermines Indonesia’s capacity to create political stability. There cannot be sustainable political development without economic development. Thus, Indonesia must work on effective reform in three sectors, namely economic, political, and security.

The Minister pointed out that with the assistance of neighbouring states in the region, Indonesia would be able to obtain economic development, which in turn would support its capacity to sustain political democracy. In this context, it is imperative that security is provided in the broader sense: economic; social; and political.

Minister Sudarsono expressed his gratefulness to all of the colleagues from the Asia Pacific region for providing the necessary help during the relief time after the tsunami disaster, which had shown the concern of the international community. He vividly emphasised that such thing reflected the vital importance for a broader meaning of ‘security’.

A number of issues were raised during the Q&A time, mostly about Indonesia’s defence/security policies. Speaking about the role of the military in Indonesia after the reform era, Minister Sudarsono pointed out that Indonesia had the worst bureaucracy in Southeast Asia despite being the
largest country in the region, and the military would still circle around the centre of the political movements unless such bureaucratic issues were solved. Moreover, he also pointed out that the most serious threat to Indonesia’s security was actually poverty.

Answering a question on regional cooperation in defence and security, Minister Sudarsono explained that three major working cooperation were being maintained with Singapore, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea that included border security cooperation and joint training. Indonesia has also been receiving assistance from the United States, Australia, and East Asian states in security.

Minister Sudarsono ended the opening session by re-emphasising Indonesia’s commitment for political and security reform.

**Session One: Northeast Asia - New Paradigm for Security.** In general, all speakers of this session acknowledged that there were still many dangerous security issues threatening Northeast Asia. Of all issues, the Korean Peninsula was considered the most critical. Other issues include territorial disputes and bilateral tensions.

It was understood pointed out that there were new challenges and threats facing Northeast Asia. The rise of nationalism, intolerance among countries, proliferation of WMD and missiles, and terrorism render major impacts on the security of Northeast Asia. The region has one of the world’s most prominent concentrations of military strength. Moreover, compared to other regions, Northeast Asia is characterised by wide diversity among countries in terms of their stages of development, political and economic systems, and views of security. It was raised in the discussion that the relationships among the three big states – Japan, China, and Korea – remain problematic.
Furthermore, the U.S. retains a fair level of military presence in Northeast Asia based on its alliances. With regard to this, the U.S. has nothing to gain from the increasing tension among Japan, China, and Korea. Most speakers emphasised on the importance of the U.S’ support to the development of regional dialogues.

Specifically on de-nuclearisation programme in the Korean Peninsula, it was acknowledged that it remained the most prominent problem. All states were thus encouraged to support the Six Party Talk and other multilevel dialogues to help solve this problem.

A discussion also evolved around the issue or Russia’s role in Northeast Asia. Although one speaker claimed that Russia played an active role in various security-related cooperation aimed at developing regional stability and promoting regional dialogue, Russia was criticised to be preoccupied solely by its relations with the U.S. and Europe, thus not ready to be a major Pacific power.

Focusing on the Japan-China relation, opinions that were raised were mostly concerned about the Yakushuni shrine issue. In general, all panelists and participants agree that both Japan and China must work together to resolve historical issues.

As the region grows closer, regional cooperation becomes more imperative than ever. Strengthening efforts among Northeast Asian states, and also with other states in the wider Asia Pacific, is important to ensure peace and prosperity throughout the region through continuation of fair, open and candid dialogues.
All in all, the session managed to conclude that to establish a new paradigm
for security in Northeast Asia would require mutual understanding and
confidence among the states, making progress in functional areas of common
ground, transparency, the establishment of a permanent forum among
Northeast Asian economies, and the broadening of the concept of security.

**Luncheon Speech: A Grand Strategy for East Asia.** The speech that
was delivered in this session sought to answer the question of (1) whether a
new security structure would be needed in this region; and (2) whether this
kind of security architecture would come about by design and planning or
emergence in a natural and historical way.

With regard to formulating a grand strategy for East Asia, five future security
scenarios or alternative architectures of security were suggested: (1) a
possibility of continuation of a U.S.-dominated security arrangement; (2)
replacement of this kind of structure by China framework; (3) the balance of
power situation by two groups of alliances; (4) a concert of power; and (5) a
condominium of China and the U.S. as the leaders.

The U.S. was criticised in an opinion to have actually misused and almost
squandered the opportunity to make good news of its post-Cold War
unipolar superpower status. The U.S. lacks the attention for on
multilateralism and in fact diplomacy itself, thus leading to the situation
where the U.S. has lost the kind of credibility not only in the military but in
diplomatic area as well. In this regard, the U.S policy toward the world and
particularly to Asia has become basically reactive. Meanwhile, Japan was also
criticised to be impeding itself in dealing with the rest of East Asia, not only in
creating an East Asian corporation mechanism but also even in conducting
diplomacy with its neighbours.
On the other hand, China has voluntarily renounced, for the time being, to take the leadership with its so-called peaceful rise, reconciliation and good neighbour policies.

Meanwhile, South Korea said to be caught between the aspiration of becoming more autonomous and self-reliant in terms of security and the need to maintain strong alliance with the U.S. and Japan, as well as with China in economic terms. Lastly, ASEAN was said to follow a policy whose main objective is to assert this provocative framework in regional affairs. At the same time, the divergence of views within ASEAN itself and among the leaders tends to get in the way community to make it.

A suggestion was made, which emphasised on the need to complement the kind of recent security framework - that is to add the element of concept and cooperation among the major powers and the rest within the region.

**Session Two: Countering Terrorism.** This session focused on finding measures to combat terrorism. An interesting presentation explored the link between terrorism and youth and education. It was said that four factors were vital in this context, namely: (1) extremist religious teaching; (2) low self-esteem among young people; (3) limited opportunities for social and economic advancement; and (4) societies continuing to fail to recognize the value of acknowledging, appreciating and respecting idea of diversity.

