COUNCIL FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE ASIA PACIFIC
1st Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Regional Security Architecture
3-5 September 2013
Parkroyal Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Co-Chair’s Report

The first meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on Regional Security Architecture was held on 3-5 September 2013 at Parkroyal Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Co-chaired by CSCAP Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, India, Japan and Philippines, the meeting was attended by 36 delegates from 17 Member Committees (Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, DPR Korea, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, USA, and Vietnam), and a non-member from Chinese Taipei.

The meeting undertook a systematic and focused effort to examine the region’s security framework. In particular, the Study Group deliberated on how existing structures and processes could be improved and streamlined to enhance regional security. The meeting was organized into 6 sessions and 14 presentations were made during the meeting.

The next meeting scheduled from 10-12 February 2014 in Jakarta, Indonesia will build on the first meeting and focus on the following issues and subject matters: a) Reconciling Contending Visions and Expectations of Regional Security Architecture, b) Designing a Regional Security Framework that Works Best, c) Streamlining Regional Security Architecture, d) Constructing a Common Security Framework for the Region, e) Enhancing Track 2’s Contribution to Regional Security. In addition to these substantial issues, the meeting will also strive to pull together the common threads of the discussion and draft recommendations for discussion in the Study Group Final Report.

Session 1 – Understanding Asia Pacific’s Security Problematique

Tsutomu Kikuchi started with a presentation on What is Security in Asia? Kikuchi gave an overview of the multiple definitions of security due to the different perceptions of what constituted threats to core values among states in the region. A hierarchy of priority in security issues can be discerned from the dimensions of security in the region, with national security and its subset, regime security occupying the preeminent position, followed by international security which includes regional and global security, and finally human security.

Kikuchi moved on to explain the salience of national security in Asia which is due to the confluence of several factors: 1) Modernist stage of development among Asian states characterized by the emergence of nationalism and strengthening of national power; 2) Changing power relationship among Asian states and future power configuration in the region; 3) Self-help and collective actions against uncertainty; 4) Security dilemmas as actions taken led to counter-measures which aggravate tensions between states.
Therefore, the current regional security architecture based on cooperative security arrangement might decay into a competitive security system. Cooperative security institutions e.g. ARF and ADMM Plus which mostly focus on dialogues and trust building are unable to manage structural conflicts related to sovereignty, balance of power, and security dilemma, even though they attained measured success in functional areas such as anti-piracy, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), pandemics etc. Instead, the bedrock for regional stability depended upon alliances as crisis management institutions which dealt with diffused threats rather than coping with explicit and specific adversaries and threats. Cooperative security institutions need to be supported by alliances to function effectively. Cooperation among like-minded countries through coalition of the willing such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has provided an effective instrument to address specific security issues.


NTS issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, and transnational crimes. These dangers are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive political, economic, and social responses, as well as the humanitarian use of military force. NTS issues are regularly featured among the Top 5 Global Risks in terms of Likelihood and Impact from 2007-2013, based on the Global Risks 2013, 8th edition, published by the World Economic Forum (WEF).

In terms of its overall impact on regional security architecture, a non-traditional security framework promotes multiple stakeholders, multi-level governance, and cross-sectoral international cooperation. New institutional arrangements within the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) pillar under the ARF and ADMM Plus, while ad hoc, have led to new regional configurations and responses. Robust cooperative measures are gradually shifting from confidence-building to problem-solving. There is also more coordination to minimize duplication.

Nguyen Nam Duong delivered the third presentation using the case study of Vietnam. The importance of a national approach in terms of studying security conceptions was emphasized due to the diversity of the Asian region. Even if there is consensus on what constituted security issues, the priority assigned to each issue differs in many countries in the region.

In terms of national security, there are three broad categories which is the interstate, intrastate, and transnational issues. Fluctuation in priorities among the three categories differs vastly among the sub-regions of Asia such as Northeast Asia (interstate threats), Southeast Asia and South Asia (intrastate threats), Oceania (transnational threats). Even with the sub-regional approach, there is still too much generalization and the specificities of individual countries might have been overlooked.
Also, the interstate, intrastate and transnational issues of security can be intertwined which make it hard to make a clear distinction among the three. This can be seen in the context of subversion which is considered a major intrastate threat among Southeast Asian states exposed to the process of globalization. The existence of a significant diaspora overseas hostile to the government could transform the intrastate threat into a transnational threat especially if the diaspora actively supported domestic groups opposing the government. This situation could deteriorate into an interstate threat if the government of another state covertly or openly provides assistance to the diaspora and domestic opposition without respect for non-interference in the internal affairs of states in the region to undermine the stability of the targeted state with the purpose of overthrowing its government.

On Vietnam’s conceptions of security, there are two integrated security objectives: 1) Physical safety of the country; 2) Safety of the one party regime and its policy line. These two security goals are hard to be separated and distinguished from each other, especially in the era of globalization. The underlying dynamics behind the security conceptions are domestic politics, and changes in situational and historical contexts which can lead to its lack of coherence.

