USCSCAP and CSCAP Vietnam co-chaired the fifth meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (NPD) in the Asia Pacific. The meeting took place in Seoul, Republic of Korea on April 4, 2018, on the front-end of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD). Approximately 40 senior scholars and officials as well as 10 Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders attended, all in their private capacity. The off-the-record discussions focused on recent developments in nonproliferation and disarmament, the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and ways to enhance collaboration between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states on nuclear risk reduction.

Session 1: Recent developments in nonproliferation and disarmament

This session focused on recent developments in nonproliferation and disarmament. Manpreet Sethi (Center for Air Power Studies) opened the session by describing the current strategic nuclear landscape as worrisome. She said that nuclear brinksmanship – in particular, the rhetoric on nuclear weapons by the leaders of the United States, Russia, and North Korea – has become the “new normal.” It appears that nuclear weapons are again becoming a currency of power. The UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (Ban Treaty) seems to have done little to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. Moreover, new technologies such as 3-D printing and hypersonic vehicles have the potential to destabilize nuclear deterrence. Sethi also discussed the significance of India’s recent accession to three of the multilateral export control regimes: the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group. India is also seeking membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which other states have resisted because India is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). From an Indian perspective, membership in all four multilateral export control regimes is a rightful acknowledgement of its responsible nuclear behavior and will benefit nonproliferation.

Victor Mizin (MGIMO International Studies) argued that further reductions in excess nuclear stockpiles is challenging at this time, and that “information warfare” between the United States and Russia is worse today than it was during the Cold War. It is unclear if there is even enough political will in both capitals to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Today the world is witnessing the advent of many new nuclear states and new types of weapons. Cyber warfare, information warfare, and hybrid warfare are often confused, Mizin observed. He said that in these new domains, it is impossible to make any negotiated limits. He noted that Russia is quite worried about the future of the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,
JCPOA). Russia has worked in close cooperation with European colleagues on the deal, and even if United States opted out, Russia would still want Iran to comply with its terms. Nonetheless, he said that US withdrawal from the agreement would be a blow to the process of nonproliferation.

The discussion included China’s perspective on India’s NSG membership. The argument presented was that if the NPT is under pressure and countries are not satisfied with the disarmament process, the cornerstone role of the NPT cannot be maintained if a non-NPT country (i.e., India) joined the NSG. It was also noted that in 2008, the United States made a nuclear trade exemption for India, so India has the right to enjoy benefits of NSG even without being a member.

Participants emphasized that the regional situation cannot be divorced from what is happening at the global level. The downturn in US-Russia relations is affecting regional stability in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Developments in US-Russia relations and nuclear weapons will affect China’s nuclear behavior, which will in turn affect Pakistan and India. It was further noted that the US-Russia relationship can no longer be held as “the” model for strategic stability. Even if none of the new weapons described in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (a low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile) or in Putin’s 2018 statement about Russia’s invincible nuclear arsenal (a new intercontinental ballistic missile “with a practically unlimited range” and nuclear missiles powered by nuclear rather than conventional fuel) are actually developed, the salience of nuclear weapons has increased. This has set in place a negative cycle. The optics around nuclear weapons and their significance have shifted, and this matters because nuclear weapons are all about perception management.

It was noted that defining good (or bad) nuclear behavior is difficult and unlikely to be universally accepted. Strict disarmament advocates, for instance, argue that nuclear-armed states are, by definition, irresponsible. Conversely, nuclear-weapon states believe that nuclear deterrence provides global strategic stability. The concept of “nuclear responsibility” is an area for future research.

There was general agreement that achievements in arms control and nonproliferation should be preserved. The principle should be “do no harm” to the existing, functioning instruments. Arms control has brought stability between the United States and Russia. The nonproliferation regime and its associated initiatives, such as the JCPOA on Iran’s nuclear program, the NPT, the CTBT, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, have been effective in controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction. If building upon these achievements is currently out of reach, at least efforts should be made to preserve them.

