Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

6th General Conference

Great Power Relations and Regional Community Building in Pacific Asia

Jakarta, 7-8 December 2007

REPORT

For Public

CSCAP Indonesia
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 6th General Conference was successfully convened in Jakarta, Indonesia, from 7 to 8 December 2008. CSCAP Indonesia again served as the host committee. Four other member committees, namely AusCSCAP, CSCAP Japan, CSCAP Singapore, and CSCAP China agreed to co-organizing the conference, most notably in finding and securing funds and inviting speakers and dignitaries from their countries.

With the objective to create a forum for an open second track dialogue, the co-organizers worked and consulted closely to formulate a set of topics and speakers. Despite its tight and lengthy schedule, all sessions succeeded in creating lively, open and frank discussions and debates on the most significant contemporary security issues faced by the region.

With “Great Power Relations and Regional Community Building in East Asia” as the theme, the conference lasted two days, with the first day devoted to broadening understanding of the strategic and macroeconomic relationship between China, Japan, and the United States, gauging their respective views regarding of one another’s roles and intentions in the region, and then exploring how to build a sustainable regional order.

Against the backdrop of this broader power architecture, day two of the conference was to address specific issues and threats regarding peace and security in the region, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, peacekeeping and peace-
building, maritime security in the Malacca Straits, terrorism, and the security implications of climate change.

Distinguished scholars and government officials from around the region were present and delivered their views. Among the officials were H.E. N. Hassan Wirajuda (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Indonesia), H.E. Juwono Sudarsono (Minister for Defense, Indonesia), H.E. James Clad (Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Southeast Asia, U.S. Department of Defense), H.E. Ong Keng Yong (Secretary General, Association of Southeast Asian Nations), H.E. Lee Su-hoon (Chairman, Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Republic of Korea), and Mr. Masatoshi Shimbo (Deputy Director General for Foreign Policy Bureau, and for Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Following the success of the previous two General Conferences, the 6th General Conference promoted the enthusiasm among all CSCAP Member Committees to continue this great effort, which in the longer run is hoped to contribute greatly to the regional security in the Asia Pacific.
Part II
GENERAL OBSERVATION AND ASSESSMENT

Participants and Role Players

Around 120 foreign participants from 18 countries in the region and over 180 Indonesian participants attended the conference. In addition to representatives from CSCAP Member Committees, the conference participants also include scholars, journalists, activists, and government officials. A large number of the participants were from the younger generation, including university students and young scholars, and most notably the participants of the Pacific Forum Young Leaders program. This is very encouraging, as the involvement of the younger generation in CSCAP is relevant to the extension of the network. All participants attended the conference in their private capacity.

Distinguished individuals were invited to participate and play various roles in the conference, namely as keynote speakers, presenters, and chairs. The presentations given by all speakers were sharp and candid. The way they shared their minds on their assigned topics showed the high quality of their presentations.

Each session commenced with a Keynote Speech, which gave an overview to the audience about the topic of the session. The sessions were then followed by several issue-specific presentations, to create comprehensive discussions. The role of the chairs was pivotal in the success of each session, as they stimulated lively and scholarly debates and discussions, as well as making sure the sessions went as scheduled.
Selection of Topics and Flow of Discussion

At the preparatory stage, drafting the program of the conference included formulating a set of topics that would not only attract the attention of the audience, but would also cover all contemporary security challenges in the region. Although full mandate and liberty has been given to the co-organizers to decide the topics, wide consultation was made with as many members of CSCAP as possible. In addition to this, experience from the previous CSCAP General Conference also contributed to the consideration.

In order to create effective presentation and encourage more discussion among participants, each Keynote Speech was given 20 minutes, while presenters were given 10 minutes each to present their views on their respective topics. Chairs of each session were given the liberty to remind the speakers about their time limits, and they were giving the task to be interventionist – clarifying points, relating the views of one speaker to those of another, bringing the speakers into conversation with one another, identifying other conference participants with expertise on the matters under discussion, keeping the focus on key issues and if necessary asking questions to the panelists.

To ensure open, frank, and friendly atmosphere for discussion, the conference was held under the Chatham House Rule. All participants were repeatedly reminded to observe to this rule.

At the sidelines of the conference, CSCAP proudly launched the first annual CSCAP Regional Security Outlook. A press conference was held in the event of the launch of the report titled “Security Through Cooperation: Furthering Asia Pacific Multilateral Engagement”.

Minister Wirajuda highlighted the evolution of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from its Cold War origins to its recent expansion to include all Southeast Asian states, to its current status as a potential catalyst for political and economic integration in the broader Asia Pacific region. He noted that as the central front of the Cold War, Europe had found it necessary to develop the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe, while East Asia, positioned on the periphery of the Cold War, found no need to establish a similar institution. The onset of the Vietnam War in Southeast Asia and the Cultural Revolution in China, however, thrust the region onto the center stage of world affairs.

ASEAN’s formation in 1967 provided the basis for regional cooperation, though lack of trust and ongoing conflict in the region, along with sensitivities regarding military alliances, initially precluded cooperation on security matters. Despite this slow-going beginning, habituating processes of cooperation and dialogue in the region paved the way for the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which lifted the taboo on addressing security issues within ASEAN.

Minister Wirajuda emphasized that more recently, regional responses to intrastate conflicts have continued to demonstrate what he termed the “ASEAN spirit,” and have greatly enhanced ASEAN’s confidence in addressing security issues. In particular, he noted the involvement of regional parties in providing for peaceful resolutions of
conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines. Moreover, the 1994 establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has provided a means for foreign ministers to discuss security issues and eventually establish a dispute settlement mechanism. Already, he added, inter-governmental cooperation on fighting non-traditional security threats has proven productive, and confidence building and the establishment of norms have eased tensions in the region.

In addition to addressing intra-ASEAN issues, Minister Wirajuda commented that through the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism and the East Asia Summit, ASEAN is also helping shape a new architecture in the broader Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia, he said, advocates a broader notion of East Asia—one that includes New Zealand, India, and Australia—based not on geography, race, or culture, but rather on commonality of purpose and values. Such an organization should use economic integration as the basis for future cooperation, and upon its establishment and consolidation, could include major East Asian powers as observers.

Having already helped provide security and prosperity both within and outside its geographical area, Minister Wirajuda argued that ASEAN must now complete its transition to an “ASEAN Community” built upon security, economic, and socio-cultural pillars. In concluding his remarks, Minister Wirajuda cited greater socio-cultural cohesion within ASEAN as well as the newly signed ASEAN Charter as positive signals of movement in this direction.

In the Q and A session, Minister Wirajuda responded to two questions on the issue of Asia Pacific community building. As to whether such a community would be “pan-Asian” or “pan-Pacific”, he noted that East Asian community-building should be a “bottom-up” process, like ASEAN, rather than a “top-down” process, like the European Union. As such, its ultimate composition cannot yet be known.
Regarding the involvement of external powers in this process, Minister Wirajuda pointed to Russia’s interest in joining the East Asia Summit, and U.S. intention to wait until the process is further developed before joining. To admit one without the other might disturb the organization’s external balance and mar the process. However, bringing Australia and New Zealand into the process would demonstrate a positive commitment to inclusiveness, he said.

Special Address: Emerging Regional Order in Pacific

This session was dedicated to as an overview of the theme of the conference, during which the speaker identified the key nations, bilateral relations, multilateral institutions and organizations, as well as social and political trends within nations shaping the East Asian order. The speech began by a reminder that while ASEAN has been a central forum for and catalyst of discussions about broader regional order, the organization has serious shortcomings. Despite ASEAN and a multiplicity of international and regional structures, bilateral relations remain very important in reducing tensions in the region and building operations there.

Sino-Russian relations have improved significantly of late, with past tensions having begun to recede. Sino-U.S. relations remain complex, as a massive trading partnership underpins a relationship strained by disagreements over monetary policy, product safety concerns, and a host of other issues of concern to both parties. India’s growth and its projection outward and increasing relevance to international affairs will, likewise, impact the East Asian order as it seeks to accommodate a second major rising power. Finally, Russia’s recent assertiveness under Vladimir Putin’s leadership has the potential to trouble its relations with the U.S. for the foreseeable future.
Turning to the role of institutions in structuring the regional order, it was discussed that inter-governmental and other multilateral organizations are making progress at promoting cooperation in many fields—particularly economic. Interestingly, these multilateralism institutions have typically been instituted to address one discrete field. In addition to the intergovernmental organizations, informal, non-governmental networks such as CSCAP constitute another type of regional organization that can generate and propose new solutions and issues.