Within the context of physical safety, traditionally it concerns national survival which is equated with territorial integrity of the land and maritime (Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea) borders. Currently, water resources security is also considered as a matter of national survival for Vietnam due to effects of climate change on the Mekong River which led to resource scarcity, environmental sustainability and natural disasters. Meanwhile, within the context of regime safety, in terms of security by what, a change from military instrument to economic instrument in the 1980s can be seen from the Doi Moi economic reform in the mid-1980s to create a socialist-oriented market economy. In terms of security for whom, there is a shift from the narrow concern for the party and government to a broader concern for the people and society.

The discussion concentrated on how security is conceptualized in the Asia Pacific, and the identification of the major security challenges that should be addressed and managed by the regional security architecture. On the conceptualization of security, it was decided there is no need to repeat this approach as there has been many studies done already on the definition of security, including by CSCAP in the past. Security is contextual with varying conceptions since it differs from one country to another in the region, due to each country unique circumstances.

The major security challenges identified are grouped into traditional security and non-traditional security. Contentions arose on whether the regional security architecture should prioritize traditional security with its focus on national security and interstate military security, while relegating non-traditional security to secondary importance. A case was made for prioritizing traditional security due to the inherent weakness of regional cooperative security institutions in addressing the competitive relations that led to increased rivalries and heightened tensions among states in the Asia Pacific, especially with regards to major powers and their allies. In the end, equal priority was given to both aspects of security challenges, since the promotion of cooperation and confidence-building in non-traditional security domain will complement and strengthen the effort to constrain the competitive aspect of traditional security.
Session 2 – Overview of Regional Security Architecture in the Asia Pacific

Ron Huiskens stressed that security architecture based on multilateral processes are only part of the solution for the region and should be made more effective as a supplement to military alliances (US hub and spokes system) and robust bilateral relations. US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton in January 2010 characterized the requirement as an institutional architecture that “maximises prospects for effective cooperation, builds trust, and reduces the friction of competition.”

The current structure was viewed as ineffective due to: 1) the emergence of the existing architecture was based on contingency rather than a grand design. Inevitably, the purpose of each forum is not as distinctive which leads to overlapping as forums expanded their agendas to enhance their pre-eminence over existing or prospective future bodies; 2) the modalities of all ASEAN associated forums tend to focus on the least demanding soft security issues with the unlikely prospect of being more substantive as they evolved; 3) ASEAN’s determination to protect its status as the driver of these processes, has tended to emphasize the status of non-ASEAN participants as guests rather than fully equal participants, or co-owners of the process.

The multilateral pillars to the security architecture should comprise three interdependent processes: 1) A leaders’ forum to address global and regional issues of common interest and concern; 2) A forum headed by foreign and defence ministers to address the security and defence agenda; 3) A forum headed by trade and finance ministers to address the economic and trade agenda. Such pillars (EAS + ARF + APEC) should be the model to be adopted if opportunities arise or can be created to adapt the existing processes. However, confidence in the EAS will have to rise before APEC’s prime movers agree to discontinue the summit dimension of this process.

ASEAN (and the other smaller and middle powers in the region) cannot invest these processes with the authority needed for them to become more effective, influential and consequential. These are qualities that only the major powers can bestow. To facilitate an evolution in this direction two areas of development are needed: 1) Inclusion of a Non-ASEAN Co-Chair to build a wider sense of ownership of the ASEAN-centred processes; 2) Conducting periodic review and assessment to strengthen perceptions of performance and accountability.

Hemant Krishan Singh gave a review of existing institutions which emerged from over two decades of contestation between East Asian and Trans-Pacific focus, open regionalism and closed regionalism, and growing economic interdependence and strategic competition. The results of such contests led to the current structural and functional overlaps as well as gaps in the existing economic and security frameworks in the regional architecture. The network of ASEAN-centred institutions assumed a higher profile as the US rebalances within Asia, while China enters the Indian Ocean and India reaches out towards the Pacific. These geopolitical developments made Southeast Asia the critical hinge of the Indo Pacific (or the Asia Pacific).

Within the economic framework, proposals have included ASEAN-centred regional economic integration such as China’s 2001 proposal to establish an ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and Korea) East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and Japan’s 2006 proposal to establish an ASEAN+6 Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA), which would include Australia,
India and New Zealand. In 2010, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was initiated by the US with the support of some Asian and ASEAN countries. In November 2011, in order to end the deadlock between China-Japan and to respond to the TPP challenge, ASEAN proposed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The challenge of harmonizing the RCEP and TPP is exemplified by the non-inclusion of US and Russia in RCEP, while India, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are excluded from the TPP ambit. A possible solution to the situation is by making RCEP and TPP open to EAS or APEC members.

Within the security framework, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) of foreign ministers founded in 1994 was constrained by its size, diversity and conflicting notions of sovereignty that have marked the interactions among its 27 member states. This effectively limited the ARF’s role to confidence building while undermining its role in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting (ADMM) Plus founded in 2010 is the highest defence cooperative mechanism between ASEAN and its dialogue partners which evolved from the ADMM in 2006. The ADMM Plus is emerging as the main regional defence track, moving defence diplomacy from dialogue to concrete collaboration on non-traditional security issues such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), maritime security, counter-terrorism, peace-keeping operations, military medicine, etc. ADMM Plus exercises are increasing in frequency, but the need exist to institutionalise these initiatives.