**Session 2: The Korean Peninsula and denuclearization**

This session examined the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. The 2018 “spring of summits” with North Korea is raising both hopes that a solution may be found and fears that diplomacy could fail and lead to war. Seung Whun Cheon (Asan Institute) argued that while all agree that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the goal, it is unclear what each party means by “denuclearization” and the conditions each would demand for it to happen. Cheon noted that
the discussion has a long history. For North Korea, “denuclearization” has meant moving US forces off the Korean Peninsula and dismantling the US-ROK alliance. For South Korea and the United States, “denuclearization” has meant dismantlement and removal of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Similarly, countries today likely mean different things when they use the same word, “denuclearization.” South Korea and the United States are on one side and North Korea (and possibly China) are on the other. Cheon described the current situation as being “on the same denuclearization bed dreaming two different dreams.” He argued that clarifying the definition of denuclearization is the most critical component of talks with the DPRK, and doing so will clarify the path for the future.

Shea Cotton (Center for Nonproliferation Studies) explained the UN sanctions regime against the DPRK. He noted that targeting DPRK finances is a new aspect of sanctions and that UN Security Council Resolution 2270, passed March 2016, is where we begin to see that shift. In addition to a full arms embargo, UNSCR 2270 has a requirement for member states to cut ties with DPRK financial institutions. Cotton described the challenges in implementing a sanctions regime as broad as the one against the DPRK. He said that the speed of roll-out has caught countries by surprise and it is hard for many of them to keep up. Meanwhile, North Korea is trying to evade or work around the sanctions. On the question of whether the sanctions are working, Cotton pointed out that having an impact is not the same as success. He said that while the sanctions are creating headaches for North Korea, it is not certain that they are getting North Korea to do what we want – to coerce the regime to give up its nuclear and missile programs. Whether that is even possible is an open question, as most experts think that the North Korean regime views nuclear weapons as critical to its survival. Cotton said that countries cannot have effective sanctions in place permanently, especially for a goal that is impossible to meet. He therefore suggested that, in the short run, it is worth considering relaxing some of the sanctions in exchange for something short of the ultimate goal (i.e., North Korea’s complete disarmament).

Participants generally agreed that North Korea is extremely unwilling to give up its nuclear weapons program. It was noted that if that assessment is correct, now is not the time to weaken or destabilize the existing US nuclear umbrella, because the nuclear umbrella has been keeping South Korea and Japan from developing their own indigenous arsenal. The logic is that from a nonproliferation perspective, it is better to have the umbrella than more nuclear powers. An alternative suggestion was to build a new nuclear umbrella, this time for North Korea, since it has been unprotected and insecure due to a lack of guaranteed protection from the Soviet Union and China. Thus, what if Russia or China rebuilt a nuclear umbrella as a quid pro quo for North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons? This suggestion was countered with the assertion that North Korea’s core principle is self-reliance. It is therefore difficult to imagine it relying on an outside major power for its security (i.e., a Chinese nuclear umbrella).

As the sanctions regime against the DPRK has become more robust, capacity building for effective implementation has become a significant challenge. For example, two countries with minimal capacity, Samoa and the Marshall Islands, were accused of being involved in smuggling oil to the DPRK. It is very difficult for smaller, weaker countries to keep up with enforcement requirements, and with small bureaucracies, it is hard to adapt to changes in the sanctions regime. Given what one participant described as a massive gap between the sanctions regime and actual sanctions
implementation, it is not appropriate to talk about sanctions relief at this point. Nevertheless, it was also argued that there is an upper limit to what we can expect to get out of UN sanctions. While there are still a few loopholes and a few additional DPRK industries, like IT services, that can be targeted, as long as there are countries that do not want to see the collapse of the Kim regime or massive deprivation of the general population, sanctions can only inflict a limited amount of pain.

One practical suggestion was that countries need to better share information. For example, once a ship is de-registered due to being in violation with UNSCR sanctions, that ship can be re-registered with another country. Unless countries share information on ship registration, there is nothing to prevent this process. Also, there needs to be more government outreach to private actors because those on the front lines of sanctions implementation are often not government agencies but private companies. For example, setting up a joint venture has to be done through a corporate registry service or a lawyer. Private actors are the first line of defense against DPRK sanctions evasion attempts.

