The 11th meeting of the Council of Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific convened July 3-4, 2010, in Singapore. The meeting was co-chaired by USCSCAP and CSCAP Vietnam; the chairs thank CSCAP Singapore and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University for outstanding work putting the meeting together. The meeting hosted 47 individuals from 18 member committees; a significant number of attendees were government representatives participating in the Second ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament, which began immediately after the CSCAP Study Group meeting. In addition, they were joined by 13 members of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders program, who provided a next generation perspective on the issues discussed at the meeting. All participants, no matter who their employer, attended and spoke in their personal capacity.

The Nuclear Security Summit

Since 2010 has been a busy year, this meeting eschewed the usual one-session assessment of nuclear policy developments and instead took a detailed look at specific nuclear-related meetings that have taken place since we last convened. We began with a look at the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) that was hosted by US President Barack Obama and was attended by 47 world leaders in Washington in April.

Rajesh Basrur (CSCAP Singapore) labeled the meeting a milestone in helping to mark the shift in thinking about nuclear policy from deterrence to security broadly defined. It underscored the awareness of the need for a comprehensive approach to nuclear policy, one that includes systemic peace and stability, as well as security and safety of materials and facilities, and inculcating a “culture” of safety and security. A remarkable feature of the summit included commitments by several countries to ratify existing conventions, to increase financial contributions for safeguards, to eliminate source materials, and to strengthen national laws in an effort to reduce the risk of proliferation. Nonetheless, Basrur also pointed out several problems. First, with just 47 countries participating, several important nations were not present; their absence makes it hard to ensure the universality of any solutions (an ongoing concern for any nuclear issue). Second, he worried about the consistency of positions and decisions made regarding elements of the global nonproliferation regime (GNR); decisions in one context seem to contradict other elements of the GNR. Third, he decried the seeming lack of political will to take seriously nuclear safety and security; for example, only 14 of the NSS attendees have ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism. Finally, he wondered about the viability of enforcement mechanisms. Is it feasible to consider
punishing nations that violate emerging nuclear safety norms at an international tribunal at the Hague? Basrur thought not. Therefore, one of the immediate challenges that must be addressed is to improve existing enforcement regimes.

Li Hong (China CSCAP) agreed with much of that assessment. For him, it was an “historic event to seek joint efforts to address nontraditional security challenges.” The meeting reflected the elevation of the significance of nuclear terrorism which is vital given the backdrop of the global nuclear renaissance. The summit reinvigorated multilateralism and respect for international law. He argued that the NSS (and other nuclear policy instruments) should make illegal state attacks on civilian nuclear facilities; thus far, there is no mention of such a provision. Moreover, there was no mention of highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium in the final document. Looking ahead, Li Hong urged Seoul, host of the 2012 NSS, to invite the DPRK to the meeting. Moreover, he called for a criteria-based approach when dealing with the spread of nuclear technology, rather than a case-by-case approach.

Andy Rachmianto (CSCAP Indonesia) applauded the agreement at the NSS to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, but he fears that goal is overly optimistic. He also noted that IAEA mechanisms are the best venue to achieve that goal and to increase ownership of the outcome of the NSS. (This view was disputed during the discussion, with several participants noting that there are divisions within the IAEA about the organization’s responsibility for security, as opposed to proliferation.)

Discussion probed several themes. The first was the future of the Nuclear Security Summit. South Korea will host the next meeting, in 2012, and while it is too early to set priorities, participants agreed that planning should already be underway. One key component is the need for more public-private partnerships to tackle security problems. There was an industry roundtable at the third day of the first NSS; a US participant noted acknowledgement of the need to build safety and security into nuclear plant designs. This is part of the broader attempt to build a nuclear safety culture, a point that surfaced several times during the discussion.

A second theme was the role Asia-Pacific regional organizations can play in promoting nuclear security and safety. A Southeast Asian participant pointed to numerous workshops that have been held for nuclear-energy producing authorities in the region to ensure that those decisionmakers are aware of all the concerns as they move forward with those plans. Several participants pointed out that CSCAP’s Nuclear Energy Experts Group (currently inactive) previously accomplished that as it focused on back-end fuel cycle issues. They suggested that perhaps it was time to resurrect the group. The Southeast Asian participant called on CSCAP to assess the impact of the “nuclear renaissance” on the environment. Another participant suggested that CSCAP should link to other groups working on these issues to raise their profile and to give those experts better access to regional decisionmakers.

A key instrument in the region is the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Established a decade ago, SEANWFZ has focused on the right to peaceful
use of nuclear technology and has not yet taken up safety and security concerns; that may be changing. Last year, the group launched the Nuclear Energy Regulators Network and Singapore has proposed a Nuclear Safety Subsector Network, which will build public awareness and develop human resources related to nuclear energy and promote emergency preparedness plans. There was reportedly considerable debate in ASEAN as this initiative was developed: there are real questions about whether the region should create its own instruments or rely on existing mechanisms, such as the IAEA. (Several participants noted that the two should not be seen as exclusive or competitive, but rather as complementary.) Another tool is the Asian Nuclear Safety Network (ANSN), which was launched in 2002 to pool, analyze, and share nuclear safety information, existing and new knowledge and practical experience among the countries. It is, in the words of one participant, mostly a talk shop that has yet to show real progress or substance.

This discussion brought us to the third topic, the desirability of making nuclear security the fourth pillar of the nuclear policy regime (after disarmament, nonproliferation, and the right to peaceful use). Most of our participants were skeptical. They argued that security concerns were covered under safeguards and that states were not ready to take on additional obligations to protect nuclear materials. (For this school, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 was burden enough.) Another participant flatly dismissed the idea, claiming additional pillars – and concomitant responsibilities – weren’t practical if international law refused to consider the use of nuclear weapons a crime against humanity. Moreover, the failure to ensure real consequences in the event of noncompliance – a challenge for the NPT regime and the global nonproliferation order – renders any such notion meaningless.

**Arms Control and Disarmament Developments**

David Santoro (*CSCAP Canada*) began our exploration of arms control and disarmament developments, the topic of the second session. He focused on the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the nuclear strategy document released by the Obama administration in April. Santoro noted the new NPR was much broader in scope than its predecessors and identified prevention of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as its top priorities. It takes a comprehensive approach to the nonproliferation regime, yet he called the limited emphasis on UNSCR 1540 and the Proliferation Security Initiative as “striking.”

The NPR continues the policy of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US military strategy. While the document didn’t go so far as to embrace a no first use policy, according to Santoro it moves in that direction by insisting that the primary purpose of such weapons is deterrence. It clarifies US negative security assurances – promising not to use nuclear weapons first against countries in compliance with their NPT obligations – and strives to maintain strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear levels. Central to this mission is extended deterrence. The US aims to strengthen regional deterrence and reassure allies and does so by emphasizing the growing role of nonnuclear forms of deterrence.
Equally important is the maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. This is difficult when the US is not conducting new tests or building new nuclear weapons. Instead, the US is relying on refurbishment, reuse, and replacement. The long-term goal is, as President Obama has repeated often, a world free from nuclear weapons, but that is a distant objective, one toward which all nations must take steps.

Galsanjamts Sereeter (CSCAP Mongolia) then briefed us on Mongolia’s efforts to be recognized as a single nation nuclear free status. This is a controversial endeavor. While the UN General Assembly has backed the effort since 1997, the nuclear weapon states have been reserved, worried about the impact of such status were it to be adopted by other states. Nonetheless, Mongolia has begun negotiations with Russia and China to have its status recognized by them. Sereeter applauded the US-Russia New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), hoping that it would spur other countries to get involved in the arms control process. He hoped the NPR would have a similar impact. He suggested that the focus of international attention is now on China and whether it would do its part to maintain the arms control momentum.

Ron Huiskens (AusCSCAP) gave an assessment of the report of the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND), which was co-chaired by Australia and Japan. That report is “riding the wave” created by editorials by the Four Horsemen – senior US strategists George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn and William Perry – backing disarmament, the vision embraced by Obama, and the steps to that goal. The ICNND aims to first reduce the number of nuclear weapons worldwide to 2000 and then to zero. To that end, it calls for a moratorium on fissile material production, endorses a regime of NPT-like obligations for nonsignatories, calls for dialogue among all nuclear-armed states (at the UN Conference on Disarmament), calls for proliferation resistant design/operation of all nuclear facilities and calls for a restoration of the distinction between theater and strategic missile defenses. It also acknowledges the significance of conventional weapons imbalances and the significance of biological threats.

Finally, Victor Mizin (CSCAP Russia) provided a perspective on the New START signed by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April. Mizin considers it a major political event that put the arms control and disarmament process back on track. The signing of this Treaty has paved the way toward the successful completion of 2010 NPT Review Conference, which has adopted an historic Action Plan focusing on future practical steps for the promotion of global disarmament and the nonproliferation agenda. The two counties should now push to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and move forward on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Additional steps may be difficult given the central role that nuclear weapons play in Russian national security doctrine; indeed, those weapons offset a Russian sense of inferiority in conventional forces which makes further reductions problematic. Moving forward, Mizin explained that ballistic missile defenses will have to be addressed if there are to be further reductions. One option is for the US and Russia to explore the prospects of joint defense for Europe. This is part of a larger package of issues to be discussed, such as a shared understanding of the meaning of strategic stability, the role of missile defenses, and
eventual limits on nondeployed strategic weapons. The signing of this Treaty has paved the way toward the successful completion of 2010 NPT Review Conference which has adopted the historic Action Plan focusing on future practical steps for the promotion of global disarmament and nonproliferation agenda.

There appears to be real momentum behind the disarmament movement for the first time in years. Americans tend to pat themselves on the back for this development. Does the rest of the world believe that the US truly seeks a world of global zero and if so, does it matter? Most participants applauded the US position – the NPR in particular was seen as a real step forward; the only question is whether its words would be matched by action. There was also acknowledgement that the US cannot act alone and real progress demands collaboration with other nuclear weapon states. Critical to this process is China, but other large regional states also need to be included in the discussion as the nuclear weapon states change their military strategies to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Participants also highlighted two other requirements of the move toward zero: effective verification regimes and an institutionalized disarmament process. Institutionalization will, among other things, insulate the drive to disarm from political shifts. Meanwhile it is important to distinguish between moving toward zero and getting to zero.

US strategy is complicated by its provision of extended deterrence to its allies. Traditionally, this has been done via its nuclear capabilities. The acquisition of more formidable conventional weaponry allows the US to substitute one for the other, but an effective extended deterrent also requires US allies to be confident in the nonnuclear dimension of its security umbrella. The process of winning their confidence is underway. (One participant dismissed extended deterrence as a “scarcely convincing” rationale for nuclear weapons – US allies argued otherwise.) Several participants worried that this transition could spark a conventional arms race in the region. Other participants noted that regional tensions and the removal of one of the core elements of the existing security order – the US nuclear umbrella – require the development of an alternative security structure for the region. One participant suggested creation of a Northeast Asia – Japan, ROK, DPRK – nuclear weapon free zone.

**Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference**

Reviews of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT RevCon) were more stunting. Andy Rachmianto (CSCAP Indonesia) conceded that the 2010 RevCon constituted a new beginning, but the record since the 2000 RevCon set a very low bar. Dilip Lahari (CSCAP India) agreed, calling the meeting “a damp squib,” and an agreement without much substance. There was no significant movement on major issues: there was no agreement on pursuing a nuclear weapon convention, the nuclear weapon states only agreed to issue a report on progress made on disarmament in 2015 and there was no significant movement on nonproliferation – no agreement on adopting the IAEA Additional Protocol as the safeguard standard and no agreement on addressing the NPT withdrawal issue. While the final document includes 64 action items, little was accomplished, apart from a successful outcome and a reversal of the dismal performance
in 2005. Lahari insisted that the best step forward would be a convention that outlaws the use of nuclear weapons.

Other participants agreed with the overall assessment; one called the final document “distinctly underwhelming.” Several speakers argued the decision to proceed with a Middle East conference on creating a nuclear weapon free zone was a positive outcome, although that view was disputed. Israel’s refusal to participate means the decision to proceed may prove empty after all. This sparked a brief discussion of the significance of “universality” of the NPT. While almost all participants concurred on the need to bring all states under the NPT umbrella, a small minority disagreed, either insisting that countries were persistent objectors and the passage of time had not diminished their opposition to the NPT regime as it exists, or that withdrawal from the treaty ended all national obligations.

For a US participant, the most important recent development is recognition of the relationship between disarmament and nonproliferation. Both tracks must be pursued simultaneously for there to be progress in either. The “realism” of disarmament advocates is irrelevant, he insisted. If the nuclear weapon states don’t recognize the need to honor their article VI commitments, they will not get buy-in from nonnuclear weapon states on the nonproliferation agenda. A Chinese participant suggested that this underscores one of the most important contributions CSCAP can make in this field: helping to construct an international consensus on the need to proceed on both fronts and to raise awareness of the nuclear threat. He also emphasized the significance of back-end fuel cycle issues.

There was some discussion of the nuclear situation in Myanmar, but the consensus was that there is not enough information to construct an effective policy. When asked why ASEAN would not go directly to that government for the facts, we were told Southeast Asia governments would oppose any nuclear breakout but uninformed opposition would merely antagonize the regime in Myanmar. Instead, ASEAN member representatives urged caution and suggested that the group be ready to provide assistance to ensure that technology is not misused.

**Developments on the Korean Peninsula**

Our fourth session tackled developments on the Korean Peninsula; sadly there was a great deal to discuss, little of it positive. *Yang Yi (CSCAP China)* began by noting the renewed tensions that grip that part of the world. The sinking of the ROK Navy vessel Cheonan, and the ROK accusation that the DPRK was responsible, has inflamed the situation. Yang argued that all parties should try to defuse tensions, and identified the US-ROK naval exercise in the Yellow Sea as particularly unhelpful. Fortunately, the meeting of the foreign ministers of the “plus Three countries” (China, Japan, the ROK) and the subsequent leaders summit demonstrated a shared commitment to peace and stability in the region. Unfortunately, the Six-Party Talks remain stalled and there has been little progress toward getting them resumed. Yang emphasized that the nuclear issue is more regional than bilateral, and that all parties must be involved and help work toward a solution. He conceded, however, that the Cheonan sinking is a real obstacle to the
resumption of those talks and that it must be settled before the Six-Party Talks will be able to resume.

Choe Son Hui (CSCAP DPRK) began by pointing out that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula has remained the goal of the DPRK regime and that considerable progress has been made toward that objective – she pointed to the destruction of the cooling tower at Yongbyon as one poignant example. However, she blamed the US and its insistence on a verification regime, which she equated with a house-to-house search, for the breakdown of the six-party process. President Obama’s review of US policy toward the DPRK – and the freezing of talks that was part of that process – also created obstacles to progress.

Choe argued that the lesson to be learned is that the situation on the Korean Peninsula cannot be settled without confidence among all the parties and especially among the US and the DPRK. She insisted that the first step should be a peace treaty to eliminate the state of war; as long as the two sides do not have a formal peace, multilateral talks will be fruitless. Moreover, such a treaty would have precluded the nuclear problem as it would have kept the US from threatening Pyongyang with nuclear attacks (as is evident in the Nuclear Posture Reviews of the Bush and Obama administrations). She argued that it was the prospect of a preemptive nuclear strike – which was offered in the Bush NPR – that obliged the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons. This, along with the imposition of sanctions as authorized by UN resolutions, has undermined the credibility of the US pledge not to attack as laid out in Article 1 of the September 2005 joint statement.

Nevertheless, Pyongyang remains committed to dialogue, bilateral and multilateral. But she argued that the US nuclear threat requires the DPRK to have and strengthen its nuclear deterrent. And, the DPRK seeks unconditional support from the international community to revive the peace process.

Cheon Seong-whun (CSCAP ROK) noted that our meeting took place on the 100-day anniversary of the Cheonan sinking. His government also seeks stability and peace and peaceful unification. But, Seoul and the South Korean people want an apology from the DPRK for the sinking of the Cheonan. To muster international opinion to its position, the ROK has referred the incident to the UN, claiming it is a violation of the UN Charter, the armistice agreement, and all major North-South agreements.

Cheon agreed that the Six-Party Talks have been badly affected by the incident, but he insisted that his government hasn’t lost hope in that negotiation framework and is waiting for Pyongyang to return to the table. He is not optimistic, however, pointing to the DPRK’s record since the talks began: it has conducted two nuclear tests, admitted that it does have a program to make highly enriched uranium, and sold a nuclear reactor to Syria. But before the talks can move forward, the DPRK must apologize and promise that there will be no repetition of such behavior.

In a rebuttal, Choe dismissed the “so-called Cheonan incident,” calling it an election ploy to boost the government’s prospects in local elections. A US participant noted that the
Six-Party Talks had been in abeyance before the Cheonan incident; he argued that the North had shown no inclination to return to the talks and the controversy gave Pyongyang an excuse to continue on its current path. In fact, he noted that there are very few people in Washington and elsewhere who believe that the North will give up its nuclear weapons under any circumstances. If that assumption is correct, then there is little incentive to talk. A DPRK participant denied that insinuation and said that Pyongyang remains committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and the Six-Party Talks – as long as the September 2005 joint declaration remains in effect.

The challenge is how to “settle” the Cheonan incident. Our discussion evidenced some skepticism about the results of the ROK investigation. One participant suggested that it be tabled at the Six-Party Talks; several proposed that the DPRK be allowed to inspect the evidence. Another participant suggested that it be brought to the Armistice Commission, but it was noted that the DPRK had declined that suggestion. For all the uncertainty, it is clear that the Cheonan attack has underscored the volatility and the dangers in Northeast Asia. It has, said a US participant, reinforced US resolve to address the threats posed by North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. Moreover, he emphasized the US position that the DPRK won’t achieve security or international acceptance without complete and verifiable abandonment of its nuclear weapons program. It should cease provocative behavior toward its neighbors, make peace with them, comply with international law, and resume its nuclear obligations.

All parties agreed that efforts should be made to dampen tensions and prevent instability. The problem is that there are disagreements about the causes of instability. There are aggressive acts against states, there are unilateral acts that some governments insist are within their rights, and there are unanticipated developments that can trigger instability as well. Regional governments should prepare for all three.

There were several attempts to provide clarification during the discussion. US participants countered the North Korean assertion that it was targeted by the US for a preemptive nuclear attack. In fact, the message from the new US NPR is that if a state is not in compliance with its NPT obligations it will not enjoy negative security assurances; that is not the same as saying the US will attack. The second part of the US message has also been ignored: if a state is in compliance with those obligations, the US will not attack.

A DPRK participant noted the alleged missile test that triggered UNSC resolution 1874 was actually a satellite launch and all states have the right to launch peaceful satellites. Furthermore, the DPRK position is that the sanctions imposed against it are not justified but they do not, by themselves, preclude Pyongyang’s return to the Six-Party Talks.

Day two began with a quick review of progress on the *Handbook on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific*, one of the Study Group’s work products. It is taking shape, but USCSCAP member and Handbook writer/editor/coordinator Carl Baker urged participants to provide information for the section on national initiatives to prevent proliferation and promote disarmament. He has
made that plea at the last several meetings and has received a desultory response. The
session was devoted to an explanation of changes he has made and he fielded yet more
suggestions from the floor. He reminded participants – and readers of this report – that
criticism is appreciated, but suggestions on improvements and the provision of words and
information are most valuable.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Larry Scheinman (USCSCAP) gave us a rundown on the role that UNSCR 1540 has
played in helping reinforce NPT obligations and how regional organizations can support
it and their member governments to be compliant with its terms. The role of regional
organizations will take on additional significance as nuclear energy spreads and more
states grapple with the resolution’s requirements. UNSCR 1540 will become even more
important in this environment in ensuring that nuclear materials are not misused.

He was followed by Ta Minh Tuan (CSCAP Vietnam), who outlined his country’s nuclear
energy agenda. In 2014, Vietnam will start of construction of its first nuclear power plant,
which should be operational by 2020. Other nations are also contemplating the nuclear
energy option. Asia is experiencing what some have termed a “nuclear renaissance.” In
this situation, Tuan noted, ASEAN has special responsibilities. It is promoting nuclear
safety networks, as was discussed the previous day. Track-two workshops on nuclear
energy and nonproliferation have also been held. The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (SEANFW), the region’s key nonproliferation mechanism, is developing a
five-year action plan. Those efforts will: ensure compliance of all ASEAN undertakings
with the NPT, IAEA safeguards and related instruments; obtain accession to the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation by all NWS; promote cooperation with the IAEA, other NWFZs
and other states to meet regional standards regarding accidents, safety, security, and
protection of nuclear materials; articulate a work program to implement the action plan.
Uplifting as this agenda may sound, Tuan concluded by noting that no one really talks
about nonproliferation in the ASEAN security community.

Our discussion probed the ways ASEAN can promote a better understanding of the risks
and requirements surrounding the use of nuclear energy. One Southeast Asian participant
noted that there have been numerous studies of the pros and cons of nuclear energy along
with assessments of other renewable energy options; a recent analysis by Singapore’s
RSIS drew no conclusions on the ultimate desirability of that option. But it was pointed
out that ASEAN is focused on nuclear materials, not the fuel cycle itself. A Southeast
Asian participant noted that the treaty that established the SEANWFZ doesn’t include
weapons of mass destruction, although the new ASEAN charter does include a
commitment to keep the region free of WMD. In addition, counterterrorism cooperation
does cover nuclear terrorism. For its part, the SEANFWZ does refer to illegal dumping of
wastes and safeguard provisions.

This would seem to pose an opportunity for CSCAP: several participants suggested that it
is time to resurrect the Nuclear Energy Experts Group, which could focus on back-end
fuel cycle issues, especially how to deal with long-term waste storage and disposal. There
was considerable support in our group for the development of a regional solution to this problem. