Fourth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Non-proliferation and Disarmament in the Asia Pacific
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Conference Report
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The Pacific Forum CSIS and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York, co-chaired the Fourth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific in Hanoi, Vietnam on Oct. 26-27. About 45 senior scholars, officials, and Pacific Forum Young Leaders attended in their private capacity. Off-the-record discussions focused on recent developments in nonproliferation, nuclear technology, and nuclear security in Asia; approaches to and sanctions against North Korea; implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); and non-proliferation and disarmament (NPD) capacity building.

Session 1: Recent developments that influence nonproliferation and peaceful use of nuclear technology

The session began with a presentation by Richard Cupitt (Stimson Center) delivered by Carl Baker (Pacific Forum CSIS) on the second comprehensive review of UNSCR 1540. Positive findings of the review included the development of more global governance instruments; more cooperation with international, regional, and sub-regional organizations; more assistance, including via the UN trust fund; and most importantly, more implementation of UNSCR 1540 requirements. Negative findings included the presence of state WMD proliferation amidst lack of progress in Conference on Disarmament; new threats such as those from Syria and DPRK; new risks including advances in biological science, 3D printing, and drones; and an ineffective process for matching assistance requests with offers of assistance among UN member states. The assistance process was one of the more ambitious aspects of UNSCR 1540, but matchmaking has not worked because requests have been too general and offers have tended to be too general. Cupitt identified persistent gaps in implementation, especially in biosecurity, and noted that chemical security is an emerging field.

Manpreet Sethi (Centre for Air Power Studies, India) gave a presentation on the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Ban Treaty), adopted by the UN General Assembly on July 7, 2017. Sethi described the positions of the treaty critics, who worry about a lack of details, and its supporters, who appreciate a framework for disarmament being in place. Realizing the possibilities of the treaty depends on many factors, and it is unclear whether the treaty will bring the world closer to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The positions and objections to the ban of the five nuclear weapons states are fairly similar, and the United States, United Kingdom, and France have declared they will never become party to the treaty. States protected by the US nuclear umbrella face a dilemma in which extended deterrence requirements are in conflict with the core prohibitions of the treaty. Sethi also noted that the US-DPRK standoff has increased the salience of the nuclear umbrella. Her biggest concern about the ban was its potential to deepen the divide between the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT, as was seen in the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

Participants expressed a range of views on the effectiveness of the ban. A point of debate was whether the treaty should be broad to help establish a community around banning nuclear weapons,

or be more specific and technical to give nuclear-armed states a framework for facilitating disarmament. Also highlighted was the existence of opposing disarmament models – a step-by-step approach to disarmament versus an outright nuclear weapon ban (or their use). Participants also discussed the legal and practical implications for the states that ratify the ban. States such as India and New Zealand and US treaty allies would do well to find a way to bridge the divides between NPT nuclear weapon states and others.

Session 2: The Korean Peninsula

Andrea Berger (Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey) discussed the UN sanctions regime against North Korea, describing its establishment in 2006, the strategic shift in 2016 to focus on prohibiting entire classes of goods from entering or leaving North Korea, and the rapid expansion of sanctions in 2017. New important developments, such as prohibiting banks from clearing sanctioned transactions under UNSCR 2371, were also highlighted. UNSCR 2371, which identifies a major North Korean sanctions evasion practice, also clarifies that companies performing financial services commensurate with those provided by banks are considered financial institutions. Berger also reviewed the US sanctions regime, describing the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (Department of Treasury) as having "a long arm and large bat." The US Department of Treasury has been given a major mandate to sanction most things DPRK-related, including foreign facilitators. Berger concluded by addressing good practices for implementing North Korea-related sanctions: national risk assessment, making sure implementing legislation is up to date, participating in information sharing, and engaging in conversations with the private sector. (It was noted that the DPRK chose not to participate in this particular meeting of the CSCAP NPD Study Group.)

Cheon Seong-Whun (Asan Institute for Policy Studies) offered his perspective on current Korean Peninsula issues. He highlighted the change of political landscape in Seoul and that the new administration has a very different view compared to previous two administrations. Similarly, he noted that the new administration in the United States has been critical of Obama's policies and indeed the approach of the previous 25-26 years. President Trump has proposed "maximum pressure and engagement" toward North Korea. Today there is general consensus in the ROK that denuclearization policy has failed and a different approach is needed. The options Cheon proposed are either to re-introduce US tactical nuclear weapons to Seoul to use as a deterrent against the DPRK threat, or to launch an independent nuclear weapons program. Cheon noted that in recent surveys more than 60 percent of the South Korean general public has consistently supported reintroduction of US tactical weapons or development of an indigenous nuclear program. He noted that the purpose of reintroduction or development of nuclear weapons is not to permanently maintain them, but rather to give South Korea bargaining power and to bring North Korea to the table for disarmament talks.

Initially, the discussion focused on the rationale for redeploying US tactical nuclear weapons in Korea. Operationally, the redeployment would be of little value. Moving US tactical nuclear weapons within range of artillery range creates vulnerabilities to local communities and adds a significant logistics burden with little operational utility. In effect, the weapons would serve a political purpose to offset to the North's capabilities. There has been no indication that the United States is prepared to redeploy the weapons, and South Korean President Moon Jae-in has publicly stated the ROK will not request deployment and does not intend to develop an

indigenous capability. Nevertheless, it is likely that North Korea will continue to conduct nuclear and missile tests. Specifically, the group agreed that the recent threat of an atmospheric nuclear blast by the DPRK was completely unacceptable, and that if one occurred, one participant suggested this be condemned by CSCAP and the international community for being in violation of the political norms of the comprehensive test ban treaty.

China's influence on DPRK was also raised, as well as the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea. While it is unlikely that sanctions can significantly change Kim Jong Un's cost-benefit analysis associated with retention of a nuclear weapon capability, the sanctions can promote other positive outcomes. Sanctions that focus on keeping North Korea from selling illicit military goods overseas, from proliferating, and from accessing goods for their WMD and military programs are worth keeping in place. Different types of sanctions can have different impacts. Aside from the economic impact of restricting the flow of goods and limiting access to financial resources, the non-economic aspects of sanctions are also important in constraining behavior. The North Korean regime is sensitive to its status and how it is perceived in the world; we need a strong consensus on what North Korea is and both economic and non-economic ways to address the North Korean position.

Session 3: Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in Asia

This session discussed implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in Asia. While all states in Asia have signed the CWC, not all have the legislation needed to implement it. Simply signing these agreements is not sufficient. Beyond national legislation, participants discussed what can be further done to implement these treaties.

Joseph Ballard (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) gave a presentation on the implementation of the CWC in Asia. The CWC and BWC are potentially more important for countries in this region than are nuclear related commitments because the risks are higher and possibly growing. Ballard pointed to the comprehensive scope of CWC. While prohibition treaties on all three types of WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological) exist, the CWC is the most comprehensive and detailed. Today it focuses on prevention of the reemergence of chemical weapons, and ensuring that the CWC remains relevant in the future. Issues that require preparing for the future are the increasing role of non-state actors in proliferation-related activity, advances in science and technology that increase the difficulty of controlling strategic goods, and economic integration that blurs national borders. These new threats, which are evolving, make national implementation even more important. The three major components of the implementation process are the initial declarations of member states, verification, and response capability. The OPCW is focusing on cooperation with other international organizations, industry, civil society, and academia to ensure awareness. The OPCW is also embarking on new initiatives in the assistance and protection areas. National capacity building is a major aspect of the organization's outreach efforts.

Shuji Amano (Nihon Institute of Science) shifted the discussion from chemicals to biologicals, discussing BWC specific implementation requirements, efforts states parties have made to that end, and the future vision for the BWC. The BWC is a platform for states parties to discuss and

promote common understanding to fight accidental, intentional, and natural biological threats. The BWC creates strong norms against developing biological weapons. In general, developing countries lack the technical knowledge to sustain biosecurity measures. The developed countries are responsible for supporting developing countries under Article 10. States parties failed to develop its agenda items under the framework of the BWC, but the research and global health community has developed standards to maintain biosecurity and safety. The BWC can promote common understanding of these standards. Regional organizations can also initiate programs to help developing countries enhance biosecurity and biosafety.