An analysis of terrorism from the perspectives of security, ideology, and community was also presented. From the security perspective, the war against terror is a war of attrition. However, terrorist resources are not infinite. To prevent future attacks, effective and responsible law enforcement to coordinate security and intelligent mechanism at national and international level remains the key. On ideology, terrorism cannot be defeated solely by
special counter-terrorist squads or elite army units. The ideology that underpins this group must be addressed. The key must then be to expose such terrorist ideology for what it is: a corrupted understanding of Islam. From the community perspective, while Muslims focus much on the security ideology aspect, there has been relatively little discourse on the role of community. The local community is probably one the most effective but under-utilised institutions in countering terrorism.

Furthermore, one speaker suggested that improving fragile democratic institutions could be the best measure against the growth and spread of terrorism, as there was a fragile balance of democratic institutions against tendencies of authoritarianism in light of the war on terror and challenges to the will to order, as well as a fragile balance of emerging democratic institutions against tendencies towards the misuse of government office.

It was also found during this session that there were various understandings (and misunderstandings) of the concept of Jihad, which contributed a great deal to acts of suicide bombs and terrorism. It was also found that there is terrorism rationale for some Muslim communities. These communities or individuals claim that the enemies of Islam, i.e. the U.S. and its allies, will not understand spoken and written language, but only the language of force. Thus, this gives the rationale for them to “communicate” through bomb explosions so that the enemy would hear and care.

This session was also enriched by a presentation on the work of the CSCAP Study Group on Countering Terrorism, which had produced a Memorandum on Enhancing Efforts to Address the Factors Driving International Terrorism. The memorandum presented a working definition of terrorism as “organised violence employed against civilians for a political purpose”. International terrorism is terrorism mounted by an entity with a capacity to undertake
attacks in more than one country, and with transnational elements in terms of goals, membership or support.

The memorandum explains that there are dominant factors driving international terrorism. There is general agreement that terrorism feeds upon a complex mix of factors that can vary in different environments depending upon the peculiar historical, political, economic, social and security conditions. International terrorism also has a degree of domestic moorings where local terrorist groups link themselves to the al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda has also demonstrated a tendency to exploit any emerging issue in order to serve its cause.

It was generally agreed that the region had to broaden perspectives towards formulating solutions to the common adversary in line with continuing trust to improve the regional response. The discussion was indeed very lively due to the high interest of the participants in the topic of the session. The most part of the discussion evolved around the on-going regional efforts in countering terrorism, and what more could be done to address the issue. Several framework of regional cooperation were suggested.

**Session Three: Human Trafficking.** It was explained that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates that human trafficking involves 4 million people per year - valued at USD 7 billion. In this regard, human trafficking is the third largest business worldwide. It involves issues of transnational crimes, violation of labour standards, and also migration problems. Most recently, the issue has expanded to involving discrimination and gender-biased violation.

Human trafficking is now facing a new level of scrutiny. More than 50 years after the UN 1949 convention, the dynamics now include various human
rights abuses, including exploitation, prostitution, forced labour, slavery, even removal of organs.

One speaker explained that the problem was that the law enforcement instrument was lacking definition. Moreover, the era of globalization, and current political and social change of the world exacerbate the issue. The dark side of globalization, which impacts on the exploitation of resources at the cost of the poorer countries, has also triggered the blossoming of human trafficking cases. In this regard, human trafficking presents a life of slavery and involuntary servitude.

Thus, an emphasis was put on the call to adopt treaties, guidelines and new principles – particularly for countries with gross cases of human trafficking. The UNHCR Report of 1998 called for the focus to be on careful anti-trafficking strategies and the need for proper protection. Domestic improvements have to be made as well, particularly in dealing with cases of corruption, the use of people as merchandise, the patronising of human trafficking victims, problems of education, and last but not least legal reform.

Another speaker put forth several issues to deal with when responding to human trafficking. First, there is a need to understand ‘the nature of the beast’ to fight this problem permanently - it must be acknowledged that the necessity of labour due to globalisation is a factor to human trafficking. Secondly, there should be an exclusive focus of human trafficking on the sex industry. Thirdly, there is low governmental commitment to end trafficking. Although there have been talks and dialogues, there has only been few dedicated prosecutorial processes. Thus, it seems that combating trafficking is not a priority for most states. Fourthly, states and other actors should push for better prosecutions, rather than just more numbers of prosecutions. There is a need for better advocacy, and there is also an obligation for states and other actors to support criminal judiciary system. Lastly, there is the need for
cooperation across national borders. In this regard, it was also stressed that ending human trafficking is a global responsibility.

The work of the Bali Ministerial Conference of People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons, and Related Transnational Crimes was also explained during this session. It was explained that the Bali Process is one of 13 regional processes in the world dealing with migrant use. However, there are three areas which distinguish the Bali Process from the others, namely: its focus on criminalising the activities of human smuggling and trafficking as well as the accompanying transnational crimes; its nature of action-oriented forum rather than a consultative forum; and its intention to collaborate with broader relevant established regional and multilateral institutions such as ASEAN, APEC, and the UN. So far, it has successfully brought together thirty-eight source, transit and destination countries from throughout the region, eighteen observer countries, and fourteen relevant international organisations to work on raising awareness and coordination, as well as building practical measures.

The discussion during this session focused on the applicability of regional cooperation to combat human trafficking. It was conceded that there had been very little cooperation among agencies and states in the region on this issue. It was suggested that it might be the time to make the measures more binding.

It was also admitted that human trafficking is indeed a consequence of economic conditions and that some states may have other priorities such as fighting terrorism. Thus, there is a need to develop the awareness of the states, and also to create some sort of formal identification of the elements on how to respond to the problem.
**Dinner Speech: Maritime Security – New Challenges for the Region.** The focus of the speech was on the Indonesian perspective of the security in the Strait of Malacca. Indonesia’s concerns regarding the Malacca Straits include the status of the strait, the safety of navigation, concerns regarding fisheries, environmental concerns, and security concerns.

While Indonesia has its concerns, there are also concerns of the non-coastal states, which regard the strait as important to their trade, economic, strategic and security interests. Their main concern is of course safe navigation.

Seeing all these interests, there are actually common concerns among Indonesia and other states which are also stakeholders in the security of the Malacca Straits. These include the safety of navigation, the protection of the marine environment, the need to cooperate on search and rescue, contingency plans against pollution, elimination of piracy and armed robberies, and preventing maritime terrorism.