**Session 3: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) aims at reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. Nikita Perfilyev (CTBTO) reported that 183 countries have signed the Treaty and 163 countries have ratified it, and that universalization is a very important aspect. Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia that has not yet ratified the treaty, but it is expected to do so soon. Discussions about the CTBT usually revolve around the outstanding accession of Annex 2 countries (states that participated in the CTBT’s negotiations between 1994 and 1996 and possessed nuclear power reactors or research reactors at that time), which is required for the Treaty to enter into force. Yet states have much they can do now to improve the international monitoring aspects of the CTBT, notably enhancing data collection and analysis. Signatory states stand to gain not only from nuclear explosion monitoring but also from natural disaster monitoring and other civil and scientific applications.

Stephen Herzog (McMillan Center) described support for the CTBT in the United States among every demographic group, although the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review falls short of supporting ratification of the Treaty. Herzog stressed the importance of establishing national data centers (NDCs) in each country – currently, 129 out of 183 signatory states have an NDC in a government institution, university, or other institution. Several states in the Asia Pacific still need to establish an NDC. Often the NDCs only measure seismic activity or radionuclides – but both are needed to determine whether a nuclear test has occurred. Recognizing the non-universal interest in nuclear explosion monitoring, Herzog pointed out that the NDCs are also useful for seismic hazard mapping. Furthermore, the data is dual-use – the more civilian scientists are engaged, the more indirectly engaged they are with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and explosion monitoring. Herzog’s concluded by saying that ratification and entry into force of CTBT are vital. But in the meantime, he said that states need to build capacity and improve global monitoring; that bottom-up scientific initiatives will help; and that deciding that a nuclear test has occurred is a political decision, but should be informed by states and science.
One point made during the discussion following the presentations was that it is in the interest of the nuclear-armed states to limit the “nuclear club,” which makes ratification of the CTBT is in their best interest. The CTBT helps stop horizontal proliferation (new countries from being able to develop nuclear weapons) and vertical proliferation (countries cannot develop more sophisticated weapons design without a large bank of testing data). It was also noted that the Treaty is not subject to reservations, but the Annex and protocols are. There has there been consideration about provisional entry into force, but at this point, there has been no action taken to modify the Treaty.

**Session 4: NWS and NNWS Collaboration on Nuclear Risk Reduction**

The opening of the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty for signature has highlighted and created new animosity between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. This session focused on the perspectives of nuclear weapons states, non-nuclear weapons states, and nuclear umbrella states.

Raymund Quilop (De La Salle University) described the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ) as a useful vehicle for promoting cooperation in Southeast Asia. The establishment of the ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy (ASEANTOM) is the “most substantive” progress that ASEAN has made in implementing SEANWFZ. Quilop noted that ASEANTOM is not the equivalent of the IAEA – it is an ASEAN-wide network of existing national agencies, something that is prevalent in ASEAN. Still, forming this network to coordinate and harmonize work plans is a good starting point. The practical advantage is that it has spared ASEAN from having to establish a new body such as a regional center, which is difficult within ASEAN given its preference for organizational minimalism. The network nature of ASEANTOM also spares members from having to allocate additional resources. Nevertheless, Quilop argued that ASEAN member states should consider putting up an ASEAN-wide center for atomic-related matters, similar to, for example, the ASEAN Center for Military Medicine (ACMM). The question then becomes which member state would champion the establishment of such a center. Thailand was suggested as one possibility since it has been the strongest advocate for ASEANTOM. Establishing a SEANWFZ Center that focuses resources on the issues covered in the treaty could be an important first step in moving the SEANWFZ process forward.

Since 2012, there has been no apparent progress on getting the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to ratify the Protocol to SEANWFZ. An open discussion between ASEAN and NWS is critical to resolve this deadlock. Accession to the Protocol by the nuclear weapons states has become a defining element to SEANWFZ – accession has de facto defined the effectiveness of the Treaty’s implementation. Quilop argued that ASEAN member states should be able to exercise more flexibility and pragmatism, which has been its strengths. For example, there could be more flexibility on the exact territorial boundary delimitations of SEANWFZ. While the SEANWFZ treaty covers the territories, continental shelves, and exclusive economic zones of the states parties, military vessels of NWS could be allowed to “freely navigate” waters beyond the territorial seas and/or contiguous zones of the ASEAN member states. Doing so would resolve US concerns about passage through these areas. Another area for flexibility/pragmatism is in response to the Chinese concerns about the SEANWFZ area covering the contested South China Sea. ASEAN member states could stipulate that accession to the protocol would be without
prejudice to delimitations of that area in the future. In short, accession to the protocol should not be considered an all-or-nothing matter, but more of a political statement that would facilitate moving the process forward. Quilop said that it would be disappointing to see another plan of action in 2020 that says ASEAN member states will continue consultations with nuclear weapons states to encourage them to accede to the protocol.