The ARF Defence SOM meetings and ARF Security Policy Conferences was originally initiated to engaged regional defence establishments before the establishment of the ADMM Plus, with the expectation that the ARF would eventually include defence ministers alongside foreign ministers. In 2013, the ARF noted continued efforts to integrate ARF and ADMM Plus by having the ADMM Plus Experts’ Working Groups members to take part in the various ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings (ARF ISMs) to share recommendations. This development marks a nascent step towards greater integration of security architecture.

The East Asia Summit (EAS) inaugurated in 2005 evolved from the ASEAN+3 frameworks. Contestation between open regionalism and geographically closed regionalism was settled in favour of former when the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Cebu, April 2005, laid down the criteria for EAS membership which are full dialogue partner, substantial relations with ASEAN, accession to Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)). This enabled its transformation into the ASEAN+6 with the entry of Australia, India, and New Zealand in 2005. The entry of the US and Russia in 2011 transformed it further into the ASEAN+8.

The EAS has the potential to provide an “eco-system” to sustain the power balance and normative frameworks, despite its limited role and agenda as a forum for strategic dialogue. To yield positive results, EAS needs a supporting institutional frameworks consisting of: 1) ASEAN Plus Economic Ministers as trade and finance ministerial; 2) ADMM Plus as defence ministerial; 3) ARF as political and security ministerial; 4) Other pillars like energy, health, education, etc. can complete the architecture.

Tan See Seng noted that the region currently accommodates a variety of security structures which are intergovernmental in nature based on consultation and consensus, with largely ad hoc institution-building. Its primary purpose is to facilitate dialogues among the great powers by
providing meeting places while maintaining control of the process in line with the concept of ASEAN centrality. This has led to criticism that the existing Regional Security Architecture (RSA) are mere talk-shop without producing substantive results, which highlighted the dilemma of balancing representativeness and legitimacy with effectiveness in the network of ASEAN-centred institutions. There are three schools of thought on the issue.

The Canberra School based on command or centralized regionalism represented Australia’s views which called for an overarching (apex) institution to provide overall management of the entire RSA. This is embodied in the Asia Pacific Community (APC) proposal by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2008. It criticizes the existing RSA as cluttered and ineffective, and argues that the RSA should be intelligently-designed, functionally-oriented, and streamlined with underperforming institutions being discarded. It supports the formation of a concert of powers comprising Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the US, neglecting any role for ASEAN. The enlarged East Asia Summit (EAS) is considered as an apex institution.

The Washington School based on functional regionalism represented the US views that promotes an effective and relevant regional RSA that works by being able to deliver results, and not just produce organizations. It neither calls for an apex institution nor removal of underperforming institutions. It supports minilateral or plurilateral coalitions of likeminded countries that collaborate on specific interests such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). It views ASEAN as the fulcrum of RSA but calls for overlaps to be minimized and a clear division of labour among institutions.

The Singapore School based on laissez faire regionalism represented Singapore’s views that saw the existing RSA as fundamentally sound and still relevant despite its flaws. It accepts that some reform is needed but neither sees change as urgent nor major. Multiple institutions are considered useful for different ends. Ad hoc construction of more arrangements are supported should the need arise exemplified by the failed ASEAN + 8 proposal by Singapore prior to the EAS expansion in 2011 to include the US and Russia. It supports the preservation of ASEAN centrality based on Tommy Koh’s description that: “ASEAN is acceptable to all the stakeholders as the region's convener and facilitator because it is neutral, pragmatic and welcoming.” The concert of powers are regarded as inimical to majority interests including its own due to the exclusionary nature against small states by favouring great and middle powers.

Overall, the Canberra and Washington Schools viewed the oversupply in regional institutions as a negative phenomenon. The cluttered and messy RSA which is the likely result will caused overlapping agendas leading to potentially clashing interests and role confusion. Also, the diffusion of resources and attention will lead to underperformance of institutions and overall ineffectiveness of the architecture. The net contribution to regional order is limited and even negative.

In contrast, the Singapore School viewed the oversupply in regional institutions as a positive phenomenon. The political, economic and cultural diversity of the region requires a variable geometry structural approach whereby different arrangements and memberships are used for handling different issues. Multiple platforms are needed to mitigate security dilemmas and
tensions should negotiations standstill in one institution. Multiple institutions also prevent the domination of the RSA by one single power or a concert of powers. Therefore, Asian states have greater flexibility and manoeuvrability in their regional relations.

Discussants recognized the contributions of ASEAN in giving voices to smaller states, and successfully managing the presence of great powers and the emergence of rising powers as well. ASEAN have also shown the capacity and will to regroup itself and lead the region forward in the face of new challenges. The continuity of ASEAN’s role in the region brings predictability and transparency to interaction between regional and extra-regional states, which would be hard to imagine if ASEAN never existed.

There was also a debate over the concept of the Indo Pacific covering parts of the Indian and Pacific Oceans due to its imprecise boundaries. The concept was originally used in the biosphere which later spillover to the strategic sphere. A suggestion was made to restrict the scope of study to the Asia Pacific. A consensus later emerged that there should be no preference for one regional term or another since both are arbitrary geographical definition which can change over time.