While relationships—bilateral or multilateral—among key countries in the region remain a key determinant in East Asia, forces within those countries will also help determine whether the future of the region is one of peace and stability, or conflict and confrontation. In particular, each country’s interactions with the outside world will be informed by pressures for internationalism, nationalism, and communalism. The search for a more meaningful identity—whether religious, ethnic, or local in character—can lead to separatism, adding that peace and stability in the region and the future of regionalism will depend on how this issue is handled. Both types of multilateralism—formal and informal—are essential to peace in the region for two reasons: (1) a variety of factors have made it clear that wars cannot be won today; (2) addressing the key internal issues that states face requires a calm international scene.

Session One: Great Power Relations in the Pacific Asian Region

Presenters in the conference’s first panel session took on one of the most pressing questions in international relations at the outset of the 21st Century: what is the future of Chinese-Japanese-American relations? Moreover, how will trends in the relations affect the prospects for peace and stability in the region? A common subsequent question then emerged: how well China can cope with the environmental and social consequences of its rapid economic growth? Many people doubt China’s own under understanding of its
role in the world, and whether it ultimately aims for regional hegemony. All panelists pointed to the current dynamism of this relationship, and highlighted China’s continued rise and growing role as a major player in the world economy as key variables in answering this question.

It was discussed that although the U.S. is the world’s sole superpower, rising powers and other developing nations are playing larger roles internationally, causing a shift in the strategic weight of the world toward Asia. Second, the role of ideology in international relations has diminished in the world, as the international community has realized that there is no one universally accepted national system, and countries should thus be permitted to pursue their own paths. Third, while traditional security issues remain important, a host of new issues—including poverty reduction, climate change, and energy security—are changing the nature of international relations, because no one nation can address these issues on its own.

With regards to China’s strategic interests into the broader context of Northeast Asian relations, democratization, cooperation, and economic integration are the key forces shaping the Asia Pacific region and framing Chinese-Japanese-U.S. relations. These trends have the capacity to provide for “strong decade” in regional relations if domestic political and nationalist pressure on key regional actors remains in check. In China, the focus remains on generating and managing economic growth, while the goals and nature of its military modernization process are not clear. These two features suggest that China is not yet in a position to assume an international leadership role. At the same time, Japan’s uncertain political climate and fears about Chinese competition interject some uncertainty into relations between the two countries even as their economies become more closely intertwined.

While regional players seek to accommodate changing regional dynamics, the U.S. political elite remains focused on the issue of terrorism. It was predicted that as this
focus fades, China would become the top priority for American strategists. Nevertheless, he added that renewed focus on the region would be based not primarily on ensuring military balance, as it has in the past, but on accommodating the rise of regional economies, an evolving “East Asian identity,” and increasing regional integration.

The efforts to resolve disputes over the hot-button issues of the Taiwan Straits and the North Korean nuclear weapons program were currently on positive trajectories, but that the long-term key to reducing regional tensions would be improving Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations. Looking forward, he cited as the keys to ensuring regional peace and stability in the future: economic nationalism; resisting an “alliance of values” between the U.S., India, and Australia; recognizing Japan’s global citizenship with a permanent UN Security Council seat; and finding a workable modus operandi between China and Japan.

On Japan-China relations, it was noted in the session that the world has never before seen both a strong Japan and a strong China at the same time, and that the modus operandi Ambassador Abramowitz had cited as key to regional peace had not yet been found, despite relations that have been warming of late. As a result, the U.S. presence in the region is still required to act as a buffer between the two nations. A panelist qualified his optimism about Sino-Japanese relations by noting lingering uncertainties about China’s future. Not least among them was whether China’s political system would eventually become more open and transparent.

Another panelist, however, contended that relationship is in fact bilateral, with the U.S.-Japan alliance, on one side, and China on the other. This dynamic has both positive and negative effects, he said. The Japan-U.S. relationship has discouraged Japanese development of nuclear weapons; however, it also provides a necessarily divisive regional framework that engenders suspicion and rivalry. A gradual transition—not a
revolution—to multilateral security architecture would prove preferable to the series of bilateral relationships that currently exists.

In the Q and A period, the panelists addressed issues ranging from the potential consequences of a values-based alliance system, to the impact of India’s rise on East Asian relations, to the possible effects of U.S. normalization of relations with North Korea. The three presenters agreed that a values-based alliance would be unnecessarily provocative towards China, but exhibited some differences in how they believe democracy and human rights should factor into the regional security framework. Moreover, it was explained that while a values-based alliance may not be a prudent policy, democracy in China is important to fostering better relations between China and Japan.

There was also widespread agreement that the main impact of India’s rise on the region would be economic rather than military in nature, but that increasing Indian influence and the effects of its “look east” policy are already evident in closer involvement in Southeast Asia.

Luncheon Speech

The main topic of the luncheon speech on the first day of the conference was Australia’s abiding strategic interests: strong regional relations, engagement with the U.S. focused on the Asia-Pacific region, and continued engagement with multilateral organizations. Australia has made strong regional relations a pillar of its foreign policy. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), she said, has proven itself essential to the region and to Australia, which sends half of its exports to five APEC markets. Likewise, the ARF has established itself as the most important regional security mechanism, and is now ready to increase the tempo of its operations. The Australia-Indonesia conference
also serves as a forum for developing practices for multinational responses to natural disasters, and this cooperation may in turn lead to greater cooperation on other transnational security issues such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. Finally, the East Asia Summit may indeed make a valuable contribution to regional security as well.

It was further discussed that stability in the Asia Pacific region also requires a view beyond the region. Ongoing U.S. engagement is essential to peace in the region, along with movement toward a rules-based regional order in Northeast Asia, and active engagement at the UN are also essential aspects of ensuring this stability. Australia seeks to take these relations to their logical next stage by expanding the ARF’s preventative diplomacy mission, and by urging regional organizations to take a role in global issues—in particular, in addressing climate change.

Session Two: Regional Reaction to Pacific Asia Great power Relations

Picking up from the first session’s discussions regarding Japan, China and the U.S.’s continued efforts to redefine their relationships for the 21st Century, the second session addressed how these developments are being received elsewhere in the region. All of the speakers underscored the importance for the region of China’s economic and military rise, Japan’s efforts to find an international role consummate with its economic power, and the U.S.’s continued engagement in the region.

During the session, it was highlighted that Asia has indeed been shaped by great power relations, and the 30-year period since U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China has been a period of extraordinary peace and security in the region. Currently, however, with the rise of China and India, we are witnessing the biggest power shift in the region since the U.S.’s emergence as a world power.
It was discussed that these changes take place against a broader backdrop of changes in the region that include ASEAN’s recovery from the late 1990s financial crisis, Russia’s role as a principal energy supplier and its efforts to regain major power status, and India’s massive economic growth, which soon stands to reach nine percent. At the same time, terrorism has become a key issue in the region, particularly for the U.S., which, he added, though still the preeminent “hard and soft power” in the region, has lost influence in the Asia Pacific region because of its current focus on its commitments elsewhere in the world. Finally, Northeast and Southeast Asia are building social linkages.

Accommodating and managing this change is the most pressing challenge for other countries in the region, particularly for middle powers like Australia. China, the U.S., and Japan will each have to undertake changes to create a new regional regime reflecting the new distribution of power in the region. This is a delicate process, warning that major power countries do not willingly choose conflicts, but rather find themselves unintentionally drawn into conflicts. One of CSCAP’s challenges will be to help spell out just what kind of new regional order would most effectively militate against conflict.

The session discussed some practical steps that middle powers can take to facilitate that transition. Regional actors should begin this process by encouraging the U.S. and China to negotiate and collaborate with one another. This is an important step toward maintaining transparency and balance at this volatile time. Japan’s candidacy to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council also deserves support. Maintaining a reliable balance of power in the region and containing competition in the future will determine whether the next 30 years in the region can be as peaceful as the last 30.

Specifically for India, it believes the growing interdependence between China and Japan to be extremely important. Closer regional cooperation can make this relationship more durable, and can be facilitated by increasing economic cooperation. However, India’s
engagement in the region is not limited to its increasingly comprehensive relationship with the U.S., or its relationships with China and other Northeast Asian states. India’s embrace of a broader understanding of security issues, and its inclusive approach to regionalism have also led to a convergence of interests with Southeast nations. This has led to maritime security cooperation and on progress toward an India-ASEAN free trade agreement. India is committed to participation in regional summits and other arrangements and to furthering regional integration, which has allowed India to become increasingly engaged on both economic and security issues in the region.