Panelists agreed that implementation means different things for different states parties and that there is a link between implementation, nonproliferation, and capacity building. The example of Africa was raised, where many stakeholders do not even know that they have a role to play in implementation. National legislation can help link to nonproliferation, providing a basis for regulation and for operationalizing the national stakeholders to at least cover treaties' initial measures. Also noted was a vast difference between the CWC and BWC. Once a state has signed the BWC, implementation is essentially left to the individual member state. The BWC has no established verification measures and only limited staff (three full-time members) at the Implementation Support Unit to articulate what implementation looks like. The treaty thus becomes secondary to other biosecurity initiatives developed under the auspices of the World Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN. In contrast, the CWC is supported by the OPCW and has an extensive implementation process with its initial declaration, verification inspections, and response exercise evaluations. While the CWC requirements do not extend to the trade control requirements included under the Australia Group (AG), they do serve as a mechanism to facilitate controls established in the AG.

Session 4: Nuclear security governance in Asia

Jor-shan Choi (Berkeley Nuclear Research Center) addressed nuclear security governance in Asia with a focus on small modular reactors. About 200 small reactor units are predicted to be deployed around the world in the coming years. Currently, small reactors are in operation in Pakistan (Chinese built) and in India. A floating reactor is under construction in Russia, and China is also developing one. Choi argued that land-based SMRs have a similar impact on nuclear security governance as large-size nuclear reactors, but that floating SMRs may have a heightened impact. Floating SMRs invoke heightened security governance concerns due to nuclear materials being in transit; potential targeting by terrorists/pirates; fuel bundles possibly going overboard; a lack of containment options; and vulnerability to airborne attacks. Choi stressed that issues about 3S (safety, security, and safeguards/nonproliferation) need to be raised now so that the vendors can consider them in design of SMR.

Anatoly Diyakov (Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology) summarized the status of Russian nuclear cooperation agreements with ASEAN countries. He explained that since its formation in 2007, the State Atomic Energy Corporation ROSATOM has signed 70 intergovernmental agreements for peaceful use of nuclear energy with more than 60 countries. He described ASEAN countries' growing demand for more electricity generating capacity. He said that Vietnam and Malaysia were considering nuclear cooperation with Russia, while other countries (Thailand, Indonesia) were in earlier exploratory stages. Russia is most optimistic about Vietnam and Indonesia for progress in nuclear cooperation.

Cristophe Carle shared the IAEA perspective on nuclear security governance. The IAEA sees capacity building an integral part of security. Carle believes that the SMR issue is really the latest episode in an old story in the nuclear industry. Many of the salient characteristics of the purportedly new generation reactors have been put forward. Reactors or devices built remotely in a factory that encases the fuel and other sensitive items and have longer refueling cycles do not necessitate access to the core but repatriation to the country of origin. With SMR, states not only reduce costs but also opportunities for misdeeds by hostile non-state actors or others. It has been decades since the inception of the idea of promoting the integration of safety, security, and safeguards (3S) into the design of reactors. So far it has been a failure, Carle said, but SMRs present a new opportunity. Because their development is at an early stage, 3S by design could still be incorporated. By a recent count, 12 members of the IAEA are involved with the conception/production of SMRs, and about 46 designs or prototypes are at various stages of development. A dialogue is setting in between vendors/producers and regulators, but this dialogue is less than wholeheartedly constructive. Vendors and producers often describe security for SMRs as a burden. Unfortunately, some states consider comprehensive safeguard agreements as the be all and end all, but Carle said that things have and should change and be improved upon. The same applies to security, which is much less codified, enforced, and peer reviewed compared to other aspects of nuclear safety and safeguards. To begin to think of static or even reduced requirements for security is extremely short-sighted, especially when public acceptance of nuclear facilities at any location is very low. Yet some of the positions that are being openly expressed indicate that basic and obvious points need to be reiterated. With security, as with safeguards, the idea should not be just to implement existing requirements – it should be to go beyond them.