**Session 3 – Survey of Security Mechanisms and Organizations in Areas Other than the Asia Pacific**

Jim Rolfe used a comparative approach to examine security mechanisms and organizations in five different regions: Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, Africa, and Oceania. He explained that regional security architecture is intended to ensure effective regional governance and maintain regional security. It encompasses both bilateral and multilateral relationships, and friends, enemies and neutrals all come within its ambit. Its purpose is to ensure that the regional security environment does not allow issues between states to deteriorate into security issues which could lead to region-wide instability and conflict between regional states.

In ensuring regional security, there are wide variations between different regions which have more to do with regional understandings, needs, history and resources than with any objective best approach. Nonetheless, architectures can be examined in terms of their effectiveness, efficiency, and equity in achieving security. Effectiveness is an outcome whereby the region are politically stable and not unduly threatened by external forces nor subject to conflict between states or groups of states and issues that might lead to conflict, and/or instability at the regional level is both manageable and managed. Meanwhile, efficiency is the ability to achieve regional security at the least cost without unnecessary redundancy of institutions and overlap of institutional function. Finally, equity is the degree of openness in its membership and decision-making inputs to all states achieved affected by its processes.

Attributes associated with successful and less successful security architecture can also be recognized although specific institutions and processes cannot necessarily be replicated between regions. Attributes for success include: 1) Inclusiveness of membership and of decision making; 2) Comprehensive approaches to security issues; 3) Agreement on rules and norms; 4) Enforcement of rules and norms. Among the attributes connected with less success: 1) Lack of
regional agreement as to the issues or the means to address them; 2) A dominant regional actor; 3) Lack of enforcement of regional norms and rules.

Victor Sumsky presented on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) formed in 2001 in Shanghai, China, by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Among the priorities of the SCO are: 1) Greater strategic stability and security in its parts of the world (Central Asia); 2) Cooperation in fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism, and drug trafficking; 3) Joint economic development of its member countries and their partnerships in the fields of energy, science, and culture. The SCO is evolving towards a rules based comprehensive security organization as these priorities are codified in legally binding multilateral treaties and agreements, and not just expressed in declarations.

Two important lessons from the SCO experience considered relevant for adoption in East Asia were singled out. First, traditional, military-political security issues must be addressed to establish a viable foundation for security architecture. The final result need not be a defence-oriented structure or military bloc such as NATO as the case of the SCO demonstrated. Second, confidence building measures needed to be codified in legally binding agreements acceptable to all interested parties to promote mutual security which will lead to emergence of strategic trust, and cannot be limited to seminars, voluntary exchanges of data and informal social interactions.

Both lessons are inherent in the 1998 multilateral agreement between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and China on strengthening military CBMs in the borderline area which became a major common achievement that laid the foundation for the SCO. The legally binding measure aimed at building confidence by specifying the parameters of borderline demilitarization. The agreement also developed the basis of SCO-style preventive diplomacy (although the term did not exist in the SCO vocabulary unlike the ARF practices) by highlighting steps to restore confidence after it has been shattered in conflict situations.

However, the present security achievements will not endure in the absence of economic development and prosperity. Therefore, the SCO’s collective ability to boost economic cooperation is crucial as unhealthy economic asymmetry between its member states especially between Russia and China are not conducive to a more harmonious relationship. This may eventually jeopardize the steadily improving relations between Russia and China which is an important precondition for the SCO’s success.

The SCO has managed to prevent the emergence of failed states in Central Asia where sources of domestic instability and inter-state conflicts remains abundant but have yet to consolidate that achievement with effective state-building. This domestic level vulnerability will be enhanced with the impending generation change at the level of the ruling elites. There is also the uncertainty on the future of Afghanistan and the impact of threats that may emanate from it after the withdrawal of US troops.

Carl Baker focused on the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which is the largest and most diverse regional security organization in the world comprising of 57 states from Europe, Central Asia, and North America. It was originally established in 1973 during the Cold War as the Council for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In the interest of promoting the
security interests of a diverse group of member states, the OSCE serves as a useful example of how to proceed with the challenge of creating collective action.

The OSCE takes a comprehensive security approach in three dimensions: political-military, economic and environmental, and human. Its activities included hard security issues such as arms control, counterterrorism, confidence building measures, and conflict prevention along with soft security issues such as fostering economic development, ensuring natural resources sustainability, and promoting democracy and human rights. It is a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. All 57 member states enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis.

However, some of the OSCE features is unlikely to be accepted in Asia despite being well-adapted to the changing security dynamics in Europe with the end of the Cold War. Mechanisms associated with the promotion of democracy (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) and the protection of minority rights (High Commissioner on National Minorities) has few prospects for adoption in the foreseeable future in Asia. In relations to the ARF, it should not preclude the development of options to pursue such mechanisms since a danger of growing cynicism exists that could turn into a loss of political will to continue participation in the organization which is described as a talk shop without any clear direction.

A detailed study on the role of the OSCE Centre for Conflict Prevention (CCP) should be considered in finding ways to enhance regional response capacity, especially in terms of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). The CCP approach to planning and personnel requirements should be adopted if Asian countries continue the trend toward greater cooperation in disaster response. Consideration for the adoption of a more robust European approach to military transparency and confidence building might also be necessary in future should the current trend in Asian military modernization that might lead to a regional arms race continue.