Recently, there has been increasing attention to this issue. The fourth Tripartite Ministerial meeting of the littoral states was held in Batam on 1-2 August 2005. A month later, an international meeting was held in Jakarta, organised by IMO in cooperation with three littoral states to discuss the enhancement of safety, security, and environmental protection in the strait. There has also been cooperation between the three coastal states and Japan.

Aside from these efforts, it was said that a lot more were still needed to be done, particularly in the area of the protection of the marine environment and the promotion of safety and security of navigation. Many issues remain, including: there is now an extensive industrialisation along the coast of the straits of Malacca and Singapore; there is an extensive sand-mining for land reclamation along the coastal areas, particularly in the Singapore Straits; and
the density of traffic is increasing and larger ships are carrying more cargoes and some might be dangerous to the marine environment.

Within the last three decades, experiences have proven that: (1) the problems of the straits of Malacca and Singapore could be solved through practical/technical mechanism and cooperation; (2) cost and burden sharing in promoting safety and security of navigation are possibly with the cooperation with Japan, and are increasingly necessary and essential; (3) user states should voluntarily cooperate with the coastal countries to promote the safety of navigation and to protect marine environment in the straits, as well as in law enforcement activities; (4) what is needed now is a more authoritative and permanent institution to follow up on previous measures; (5) while cooperation and assistance from user states are needed and required under UNCLOS 1982, there are certain situation in which Indonesia would not be comfortable with, such as the stationing or hiring of foreign navies or marines, arming commercial vessels with offensive weapons, and joint patrols of foreign navies in the straits.

Some other issues emerged during the discussion. The debate about the relationship between piracy and terrorism was raised. It was acknowledged that the relation between the two has not been able to be determined. There was also a discussion on sovereignty, particularly linking issues such as the resistance towards foreign navies, and also relations with user states.

Session Four: Countering Proliferation. This was a keynote session on the topic of proliferation as one of major security issues, which was meant to be an overview or introduction to the following sessions that would comprehensively discuss several aspects on proliferation issue in the Asia Pacific region. The Hon. Alexander Downer, MP, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Australia, shared his views on the topic by giving a Keynote Speech.
Minister Downer addressed proliferation of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) as one of the greatest threats to international and regional security. According to him, there is no country that can claim immunity from this menace. He highlighted the threats from countries illicitly pursuing WMD and missiles capable of delivering them were beyond their source, and the urgent need to make an urgent act and a practical commitment to prevent WMD from falling into the wrong hands.

Minister Downer stated that a variety of dramatic changes in the global security environment over the past two decades contributed to the spread of WMD and the increased risk of their use. He outlined some key trends in the diversification of proliferation threats: (1) a small number of states continue to flout international non-proliferation norms by secretly developing WMD, and their reason for doing so are based on the misguided belief that these weapons would bring them the power and prestige to be a superpower; (2) the increase in economic development and free trade system have opened up new opportunities for both proliferators and terrorists, as globalisation has increased the availability of materials and technology required to make biological, chemical, and even nuclear weapons, thus resulting in more countries developing indigenous capability to produce WMD and missiles; (3) a few of these countries or individuals within them have exported their expertise - the nuclear procurement network operated by Abdul Qadir Khan is the most disturbing of the cases that is so far come to light; (4) the rise of transnational terrorism has significantly increased the problem for states, because terrorist groups cannot be constrained in their action by a threat of retaliation.

To counter proliferation, Minister Downer emphasised that it demanded a broader range of tools and measures as possible. It includes not only continuous efforts to comply with multilateral non-proliferation treaties, but
also international cooperation to cut supply of weapons and missiles programmes. Other measures are also needed to protect vulnerable sources of WMD-related materials against terrorist procurement, such as improved security for radioactive and other hazardous materials.

Minister Downer considered the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI) as a leading example of the type of new thinking that facilitated immediate practical actions against the acquisition of WMD and/or WMD materials by proliferators and terrorists. The PSI aims at enhancing operational capacity within and between participating countries to help them contribute to effective and timely actions to stop illicit trafficking of such weapons.

He concluded and closed his address by making some points: (1) no one’s tool or measure is adequate for arresting the proliferation of the most dangerous of all weapons; (2) the diversity of the threat requires comprehensive, flexible, and innovative responses; (3) it is also clear that the global counter-proliferation network can only be as effective as it is wide, and the full commitment of all countries is required to deny the proliferators opportunity to exploit the weaknesses in existing collective defences; (3) all states should be under no illusion to the difficulties of the challenges they face and of the urgent need for practical actions; (4) there are risks and costs to a programme of actions, but they are far less than the long-ranged risk and cost of not doing so; (5) if all states in Asia Pacific work to integrate their economies more closely, they have a clear responsibility to the next generation to ensure that their future prosperity and security is not held hostage by such threats.

Session Five: Current WMD Developments. The main topic of this session was “Various Challenges of Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD) as Contemporary Challenges to the World Security”. The issues discussed included the development of nuclear weapon, missiles, chemical, and
microbiological weapons, with the objective to raise awareness that the problem of proliferation and WMD were everyone’s problems and everyone could contribute to deal with the problem. This session underscored how serious the problem was, what the dimension of the problem was, and why it was of crucial matter in East Asia and Asia Pacific.

First, on the topic of nuclear terrorism and proliferation, it was explained that the threat of nuclear attack had never been greater, as using a nuclear weapon in a populated city could kill as many people as in the tsunami disaster last year (2004), but the consequences will be more horrific and would transform the global security environment. Moreover, nowadays, terrorist groups are more likely to use nuclear weapon in their actions, and no country is free from that threat. Therefore, there is a need for a shift in the paradigm of securing nuclear weapon, by focusing on nuclear terrorism threats as there has not been enough effort to combat them.

Moreover, three areas of concern were listed. The first is Pakistan, as the number one nuclear terrorist concern in the world, especially in this region. The second area of concern is Russia, as the richest country in uranium in the world. Securing the materials is not enough as it is also important to reduce or eliminate the material, or transforming the use of the material into non-weapon use, as what has been done by the U.S. The third is the concern about civilian research reactors. One of the examples is Australian Nuclear Reactor.