Nobumasa Akiyama (Hitotsubashi University) offered his thoughts on how to bridge the gap between NWS and NNWS states. The current state of affairs is that the NPT review conferences have alternated between success and failure every five years. There was no final document at the most recent 2015 NPT review conference and no progress on creating a Middle East WMD-Free Zone. As noted in earlier sessions, there has been a deterioration of the strategic environment that has led to an uncertain future for the follow-on START treaty. The good news includes North Korea’s willingness to talk and the maintenance of the JCPOA (for the time being). It is unclear whether the Ban Treaty is a positive or negative development. Akiyama suggested that it expresses the frustration of NNWS over the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. The risk is that the Ban Treaty has deepened the gap between “Disarmers” and “Deterrers.”

Akiyama provided examples of overlaps or “crossover issues” that can help to bridge gaps between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states: negative security assurances, nuclear weapons free zones, humanitarian norms, international law and nuclear doctrine, and the right of self-defense. To prepare the ground for the convergence of different approaches, he said it is important to enhance implementation of the NPT review process. Each member state could declare voluntary commitment to actions with gift-basket type commitments – similar to what occurred with the Nuclear Security Summit process. There should also be interactive discussion on NWS’ national reports at the third Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2020 NPT Review Conference. Finally, all states should be fostering dialogue on threat and risk reduction, addressing national security concerns during the nuclear disarmament process, and investing in confidence and trust building measures. The work of the “Group of Eminent Persons on the Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament” spearheaded by Japan, which is intended to make recommendations in the run-up to the 2020 NPT Review Conference, is one such initiative.

Akiyama noted that states should also intensify efforts to develop monitoring, verification, and compliance mechanisms. Once a certain level of reduction of nuclear weapons is achieved, compliance becomes very important to maintain. We need to set a nuclear disarmament agenda that addresses the hard questions about the relationship between security and disarmament, including how to reduce and minimize the role of nuclear weapons in international security while considering strategic stability, cross-domain stability, and the fungibility and indispensability of nuclear weapons in various scenarios. We also need to discuss how to reduce or eliminate the value of nuclear weapons in international politics and address questions associated with the use of nuclear weapons in the context of international law.

The big issue for 2020 NPT review conference is how to define “success.” This has been a challenge ever since 1995, and it is even more difficult to agree on the final document today. Another issue is how to deal with past outcomes, in part because political commitments can change. A final issue is how to maintain balance among the “three pillars.” According to the
NPT, the obligations and commitments made by parties to the treaty should be interpreted equally. The challenge is being able to find the appropriate balance among the pillars. Beyond 2020, we have to reconsider effective implementation of the review process and its outcomes. Today the nonproliferation regime is at risk of “forum shopping” between the NPT and the Ban Treaty. More countries are ratifying the Ban Treaty – Akiyama asked if upon reaching a saturation point whether there will be two similar forums at the same time.

Paul Dean (US State Department) spoke on the legal implications of the Ban Treaty. Given many states in Asia are considering whether to sign/deposit the treaty, Dean argued that based on the treaty text, there are significant legal risks for states that want to join. First, there is the risk to the NPT framework. Second is the risk to existing relationships and military alliances. Third is the risk inherent in the vaguely drafted and ambiguous nature of the treaty itself. The risk to NPT framework arises from the Ban Treaty language that says it precedes prior incompatible treaties, which means that for states party to both the NPT and the Ban Treaty, the Ban Treaty prevails. The Ban Treaty also fails to address disarmament verification, unlike Article VI of the NPT. The risk to existing relationships arises from strain for the extended deterrence states, but also for broader military cooperation with nuclear weapons states. Finally, the breadth of the treaty creates a risk in itself. Article 5 in particular has broad obligations for states to adopt into domestic legislation penalties for private actors, similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Penalties cover not only possessing nuclear weapons but also assisting, encouraging, and inducing nuclear weapons enterprise. This raises a host of legal problems, including potentially affecting the ability of commercial interests involved in the production of nuclear weapons to engage in commercial activity with commercial entities in states joining the Ban Treaty. The Ban Treaty also prohibits reservations, meaning states have limited flexibility to shape their obligations. Thus, Dean concluded that joining the Ban Treaty is not a cost-free public-relations exercise. Rather, there are real risks – from commercial to defense and military – and to the real progress made on disarmament in the past decades through the NPT framework.