During the discussion, there was a consensus that there is no evidence that any region in the world wanted conflict, and all region wanted peace to prevail. Nevertheless, regional problems needed context-specific solutions, and there is no best approach. Therefore, what are needed is insights from best practices rather than templates based on modalities from the various security mechanisms around the world. The Asian region also preferred the term of common prosperity rather than democratic peace which is more suitable for the European context.

The success of the SCO in legally binding agreement was contrasted with the lack of prominence and lack of success of its two members Russia and China in pushing for the adoption of such an agreement in the ARF. The low key profile of both Russia and China in the ARF was explained in the context of their respect for ASEAN centrality to avoid the perception of being overbearing towards smaller states which could result in their regional isolation.
Session 4 – Understanding Bilateral Security and Cooperation Mechanisms

Zhao Gancheng began by focusing on the deteriorating security situation in Asia caused by maritime territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The disputing parties are not interested in seeking solutions which led to the visible trend of an arms race in the region. This situation is mitigated by regional economic growth and prosperity which reduces tension but not enough to eliminate it.

China advocates that bilateralism should be the fundamental approach to handle the disputes without opposing multilateralism provided the approach is helpful and accepted by all the parties. Within the context of the South China Sea disputes with several ASEAN states (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam) over the Spratly Islands, both the bilateral and multilateral approaches will be pursued by China, which is also ready to negotiate for the Code of Conduct (CoC).

China is also committed to the principle of equal and indivisible security in bilateral approach. The success of a bilateral approach depended on whether both parties acknowledging the existence of the dispute. Based on China’s experience, if negotiations do not solve dispute, the best way might be to shelve them aside to retain the status quo. Any unilateral move made to change the status quo without taking into account the interests of both states, and without considering any consequences should not be made.

China also put emphasis on the development of bilateral and multilateral military cooperation not directed at third countries. The US wants to strengthen the alliance system for the consolidation of its leadership in the region rather than to create new structure for regional security. This will create divisions among states in the region. An institutionalized mechanism that is able to deal with crises and reduce tension is what the region really needs instead of a Cold-War style military alliance.

China believed that the resolution of mutual disagreement by peaceful political and diplomatic means depended on the basis of the principles of mutual understanding and search for compromise. This is exemplified by China’s pursuit of a Good Neighbour Policy which remains unchanged. A new model of major power relations, in which the Asia Pacific security accounts for a major part, was also reflected in China’s active engagement with the US.

Intaek Han gave an overview of a South Korean Perspective on Bilateral Security and Cooperation Mechanisms. He focused on the measured success of the US-centric hub and spokes alliance system in maintaining the peace in Asia in the past. The US alliance have deterred aggression against US allies while at the same time deterred US allies against escalation of conflicts. Nevertheless, the existing bilateral alliances are inadequate unless several challenges are addressed.

The most prominent challenge is the security dilemma that led to an inevitable gap in security perception whereby a defensive alliance can be perceived as offensive which led to the undermining of peace. China for instance may see the alliances less as promoting peace but more as its encirclement and containment.
Also, the existing mechanisms are designed and built to deal with conventional security threats, and they have been successful so far. However, this is undermined by the rise of nuclear threat, as opposed to conventional threat. The increasing nuclear capabilities of North Korea coupled with the existence in Asia of nuclear threshold states, require that existing mechanism be redesigned and rebuilt to deal with the challenges of nuclear threat through improvement of nuclear deterrence credibility and enhancing nuclear security in case of contingency to keep fissile materials safe.

Finally, the bilateral mechanisms need to be supplemented by a multilateral mechanism within the context of engaging China. The rise of China led to the need for its integration into the regional framework. However, there is no comparable security mechanisms built around or by China unlike the existing bilateral mechanisms built around or by the US. A clarification was made that this was not an endorsement for a hub and spoke system centered on China. It was suggested that multilateral mechanism is preferable to bilateral mechanism in engaging China. This is because multilateral mechanism are less likely to generate mistrust and uncertainty since it will have room for China and any interested states without the bilateral drawback of exclusion.

Tang Siew Mun presented Malaysia’s Perspective on Bilateral Security and Cooperation Mechanisms. He emphasized that bilateralism does not equate with military alliances and could also be political-strategic since not everything security is military in nature. In Southeast Asia, security focused on a secure border through cooperation with neighbouring countries in managing threats.

Malaysia which has extensive experiences in the use of bilateral arrangements to resolve and manage outstanding problems with its neighbouring countries was used as an example. It cut across many levels such as the summit level, ministerial level, and working committee level where most of the functional cooperation takes place. The bilateral arrangements are also multi-sectorial involving not only the police but also the military, home affairs, and immigrations and customs. Key features of the bilateral arrangements which led to its exemplary success are:

The bilateral arrangements are not directed outward at any third parties or specific threats as it is aimed inward between the two parties and meant to address both specific and broad issues. Therefore, it is a constructive and productive method of engagement without causing confrontation and antagonism characteristics of military alliances which is directed outward against third parties leading to potential rivalry and conflict between allies and non-allies.