For specific types of SMRs, Carle said that it needs to be determined what is required for security to be at least on par with existing installations and power plants. Much seems to be made of automation/less human intervention, but this might not always be good. Some are opposed to heightened security regulations on the grounds that nuclear security is fundamentally the responsibility of states. Further, more than safety, security involves confidentiality. Are there devices that can allow confidential aspects to be discussed meaningfully among experts? Carle believes that there are. Canada and a few other member IAEA member states have made their International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) physical security inspection reports available to the public. The IAEA is doing much more in terms of security than it has in the past in light of two main developments, the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the holding of the last nuclear security summit, which left a gap in nuclear security governance. The IAEA will not be prescriptive, but rather needs to coordinate the number of initiatives that do exist.

Questions were raised during the discussion about what would happen if floating reactors were transported through international waters. Despite regulatory gaps, Chinese floating nuclear power plants are supposed to be online by 2020. If a nuclear accident occurred on the ocean, it would affect many countries in the region. The need to engage in environmental impact studies for the installation of a floating reactor was also raised: states that might be affected should be consulted prior to the construction of such nuclear facilities. It was suggested that floating SMRs are a good opportunity for cooperation between ASEANTOM and the IAEA, but they also present a challenge. ASEANTOM should take up the effort to begin developing a set of regulations if the region has an interest in introducing floating reactors. Indonesia, for example,

should work with IAEA and the vendor to be sure the regulations in the design and 3S are accommodated for.

Session 5: NPD Priorities in Asia

Carl Baker (Pacific Forum CSIS) outlined nonproliferation priorities in Asia based on the information contained in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) nonproliferation and disarmament (NPD) work plan and ASEAN 2025 Political-Security Blueprint. Although nonproliferation is consistently included in ARF and ASEAN annual security outlook, there is little evidence that implementation is being seriously pursued as a result of the guidelines and vision statements. Activities have been focused on workshops and seminars, with hardly any emphasis on non-nuclear WMD or means of delivery. The most recent version of ARF NPD work plan blends ARF and ASEAN initiatives; there is also an overlap between NPD and Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime work plans and activities. Such mixing of various plans and initiatives creates confusion. Baker noted the need to promote disarmament and elimination of WMD (not just nonproliferation) and to promote safe and secure use of WMD related dual-use goods (not only the promotion of nuclear technology).

Jacqueline Espenilla (Philippine Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea) presented on the prospects and possibilities for Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which is based on the Bangkok Treaty of 1995, to serve as a basis for establishing nonproliferation priorities for ASEAN states. SEANWFZ, like all other nuclear-free zones, bans the development or deployment of nuclear weapons. What is unique about SEANWFZ is that it includes the EEZ and the continental shelves, which is relevant to shipment of nuclear weapons, among other things. SEANWFZ also has a heavy ecological component, which includes prohibitions on dumping any radiological material in maritime spaces of the region. SEANWFZ also includes a mandate to ensure compliance and a mechanism for verifying suspected nuclear-related activities. No NWS was involved in drafting the agreement and no nuclear weapons state (NWS) has signed the treaty's protocol, but the all five of the NWS have shown a continued willingness to engage ASEAN on this. The last push to get the NWS to sign was in 2011 by Indonesia. Indeed, the main challenge to SEANWFZ implementation is refusal of NWS to sign the SEANWFZ protocol.

Floating nuclear reactors in the South China Sea could be problematic if stationed in the EEZ of another country in Southeast Asia. These reactors would be subject to the compliance regime and also the ecological rules about dumping nuclear waste. China has been the most open NWS to possibility of signing, even before the 2011 negotiations. Espenilla noted that SEANWFZ itself is a confidence-building measure and shows that the region is committed to reducing nuclear threats. It is also aligned with NPD priorities. She concluded by saying that there needs to be a level of compromise among NWS and SEANWFZ member states to move beyond the stalemate over the SEANWFZ NWS protocol.

Robert Finch (Sandia National Laboratories) offered the argument that universal implementation of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement should be a top priority. The Additional Protocol has been adopted by a majority of NPT signatories, but not all. Finch noted that simply because states have signed the Additional Protocol does not mean that it is being implemented – countries, including Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand, have taken

steps to enforce it. The Additional Protocol expands IAEA authority and includes access to information and additional nuclear sites, and offers assurance about declared and possible undeclared activities. It focuses on a state-level concept or approach. The goal is to eventually transition to state-based evaluations and move beyond facility-based declarations. The traditional safeguards (comprehensive safeguards agreement) covers conversion into useable fuel down to reprocessing. The additional protocol covers the rest of the fuel cycle, from mining to permanent disposal. Finch said that current safeguards trends are moving to a more holistic approach of integrated safeguards. This is a further development under the state-level concept and has an increased focus on unattended and remote monitoring.