India is expected to continue to engage regional actors in both bilateral and multilateral settings. India’s bilateral relationship has been integral to its efforts to combat terrorism among other issues. It was emphasized that India’s current focus is on consolidating the benefits of its economic growth and political development, rather than taking the lead on the international stage. Despite its inward focus, however, India has clearly become important to the region. Its rapid growth has made it an important economic player. At the same time, the dynamism of the East Asia region is creating new opportunities and roles that India can fill. Finally, if East Asia is to be redefined with ASEAN at its center, India must necessarily be included for the sake of equilibrium.

The proposed U.S.-India deal to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology also has important implications for U.S.-China-Japan relations is seen as a reflection of the U.S.’s changed understanding of India’s role in the world. Japan and China’s current opposition to the deal on the ground that it would undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is unfounded and runs the risk of being understood as opposition to India as such. In this regard, it was explained that for India, energy security and democracy as two additional issues effecting regional great power relations. Neither India nor China subscribes to the U.S. position that global energy resources should be allocated through a market-based system, each opting instead for equity investment in energy sources throughout the world. This could lead to competition and
more troubled relations between the two nations in the future as they both seek to meet skyrocketing energy demand.

On the other hand, for South Korea, it is primarily concerned with achieving a peaceful resolution of the standoff over the DPRK’s nuclear program. Beyond this, South Korea is trying to translate the six-party talks into a framework for broader regional security cooperation. The South Korean government believes that enhancing economic cooperation with the DPRK will pave the way for broader East Asian security cooperation. South Korea also aims to enhance the region’s security through its alliances as well as through multilateral security cooperation, he said.

Another important middle power in the region is of course the Southeast Asian states. The diversity and differences among Southeast Asian countries precludes the possibility that there will be one regional reaction to great power relations. That qualification aside, it was noted that in general Southeast Asian nations have friendly relations with all the major regional players, and refrain from taking hostile stands against anyone. Accordingly, Southeast Asian countries have sought peaceful and stable relationships with both the U.S. and China. In addition, Southeast Asia recognizes Japan’s desire to be a “normal country” and to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Southeast Asia also would also like to be engaged in the regional security building, though this general sentiment has yet to be developed into actual policies within ASEAN.

Questions from the audience ranged from the regional reaction to the situation in Myanmar, to opinions about the direction of Japan’s foreign policy, to understandings about China’s relationship with the U.S., to the role of the Non-Aligned Movement in contemporary Indian foreign policy. It was discussed that since 2001 ASEAN has forcefully called for reconciliation and an end to repression in Myanmar, but has not taken additional actions beyond broad condemnations. Alluding to the complexity of the
issue, he added that it is not clear that expelling or suspending Myanmar from ASEAN would improve the situation there. Moreover, sanctions are problematic because India and China’s interests in Myanmar are not merely economic, but rather strategic. It was further pointed out that no country is currently willing to back up sanctions or tough diplomacy with the threat of force. As a result, they are without effect. The real challenge, he said, would be to find a way to make China and India see it as in their interests to see the regime in Myanmar evolve.

On the question of how middle powers can influence great powers, it was explained that some countries have a better track record on this issue. The key service the middle powers can provide is to inform great powers of the consequences of what their actions mean for the region.

Session Three: Regional Institution Building in Pacific Asia

This session is preoccupied with the issue of the regional institution building in Pacific Asia. The panelists addressed the current state of regional institution building in Pacific Asia, and offered ideas about what the prospects and shape of any future such institutions might be.

Begun by an historical overview of U.S. approach to Asia Pacific matters as well as how the U.S. plans to approach the region’s security situation in the future, some of the discussions evolved around the idea that the U.S. has asserted itself in the Pacific since its independence, not just since the second World War, adding that the predictability that the alliance system provides the international system has been an essential pillar of peace in the world. Today, the U.S. conceives of itself as an Asia-Pacific power—not just a Pacific power. Nevertheless, the U.S. must choose which regional meetings and fora matter, and which do not, as its multiple engagements elsewhere require the U.S. to have
clear priorities. APEC and ARF as two such bodies that matter a great deal. APEC provides real benefits in the form of lowered barriers to trade and investment in the region. Likewise, ARF has a real and important mission, despite how slow and taxing its deliberations can be. However, in addition to the regional institution building, the U.S. also values its bilateral relationships in the region; partnerships with Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Singapore provide key elements to the region’s security.

It was noted that despite the proliferation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs) in the region, Pacific Asia would not have an EU-style regional body anytime soon. While arguing for the extension of the current patchwork of FTAs to include 16 key countries, he also cautioned that planning for regional institutions requires sober analysis, and must take into account the complex forces—separatist, nationalist, and economic—that are critical to a realistic understanding of the prospects for regional institutions in Pacific Asia. Identifying specific functions and processes—rather than specific groupings of nations—and building mechanisms to address them, should be the basic organizing principle of regional institution building.

There are issues that pose challenges—and in some cases, also opportunities—for institution building in the region, beginning with the DPRK nuclear issue. The six-party talks had been a success, he said, because they reflected a comprehensive approach to regional security, taking into account the economic and political issues, rather than seeking to address the basic security situation in isolation. The emphasis on dialogue, negotiation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the commitment to engagement that emerged from the six-party talks may provide solid normative foundation for efforts to institutionalize regional relations. At the same time, ASEAN’s consolidation through its Charter, and the ARF’s progress in economic integration and, increasingly, in addressing security issues, also serve as an example of regional institution-building and a means of socializing norms of effective regional relations, respectively.
By taking stock of the institutions—both formal and informal—that currently underpin the region’s security, which include the Westphalian state system, the U.S.-centric system of alliances, the international financial system, the development of ASEAN, and other less formal, but still important, relationships, it was argued in the session that the architecture has served the region relatively well, but is currently under stress, and its past performance does not guarantee its future success. The rise of China and India present potentially destabilizing structural changes to the region’s power dynamics. At the same time, financial interdependence has exposed the risk of a regional crisis, and globalization and the rise of new transnational threats and linkages have eroded Westphalianism and created new fissures—often within states themselves. At the domestic level, the trend toward democratization in the region and increasing expectations of good governance have introduced a new, and in some instances less predictable, variable into foreign policy planning.

The rise of China and the possible ascent of Chinese nationalism are also major issues. The region need not hedge against China per se, but rather that one-party rule has made China’s future plans and intentions unclear. As a result, the region needs a trilateral mechanism between the U.S., Japan, and China, to increase transparency in their relations and in their respective goals for the region. In addition, China’s rapid economic growth, along with that of Southeast Asia, has brought with it new regional problems such as widening income disparities and adverse environmental effects that any regional framework would have to address.

Moreover, non-traditional security issues should be discussed separately from traditional security issues. Cooperation on counterterrorism and counter-proliferation is based on clear, shared interests, and should not be inhibited by disputes over other more contentious issues.
At the same time, however, questions remain about ASEAN’s ability to live up to its high goals, and failure to bring enhanced security cooperation would have a devastating effect on efforts to expand institutionalize a broader regional security framework. Moreover, despite recently warmed relations, failure to achieve broad-based improvement in Sino-Japanese relations would doom efforts at regional integration. In fact, a joint effort is necessary to mitigate China and Japan’s ongoing rivalry, and both parties should elevate the six-party mechanism in order to take advantage of the currently positive environment in order to start the hard work of building a rule-based, institutionalized system in East Asia.

It was also highlighted that the region needs a fundamental reconsideration of the security doctrines in the region, along with the realization that security and prosperity is not a “zero-sum game.” Peace requires shared security and common prosperity. The unpredictability of developments in certain countries should not be used as excuses for “hedging” against them. Such a transformation in regional relations is possible, he said, but requires significant political will.

In this regards, states in the region should build up existing institutions in order to provide the normative basis for achieving these goals. No less important than enhancing the capability of such institutions, however, would be shaping their values and norms. Only inclusive, multilateral security processes that steer clear of being characterized as being directed against anyone in particular can facilitate the cooperation necessary for peace in the region. This in turn demands a departure from adversarial, militarized foreign policies, as well as from policies that use ideological grounds to determine terms of engagement and cooperation. Only with the participation of all the relevant actors in the region can security be achieved, with cooperation on non-security issues serving as the basis for future cooperation in security matters.
It also requires a way to “knit together” Northeast and Southeast Asia, greater non-governmental and civil society cooperation, the promotion of the World Trade Organization system to mediate financial disputes, and structures that reflect the distribution of power in the international system, rather than ideological and historical factors. However, the key to a sustainable system would be fostering a constructive U.S.-China relationship through greater military to military contact and cooperation. Finally, he said that as the majority of violence in the region now occurs at the national level, ensuring peace and stability in the region requires attending to governance and security issues at the national level.

In the lively discussion that followed the panelists’ presentations, the speakers elaborated their views on the six-party talks on the Korean peninsula. It was expressed that the near future would be a difficult time in the talks as Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. election seasons all make political compromise there difficult. Despite any short-term setbacks, the talks are significant insofar as they show the capability of regional players— and most importantly China and the U.S.— to discuss regional security in a constructive manner.

Regarding the six-party talks’ potential as a mechanism for regional problem-solving, it was noted that the existence of the ARF makes the establishment of a separate Northeast Asian security forum a less pressing task. Some of the panelists voiced their criticism of the notion of a values-based organization for addressing the region’s problems, adding that such an alliance would be unnecessarily provocative and would not facilitate the cooperation needed to ensure peace and security in the region.

Panelists also addressed ASEAN’s contributions to regional peace and security. On the question on the U.S. opinion of aspirations for an ASEAN community, it was explained that the results of expanding ASEAN’s membership were mixed, as the difficulty of accomplishing its lofty goals with such a diverse membership had caused the
organization “to lose face a bit.” Regarding the situation in Myanmar, the “ASEAN way” is meant to be effective, but the organization’s activity on the issue appears more as “hand-wrinking” than quiet, effective diplomacy. However, it was agreed that a growing sense of community in the region, even if that sentiment had not yet been operationalized within ASEAN.

**Dinner Speech**

The central theme of the dinner speech was Japan’s approach to regional and global security issues. Japan’s alliances and active engagement in the region was conducive to strong and mutually beneficial relationships in the Asia Pacific region. A four-pronged strategy to accomplish the political and economic stability that he said should be the common objectives for the region was proposed.

First, cooperative and active engagement should characterize regional relations. Second, all countries should actively seek constructive roles for China to play. Third, regional cooperation should be based on the rule of law, and should be conducted with transparency, openness, and a view toward the shared interests of all the region’s actors. Finally, the transparency of the East Asian Summit and ARF processes should be increased.

With regard to how Japan, specifically, would fit into this framework, Japan’s alliance with the U.S. remains important, and this relationship is only strengthened by working with the U.S. to address major global challenges, including containing nuclear developments in North Korea and Iran, and supporting the fight against terrorism, while at the same time working to deepen its diplomatic relationships with neighboring countries.
The complexity of Japan’s relationship with China was also discussed. China’s economic development, has been a blessing for Japan, as has its efforts as chair of the six party talks to create consensus among parties in order to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula. Japan seeks to build this mutually beneficial role and to support China’s constructive engagement in the region, he said, citing the example of cooperation among the Chinese and Japanese leadership on economic cooperation and environmental protection.

At the same time, Japan has paid close attention to China’s rapid modernization of its military and believes that for China to be a constructive partner in the future, it must be transparent and responsible about its military capacity. Toward this end, the ASEAN Plus Three mechanism can serve as a forum for confidence building measures and preventative diplomacy. Because of the positive contribution ASEAN and the ARF can make to advancing an East Asian community, Japan welcomes the ASEAN Charter and provides strong support for ASEAN’s further integration and development.

Session Four: Combating Terrorism – Achievements and Obstacles

This session sought to discuss two main issues: a global overview of the successes and challenges in combating terrorism; and the contextualization of the regional assessments of terrorism.

Successes in combating terrorism since 2001 was said to include: the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq; the destruction of the al Qaida safe-haven and leadership in Afghanistan; the allocation of funding worldwide to combating and preventing terrorism, and the resulting hardening of critical infrastructure as well as border and aviation security; the disruption of terrorism financing and support operations; the increase in public awareness and vigilance
concerning terrorism; the enhancement of intergovernmental counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing, as well as streamlined processes within governments for sharing and acting on intelligence information; and the reduction in state sponsorship of terrorist activity. Perhaps most importantly, there has been no attack on the scale of the 2001 attacks in the U.S.

The different varieties of terrorism in various countries and contexts preclude the possibility of a single “silver bullet” response to terrorism. The diversity of terrorist movements, tactics, and strategies have likewise necessitated a multifaceted government response. Various national governments’ counterterrorism policies have improved, and the most successful responses have combined coercive measures to combat committed terrorists with conciliatory measures to deter would-be terrorist recruits and supporters.

These successes, however, have come in spite of major failures and mistakes—particularly on the part of the United States. The “Global War on Terror”, has been poorly conceived and poorly executed. In framing its response to the 9/11 attacks as a war, the U.S. succumbed to the emotional fervor of the time, in the process inadvertently elevating its adversary and committing itself to a primarily military strategy to combat terrorism. This lack of clarity and sobriety led to the wrong-headed conflation of the threats posed by Osama Bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. It also led to two important missed opportunities: first, to mobilize the international community to cooperate in combating terrorism, and second, to educate the American public as to the risks and implications of its status as the world’s sole superpower.

Such mistakes and missed opportunities have created a series of new obstacles, the war in Iraq most notable among them. As long as the U.S. military remains on the ground in the Middle East, it will be considered an imperial power and as a result have little capability to be a moderating influence in the region. More broadly, the loss of American
standing in the world makes it difficult for other countries to support U.S.-led policies and initiatives.

There are also other factors increasing the danger posed by terrorism. Smaller and smaller groups are finding it easier to procure lethal weaponry to carry out their radical agendas with violence. Migration from conflict zones in South Asia, North Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere to Europe and other developed countries can provide terrorist groups access to those countries, while also potentially causing a sense of separation and alienation within migrant groups that can aid terrorist recruitment.

In the years since the 9/11 attacks and the world’s response, terrorists have also learned and adjusted their tactics. Such developments have been aided by terrorists’ ability to capitalize on the internet to facilitate their activity. Finally, a lack of knowledge on the part of governments as to how the terrorist recruitment and radicalization process actually works also inhibits a comprehensive and effective government response.

Overcoming these obstacles will require recognition that a military response is not the solution to the problem of terrorism. Instead, lessons from successful instances of combating terrorist movements should be tailored and employed to address the dynamics of current terrorist movements. Combating terrorism successfully requires a multifaceted response that forgoes to the temptation for politically appealing but ultimately ineffective short-term measures.

On the updates on regional counterterrorism developments, it was noted that there have been no major bombings in Indonesia since October 2005. A successful operation against Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has denied the terrorist group a key base in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and extensive infiltration of jihadi networks have provided the government with critical information about militant plans and operations.
Moreover, recent times have seen major splits and fissures within the most feared jihadi groups, and the successful denial of international funding to such groups have forced them to generate their own sources of funding. Important arrests and the successful prosecutions of terrorists in the Philippines also constitute a major victory. Better border controls, more awareness about the problem of prisons as centers of radicalization and recruitment as positive developments in regional efforts to combat terrorism.

Some potential sources of strength upon which terrorists might capitalize in the future were also presented during the session. Radical publishing houses continue to operate in Solo, and recruitment and indoctrination continues, particularly among pre-teens and adolescents in radical schools. Likewise, the splintering and weakening of well-known terrorist groups like JI has created space in which new radical groups can form and thrive.

In the context of these dynamics, increased focus on local operations should be expected. Moreover, the issue of apostasy at home can generate far more fury among potential terrorist recruits and sympathizers in the region than civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan can, she said, adding that local “jihads” in Ambon and Poso have been hugely important for recruitment and combat training. Such local conflicts also provide an ideological common ground for radical groups that may otherwise have many disagreements.

The practical and political difficulties that arise from portraying the fight against terrorism as an international effort were then highlighted. When it is carried out as a national agenda—rather than an international effort—it is easier for governments to garner the popular support they need for effective implementation of their plans. Doing so helps governments avoid adopting misleading concepts that undermine their counterterrorist agendas, adding that counterterrorism correctly understood is primarily concerned with law enforcement, rather than war. Finally, while noting that
international assistance in implementing counterterrorism policies is important, he said that it is also necessary to ensure that such efforts do not compromise domestic support for counterterrorism measures—particularly the essential support and cooperation required from within the Muslim community.

