Key Points:

- Draft recommendations on how to promote multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia were discussed at the meeting. These will be finalised by the co-chairs in November, and submitted in the form of a ‘co-chairs’ statement’ (rather than a consensus document) to the Steering Committee in Wellington in December 2006.
- There was a great deal of disagreement within the group over the substance and wording of these recommendations, most of which consisted of proposals for responding to North Korea’s nuclear activities and its disregard for international opinion.
- Although there was support at the last meeting (held in April 2006 in Beijing) for the continuation of the Study Group, with its focus on promoting multilateral security cooperation, opinions appear to have shifted. In response to the escalation of regional tensions resulting from North Korea’s nuclear test, many in the group now believe that CSCAP’s energies would more usefully be devoted to other projects, including one specifically dedicated to helping resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. There was a general feeling that the types of regional security cooperation originally envisaged by CSCAP Japan (which had proposed the formation of the Study Group at the Steering Committee in Kuala Lumpur) were now a distant prospect, and that other priorities should now prevail.
- About 80 percent of the discussion both inside and outside the formal sessions in Berkeley focused on the North Korean nuclear issue. At previous study group meetings, North Korea’s nuclear activities were a major topic of conversation, but more attention was directed to broader regional issues.
- During the 18 months of the Study Group, a number of papers representing the thoughts and analyses of individual participants were presented, discussed, and then revised in response to feedback from the group. It is hoped that this work will be published in an edited volume in the near future.

Attendance
The Fourth (and final) Expert Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Multilateral Security Cooperation in North Pacific/Northeast Asia was hosted by CSCAP USA, at the Institute for East Asian Studies (IEAS) in Berkeley, California, from 23-24 October 2006. The meeting was attended by representatives from eight CSCAP member committees, including Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, ROK, Thailand, and the USA. Other participants included: Dr Chyungly Lee, Chengchi University (Taipei); Professor Phillip Yang, Taiwan University; Joyce Kallgren, Emeritus Professor, IEAS; Robert Scalapino, Robson Research Professor of Government Emeritus; and Chris Sigur, of the Asia Society. All together, there were 25 participants, including the four co-chairs: Professor In-Taek Hyun (CSCAP Korea); Professor Yoshinobu Yamamoto (CSCAP Japan); Ambassador Jin Guihua (CSCAP China); and Professor T. J. Pempel (CSCAP USA). China and the ROK were particularly well-represented at the meeting, with both officials and academics participating. Representatives from CSCAP DPRK were invited but were unable to attend, apparently due to the refusal of the State Department to grant them visas. CSCAP New Zealand was represented by Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White, University of Canterbury.
Session 1: Overview of Security Situation in Northeast Asia and Tasks for Multilateral Security Cooperation

The first session was chaired by Professor Yamamoto of CSCAP Japan. Reworked papers that had been presented at previous meetings of the Study Group in Beijing and Seoul were presented by Professor T J Pempel of CSCAP USA (entitled “Toward a Multilateral Framework for Northeast Asian Security”) and Ambassador Jin Guihua of CSCAP China (entitled “Opportunities and Challenges for Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia”). The third paper to be presented during the session comprised a new contribution from Professor In-Taek Hyun of CSCAP Korea, entitled “Northeast Asia’s Uncertain Future: North Korea’s Nuclear Test and Its Aftermath.” In the first part of his paper, Professor Hyun addressed the technological questions surrounding North Korea’s nuclear test, concluding that, though the explosive force of the test was small, it nevertheless showed that North Korea has the capability to produce fissile materials and to develop nuclear weapons. The second and third parts of his paper assessed international responses to Pyongyang’s nuclear brinkmanship: support for UN Security Council Resolution 1718, and the importance that both Beijing and Seoul honour their commitments under the new sanctions regime, particularly in the light of their expanding trade relations with their neighbour. The final part of the paper explored North Korea’s hard choices: the continuation of nuclear brinkmanship, with associated risks; a return to the negotiating table, without preconditions; or - what appears to be Pyongyang’s preferred option – an effort to ‘muddle through’, continuing to use the nuclear issue to attempt to secure concessions from the US.

In the discussion that followed, the general observation was made by a number of participants that all three papers tended to understate the recent shift in US Northeast Asia policy towards greater flexibility and pragmatism. Most comments, however, focused specifically on the North Korean nuclear issue, and on analysing Pyongyang’s intentions and their implications for regional and international security. Amongst other suggestions, an international focus on preventing a second test was urged; the importance of implementing and monitoring compliance with relevant UN Security Council resolutions - particularly 1540, 1695 and 1718 - was discussed (in the context of recent behaviour, which indicates that North Korea ‘listens to no one and is afraid of no one’); and increased efforts to understand the impact of domestic political and military developments within the North Korean regime on its recent nuclear decision making were proposed. The regional impact of North Korea’s nuclear test was also discussed: would Japan respond by ‘going nuclear’? How would the US respond to a nuclear Japan? Will China and South Korea enforce the sanctions set out in UNSCR 1718, and how would they respond to further escalation by Pyongyang? Is China’s doctrine of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states outdated in the context of the new security environment? Is the US insistence on complete, verification disarmament (CVID) in North Korea counter-productive and unrealistic? The point was made that, in thinking through these questions and others, consideration should be given to the impact that North Korea’s nuclear activities are having on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and to the messages that are being sent to other alleged and potential violators of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This issue should also be kept in mind by the international community as it attempts to coax Pyongyang back to the Six Party Talks, as any sign that non-compliance and defiance is ‘being rewarded’ should be avoided. One point, which proved controversial, related to the question of the relationship between law and force: if China, as stipulated in its New Security Concept, rejects the multilateral use of force as a ‘matter of principle’, how can the international community uphold international law in the long term,
particularly if UN Security Council resolutions are violated time and time again without the prospect that force might be used as a last resort?

Session 2: Theoretical Framework, Approaches and Mechanisms for Multilateral Security Cooperation

The second session was chaired by Mr Zhou Xingbao of CSCAP China. The first paper, presented by Professor Yoshinobu Yamamoto of CSCAP Japan, was entitled “Development and Decay of Multilateral Security Framework in Northeast Asia.” This was a reworked version of a paper presented at the Study Group meetings in Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing, the most significant change being a more pessimistic assessment of the opportunities for developing a stable multilateral security framework in Northeast Asia. Professor Yamamoto’s presentation was followed by a reworked paper by Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi of CSCAP Japan, which was previously presented in Seoul and Beijing. The paper, entitled “Institutional Linkages and Security Multilateralism: The Case of the Korean Peninsula,” analysed the complex interplay of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and global institutions in Northeast Asia, arguing that problems that exist in the region do not derive from a lack of multilateral security institutions (as is often assumed), but often stem from a lack of coordination between them. In a significant amendment to earlier versions of the paper, he argued that the North Korean nuclear test may be helping to foster these linkages, especially the crucial link between the UN Security Council and the stalled Six Party Talks process. He urged that bilateral dealings between states in the region should not be allowed to destroy these emerging linkages, lest a ‘golden opportunity’ for multilateral coordination be lost. The final paper of the session, entitled “Northeast Asia Security Cooperation: International Relations Theory and Embedded Regionalism”, was distributed by Professor Philip Yang of Taiwan University. This was a slightly amended version of a paper presented at the third study group meeting in Beijing. Although much of the paper remained unchanged, the presentation departed from the text by applying the IR theories explored in the paper (Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism) to the dynamics unleashed by the North Korean nuclear test.

The discussion that followed was generally pessimistic about the prospects for stable multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia. Several points of note were made by participants:

- ASEAN provides a poor model for future multilateral security arrangements in Northeast Asia, as it has not matured into the type of security framework that ‘takes responsibility for the actions of its members’. It remains a ‘soft organisation’, unsuited to the challenges confronted by today’s security environment.
- No genuine multilateral security mechanism can be built in Northeast Asia until China, Japan and the US find ways to ‘live together’ through creating new cooperative structures. At the moment, the major regional powers appear to have little appetite to address these issues seriously.
- Perception of interests are not fixed – they are constantly changing. Unfortunately, the Northeast Asian institutions that do exist have failed to transform national interests into shared interests, which are the foundation of successful institution-building. The growth of nationalism in the region is an indication of this problem.
- The North Korean nuclear crisis presents an opportunity for regional players to work together to address common security and, in doing so, lay the foundations for more permanent multilateral security structures in the region. With this in mind, it is time to propose additional dialogues outside the stalled Six Party Talks, which should not exclude bilateral initiatives.
• The effort to expand the dialogue on North Korea’s nuclear activities at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Kuala Lumpur in July (the so-called 5+5 initiative) and on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September is generally seen as a positive development. However, China remains concerned that this dialogue should not eclipse the Six Party Talks, which remain ‘a viable option’ for resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea.
• Far more thought needs to be given to the scope and forms of multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia, and particularly the issue of how to integrate global and regional security cooperation.

**Session 3: 6-Party Talks and Multilateral Security Cooperation**


All papers had had to be significantly reworked since the April meeting in Beijing, due to North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear test and the strong international response to these developments (UN Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718). The general message contained in all of the papers was that the sanctions regime should be enforced, but that a return to the Six Party Talks (and the Joint Statement of Principles) was still desirable. Discussion of Pyongyang’s motivations and intentions was lengthy, but could be summarised as follows:

• It is seems increasingly plausible that North Korea has always intended to develop deployable nuclear weapons (not just a sham programme for use as a nuclear ‘bargaining chip’), and that its nuclear test could be seen as an inevitable step in the long-term advancement of North Korea’s nuclear programme. When seen in the context of North Korea’s policies of self-reliance and ‘military first’, an ideological basis for an independent nuclear capability emerges.
• The test was supposed to announce and confirm North Korea’s nuclear status to the international community. US hostility towards North Korea, particularly since President Bush’s reference to an ‘Axis of Evil’ in his 2002 State of the Union address, intensified North Korea’s insecurity and fears of a US policy of promoting ‘regime collapse’ in Pyongyang. Thus the test was conducted to signal the existence of a credible nuclear deterrent and to increase the pressure on the US to adopt a policy of genuine engagement;
• The test was conducted partly in retaliation for the ‘double standards’ of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the US’ non-proliferation policies in particular. North Korea observed that the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan in 1998 were presented to the world as a *fait accompli*, and had minimal negative consequences for either state, despite subsequent revelations about illicit proliferation networks.