Next, the discussion continued to the topic of missile development, including ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. It was said that threat was a declaration of intent; in this context it means military capability plus political intent to use the military capability. Missile proliferation and WMD is more political than military. To deal with the proliferation threat, a speaker suggested not relying on threat forecasts. Proliferation is needed; the production of ballistic missile is actually starting to level off. On the other hand, cruise missile is increasing
exponentially. Therefore, the best forecast is risk assessment not threat assessment. However, the assessment has to consider all nation and terrorist organisations.

On another dimension of WMD, which is biological weapon development, a speaker expressed concern about the use of biological weapon by terrorist groups. The threat of biological weapon grows in line with at least five reasons. Firstly, the rapid diffusion of biotechnology and the indiscriminate use of antibiotic are increasing the resistance of people against these issues. Besides, biological weapon manufacturer is conceivable in a legitimate program. Secondly, it is easy to manufacture and conceal the production. Thirdly, the production can be easily enhanced by genetic manipulation. For example, the avian flu would be more dangerous if the virus of avian flue mutated either naturally or manipulated. Fourthly, there are defence scientists involved in bio-defence measures that could defect to assist terrorist groups. Lastly, biological weapons threat is of low risk but with high consequences. The psychological affect is also immense.

In this regard, a suggestion was put forward, which includes three strategies to deal with the threat of biological weapon: firstly, by establishing norms; secondly by detecting and preventing biological weapon proliferation; and lastly by responding to biological weapon attacks. In addition, several points were emphasised: (1) Domestic legislation is imperative to ensure surveillance within countries or detection and prevention of illicit activities; (2) International consensus on the establishment of verification norms is imperative; (3) Security Council Resolution 1540 undoubtedly provides a blueprint for addressing biological weapons proliferation.

Next, on the issue of biological weapon with the focus on the risks and ethics of its counter-measures, it was explained that biological weapons issue was not simply a mass destruction issue. Rather, it should be seen as microbial
threats to security which might be perceived in three overlapping dimensions: (1) deliberate disease; (2) fast moving natural outbreaks of familiar infectious diseases; and (3) the risk associated with laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organism, which is generally carried out for the benign purpose of devising pharmaceutical and other countermeasures against both deliberate and natural disease threats. In this regard, biological weapon proliferation is not like any other proliferation, as it would include proliferation of knowledge and proliferation of technology.

With regard to the issue of laboratory research, there are two concerns. The first is the ethical concern of genetic engineering of pathogens and weaponisation of biological agent for biological weapon threat assessment purposes. The second concern involves the risks. The challenge of biological research is to conduct it safely, securely, and in a manner sensitive to international security. Bio-safety concern is how to prevent the biological agent from escaping from the laboratory. Bio-security concern is related to the prevention of the misuse of the biological agents as weapons.

In this regard, it was pointed out that East Asia experienced a rapid expansion of interest and investment in biotechnology, leading to an increase in the number of people and facilities engaged in research on pathogenic microorganisms. The security challenge this poses is best addressed at the global level by strengthening Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) compliance, although regional cooperative initiatives would support that process. It is important to enhance information exchange and technical assistance between developing countries and developed countries in the world.

The Q&A part of this session centred upon the awareness of various dimensions of WMD. The discussion assisted all participants to understand
the key points of how to best prevent all negative impacts of WMD. The issue of prevention was then covered in the following session.

Session Six: Countering Proliferation – International Arms Control Activities. This session commenced by an introduction of the current international efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons, which are done in multilevel with different measures, tools and efforts, by the UN and other multilateral institutions, groups of sovereign states and those taken bilaterally or by limited numbers of countries. Particularly on WMD, several measures had been taken by the IAEA, OPCW, the new UN SC Resolution 1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). On the other hand, there are some efforts through the SALW proliferation and certain conventional weapons.

Four implementations of the new Security Council Resolution 1540 will greatly help close the existing gap among non-proliferation regimes, which primarily put more focus on state-to-state mechanism. This resolution covers not only the WMD and their means of delivery, but also the proliferation and use by terrorist groups and other non-state actors, hence strengthening the export control and border control. The current non-proliferation regimes oblige only those states who have joined or voluntarily participated in the regime, while the resolution comprehensively mandate the all nations whether they are a member of the UN or not. This resolution has given awareness to all members of states about their obligation under the resolution to give clarification of what are lacking, what needs to be done and what kind of assistant is available to help the implementation.

The other progress on the WMD non-proliferation measures include the adoption of the convention about the nuclear and radioactive material by the UN General Assembly and the IAEA convention which set binding obligation
to protect nuclear facilities and materials. The nuclear terrorism convention is significant in mandating the signatories to criminalise and extradite those who involve in all activities relating to nuclear and radioactive materials.

IAEA is considered to be playing a vital and practical role for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In halting the state to state spread of nuclear weapons, it has come to be trusted as a sound and independent point of reference as well as a potential arbitrator with the necessary integrity. It has the expertise, facilities and accumulation of knowledge in securing nuclear material and preventing the proliferation. However, a speaker said that although the IAEA might be competent and effective in verifying compliance with the safe cost obligation, it was not the ultimate enforcement power. Therefore there is a need to link the IAEA’s confidence to more political level and to put it in a mechanism that guarantees full attention and involvement of the Security Council in overseeing the IAEA’s roles. There was also an idea to establish an international framework that could prevent the risk of nuclear proliferation while preserving the rights of peaceful civilian use of nuclear energy and technology.

The session also discussed the Korean perspective and explained how the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) served as a cornerstone in global non-proliferation and disarmament regime. It was explained that the North Korean nuclear issue posed the threat for peace and security on the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and beyond. NPT has shown its inherent limitation in dealing with such issue. A speaker believed that the Six Party Talk was the best means to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The adoption of a Joint Statement was enough to build the expectation that problem would be resolved by rational dialogue and negotiation.

North Korea is now much more economically dependent, therefore more vulnerable to the pressures from other countries. However, such pressure
could have impacts, such as it could bring much more lucrative deal which makes North Korea will be more reluctant to give up their nuclear program at the early stages.

To this end, South Korea should be mindful of the following points. Firstly, North Korea should build sufficient trust by returning to the NPT as soon as possible and then discuss the issue of peaceful use of the nuclear energy. Secondly, the issue of peace regime and the nuclear issue should not be mixed up. Lastly, South Korea should design a region for South Korea-U.S. alliance under the premise that North Korea nuclear problem has been resolved.

Another speaker explored that the international effort to prevent proliferation has shown a significant progress as well as some problems and challenges. Concerning the positive aspects, four points were mentioned: (1) the international consensus has been constant in the prevention of the WMD proliferation; (2) the SC Resolution 1540 on non-proliferation has been adopted and is under implementation; (3) some initiatives to strengthen non-proliferation regimes have been put forward; (4) political and diplomatic efforts have been continuously pursued to resolve proliferation issue by weighing up dialogues and cooperation.

On the other hand, several difficulties and problems were also mentioned: (1) the review conference of non-proliferation treaty ended without substantial results; (2) no powerful consensus on arms control or disarmaments; (3) nuclear issues are constantly growing all around the world; and (4) there is growing risk of WMD acquisition by terrorist groups and other non-state entities.

The Q&A part of this session was dominated by the issue of North Korea, as scepticism about the Six Party Talk was raised. Questions were also raised about the activities of the UN to reduce, if not prevent, proliferation.
An observation from CSCAP Study Group on WMD was also revealed during the discussion time. The Study Group observes that there is a great deal of support in theory for broader international non-proliferation regime and certainly there has been great international support for the UN Security Council as the ultimate arbitrator. In reality, however, the Study Group found that there has been several instances, such as in Iran and North Korea, where attempts to bring the matter to the Security Council are resisted.

There was also a discussion on China’s nuclear weapons policy, particularly the trends in Chinese nuclear deployment and how China reconciles its policies with its legal obligation under the Article 6 of the NPT.

Session Seven: Regional Cooperation on Countering Proliferation.

It was explained in this session that three pillars of the global regime exist, namely the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Disarmament, and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (PUNE). The 9/11 terrorist attack has aggravated the threat of proliferation and the threat to international peace and security, thus requiring collective actions by the international community. Arrangements and cooperation in countering proliferation in the Asia Pacific would include the Treaty on Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ or the Bangkok Treaty), the Rarotonga Treaty and the Declaration on the Korean Peninsula. These regional arrangements give significant contribution, not only to the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT, but also to the promotion of peace and stability in the region.

The establishment of regional cooperation on non-proliferation complements the global regime of NPT, which would also provide the region with more flexibility to adapt to the characteristics of the region, including the view on
the geo-strategic environment, perception of security threat to the region and to the individual states in the region.

With the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula still unresolved, the prospect to establish a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia is very bleak at the moment. Indeed, the issue is very complex and politically sensitive. Moreover, it was emphasised that nuclear-free zones with effective safeguards under the IAEA system would become the backbone of regional cooperation for countering proliferation and at the same time serve as an important mechanism to maintain regional peace and stability. For Asia Pacific, resolving the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula would be of utmost importance.

During the Q&A, it was expressed in a comment that the increasing interest in non-proliferation and nuclear energy in the region had raised additional concern about just how effective a nuclear weapon free zone might be. Moreover, it was raised that the safeguard system under the IAEA system were important in analysing the nuclear weapon free zone issue, especially in South East Asia, for it to work effectively. However, the mechanism of consultation would eventually reduce the interest of nuclear weapon proliferation.

On the issue of nuclear weapon trade protocol, there have been efforts where Chinese would like to be the first one to accede to this treaty. In this regard, it was discussed whether there was any further action to follow this political declaration. It was understood that there were internal problems which hamper the participation in nuclear weapons free zone.

After discussion, a review and summary of the previous sequential sessions on WMD proliferation was given. It was considered a correct decision to put the WMD proliferation and its possible countering measures as the central theme in the first half of the second day of the conference. WMD issues
comprise the single most important set of security issues in the international agenda. Hence, WMD proliferation remains as a strategic issue in the future, compared to the war on terror.

Referring to the previous sessions on countering proliferation, it was explained that a number of different practical efforts to address WMD proliferation problems had been raised. Moreover, the CSCAP Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of WMD has also been working on the identification and refinement of a broad range of practical proposals on countering WMD proliferation.

The review concluded that it was necessary to explore an ambitious and imaginative thinking of these efforts to successfully address the most strategic issue.

**Luncheon Speech: U.S. Policies on Countering Proliferation.**

Following the sequential sessions on countering proliferation, there was a comprehensive speech during lunch about the U.S. efforts to prevent WMD proliferation. Firstly, the growing international consensus over the need to combat WMD proliferation as well as missiles capable of delivering such weapons was mentioned. To combat this threat, all countries should work in all levels: national; bilateral; and multilateral.

Action at the national level is a binding legal obligation under the UN Security Council Resolution 1540. This resolution requires all UN member states to criminalise WMD proliferation, adopt and enforce effective export controls, and secure nuclear materials. It also mandates that states adopt laws designed to prevent the financing of proliferation. The speaker cited the export control policy of the U.S. as one of concrete actions to combat proliferation of WMD at the national level.
At the bilateral level, the U.S. has been working for years with other governments to improve their ability to implement the types of controls now required by Security Council Resolution 1540, including to stop shipments and to secure dangerous materials.

At the multilateral level, multilateral cooperation against proliferation is more than just good citizenship. It was said that Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was one of the examples of multilateral efforts to combat WMD proliferation. However, PSI is not a treaty-based approach. As a result, it imposes no legal obligations on the participating governments. There is no formal organisation with a budget or headquarter. Instead, it is a partnership designed to act proactively in enforcing national and international legal authorities to deter, disrupt, and prevent WMD and missile proliferation.

Organisations like the United Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC can make valuable contributions to multilateral efforts to combat WMD proliferation. It is important to recall that WMD non-proliferation obligations are not an imposition by any one state or group of states. Rather, these obligations are established under international legal instruments to which the vast majority of the world’s governments are party. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention define the non-proliferation obligations of the parties to these treaties.

Most of the questions following the speech addressed the issue of PSI and its consistency with international law. Some concerns were raised, which centred upon the opinion that the membership of PSI was limited only to certain countries, thus making PSI suitable only for the U.S. interests.

