

**NORTHEAST ASIA WORKING GROUP
MULTILATERAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK IN NORTHEAST ASIA**

Policy Recommendations

The following are the unanimous policy recommendations of the co-chairs of SG: MSF:

1. **General Principles:** Improvement in the security climate in the Northeast Asia is both needed and possible. Achieving this improvement requires countries in the region move beyond past patterns of thinking and to consider the merits of a new security vision based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination. This reconsideration should be fostered gradually and patiently with an eye toward the following:

- Northeast Asia has great potential as a natural economic unit with complementarities on trade, investment, energy use and the like. Current levels of regional inter-dependence, interaction and integration should be deepened.
- Regional cultural and educational exchanges offer a valuable mechanism for enhanced understanding and confidence.
- Harmonious co-existence of different cultures should be promoted and extreme nationalism should be avoided.
- The complexity and diversity of the region should be acknowledged. No one model of politics, economics or security will fit all countries. Recognition of that diversity suggests that a premium should be placed on moving toward enhanced security cooperation designed to enhance mutual understanding, reduce misgivings, and build confidence.
- Non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, energy security, environmental protection, infectious epidemic diseases and disaster relief provide excellent areas for regional cooperation and confidence building. Working toward the resolution of “easy” problems will allow for greater cooperation in subsequently tackling “tougher” problems.
- At present, no consensus exists with regard to the future modalities of any multilateral security cooperation framework, but in the interim a variety of different security cooperation mechanisms can be encouraged to exist side by side.

2. **Institutional Mechanisms:** The promotion of positive strategic dialogue across Northeast Asia can take many institutional forms, including, such mechanisms as ARF, APT, CSCAP, NEACD, and the Six Party Talks, among others. These different bodies can sensibly be tasked with addressing different security problems

- All countries should accept the benefits of overlapping and functional differentiation of roles by different bodies
- Different memberships in different bodies in themselves do not pose any security threat to the region
- There is a benefit in many instances to expanding the number of actors involved in East Asian regional bodies, particularly in that such members may offer new perspectives on difficult issues.

3. **Korean Nuclear Question:** The most immediate threat to security in Northeast Asia at the present time is the situation on the Korean Peninsula following the DPRK's nuclear test. Resolving the nuclear issue needs the common wisdom and resolve of all the parties concerned.

- All parties concerned should adopt a prudent and responsible attitude and refrain from taking any unilateral provocative steps that may intensify the tension.
- All parties should stick to their prior commitments to bringing about denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
- There is a great need to maintain diplomatic momentum and to avoid losing control of momentum
- The Six-Party Talks are still the only realistic means for handling and resolving the relevant issues. The next round of the talks should be opened as soon as possible.
- The use of force should be resisted in keeping with UN Security Council Resolution 1718. A return to dialogue and negotiation offers the best means for resolving the current crisis. Any acts that may cause escalation of the tension should be avoided.
- The UN Security Council's resolution 1718 on the DPRK nuclear test has sent a strong message to the DPRK government. However, sanctions themselves are not the end but the means to resolving the current problems. Individual governments may adopt measures congruent with their own perceptions of the situation, that are prudent and appropriate and that comport with UN Resolution 1718.

4. **Concrete Steps on the Korean nuclear problem:** A variety of concrete steps should be taken:

- Specific measures should be advanced in line with UN Resolution 1718;
- Greater details should be specified as to how denuclearization would take place;
- A mediator or guarantor should be identified; this should be a country that is trusted by both DPRK and US to ensure that measures agreed to are being met;
- There are benefits to incentivizing the DPRK to return to Six Party
 - a. While no specific promises should be made to any party for returning; it would be well to reconfirm the 9/19 agreed framework and to articulate the particular combination of gains and losses that would be faced by failure to comply with UN Security Resolution 1718 and failure to return to the Six Party Talks.
 - b. Specific measures should remain the decision of individual countries but it is important for all to reevaluate past policies in light of new challenges.
 - c. There should be an explicit articulation of possible aid and investment package totals; energy commitments, and the like
 - d. Behind the scenes pressures should be exerted on DPRK and US for more flexibility
 - e. A multilateral framework should be put into place to deal with financial matters such as counterfeiting and money laundering. This issue should be decoupled from the Six Party Talks which should focus on denuclearization.

- f. The US should publicly reaffirm its earlier commitment to restore full diplomatic relations to the DPRK.
- g. The parties should work to create an agreement upon a road map regarding timing and sequencing of steps outlined in the September 19, 2005 agreement.
- h. There should be an affirmation of the need for IAEA involvement in inspection regime.

5. **Harmonizing Regional Solutions with Global Solutions:** Regional agreements on trade, investment, non-traditional security and denuclearization must be sensitive to broader non-proliferation regime globally.