The discussion noted that the Ban Treaty arose from the humanitarian consequences movement’s interest in changing the narrative on nuclear weapons. Yet at some point, the movement morphed into a campaign to outlaw nuclear weapons. Now this treaty exists, although most experts acknowledge it as imperfect given its lack of details and the refusal by all NWS to participate. The question is, should we look at the text of the treaty itself, or is it a framework from which its supporters want to build? It was also noted that Ban Treaty does not constitute a legal norm because the vast majority of international community is not party to the treaty, with only 50-some states having signed and less than 10 ratifications. Participants concluded the session by asking what steps can be taken to address underlying security concerns that have created the growing rift between the NWS and NNWS. The challenge of finding the balance between nonproliferation and disarmament has clearly intensified – only when both sides are prepared to have an open discussion will we be able to reduce the gap. This makes Track 2 dialogues like the CSCAP Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament an important venue moving forward.
USCSCAP and CSCAP Vietnam co-chaired the fifth meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (NPD) in the Asia Pacific. The meeting took place in Seoul, Republic of Korea on April 4, 2018, on the front-end of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM on NPD). Approximately 40 senior scholars and officials as well as 10 Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders attended, all in their private capacity. The off-the-record discussions focused on recent developments in nonproliferation and disarmament, the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and ways to enhance collaboration between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states on nuclear risk reduction. Key findings from this meeting include:

The current strategic nuclear landscape is worrisome. The bipolar nuclear order of the Cold War has given way to a world of many nuclear-armed states. In this new multiplayer system, it is not clear that deterrence will hold as it did in an environment dominated by two states. Moreover, the emergence of new tools of strategic significance in addition to nuclear weapons, such as precision-guided and hypersonic conventional weapons and missile-defense systems, as well as new domains of engagement, notably space and cyber, make arms races and escalation more likely and deterrence and arms control more difficult.

A related problem is the deterioration of the international security environment, including among major nuclear-armed states (read: between the United States and Russia). Nuclear brinksmanship is becoming the new normal and the US-Russia arms-control relationship may soon be in jeopardy. It is unclear if there is even enough political will in both capitals to extend the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. The downturn in US-Russia relations is affecting regional stability in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East.

There is general agreement that achievements in arms control and nonproliferation should be preserved. The principle should be “do not harm” the existing, functioning instruments. Arms control has brought much stability between the United States and Russia, and the nonproliferation regime and its associated initiatives, such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program, have been a success. If building upon these achievements is currently out of reach, efforts should be made to preserve them, at a minimum.

India has recently joined the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group. New Delhi is also seeking membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which has been resisted because India is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). From an Indian perspective, membership in all four multilateral export control regimes is a rightful acknowledgement of its responsible nuclear behavior, and will benefit nonproliferation.
Defining good (or bad) nuclear behavior is difficult and unlikely to be universally accepted. Strict disarmament advocates, for instance, argue that nuclear-armed states are, by definition, irresponsible. The concept of “nuclear responsibility” is an area for future research.

The 2018 spring of summits with North Korea is raising both hopes that a solution may be found and fears that diplomacy could fail and lead to war. While all agree that denuclearization is the goal, it is unclear what each party means by “denuclearization” and the conditions each would demand for it to happen. The current situation puts a premium on coordinating positions to avoid misunderstandings.

Until there is a breakthrough on the Korean denuclearization issue, UN sanctions against North Korea will remain in place. Significantly, the sanctions regime has been strengthened considerably over the past two years in the context of North Korea’s “race to the finish line” with its missile and nuclear testing. Some argue that these enhancements have the effect of an economic blockade, while others note that sanctions implementation is lagging and that Pyongyang has consistently improved its evasion tactics.