Some critiques were also raised about the U.S. policies on the issues. Cynicism about U.S. double standard was voiced, particularly in assessing the U.S.’
policies on Israel. A question was also raised regarding the U.S.’ aggressive policies against terrorism and how that related to non-proliferation efforts.

**Session Eight: Maritime Security.** A discussion on maritime security in the Asia Pacific region would of course require an observation of the Chinese perspective. It was explained that the current situation of maritime security in Asia Pacific reflects that the old mechanism of maritime security has passed, while the new mechanism has not been established yet. The new approach of maritime security in this region was still led by the U.S., although the region had developed to be multi-polar. Therefore, it is important for countries in the region to seek for a common understanding of maritime security in the regional context.

It was also explained that China practiced a new maritime security concept, which emphasised more on interregional cooperative security, especially in the sharing of some common concerns. The measure is to use non-military means such as political dialogues in resolving disputes and conflict by eliminating misunderstanding between states.

Another speaker presented a different perspective on the issue of interstate conflicts within the seas of the Asia Pacific region, especially the East and South China Seas and the Strait of Malacca, and also the sea areas around the Indonesian archipelagic waters. The conflicts include issues of territorial rights over small islands or over the demarcation of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or over dangers such as piracy, maritime terrorism, illegal fisheries, illegal immigration, illegal trade, the proliferation of WMD and foreign military activities.

Regarding the conflict between China and Japan on the development of seabed resources in the East China Sea, the probability of military incident is
feared. In the 21st century, the demand of maritime resource is increase, and a number of countries are not hesitance in expanding their claims to seabed resources.

At the same time, marine environment protection and conservation in the Asia Pacific region is an urgent issue. The problem of global warming is deeply linked with the oceans, and marine environment issues are connected to both resource development and security. The approach to ocean-related issues must be comprehensive and integrated.

Next, an explanation about two categories of contemporary issues regarding maritime security was given. The first set of issues includes disputed maritime areas which concerns sovereignty of offshore island, overlapping claim of economic zone, sovereignty over geographic feature, etc. The second category includes issues of shipping activities, safety of the passenger of the ship, armed robbery and piracy.

International cooperation is important to cope with the problem, however one must note the premise that difficulty arises because the ship are passing through territorial water or archipelagic water under the sovereignty of the coastal state and under the international law. The only state that can exercise this power or patrol with the state under sovereignty is the coastal state. The Strait of Malacca is an example.

Since the 11 September 2001 incident, the priority of all maritime organisations has been maritime security. A new protocol was recently adopted, which was intended to update the convention. It includes new offences, such as the use of ship to transport WMD and provision to board ships that are suspected in illegal activities. In this context, legal framework is mandatory in resolving maritime security issues.
A discussion evolved regarding the Law of the Sea Convention. Article 43 regulates that coastal countries will allow free transit, as safe and soon as possible, for tankers. On the other hand, user states have to cooperate with coastal countries to safeguard the environment. Similar regimes are applied for archipelagic sea lanes. In this regard, it must be understood that coastal countries are not interested in making it difficult for passing vessels. What is more important is to see the common concern, where both littoral states and user states could cooperate and offer assistance to assure safe navigation.

In addition to that, issues of jurisdiction of coastal states and cooperation to solve the problems of oil and gas exploitation in the South China Sea were also discussed. Particularly concerning disputed areas along the coast of East Asia, it was acknowledged that the problems included resource management and arrangement of law and order at the sea area. It was suggested that Northeast Asia should learn from the good progress of cooperation in Southeast Asia.

**Session Nine: Prospects for Regional Cooperation in East Asia.**

This session focused on the prospects of cooperation within the East Asian Summit (EAS) framework. It was said that the success in the earlier stages of the EAS will depend on a number of factors. The first is the global environment. In this regard, the U.S.’ war on terror and intervention in Iraq and steady expansion of global economy are some key issues. The second factor is the EAS’ relationship with other frameworks of cooperation. It is important that the EAS both preaches and practices open regionalism. The third factor is ASEAN. ASEAN must acknowledge its own limitations, thus the EAS must also look elsewhere for inspiration.

A pessimistic view of EAS was shown, as it was said that EAS had no established precedents to follow, and there were too many imponderables at
this juncture. However to have a good start, the EAS must at first develop its own identity and intramural dynamics. Secondly, it must also reach out to the outside world in the true spirit of open regionalism. Thirdly, there must be substantive achievements, or strong indications thereof.

As for the U.S. perspective on East Asian regionalism, it was found that the U.S. would like to see some simpler architecture for Asia Pacific, freer than APEC process. It was explained the U.S.’ concerns over the architecture or lack of clarity over it, for example, are evident in various media. Various forms of international cooperation are not an end in itself but a means to achieve the aims. Converging interests are particularly true in the international cooperation in this case. Geographical cooperation can be established around the core, but there is a tendency of widening. The widening happens more rapidly than the deepening of the cooperation, thus ending up with countries with different system, basic interests, economic capacity, and less like-minded.

In the case of East Asia, there are several special problems. Firstly, there is increasing number of big countries the region but there is no vision to complement that - vision with China as leadership or Japan is there, but not with both countries as leaders. The second problem is the incredibly diverse region. The third is the unclear geography and a blurring of line. In this regard, politics is behind the decision to have 16 nations in the East Asia Summit. All in all, geographically-determined regional frameworks do not necessarily provide the best architecture to deal with any particular set of issues.

Another speaker pinpointed functional integration as the focus rather than political integration (based on common value or on common destiny). Because of the diversity, regionalism has to be functional. In terms of leadership role and initiative taking, it has to be by merit. There is no denying
that there are potentials of competition between Japan and China. With this condition, functional cooperation provides opportunities. Japan can take initiative in financial cooperation and surveillance mechanism, while China can take initiative for energy and other sectors.

Regarding the possible overlapping between EAS and ASEAN+3, it was said that they can coexist for different purposes. East Asian states should be responsible for the establishment of an East Asian Community given their geographical setting. ASEAN +3, in which ASEAN plays a key role, should take the leading role in the process. ASEAN+3 should be institutionalised with an end to achieve commercial, financial, and social goals for the regional cooperation.

While ASEAN +3 cannot enlarge its membership, EAS can. EAS is a new venue for enhanced integration with ASEAN +3 countries. The more the EAS members interact multilaterally and bilaterally, the better understanding will be reached and higher level of cooperation will follow. Moreover, EAS can be a dialogue forum that is open, inclusive, and outward looking.

During this session, several comments showed pessimism regarding the EAS. It was stated that regional configurations such as EAS should not give too much optimism, particularly seeing the differences among the states and the fact that there are still suspicion between these states. Doubts were also raised regarding EAS in the future and also regarding the ASEAN+3.

Session Ten: Cases in Regional Cooperation. As suggested by the title, this last session, as a subsequent of the previous sessions on regional cooperation, presented three specific cases in regional cooperation in Asia Pacific. The three cases were regional peace-keeping and peace-building, infectious diseases, and disaster prevention.
The first case was featured by an illustration of the CSCAP Study Group on Regional Peace-keeping and Peace-building. One major recommendation made by the study group is related to multinational coalition - in this case, for peace keeping and peace building. It was explained that in some parts of the world, regional organisations have tried to deal with this challenge, for example in Africa and in the former states of the Soviet Union. EU and NATO have also taken up this challenge to different degree.

In South Asia and Southeast Asia, even though regional organisations exist, no significant efforts have really been taken - with the exception of some efforts in Solomon Island and Bougainville. This may well be a reflection of the fact that such need in the region has been marginal.

As the region moves towards dealing with failing states scenario with the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, it is vital that regional capabilities are harnessed and institutionalised to prevent external intervention. In terms of peace building, the establishment of a Peace Building Commission (PBC) was recommended.

A discussion also evolved around the impediments in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia to firmly establish such cooperation on peace-keeping and peace-building. The capability of the region – including through the second track frameworks – to coordinate emergency contingency force especially in a post conflict, peace-building and coping with situations after natural disaster situations was questioned.

Regarding coordination and contingency, it was suggested that developing capacities and aspect of mobilization outside the UN mechanism was significant. Confidence-building measures and peace-building are the most significant features in the region.
The second case which became a topic in this session was infectious diseases in the region. It was explained that although ARF and other second track dialogues in the region had discussed so much about comprehensive security and covering in it conventional and unconventional threats, the idea of health security had not been in the region’s security lexicon.

Recent experiences of SARS have shown how it has become more than just health crisis. It affected the economy and has psychological impacts as well. The poor handling of SARS has undermined the state’s credibility and led to calls for transparency and accountability from different countries. The intensity of the issue is also a major factor. The threat of infectious diseases is greater than ever. SARS have made obvious the vulnerability of states.

In this regard, it was questioned how adding security label to infectious diseases would help in addressing the consequent threats. For one, it could increase awareness and readiness in addressing complex emergencies. It could make state conscious of the presence of these diseases for the welfare of the state as well as society. Securitising the threat of infectious diseases means translating mere pronouncement of security threats to adopting an integrated approach involving multi actors working together with medical community to cope with the immense problems.

In pushing for such attitude, various issues and problems exist, including: most countries still see as unconventional threat in traditional perspective that is as threat of offensive bio-terrorism; delayed impact of infectious diseases has affected sense of urgency that drive decision making and resources allocation amongst security planners and decision makers; attentions are drawn to domestic conditions only - state capacity, crises management, and public concerns are not enough; epistemic communities that are placed to stimulate more innovative thinking about the destabilising potential
infectious diseases (for example, public health officials, scientists) have generally not focused on security relevant aspects of infectious diseases.

It was emphasised that the gap needed to be filled. Many of existing initiatives have not combined public health personnel with policy researchers and none who has done that on policy and security framework. Thus, there is a need for catalysing actors with substantial influence over national government that do recognize new and emerging infectious disease threats in their own rights. Asia needs them to take the lead in encouraging communication between international agencies, government and public in the issue. In this regard, CSCAP as premier epistemic community can lead the way in the setting the security issues relevant to this region.

An integrated approach to help human security, which involves different actors would make the approach more coherent was suggested. Narrow state-centric approach has to be developed to face new challenges. The pinnacle of this is change of mindset that this is not a mere medical issue, rather, issues of human security and national security. There is an urgent need to build a good mechanism for global, regional and domestic disease surveillance and control mechanism. A holistic and integrated approach is needed. Holistic means being able to understand what it means for domestic regional and global governance in addressing this issues. That means requiring number of actors to work together (health workers and officials rarely coordinate with people from the defence/security sector).

The last case discussed was disaster prevention, in particular learning from the tsunami experience in South and Southeast Asia. The presentation focused on building better governance in disaster-stricken areas, in this case Aceh. In the rebuilding phase after the tsunami, Aceh got 70% of the funding from foreign aid, and roles of NGOs have been of great contribution. In this regard, people-to-people connection is the core mandate.
The need to rely on local assets and community involvement are obvious. The blueprint may come from the central and but the real building process must come from the community. Bottom up process must be ensured and the process must not fall into conflict and violence again. Village mapping program is a successful example with great people’s participation.

In the discussion that followed the presentation, it was found that reconciliation and peace-building in Aceh was an interesting situation. Issues of military capability and lack of international regime in the area (most of the responses were ad hoc) were acknowledged. It was stressed that the region needed regimes for trade and protection of exotic species or human trafficking - regimes that possessed both norms of protections and warning. Indonesia needs international supports on that. This is a region peculiarly vulnerable to disaster, thus would be more vulnerable in the future as population grows, huge immigration, and no prevention mechanism available.

**Closing Remarks.** In the concluding session of the General Conference, Professor Brian Job of CSCAP Canada began by acknowledging CSCAP’s efforts and record of achievement over the decade since its formation. In assessing the 5th General Conference, Professor Job addressed three significant factors: the theme of the conference; expectations of the conference; and the role of CSCAP as a track two organisation.