The bilateral arrangements are not limited to soft security issues such as transnational crime e.g. smuggling. Hard security issues of sovereignty and territorial dispute can and have been addressed through bilateral arrangement as well. For example, cases of maritime territorial disputes between Malaysia-Indonesia (Sipadan-Ligitan Islands) and Malaysia-Singapore (Batu Puteh/Pedra Branca) were submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration to resolve the outstanding conflicts. The outcomes of both cases were respected by all sides without recourse to the use of force.
An important innovative feature in bilateral arrangements is the concept of joint development in disputed areas. The Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (MTJDA) in the Gulf of Thailand enabled the exploitation of oil and gas resources over the maritime area claimed by both countries through a Joint Development Authority which shares the profits equally.

The bilateral arrangements is not ad-hoc in nature but a permanent mechanism which enable state officials to gradually build-up a network of working relations and enduring partnership with their counterparts in neighbouring countries. This longevity has tremendous positive spillover effects in terms of generating goodwill and managing expectations and improving bilateral ties during occasional downturn in relations.

Most of these bilateral relations had evolved into structured and highly institutionalized mechanisms that have been used regularly for discussion to manage and resolve differences. For example, the General Border Committee (GBC) between Malaysia-Indonesia was recently upgraded to the GBC 2+2 level where the Defence Ministry and Home Ministry of both countries will have representatives in the GBC.

On whether the success of the bilateral arrangements in Southeast Asia transferable when its model applied to other regions e.g. Northeast Asia in the context of China-Japan or Japan-South Korea relations depended on many variables. Among them are the comfort level and the level of trust between the states involved. In Southeast Asia, the bilateral arrangements does not work in isolation by itself, and are buttressed by the overarching framework of ASEAN, especially among its original 5 founding members (Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) which enable trust to be build and sustained. It allows ASEAN member states to resolve their problems which in turn makes the region and ASEAN stronger by contributing to regional resilience and the institutionalization and stability that is ASEAN today.

These bilateral mechanisms are one of the many options in the region’s conflict management and resolution toolbox. In the context of analyzing regional security architecture, there are problems and issues that are best dealt with at the bilateral level, if possible, since any compromise or resolution would involve directly the two parties. A caveat was added that this is an overall observation not linked to the South China Sea and not an endorsement for the issue to be discussed in a bilateral manner.

The discussion at the end of this session focused on the effectiveness of both the Southeast Asian bilateral approach based on security cooperation and the Northeast Asian bilateral approach based on the security dilemma in managing and resolving security challenges. The bilateral approach in Northeast Asia which emphasized military alliance based on the US hub and spokes system have managed to maintain peace narrowly defined as absence of major military clashes for relatively long periods. Its endurance is due to the continuing security challenges in Asia which justify their continued existence among alliance partners while others outside the alliance wanted it to remain to maintain the balance of power in the region. The only way for the alliance to weaken is from a US withdrawal into isolation due to domestic difficulties, or from a Japanese and South Korean walkout due to diverging security perceptions and interests with the US.
The bilateral approach in Southeast Asia is good at managing ongoing security issues based on state-to-state relationship. However, when new issues arise, especially those involving non-state actors, the situation is more difficult to address. This is exemplified by the failure of defence and diplomacy in Malaysia-Philippines bilateral relations due to the 2013 Lahad Datu Standoff whereby militants from Southern Philippines intruded into Sabah, Malaysia to assert the unresolved territorial claim of the Philippines to Sabah on behalf of the defunct Sultanate of Sulu.

Session 5 – ASEAN Centrality: Boon or Bane?

Probal Ghosh stressed the importance of ASEAN centrality with a specific focus towards maritime security. ASEAN’s role has been crucial in the negotiation with China to ensure regional peace and stability through its Maritime Security Confidence Building Measures (MSCBM). The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) and the on-going efforts towards producing a Code of Conduct (CoC) have a positive effect in maintaining freedom of navigation and Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) security in the South China Sea, where the overlapping maritime territorial claims over the Spratly Islands between China and several ASEAN member states led to occasional flare-ups and potential escalation of conflicts.

The formation of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) 2012 which is an offshoot of the ASEAN Maritime Forum 2010 included the major non-Asian states with interests in the region in addressing maritime related issues strengthened the view that the main challenge for ASEAN lies in the South China Sea. This comes after a new round of heightened tensions since 2009-2010 in the area between China and a few of the claimants which saw the issue raised by the US at the 17th ARF in 2010. The way ASEAN conducted itself, and whether a favourable outcome can be obtained on the issue under the pressure of China will certainly have an impact on its relevance. Nevertheless, ASEAN centrality will not be seriously at risk since there is no other regional organization that can assume its responsibilities.

Anthony Milner pointed out that Asian regionalism – deliberate top-down region building (security architecture is one of its dimension) can be approached from a functionalist or an identity perspective that may or may not complement one another. The functionalist perspective emphasized on the security, economic and practical tasks undertaken by regional institutions, and is primarily concerned with their effective management. An identity perspective focused on the cultural and historical context in which a regional institution is proposed or developed, with emphasis on the norm-building, identity-promoting activities of regional institutions, and also considers the extent to which such institutions are rooted in an existing regional identity and awareness.