Session 6

NPD Capacity building

This session focused on the types of capacity building assistance available for states and regions interested in implementing nonproliferation-related treaties and conventions. Guy Valente (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) argued that implementation, capacity building, and nonproliferation are linked and must be approached as part of a whole-of-government effort. He described the activities of the OPCW technical secretariat's international cooperation assistance division. Valente offered examples of good and bad stories from Africa and asked how ripe Asia is for the kind of concept presented. Valente emphasized the importance of matching capacity-building efforts to local implementation requirements and the need to recognize that offering training in the use of equipment is a key lesson learned by the OPCW as it has developed its outreach efforts associated with facilitating implementation of the CWC.

The discussion focused on how the nonproliferation community can set priorities and integrate process into capacity building to make it contextual and meaningful to the local situation. Participants noted that there is also a regional component to this, and offered suggestions on how to best engage in Southeast Asia. It was duly noted that the presence of equipment alone does not mean preparedness. Successful capacity building happens when recognition of the problems originates from the region itself. If states do not believe there is a problem, it does not matter what processes are in place because outreach and capacity building will not be sustainable. Furthermore, capacity building cannot be a one-time exercise. There needs to be recurring reinforcement, and participants asked how to ensure this. One best practice from Africa is to hold "train the trainers" courses.

It was suggested that this region can create the capacity here for other people to use, rather than taking from others. For example, if a floating reactor came to this region, designing regulations for this is something the region can do. ASEANTOM, in both name and charter, should be working on this. Also, the prioritizing of nuclear safety/security is directly linked to the practical need of a country. Questions to consider are if a country expects a nuclear facility in the near- or medium-term, or if there is any nuclear security risk from its neighbors. One suggestion was to reinforce efforts states care more about, such as better border controls. Other states can help with controlling people, drugs, and guns – not just for nonproliferation purposes. A useful strategy is to find more win-win situations to align interests. Also noted was the overlap of agencies doing the same thing, often in the same place. To minimize this overlap problem, states should have a national authority that has full visibility into all outreach activities so it can coordinate them.

Session 7

Wrap-up and next steps

The final discussion noted that threat perceptions vary, and there is a difference in the way in Southeast Asia thinks about threat compared to other regions of the world. Much of the difference can be attributed to the emphasis that has been put on economic development in Southeast Asia. Much of ASEAN has focused on economic development, so it takes a while for the political/security community come together, speak with one voice, and understand the security requirements of the region. Thus, we should not expect ASEAN to move fast or to have the same understanding of threats as those outside the region do. An important consideration is how to balance what ASEAN sees as important and how to help partners from outside understand how they can help to create a win-win situation.

Finally, product without process is not useful. Having processes in place at the international, regional, and state levels ensures implementation and forward movement. Part of the objective is to identify issues early – as with the small modular reactors, states should work together to identify the issues and think about how to get ahead of them. Doing so is part of the process of thinking about how to work together and make things better.

Key Findings

The Pacific Forum CSIS and the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, with support from Carnegie Corporation of New York, co-chaired the Fourth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament in the Asia-Pacific in Hanoi, Vietnam on Oct. 26-27. About 45 senior scholars, officials, and Pacific Forum Young Leaders attended in their private capacity. Off-the-record discussions focused on recent developments in nonproliferation, nuclear technology, and nuclear security in Asia; approaches to and sanctions against North Korea; implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC); and non-proliferation and disarmament (NPD) capacity building.

More than a decade after UN Security Council Resolution 1540 came into force there are still persistent gaps in implementing measures to control access to goods and technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction and related delivery systems. The impact of new, disruptive technologies such as biological weapons and the evolution of life sciences must be considered in approaches to nonproliferation.