The question of how to prevent the further escalation of tensions in the region was also addressed at length, and opinion was deeply divided on this matter. A vocal minority felt that North Korea had now permanently exhausted the good will of the international community and proved itself incapable of constructive engagement. They advocated that energy now should
focus on enforcing the sanctions set out in UNSCRs 1695 and 1718 and on implementing an effective policy of ‘containment’ of the North Korean regime. The majority felt that, although the sanctions regime was a vital element in any resolution of the crisis, equal attention should be given to trying to coax North Korea back into the Six Party Talks. This should not constitute a capitulation to North Korean demands or lead to any concessions being offered in return a decision by Pyongyang to return to the negotiating table. Effort should, however, be made to flesh out the action for action denuclearisation agreement set out in the Joint Statement of Principles, which is notoriously vague on issues of sequencing. One practical suggestion to achieve this difficult undertaking was proposed by Professor Cotton of CSCAP Australia, who suggested that a series of working groups should be set up to specifically address this issue. The point was also made that successful mediation was more crucial than ever in the context of the recent escalation – particularly to communicate the concrete benefits of denuclearisation to North Korea, and to foster trust that any commitments will be honoured. The question was raised as to whether China was still the state best placed to perform this task, or whether additional/alternative mediators should play a more active role.

Session 4: Non-traditional Security Threat and Multilateral Security Cooperation

The fourth session was chaired by Professor T J Pempel (CSCAP USA). The first paper, presented by K V Kesavan of CSCAP India, was entitled “Energy Security in Northeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities” – a reworked draft of a paper originally presented in Beijing in April. The main thrust of the paper remained the same, focusing on the energy dependence of major Northeast Asian countries on Middle East energy supplies, including dependence on oil and gas imports from Iran. According to Professor Kesavan, countries in the region need to come up with new strategies for dealing with their energy supply vulnerability, perhaps putting more emphasis on nuclear energy, devising systems for collectively bargaining with oil producing countries, and developing a regional variation on the EU initiative to formulate a common energy policy. The session’s second and final paper, entitled “Non-Traditional Security and Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” was presented by Dr Chyungly Lee, of National Chengchi University, Taiwan. She argued that it is useful to conceptualise multilateral security cooperation at the regional level in terms of ‘three beyonds’: ‘beyond sovereignty’ (i.e. moving away from a primary focus on the defence of national interests); ‘beyond territory’ (moving away from the assertion of border delimitation); and ‘beyond military means’ (shifting strategic choices away from balance of power and relative gains considerations). Such a shift is necessary in response to the existence of non-traditional threats in the region, such as economic, energy, and human insecurities (the latter refers to the lack of basic human rights and freedoms). She proposed three preliminary steps for building security multilateralism in the Northeast Asia, including engaging in ‘real talks’ in regional talk shops; taking informal diplomacy seriously; and binding states into commitments via implicit contract before pushing for more formal security arrangements.

Before the substantive debate began, it was pointed out that discussion of “Cross-Straits issues” (as had been briefly raised during the last presentation) were supposed to be avoided according to CSCAP regulations. Subsequent discussion addressed the question of how regional dialogue over energy cooperation could be fostered, particularly in the context of increased regional tensions, and how a truly safe and secure nuclear supply arrangement could be achieved, given the regional expansion of nuclear energy. Again, the point was made that any potential regional nuclear fuel cycle arrangements need be thought through in the context of global nuclear security initiatives.
Session 5: Roundtable on Policy Recommendations

The roundtable was chaired by T J Pempel of CSCAP USA. At the beginning of the session, two discussion documents were presented to the group: one prepared by CSCAP China participants, who summarised their own preferences regarding the list of recommendations that should be presented to the Steering Committee, and the other prepared by Professor Pempel, who provided a summary of the policy recommendations made throughout the meeting. The discussion that ensued indicated that it is likely to be very difficult to agree language that will be acceptable to all four co-chairs. Particular disagreements arose over the use of the phrases ‘Cold War mentality’ and ‘New Security Concept’, which Chinese participants had insisted upon, and ‘containment’ and ‘escalation of pressures’, which had been suggested by US participants. Disagreement was also evident over the types of pressure that should be exerted on Pyongyang, with some participants arguing that watered down policy recommendations represented significant backtracking on the steps already set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1718.

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