Milner stressed the importance of historical context as a factor in determining ASEAN centrality, which evolved from the competition between Asia Pacific and East Asian (or Asian) regionalism. Asia Pacific regionalism originated in the first half of the twentieth century, when the Institute of Pacific Relations (founded in 1925) was developing a Pacific architecture that would include Asia to replace the British-French-Dutch colonial structure. In 1937, Australia proposed a Pacific Pact that would include the US, Britain, and Japan. Following WWII, the United Nations created an Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. In 1966,
during the Cold War, Australia, Japan, and three Southeast Asian countries started the Asian and Pacific Council. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of Pacific institutions were developed in the economic field, and then APEC was proposed in 1988. Despite its declared economic objectives, APEC is considered by some of its proponents as a strategic body.

In the post-Cold War, Asia Pacific regionalism is not faring well. The East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998 was damaging for APEC. The Asia Pacific Community (APC) 2008 proposal by Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, which covers the entire Asia Pacific region and would engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, and cooperation on political, security, and economic issues brings the impression of being designed for an earlier era instead of the 21st century. The proposal failed from an identity perspective due to the concept of Asia Pacific having little emotional value.

Meanwhile, East Asian regionalism originated at the opening of the 20th century from the discussion of Japanese and Indian intellectuals on the idea of Asia which contrasted Asia and Asian values with the dominant cultures and ideas of the West. It later spread to China, Korea, and Southeast Asia. Japan was the inspirational leader in the regionalism project after it defeated Russia in 1905 until its military defeat in WWII. Despite later economic recovery from the war, Japan was unable to re-exert its regional leadership. The discrediting of Japan’s Asia vision after WWII and the division of Asia during Cold War hampered the efforts of India under Nehru and Indonesia under Sukarno in promoting Asian regionalism.

Within this historical context, Southeast Asia’s regionalism or sub-regionalism emerged to fill the vacuum. Before WWII, the regional concept of Southeast Asia was poorly developed due to its division by Buddhist, Islamic, and Confucian traditions, as well as by European colonial powers with their differing administrative, legal, and cultural institutions. During WWII, Japan gave the region a brief experience of unity. The ensuing challenge of Cold War divisions scuttled several early attempts at building a Southeast Asian organization until the creation of ASEAN in 1967.

An East Asia Economic Group (EAEG) beyond Southeast Asia was proposed in 1990 by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir but was thwarted by the United States and other supporters of APEC. However, strong Asian sympathy existed for his initiative since it invoked an East Asian vision comparable with the Asia project of the first half of the 20th century, especially among influential quarters in Japan. The East Asian Financial Crisis later led to the revival of the EAEG in the form of ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and Korea) in the late 1990s.

Around the same time in the early 1990s, an Australian/Canadian initiative for an Asia Pacific Security Conference was later taken up and localized under the guidance of ASEAN Track Two leaders into the foreign ministers meeting known as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. The ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus followed in 2010. An ASEAN Plus Three (APT) initiative in bringing together government leaders from not only ASEAN and the three Northeast Asian states, but also the major non-Asian states with interests in the region, led to the formation of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005. The EAS have the potential to become the coordinating body for the ASEAN-centred institutional network.
The steady achievements of ASEAN involve careful diplomacy, and a willingness to realize that some problems (South China Sea) may have to be managed rather than solved. Among them are 1) Successes in incorporating the former communist states of Indochina; 2) Lack of border warfare despite the colonial-made borders; 3) Bringing together China and Japan in a single institution; 4) On-going socialization of extra-regional powers such as the US and Australia. However, these are not newsworthy unlike the 2012 failure to produce a communique in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Nevertheless, these achievements are commendable given that the Asian region is far more complex and volatile than Europe. The progress of European regionalism has itself been a slow and long process with plenty of confidence building measures.

Discussants came to the consensus that ASEAN centrality is a boon rather bane. CSCAP and other organizations whether Track 1 or Track 2 would not have flourished in the first place had it been a bane. However, ASEAN at 46 years old is suffering from a mid-life crisis due to its selective historical remembering of the past by viewing its achievement as a result of holistic planning. In reality, ASEAN achievement is based more on trial and error making uneven progress by taking a step back for every two steps forward.

The credibility of ASEAN centrality is also crucial otherwise it will lead to the deterioration of the entire network of regional institutions linked to it with no other organizations sufficiently well-placed to take over from ASEAN. The lessons of failed and moribund organizations such as SEATO should serve as a timely reminder for ASEAN. ASEAN should also decide on whether it wanted to maintain its centrality or leadership or both, since it would influence the commitment and future participation of other extra-regional stakeholders.

Session 6 – Summary and Planning for the 2nd Meeting

In the final session, Carolina Hernandez presented a summary of the main findings for each of the previous sessions. The first session exposed delegates to the diversity of the many security perspectives in the region. The problematique is really how to understand and respond to the various meanings and interpretations of security given the complexities of the region in order to be able to construct a security architecture. The second session looks at the various regional security mechanisms already operational in the Asia Pacific with the conclusion 1) Overlapping in functions and structure need to be cleared; 2) Gaps existed in areas which have not been addressed by regional mechanisms. Many promises were made by various regional mechanisms of which only some were fulfilled while others fall short; 3) Achievements and shortcomings of regional mechanisms are both equal.

The third session focused on learning relevant lessons for the Asia Pacific from far-away regions. Among the lessons are from the European experience in the form of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and from the Central Asian experience through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which take into account their differing context with the Asia Pacific. The fourth session review bilateral security mechanisms not only in the traditional military alliance such as the hub and spokes model initiated and led by the US at the end of WWII, but also bilateral security cooperation that achieved good results such as those experienced by several ASEAN countries. Also reviewed was the security dilemma faced by
Northeast Asian countries (South Korea and China) on the proper response to inclusion in or exclusion from US-led bilateral military alliance, within a specific security context.

The fifth session tackled the question on whether ASEAN centrality is boon or bane. The general consensus was ASEAN centrality is a boon to the region, although it may not be sustained indefinitely. The issue is not whether to replace ASEAN centrality with that of another organization since its centrality have been good for the region. But rather it is the need for ASEAN to take up specific measures by trial and error to maintain the credibility of its central role.

Leela K. Ponappa followed-up and synthesize the important points of discussion. Each of the sessions has covered aspects of geography and various conceptions of security, regionalism and identity. Discussions have been wide ranging in terms of how existing structures relate to evolving notions of security. Calls for adjustment were matched by opposing calls for maintenance of the status quo. There are also views that no best approach existed to handle the issue.

In essence, the main issue vexing the regional security architecture is the divide between political identity and cultural identity in terms of what constitute Asia. Nevertheless, the political and cultural divide in relations to regional orientations can be bridged with the evolution of regional thinking. The example of the US was cited as its worldview gradually evolved from its European and Hemispheric orientations to the beginning of an Asian orientation in the late 19th century. Asia during the same period is also very different from today as the worldview of many countries in the region also has changed with the passage of time.

Another main issue is whether the region is more or less secure with the existing structure. The flexible and wide-ranging structure of ASEAN reflects the current geostrategic situation. However, whether such a situation will remain for the foreseeable future can probably be questioned. In relations, the level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with its achievements thus far among ASEAN’s stakeholders will determine the need and pace of change to maintain its relevance and credibility.

In terms of planning for the second meeting, the proposed draft agenda of the second meeting was circulated for the consideration and approval of delegates from Member Committees present at the meeting. The approval was duly obtained with two minor revisions. Firstly, the sequence of topics was rearranged for Enhancing Track 2 Contributions to Regional Security (from Session 2 to Session 5) and Designing a Regional Security Framework that Works Best for the Asia Pacific (from Session 5 to Session 2). Secondly, reference to Asia Pacific should be omitted since the views of Latin American states have to be included as the term Asia Pacific relates to APEC which includes member economies from Latin America. The revised draft agenda is attached below.

The Study Group on Regional Security Architecture is scheduled to meet again in the first quarter of 2014 in Jakarta, Indonesia. The tentative dates of 10-12 February 2014 was agreed upon subject to a final confirmation from CSCAP Indonesia. Arrival will be on 10 February, to
be followed by a full-day meeting on 11 February, and a half-day meeting on 12 February. The revised draft agenda is attached below.

THE CSCAP STUDY GROUP ON REGIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

2ND MEETING
10-12 February 2014, Jakarta, Indonesia

Revised Draft Agenda*

Session 1  Reconciling Contending Visions and Expectations of Regional Security Architecture
The diversity of security processes in the Asian region seems to suggest a preference for different modalities to address different issues. It may also suggest different visions of how security is best managed in the region. This session fleshes out the different visions and expectations of regional security architecture with the objective of identifying the common threads and differences.

Session 2  Designing a Regional Security Framework that Works Best
This session will address the primary question of how the region manages and maintain peace and stability. Building on the preceding discussions, what structures and modalities are more suited for the region? Is there any one approach that is more effective than others in addressing the region’s diverse and different security interests and concerns? What are the contours of a regional security blueprint?

Session 3  Streamlining Regional Security Architecture
Regional security is underpinned by numerous security processes which served and contributed to peace and stability. Therefore, one approach to enhance regional security architecture is to examine how these unconnected formal processes could be made to be more functional and effective by linking and streamlining these disparate processes. This session attempts to rationalize and streamline existing regional security processes.

Session 4  Constructing a Common Security Framework for the Region
A major criticism of regional security architecture in the region is that it is too diverse and uncoordinated. One solution to this conundrum is to consolidate the various processes into a common framework. Is the introduction of a common or overarching security framework in the Asia Pacific politically feasible? Would it be more effective and functional than the present “alphabet soup” approach? If a common structure is feasible and desirable, how would such a common security framework look like?
Session 5  **Enhancing Track 2’s Contribution to Regional Security**
Track 2 supports and complements Track 1’s efforts in promoting and managing regional security. Institutions and forums such as CSCAP, ASEAN-ISIS, the Asia-Pacific Roundtable and the Shangri-la Dialogue facilitate discussions and exchanges on regional security, in addition to providing policy recommendations and input to the official Track 1 processes. This session examines how Track 2 could further enhance their linkages and contributions to regional security.

Session 6  **Identification of Major Findings and Preparation for the Final Report**
This session will focus on the preparation for the Final Report. The Co-Chairs will endeavour to present the major findings and lay out the skeletal structure of the Final Report for discussion.

*Subject to change and confirmation*