A persistent weakness with UNSCR 1540 implementation has been the process of matching requests for assistance from recipient countries with offers of assistance from donor countries. The 1540 Committee is working to reduce this weakness by providing assistance to states in developing implementation plans that include specific capability requests and providing more guidance for those states offering assistance.

The recent UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (nuclear ban treaty) has a range of potential policy implications. These include highlighting the difference between opposing disarmament models – a step-by-step approach to disarmament versus an outright nuclear weapon ban (or their use). Additionally, there are legal and practical implications for the states that ratify the ban, particularly if they have a close relationship with nuclear weapons states or are dependent on a nuclear umbrella.

The nuclear ban treaty may help establish a disarmament norm, but there is disagreement whether the treaty should be broad to help establish a community around banning nuclear weapons, or be more specific and technical to give nuclear-armed states a framework for facilitating disarmament.

The UN sanctions regime against North Korea has expanded and now includes broader restrictions on entire classes of goods. Separately, the US Department of Treasury (OFAC) has been given a major mandate to sanction DPRK-related financial transactions. This means that banks and other financial institutions must now follow US rules about sanctioned transactions.

Amid DPRK threats to conduct an atmospheric nuclear blast, participants agreed that such an action is completely unacceptable and in violation of the comprehensive test ban. It was suggested that Russia and China convene an emergency UNSC meeting to discuss in advance what sanctions would be applied to DPRK if it conducts an atmospheric nuclear test.

A significant difference was identified between implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). With the BWC, not only is there lack of a verification mechanism, but there has also been little effort to develop a

comprehensive approach to treaty implementation. Implementation of the CWC has been much more systematic with the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons taking specific measures to promote implementation with separate departments established to provide targeted guidance and assistance.

Effective treaty implementation requires that interested parties provide services to determine necessary measures for each state. There is a strong link between implementation, nonproliferation, and capacity building. National legislation can help link to nonproliferation by providing a basis for regulation and for operationalizing the national stakeholders to at least cover initial measures.

In terms of their impact on safety and security requirements, land-based Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) are similar to large-size nuclear reactors, but floating SMRs may have a major impact on nuclear security governance. To date, "3S [Safety, Security, Safeguards] by design" has been a failure. But SMRs, which are still at an early stage of development, provide an opportunity to integrate 3S into the design.

There are regulatory gaps in handling SMRs. Existing treaties and conventions do not fully address the unique safety and security issues associated with floating nuclear plants, yet the initial deployment of floating nuclear power plants is expected by 2020.

Regulatory issues related to floating SMRs are a prime opportunity, specifically for ASEANTOM, which should work on establishing regulations to ensure they are safe and secure. ASEANTOM should work with the IAEA and vendors to ensure regulations are developed and the 3S' are integrated into the design before the reactors becoming operational.

The most important aspect of implementation is political will – the local recognition that something needs to be done. Countries in Southeast Asia should think about how to create the capacity internally. For example, in anticipation of floating reactors being introduced in the region, Southeast Asian countries should devise a regulatory framework for them. This would be an excellent opportunity for ASEANTOM to establish standards for the region that could be adopted by other regions.

Ensuring procedures for utilizing equipment provided are included in the capacity building process is critical. Providing equipment and training without an equal focus on integration wastes resources. Capacity building must be contextual and meaningful to the local situation. This approach of sustainable capacity building has been integrated into both the IAEA and the OPCW implementation efforts.

Countries have different perceptions of the proliferation threat. In Southeast Asia, much of the focus has been on economic development. It takes time for the political/security community to come together, speak with one voice, and understand the security requirements of the region. ASEAN partners must integrate what ASEAN sees as important and focus on developing mutually beneficial outcomes.

With the maturation of the ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on NPD, it is important to focus priorities for future activities on the implementation of the full range of nonproliferation commitments and obligations. Careful consideration should be given to shaping the ARF Work

Plan on NPD to clearly outline the steps required to implement specific obligations while identifying projects that facilitate effective implementation and take advantage of the wide range of capacity building assistance that is available.

For more information, please contact the NPD Study Group co-chairs Carl Baker [carl@pacforum.org] or Nguyen Thiep [thiep@mofa.gov.vn]. These findings reflect the view of the co-chairs and is not a consensus document. A full summary of the workshop proceedings is being prepared and will be available upon request shortly.