Regarding the themes of the general conference, three dynamics or levels of consideration were apparent throughout the sessions:

1. Global context. Minister Sudarsono highlighted that the global centre of gravity has shifted towards Asia. Thus the General Conference must
address how Asian problems fit within the overall global context. Issues such as the Korean Peninsula, human trafficking, and terrorism, while being seen as “Asian problems” within the Asian region, are being shaped and solved within the global context. On each of these issues and others, the conference has presented remarkable views and expertise.

2. Regional dynamics. The Conference keynote speakers and participants were in accord that the three powers (China, India, and Japan) are redefining their economic and political roles, and at the same time questioning the U.S. role in the region. As a result, the economic and security architectures of the region are in flux. It was interesting to note that Conference discussions focused substantial attention on the EAS, but much less on APEC and even less on the ARF—perhaps signalling shifts in the perceived importance and potential of these institutions. Also, of note, however, was the lack of discussion on the role of second track efforts and institutions. Professor Job pointed out that this was somewhat surprising, given that this was a CSCAP sponsored event.

3. Asian states and their people. Minister Sudarsono and many other presenters pointed out that each state in the region continues to experience political transformations, dilemmas of economic growth, and issues of social and cultural reconciliation—albeit at differing stages and differing degrees from one to the other. Attempting to manage these factors has challenged states’ capacities for the provision of the public goods of security, i.e., the provision of human security for their populations.

Regarding the last point of Asian states and their people, three central issues emerged during the conference. The first is the definition and redefinition of national identity - as well as the struggle - on one hand, and manipulation, on the other hand, of forces of nationalism. The second is the role of the religion.
A great deal of time has been spent on this issue, but this time on this conference it was less, although it remains a substantial issue. The third issue is the necessity to think carefully of the fragile balance between democratic institutions against the tendencies of authoritarianism and misuse of government office—tendencies that have increased in light of the war on terrorism and challenges to order.

Thus, this comes to the second question of whether this CSCAP General Conference can be said to have met expectations. Certainly in the sense of presenting a spectrum of views and spectrum of issues, it has. CSCAP has showcased its capacity to bring expertise and different voices into the forum, and to extend the forum to others. This CSCAP General Conference has also importantly, and to a greater extent than previous General Conferences, showcased the substantive and technical expertise mobilised through CSCAP Study Groups, particularly with regard to maritime cooperation, WMD proliferation, human trafficking, and terrorism. The works of these Study Groups were notable contributions and hopefully benefited other audiences outside the forum as well.

Professor Job furthermore stated that the General Conference had also presented the views of important regional players. This is a critical role for the conference. From the senior officials (particularly Indonesia, Australia and United States), participants had gained substantial and valuable knowledge of their countries’ perspectives on Asia Pacific matters.

However, Professor Job regretted that the conference did not gain an equivalent perspective from senior officials from China and India. Reflecting on Sudarsono’s comment in the opening remarks that the critical challenge of the region was the peaceful resolution of the role of China, Japan, India and the U.S., then it was imperative for CSCAP to mobilise its efforts in the
subsequent general conference(s) to ensure that senior officials’ voices of China and India were heard in discussions.

Lastly, on the role of CSCAP as a regional track two organisation, Professor Job looked to CSCAP’s role within the shifting regional architecture. CSCAP regards itself as the track two vehicle for the ARF. Thus, it is necessary for CSCAP to think about where and how it positions itself with regard to the ARF and other regional institutions in the evolving context of new economic and security architecture(s) of the region. It is also pivotal to think about how CSCAP could articulate a voice as an epistemic community that looks to engage and exert a positive influence in regional agenda setting. In this regard, CSCAP Study Groups have done extensive and impressive work, but the question is how CSCAP can present this work in ways to official and unofficial audiences that provide impact.

To go forward with this goal, it is necessary to ensure continuity of CSCAP Member Committees and the people engaged within them, while also paying attention that Member Committees represent generational changes and changes in national political perspectives on regional affairs. Unless we do so, CSCAP will lose touch with changing social and economic forces, and its deliberations at the General Conference and particularly in CSCAP’s Study Groups will lose their relevance and impact.
Conclusion and Recommendation

The 5th CSCAP General Conference has considerably scored a major success, not only in terms of attracting a large number of audience and media coverage and stipulating open and lively debate, but also in putting forth CSCAP’s views and activities to a wider public. The 5th General Conference was acknowledged to be enhanced than the previous one due to the more substantial feedback and input from the CSCAP Study Groups. A good composition of speakers and panelists should be obtained as well as involving both track two and track one representatives as the conference’s purpose is to link the two elements.

Following the previous conference, the 5th General Conference has successfully created an open and cooperative atmosphere for closer interaction between the officials – who are responsible in policy making and executing – and the public – who are concerned with the regional security issues and environment. The conference has crated good practice of exchanges of ideas among the track one and track two, which at the end might contribute to the improvement of the security of the Asia Pacific region.

As agreed at the previous conference, the General Conference would continue to be held regularly on a bi-annual basis. Having three or more Member Committees as the co-organisers would be maintained to improve and strengthen a sense of cooperation and solidarity among CSCAP Member Committees.
Acknowledgement

As the host of the 5th CSCAP General Conference, CSCAP Indonesia wishes to express its deepest gratitude and appreciation to the co-organisers, namely AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Canada, and CSCAP Japan, and also to the CSCAP Secretariat and CSCAP Co-Chairs for the quality of cooperation and support rendered in organising the conference.

Furthermore, the appreciation also goes to all other CSCAP Member Committees for the commitment, continuous support, and assistances extended to the conference. Some of the Member Committees were very much instrumental in promoting the conference, thus attracting a large number of participants from their respective countries. The presence of some key and distinguished speakers was also made possible because of great efforts showed by some CSCAP Member Countries. The host is grateful for this assistance.

The host and co-organisers would also like to thank the keynote speakers, panelists, commentators, and chairs for their excellent quality of presentation and role. Presentations and views presented at the conference have been stimulating and successfully encouraged lively and open discussion.

In the same manner, participants also deserve a credit for the success of the conference, for their active involvement on the discussion from the beginning until the very end of the programme.

Finally, the host and co-organisers appreciate the invaluable support and assistance given and the commitment made without hesitation by the large number of individuals and parties involved in the organising of the 5th CSCAP General Conference. *****