Discussions about the CTBT usually revolve around the outstanding accession of Annex 2 countries, which is required for the Treaty to enter into force. Yet states have much they can do now to improve the international monitoring aspects of the CTBT, notably by improving data collection and analysis, and they stand to gain not only from nuclear explosion monitoring but also from natural disaster monitoring and other civil and scientific applications. In that context, there is a need to enhance capacity-building efforts.

Since 2012, there has been no apparent progress made on getting the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to ratify the Protocol to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ). To resolve the deadlock, an open discussion between ASEAN and NWS is critical. Establishing a SEANWFZ Center that would focus resources on the issues covered in the treaty could be an important first step in moving the process forward.

While there is growing division between the deterrence and disarmament communities, notably in the context of the recently concluded UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (or “Ban Treaty”), research is needed to “bridge the gap.” At the most basic level, both communities share the goal of reducing nuclear dangers and preventing nuclear use or war. The work of the “Group of Eminent Persons on the Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament” spearheaded by Japan, which is intended to make recommendations in the run-up to the 2020 NPT Review Conference, is one of these initiatives.

The Ban Treaty’s relationship with the NPT remains unclear and could potentially seriously undermine the global nonproliferation regime, especially because of its failure to adequately address verification and monitoring standards. The Treaty could also have a negative impact on military and commercial cooperation between the NWS and their allies. Research is needed to better understand the implications of the Treaty.
Tuesday, April 3, 2018

18:30  Welcome Reception  
       *Peacock Suite – Lotte Hotel Seoul, Floor 36*

19:00  Opening Dinner  
       *Peacock Suite – Lotte Hotel Seoul, Floor 36*

Wednesday, April 4, 2018

8:30   Registration

9:00   Welcome Remarks  
       (CSCAP Korea, CSCAP Vietnam, and USCSCAP)  
       *Emerald Room – Lotte Hotel Seoul, Floor 2*

9:05   Session 1: Recent developments in nonproliferation and disarmament  
       This session will focus on recent developments in nonproliferation and disarmament. Following accession to the Missile Control Technology Regime (MTCR) in 2016, India acceded to the Wassenaar Arrangement in December 2017 and the Australia Group in January 2018. What is the significance of India’s membership of these groups for these export control regime? What are the next steps for nuclear security after the 2010-2016 Nuclear Security Summit process? What is the status of the five action plans developed following 2016 summit? What role does the IAEA Nuclear Security Series have in nuclear security governance? What are the prospects for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the New START treaty, and arms control more generally? What are the major issues to be addressed and the likely outcomes of the fourth CWC Review Conference in Dec. 2018?  
       Speakers:  Manpreet Sethi  
                  Victor Mizin

10:30  Coffee Break

10:45  Session 2: The Korean Peninsula and denuclearization  
       This session will examine the current situation on the Korean Peninsula. What are the respective parties’ assessments of recent developments? What impact have new UNSC sanctions and strengthened unilateral sanctions by some countries had? What other actions can or should be taken to improve the situation on the Korean Peninsula?  
       Speakers:  Seung Whun Cheon  
                  Shea Cotton
12:15       Lunch

13:30       Session 3: The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
This session will focus on the role of the CTBT in reducing the salience of nuclear weapons. What is the status of the CTBT? What are the prospects for ratification of the treaty? What is the CTBT verification regime and how does it operate? What are the capabilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS)? What kind of capacity building assistance does Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) offer?
Speakers: Nikita Perfilyev
Stephen Herzog

15:00       Coffee Break

15:15       Session 4: NWS and NNWS Collaboration on Nuclear Risk Reduction
The opening of the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty for signature has highlighted and created new animosity between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. What impact will this tension have on the upcoming NPT Review Conference? What can be done to reduce the tension? What avenues exist for greater collaboration between the nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament communities? What are the prospects for getting the NWS to accede to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) protocol? What is the status of the NTI Verification Pilot Project?
Speakers: Raymond Quilop
Nobu Akiyama
Paul Dean

16:45       Wrap-up

17:30       Meeting Adjourns

18:30       Dinner
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