Gaining that support and cooperation already poses a significant challenge regardless, of any taint of external interference it might have. The perception that the efforts to combat terrorism are actually broader sanctions against the Muslim world reinforces an already-existing perception of bias against the Muslim world, and thus inhibits such cooperation. At the same time, an ongoing sense of moral decadence and injustice in society—and the Islamic injunction to redress such injustice—feeds sympathy for terrorism.

In the question and answer session that followed, the panel addressed questions about Indonesia’s successes in dealing with terrorism, the ongoing insurgency in Southern Thailand, the connection between Islam and terrorism, the role of good governance and preventing terrorism, and links between terrorism in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world.

As to what lessons might be drawn from Indonesia’s counterterrorism successes, it was explained that the political factors since Indonesia’s transition to democracy in the late 1990s have helped the government gain legitimacy in combating terrorism. In addition, the Indonesian police have proven as a competent and effective force in combating terrorism. And finally, not all the members of radical organizations are ultimately committed to using violence to achieve their aims after all.

The issue of Southeast Asians studying in Pakistan and the potential for this to be a source of militant recruiting and radicalization was also discussed, and it was explained that more important than education was the return of individuals who had received terrorist training in Pakistan, and that this had largely taken place in the 1990s.
Indonesia has worked with moderate Islamic groups such as the Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah—groups that in the late 1990s rejected appeals to replace authoritarian government in Indonesia with a theocratic state. They have worked to address humanitarian disaster, health, education, and other factors important to denying potential grievances terrorists can use to garner support and legitimacy for their activities.

On the issue of the U.S. focus on terrorism, it was explained that it goes much deeper than the current administration of George W. Bush, noting the shock that the 9/11 gave to the U.S. polity, and that the best that can be hoped for from the U.S. in the years to come would be a de-emphasis on terrorism in U.S. foreign policy and an effort to “normalize” its response to terrorism.

Turning to the question of the link between Islam and terrorism, it was discussed that Muslim terrorists are actually quite few relative to the Muslim population in the world, and added that terrorists have come in from a broad range of ideological and religious backgrounds, including Christian, secular, atheist, and so forth. As for the situation in Southern Thailand, it was assessed that the situation is worsening, and the number of “no-go zones” controlled by insurgents is actually increasing. Nevertheless, it is not clear what the insurgents’ goals actually are. As it currently stands, the situation is not an “international problem,” and has not received attention from the international community because no foreigners have been killed.

Special Address on ASEAN Security Community

The conference next received an address that provided an update on the status of ASEAN member states’ efforts to tackle their most difficult challenge yet: the formation
of an ASEAN security community. It was mainly discussed that the “nuts and bolts” issues of ASEAN integration show there is a long way to go, and despite the fact that the security community is one of the three pillars of the ASEAN community to be established by 2015, security cooperation will always pose a unique challenge.

An ASEAN charter has been signed that includes provisions for the establishment of a human rights body. Non-traditional security issues have provided a key area for security cooperation in the region. ASEAN has made a mutual legal assistance agreement that now needs to be turned into a treaty that can serve as the basis for an ASEAN legal system, and they have successfully worked together to combat terrorism in the region. In addition, the Philippines and Malaysia have held a defense ministers meeting this year—something that would have been unthinkable even four years ago—that has adopted a plan of action and may promote mechanisms for addressing the critical issue of maritime security. ASEAN states are also in the process of developing and operationalizing the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance center to respond to disasters in the region.

There are signs of progress in ASEAN’s efforts to address traditional security issues as well. The recently-signed charter includes a dispute settlement mechanism as well as provisions for the use of ASEAN’s good offices for reconciliation and mediation. At the same time, the growth of the ARF and the commitment major regional powers—the U.S., Russia, and China—have shown to its development show the relevance of ASEAN to developing a sustainable regional order. The ASEAN Secretariat is said to see the potential to expand and heighten the profile of the ARF in the future.

These signs of progress have already formed the basis for a future ASEAN security community, despite the myriad multilateral and bilateral issues that remain to be addressed in the region. Moreover, the work that remains to be done in forming an ASEAN security community should not be obscured by the fact that there is broad
agreement that multilateral cooperation is needed to address some of the most important security-related issues in the region.

The question on ASEAN’s capability of dealing with the domestic governance issues of member states—particularly in Myanmar—and on ASEAN’s long-held principal of non-interference in one another’s domestic affairs was discussed, including a brief overview of ASEAN’s efforts to facilitate an end to repression and hostility in Myanmar. ASEAN, has been engaged on the issue since 2003 with the acceptance of the Myanmar ruling junta’s “roadmap for democracy.” The roadmap was discussed the next year, but in 2005, the change of the Prime Ministers in Myanmar and the less cooperative stance taken by the junta led to a deterioration in ASEAN-Myanmar relations. In 2007, ASEAN decided the roadmap “can no longer be defended in public”. This confrontation reached its apex with the September 2007 protests on the streets of Myanmar and their subsequent repression. ASEAN subsequently supported UN Envoy’s mission in Myanmar, and resolved not to return to the quiet diplomacy of the past and instead to move the process forward. This led to a common ASEAN position calling for progress toward democracy.

It was explained that forcing the issue would cause the Myanmar delegation to leave, thus preventing the signing of the charter. The signing of the charter was given priority, and confrontation with Myanmar was shelved, despite a commitment to publicizing the issue of repression in Myanmar and demanding the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Although ASEAN would remain engaged on the issue in the future, this sequence of events had reflected poorly upon the organization. Four major ASEAN dialogue partners—the EU, Canada, the US, and New Zealand—all decided to curtail cooperation with ASEAN because of Myanmar, delaying the adoption of a critical Free Trade Area agreement.
Both optimistic and pessimistic tones with regards to the ongoing six-party talks over the DPRK’s nuclear program emerged in the session. The six-party talks is generally regarded as part of a larger effort against proliferation in the region and the world. It was generally agreed that the dispute fundamentally boils down to two issues: disarming the DPRK; and preventing proliferation beyond the Korean Peninsula.

It was generally believed that the centrality of relations on the Korean Peninsula to stability in the greater Northeast Asian region. Security in the region requires greater economic and social integration, he said, and the outcome of the Korean issue could facilitate or inhibit broader efforts at regional integration. The DPRK’s decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and its decision to pursue highly enriched uranium were said to be the main issues that originally gave birth to the six-party talks. Early efforts at the talks faltered, however, as the DPRK and the U.S.’s commitments to the talks remained suspect. US suspicion of the DPRK’s commitment to disarmament, and the DPRK’s suspicion of the US’s faithfulness to abide by its security guarantees, led to the collapse of the talks, however. Only after the subsequent DPRK nuclear test and rounds of new sanctions did conditions change and the U.S. renew its commitment to diplomacy on the issue.

The result of that renewed commitment manifest itself in a joint statement, and a commitment to pursue concrete measures to reinforce the agreement. These measures, along with resolute diplomacy from Washington and Seoul has in turn resulted in greater confidence among regional actors and continuing progress toward resolving the issue. In the course of the subsequent discussions, the DPRK agreed to abide by past its commitments. In addition, new, concrete proposals for future economic cooperation have emerged. Whether these signs of progress reflect a strategic shift on the part of the
DPRK, however, can only be verified once the DPRK makes a fundamental shift in its economic model toward integration with the world economy.

The implications of the six-party talks for the broader region was indeed one of the major issues discussed throughout the session. It was noted that political maneuvering in the region demonstrates that a “cold war” mentality continues to animate regional relations. The climate of anxiety and mistrust this produces can obstruct improvement in regional relations and can arouse sensitivities about history and nationalism that inhibit regional progress. To this mix, there is a concern that competition for global hegemony has now been added, further exacerbating an already tense situation. In such a climate of uncertainty, the DPRK’s desire for détente with the South could further regional relations by serving as a bridge between China and Japan, thereby easing one troublesome relationship integral to the region’s security.

It was also emphasized by the panelists that the DPRK-U.S. relation remains the key ingredient for progress in the talks. The DPRK nuclear test, and the US sanctions that followed, seriously imperiled the process. Nevertheless, US preoccupation with foreign policy concerns elsewhere in the world, and the DPRK need for better relations with the U.S., have created “diplomatic space” for progress on the issue. The new commitments that have followed represent a faster track for the process.

On a more optimistic tone, elements of success are said to have existed in the course of 2007, even if disabling the Yongbyong nuclear facility is the only thing that is accomplished. Such a step would represent that the situation is not getting worse, even if it does not decisively prove that the situation is getting better.

Another interesting topic discussed was the letter US President George W. Bush reportedly sent to DPRK leader Kim Jung-II. It was said that the letter does not in fact
suggest a new US approach to the issue. Rather, it is an extension of the process of negotiations and dialogue the U.S. embarked upon last year.

On the other hand, the DPRK continues to emphasize that the practical measures toward denuclearization should be carried out in accordance with the principle of “simultaneous action.” In general, a view from the DPRK would claim that negotiations have been able to move forward because of the DPRK’s refusal to bow to US pressure, US acceptance of the DPRK’s fair demand for self-protection and recognition of its sovereignty, and US willingness to engage in bilateral talks with the DPRK in the context of the six-party negotiations. Moreover, the DPRK views that the US agreement to lift financial sanctions further suggested greater will to reach a solution to the impasse, and noted that if the U.S. now abandons its strategy of nuclear threats, further discussions could be productive.

In exchange for DPRK disclosure and disablement, the DPRK demands that the U.S. remove the DPRK’s label as a state sponsoring terrorism and other sanctions against the DPRK pursuant to the US’s Trading With the Enemy Act, and start trade, or discussions will stall again. Also, the DPRK demands the next phase of negotiations should include the provision of a light-water reactor to the DPRK, and that the trust and confidence built between the DPRK and the U.S. through the course of negotiations should culminate in normalization of relations between the two countries.

Another important topic discussed was the abduction of Japanese citizens. On the one hand, the DPRK views that. Japan’s insistence on raising within the six-party talks the issue of the abduction of Japanese citizens by the DPRK is an impediment to the process, as Japan’s actions will complicate the talks. On the other hand, the issue is extremely significant for Japan—particularly in terms of popular sentiment. In order to achieve peace, the DPRK must acknowledge the abduction and return the abductees. DPRK leader Kim had said he acknowledged the issue and would return survivors and
investigate the issue, but had yet to do so. It was further explained that the South Korea understands Japan’s grievances, but believes the interposition of the issue into the six-party talks is unhelpful. However, that pursuing the two issues simultaneously is a possibility. The U.S. must attend to its alliance with Japan, but added that Japan must come up with an acceptable idea of what constitutes progress on the abduction issue, considering the potential difficulties involved in uncovering the actual events that transpired.

More on Japan, it was voiced that Japan has been instrumental in persuading the U.S. to enter into negotiations with the DPRK. In responding to this question, it was discussed that the recent meetings between the South Korea and the DPRK had included talks on the nuclear issue, and DPRK leader Kim had signaled a willingness to cooperate in the process, and ultimately, to denuclearize. South Korea recognizes the importance of the nuclear issue and the US insistence that this be the primary issue on the Korean Peninsula. However, that the nuclear issue is but one part of the broader inter-Korean peace process.

Another question that came out was with regard to timing, particularly concerning the U.S. election cycle would be crucial to making progress, as domestic political pressures could compromise the U.S. leadership’s negotiating flexibility. In response to this, a panelist said that the ROK understood the importance of timing at this stage, but cautioned that the current juncture would not be the last opportunity for progress on the issue. The current impasse over the which actions should come first—the DPRK’s disclosure and disablement of nuclear sites and materials or the U.S.’s delisting of the DPRK pursuant to the TWEA—should be resolved by performing the two actions in parallel. Another response was given by noting that while simultaneous progress on the denuclearization issue and the intra-Korea process is possible, and would actually reinforce both efforts, as the dominant impression in Washington is that the ROK is more interested in good photo opportunities with the DPRK than it is in achieving
progress on the nuclear issue. The U.S.’s position is likely that the two Koreas should conclude a final agreement with the U.S. and China as observers, and that denuclearization and then peaceful coexistence on the peninsula should pave the way for some sort of confederation.

Another question asked was whether there was a possibility that the DPRK might ultimately be accepted as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS), and cautioned that such a development would cause Japan to revise its nuclear doctrine, though probably not to develop nuclear weapons of its own. It was explained that while Japan and China are now nervous about the possibility of the DPRK being accepted as a NWS—despite the fact that Japan and China had urged the U.S. to reengage diplomatically with the DPRK—the U.S. would clearly oppose such a development, adding that it would be politically impossible for the U.S. to normalize relations with a nuclear-armed DPRK. Moreover, the UN Security Council has demanded complete and irreversible DPRK disarmament.

A note of optimism also came up about the six-party process, but cautioning that two critical issues must be resolved for the process to go forward. First, the U.S. will demand verification that the DPRK’s accounting of nuclear-related facilities is full and complete. Second, the U.S. is unlikely to improve trade relations with the DPRK or to lift trade sanctions before the DPRK proves that it has taken concrete actions, potentially resulting in disputes over what “simultaneous action” actually means. It was generally agreed among the panelists that the common goal of denuclearization is now clear, but the framework for achieving that goal is indeed shaky. Consequently, the management of the process must be very careful and labor intensive.

Despite the efforts of various parties, including CSCAP, which has a WMD working group that has developed policy proposals on the issue, there has been no major reductions in nuclear stockpiles by the major powers, and none is in sight. Against this
backdrop, the six-party talks are one bright spot, though the verdict is far from decided as to their ultimate success.

*Luncheon Speech*

Against the backdrop set by preceding discussions of pressing security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, the main theme of the luncheon speech on the conference’s second day was an overview of how one country—Indonesia—seeks to provide for its own security. An analysis of Indonesia’s national defense should take into account five distinct levels: global, regional, national, and no less important, provincial and local. While analysis of these levels reveals competition and tension among them, adequate national defense requires their synchronization.

Some of the constraints on Indonesian defense planning were addressed. Despite being Southeast Asia’s biggest country, geographical and financial constraints make securing Indonesia’s sovereign space a distinct challenge compared to other countries in the region. For instance, Indonesia’s U.S. $3.3 billion defense budget is still outsized by Singapore’s defense budget of U.S. $4.4 billion. Bearing such constraints in mind, the key elements of Indonesian defense strategy in the coming years are said to be as follows. First, the financial burdens on the Indonesian military mean that it will have to combine both hard and soft power to provide adequate security. Second, with regards to the challenges of the securing the Malacca Straits, which serve as a link between Southeast and Northeast Asia, Indonesia requires an integrated defense strategy that draws on all types of national power and on the resources and capabilities of regional actors, not just on the military’s capabilities. Next, developing strategic partnerships with China, with Indonesia’s Southeast Asian neighbors, and with the U.S. is also important, he said. Toward this end, he proposed strengthening the ASEAN regional defense community. Finally, to help cover the gap between the resources available to the Ministry of Defense
and the challenges it faces, sensitizing provincial and local leaders to the demands of national defense and their potential roles in providing for security is important.

A number of the other elaborations were made during the session, particularly on issues dealing with the specifics of how local and provincial actor could appropriately be included in national defense. In response to a question about the possibility that might such participation exacerbate and facilitate separatist movements, it was explained imperative of ensuring that the activities at each level are in line with the national strategy, and that if this is assured, then sharing knowledge and defense burdens at the various levels should be supported. In successful instances, local and provincial leaders have participated in courses on economic development and defense sponsored by the national government.

On the issue of the territorial command structure of the Indonesian military, reforms should be calibrated to what is politically possible. As a result, the current focus should be on finding a way for local economic activities to contribute to non-military defense by connecting outlying regions with the rest of the country, rather than radical reforms.

In a broader term, questions on Indonesia’s place in the regional order were also discussed. Comprehensive security relationships with the U.S., India, Russia and others are critical for familiarizing the regional powers with one another and for meeting the political and economic demands in the region. In addition to strengthening these relationships, reinforcing the ASEAN Regional Forum is also a key priority for expanding Indonesia’s defense cooperation, adding that a broader vision about defense that recognizes the need to move beyond concerns of national sovereignty and toward inter-provincial security connections is needed.
Session Six: Security in the Malacca Straits

Continuing with the second day’s theme of addressing specific, key security issues in the region, the complex security issues the Malacca Straits present were indeed significant to be discussed. An overview of the key issues opened one’s eyes on how complex the situation is. While everyone agrees that “safe passage” should be the primary goal for the straits, transit states understand this to mean safety from piracy, terrorism, and other threats. At the same time, the littoral states believe their interests should not be adversely affected by others’ use of the Straits. These states are particularly concerned with pollution and environmental problems and their affects on fisheries in and around the Straits, stemming from the increasing number of vessels transiting the area and from shipwrecks in the Straits.

In order to improve the safety and security in the Straits, a series of practical measures were proposed. For example, wrecked ships are a hazard in the area and should be removed, along with the need to increase the ability of actors in the Straits to handle hazardous material often brought through the straits. In addition, plans to deploy an Automatic Identification System in the straits should go forward. In addition to addressing these safety and environmental issues, user and littoral states must deal with security.

A discussion on the topic of course requires a legal perspective. It was discussed that rather than a wholesale reappraisal of the security regime governing the straits, all parties involved should pay more heed already established international law. The Straits should not become a battleground for balance of power issues, because such issues were already fought out in the drafting of the Law of the Sea Convention. Moreover, as half of the Straits is within territorial waters, local laws apply, and no county can create policies governing the whole area of the Straits without the consent of the coastal states.
Any agreements and cooperation with regard to the straits should respect the sovereignty of these states and be consistent with international law, and security concerns should be worked out at the operational level. Toward this goal, defense forces have already cooperated to an unprecedented degree, and a number of bilateral agreements regarding security in the straits are forthcoming as well. As a sign of these positive developments, there have been no recent attacks on ships moving through the main straits channel.

Some optimistic tones with regards to the current situation were also found. Despite ongoing legal, safety, and security concerns in the Straits, there is actually reason to be positive about progress already made toward addressing the issues. It was voiced that security in the Straits has in fact been well served by ongoing initiatives from both user countries and the littoral states. “Eyes in the sky” surveillance, coordination among the littoral states, the efforts of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency, and bilateral initiatives for joint patrols are said to have contributed to enhanced security in the area.

In the subsequent discussions, it was generally agreed that continued efforts to help Indonesia secure its waters, to share intelligence and information and to continue and enhance cooperation on patrolling the states were all sound ideas. As to why Indonesia has been reluctant to join the Container Security Initiative, it was discussed that there was no good reason Indonesia had not originally taken part in the program, but now the initiative has appeared to have lost some steam.

The panelists also addressed in more detail the issue of piracy and terrorism in the region. All agreed that the possibility of maritime terrorism is real, and that some future collaboration between organized crime groups and terrorist groups was also possible. However, it has not been proven that such a link has been established. In fact, goals of piracy and those of terrorist groups are actually quite different, making the possibility of future collaboration a serious, but unlikely proposition.
Session Seven: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in the Asia Pacific

Peacekeeping and peacebuilding have become key issues both for managing and resolving conflicts within the region, and for Asian countries that have committed resources to and personnel to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations elsewhere in the world. Given the high costs of violence, so little is invested in preventative diplomacy.

The international community’s enthusiasm for the issue has waned, and it was generally agreed that there is a glaring absence of UN leadership on this issue. The UN has not made it clear what it expects from any new norms yet to be developed, and the principle of “responsibility to protect” has yet to be operationalized. An example is the relatively feeble support the UN panel to reform peacekeeping operations received from the international community. Serious asymmetries continue to plague efforts to raise funds and personnel for peacekeeping operations, and UN member states often use peacekeeping operations as opportunities to raise their own profiles, rather than create lasting peace in conflict zones. Failure to remedy these problems will cause the UN itself to lose relevance.

Despite the lack of such reform and of dwindling resources and planning, UN peacekeeping forces are being asked to take on more and more operations and activities. A panelist explained that the expansion of the peacekeeping section of the UN has been done without planning describing some of the reforms as “superficial.”

In the face of these challenges, a series of measures that the UN and other bodies—including CSCAP—could take to aid the reform process was outlined. First, the UN should only go where it is welcomed and can make a difference, and must be able to do so in a timely manner. Second, the UN should share the peacekeeping burden with regional organizations, which should take on peacekeeping duties both within and
outside their own regions, and should begin preparing for a wider scope of operations by adopting oversight mechanisms.

The session also included a discussion of the lessons learned from peacekeeping operations within the Asia-Pacific region. It was said that the lessons of peace operations in the Pacific island countries could be instructive for peace operations elsewhere in the world. In broad terms, the causes of conflict in the region have been essentially political in nature, and thus require primarily political—rather than primarily military—solutions that draw on the entire range of agencies and resources of the governments involved. For example, in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the government raised a force to oppose separatists laying claim to a mine from which PNG derives significant wealth. There, a peacekeeping force, though unarmed, was nonetheless able to have an impact in reducing tensions in the conflict because it correctly recognized and worked to overcome the political obstacles to peace.

It is also important to develop a sound exit strategy before operations begin, and in preparing for future political developments that may imperil peace agreements. The current political instability in the Solomon Islands shows that peacekeeping forces must have a long time horizon if they are to succeed. The case of the Solomon Islands also demonstrates how outside forces can play a destabilizing role, as Taiwan has done by injecting financial support into an already fragile political situation in order to advance its own international agenda.

CSCAP has indeed included peacekeeping and peacebuilding as one of its main issues of concern, as peacekeeping has become an important part of the region’s broader discussions about security. China and Japan have become increasingly involved in international peacekeeping, he explained, with both countries using the issue to help redefine their roles in the current international system. In addition, ASEAN and the ARF have made peacekeeping central parts of their frameworks, acknowledging the ongoing
humanitarian concerns in the region. Peacekeeping will thus be a key test of how those organizations can cooperate on their broader security agendas. The challenge was that peacekeeping practices are changing, and are based on UN norms that are themselves changing. Given the relevance of the issue for the Asia Pacific region, regional governments must be involved in the debates over just how these practices and norms change.

Turning from general studies on peace operations to a specific example, the session proceeded to discussing what the lessons to have come out of the peacekeeping operation in the Indonesian province of Aceh. The operation in Aceh was less about “peacekeeping” per se, than it was about implementing a memorandum of understanding between the Indonesian government and the GAM (Free Aceh Movement), the separatist rebel movement in the region. Integral to the operation’s success was the commitment to the peace process from both sides of the dispute. This commitment made it easier to approve and operate a peacekeeping force that was unarmed.

In addition to the commitment of both parties to peace, there were other factors that paved the way for the Aceh operations’ success. From the beginning of the operation, the force had a clear mandate that included a set timeframe. No less important, the force came to Aceh not just with the assent of the Indonesian military, but indeed at its request. It was explained that the Indonesian military deserves praise for its support for the peace agreement and the force to help facilitate its implementation.

In short, there are key lessons from the Aceh experience for future peace operations. First, it provides a great example of how in lieu of the UN, regional organizations—in this case ASEAN and the EU—can play a key role in peace operations. Second, planning and coordination of a peacekeeping mission should commence as soon as a peace accord is designed. Finally, there is the central importance of reintegration as part of ongoing
efforts to keep peace. Reducing unemployment and providing for economic development are integral to making sustaining peace and to facilitating a broader reconciliation process.

Responding to a question from the audience, the panelists underscored the central importance of preventative diplomacy in managing conflict and keeping peace. It was noted that preventative diplomacy framed the peace strategies in the pacific islands, and that preventative diplomacy should be the focus and first line of action, adding that regional organizations would be wise to establish mechanisms for anticipating and engaging in preventative diplomacy.

The panelists also received a question on how the region might engage on deciding the meaning of the “responsibility to protect” affirmed by the UN Security Council. It was pointed out that the recommendation to develop new norms for peace operations included in the report on the responsibility to protect had been controversial as it was understood to be an attack on the principle of sovereignty, though it should be understood to be quite the contrary, he said. The other problem, he added was that there is a general lack of belief that peacebuilding works. It is criticized from some corners as being too costly, time-consuming, and politically and strategically unviable. Critics point to Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of such failures, but the regional debate should take up how exactly these experiences might inform future peacebuilding efforts in this region.

Still on the same issue, it was discussed that the tragedies in Srebenica and Rwanda birthed the responsibility to protect, and that though it was accepted by the UN General Assembly, it was generally viewed as a mechanism conceived in the developed world and to be imposed on the developing world. The current impasse in the crisis in Darfur, he said, in which the Sudanese government has refused to welcome a UN force, demonstrate the gap between rhetoric and action regarding the responsibility to protect.
The current disputes over where UN peacekeeping forces should be deployed, who pays for them, and what their mandates should be, reflect larger issues about UN reform. Any mission requires a UN Security Council mandate, and until the Security Council is itself made more representative, peacekeeping missions would continue to be disproportionately borne by some countries.

Subsequent questions to the panel touched on the role of economic development in peacebuilding, the effect of peace operations on transforming civil-military relations, and about the role of regional organizations in peace operations. A panelist offered that sustaining peace often requires agricultural development not just for economic reasons, but also to facilitate the reintegration of combatants into society. With regard to civil-military relations and peacekeeping, participating in peacekeeping operations can change both the way a military works, and attitudes among military personnel to professionalization and democratization. Peacekeeping can serve as a catalyst for dialogue on broader issues of security sector reform.

The last question of the session dealt with ASEAN’s willingness to engage in peacekeeping interventions, particularly in light of the vagaries of newly signed ASEAN Charter with regard to the auspices under which such an intervention might be undertaken. It was expressed that ASEAN need not be the primary actor in all such situations, noting bilateral assistance, and the involvement of the UN and EU in Southeast Asian peace operations as examples of how other actors might participate on this issue.

Session Eight: Security Dimensions of Climate Change and Energy

Climate change and energy deserves to be understood in their own right, but it is increasingly clear that the region’s efforts to meet its energy needs have a real impact on
the climate. Both of these issues also have implications for human security, national security, and indeed international security.

The session started with an overview of energy security in Asia, which portrays that Asia has become too dependent on imported oil, much of which comes from politically volatile areas. The natural gas situation in the region was less of a concern. Coal too remains an option, but clearly poses environmental challenges as well. To meet the region’s energy needs, states must cooperate to address their energy needs. The first rule of achieving energy security should be to “do the right thing at home.” Also, the region should expand its internal cooperation to include seek energy related investment ties with other regions.

The discussion then took into account the impact of rising oil and gas prices on the region’s energy security, highlighting in particular that for countries such as Indonesia that have fuel subsidies, rising prices will increasingly stress state budgets. Higher fuel prices thus contribute to oil exporting countries security, but compromise consumer countries. Issues of energy infrastructure in energy security were also discussed, as natural disasters, terrorism and other forces can damage the infrastructure, and thus prevent reliable delivery of energy resources. Nuclear energy has not yet become a source of energy for Southeast Asia, but many of the countries in the region are looking at it as a future possibility. The prospects of a nuclear accident or sabotage, as well as the storage of nuclear waste, raise additional questions about security in the region.

The future of the region depends to a great deal on the connections between climate change, energy security, and economic growth. Considering this nexus, high oil prices are not the main problem; rather, countries should focus on demand management and improving energy efficiency. Countries in the region have had varying degrees of success at achieving efficiency, with Japan and Singapore leading the way, and other lagging behind. With regards to China’s growing need of energy, despite the large
amount of energy already consumed in China, in per capita terms China lags far behind
developed countries in energy consumption. As a result, as China continues to grow,
energy demand in China only stands to grow as well, in the process increasing the
overall demand for energy in the region. In addition, China remains largely dependent
on coal. If environmental pressures and other concerns force China to rely increasingly
on other types of energy sources, demand pressures will further increase.

It was said that while much of the current discussions on energy security focus on the
need for regional cooperation, in actuality, we are witnessing a rise of resource
nationalism. This is a particularly dire development in light of the growing consensus
that climate change is already having an adverse effect on the public health and
humanitarian situation in the area. Climate change has caused tropical diseases to move
northward, and the ability to deal with this demands improvements on governance in
the region. In this regard, a panelist cited the essential areas of concern for countries in
the region with regard to energy security. First among them was improving energy
efficiency across the region. Beyond that, managing energy resources and, no less
importantly, water resources, is a primary area of concern. Finally, the region must work
to rid itself of domestic subsidies that decrease efficiency and increase consumption.

More specifically on climate change, a gloomy picture of the security implications of
climate change dominated the discussion. Climate change will bring more of the natural
disasters that already plague the region. In addition, irreversible warming will increase
the risk of flooding, particularly seasonal flooding. At the same time, changes in the
distribution of rainfall mean that while there is more flooding, there will also be more
incidences of drought. These phenomena in turn can lead to a cascade of environmental
problems, including sequential natural disasters, increasing vulnerability of costal and
tropical areas, deforestation, and a decrease in the productivity of fisheries.
In addition to the environmental implications, it was well known that climate change also raises myriad human security issues. Decreasing agricultural productivity would have huge significant economic consequences. Moreover, intense warming could speed the spread of disease and eclipse the ability of governments and health care systems to cope with these new challenges. To make matters worse, people who live in rural areas—where government services of often weakest—and who thus rely more heavily on agriculture than their urban compatriots, will be more sensitive to the effects of climate change. As a result, climate change could displace whole populations and unleash a spectrum of security concerns.

From another perspective, it was suggested that rather than thinking about the individual effects of climate change, it is their sum effects that should be considered. Food shortages, natural disasters, public health concerns just to name a few, may each be challenges that can be met. Taken together, however, they have a compound effect that could imperil the governments that must deal with their consequences.

“Three perspectives” of climate change and security were elaborated. First, the impact of climate change on food production, water resources, and weather events will be differentiated. This will lead not only to new power dynamics and imbalances in the international system, but also, where water resources are shared, it could begin to fuel competition and create new security issues. Second, because of rising sea levels, migration patterns, and the myriad health and security issues associated with them, are changing. Third, the poverty level could increase as people are displaced from traditional farmland. This will also lead to changes in food production patterns, and could cause larger social and political disruptions. In all of these events, it is the poor who are least able to adapt to new challenges and circumstances, and who thus stand to suffer the most.
The panelists also addressed the issue of oceanic acidification. It was explained that the issue is not currently a big part of the discussion right now, but it could impact fisheries and reefs and could have a particularly acute effect in Asia, where many people are dependent on fishing and coastal agriculture.

With regards to the future of the Kyoto Protocol and on international efforts to reduce energy demand and increase energy efficiency, it was said that the U.S. believed this would put it at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis China. Moreover, a post-2012 climate change regime should bring the developing countries into the fold.

Turning to the issue of reducing energy demand, it was discussed that the key would be attracting new investment—particularly in new energy sources—to meet increasing demand. A panelist emphasized that there are no energy silver bullets, and that energy production should be increased where it is already cheap, most notably in China. Moreover, there are policies to create technology transfers to facilitate increasing use of cleaner energy producing technologies, but that there are also “bottom-up” strategies in China that could catalyze a transition to new sources of energy there.
The 6th CSCAP General Conference has considerably scored a major success, not only in terms of attracting a large number of audience and media coverage and stipulating open and lively debate, but also in putting forth CSCAP’s views and activities to a wider public. A good composition of speakers and panelists determined the success of the conference. The conference was also highlighted by the involvement of both track one and track two representatives, as the conference’s purpose is to link the two elements.

Following the previous conference, the 6th General Conference has successfully created an open and cooperative atmosphere for closer interaction between the officials – who are responsible in policy making and executing – and the public – who are concerned with the regional security issues and environment. The conference has crated good practice of the exchange of ideas between the track one and track two, which at the end might contribute to the improvement of the security of the Asia Pacific region.

As agreed at the previous conference, the General Conference would continue to be held regularly on a bi-annual basis. A proposal to hold the next conference in another country, as a change from Indonesia that has hosted the previous three conferences, came out during the informal talks at the side of the sessions. Having three or more Member Committees as the co-organizers would be maintained to improve and strengthen a sense of cooperation and solidarity among CSCAP Member Committees.
Acknowledgement

As the host of the 5th CSCAP General Conference, CSCAP Indonesia wishes to express its deepest gratitude and appreciation to the co-organizers, namely AUSCSCAP, CSCAP Japan, CSCAP Singapore and CSCAP China and also to the CSCAP Secretariat and CSCAP Co-Chairs for the quality of cooperation and support rendered in organizing the conference.

Furthermore, the appreciation also goes to all other CSCAP Member Committees for the commitment, continuous support, and assistances extended to the conference. Some of the Member Committees were very much instrumental in promoting the conference, thus attracting a large number of participants from their respective countries. The presence of some key and distinguished speakers was also made possible because of great efforts showed by some CSCAP Member Countries. The host is grateful for this assistance.

The host and co-organizers would also like to thank the keynote speakers, panelists, commentators, and chairs for their excellent quality of presentation and role. Presentations and views presented at the conference have been stimulating and successfully encouraged lively and open discussion.

In the same manner, participants also deserve a credit for the success of the conference, for their active involvement on the discussion from the beginning until the very end of the program.

Finally, the host and co-organizers appreciate the invaluable support and assistance given and the commitment made without hesitation by the large number of individuals and parties involved in the organizing of the 5th CSCAP General Conference.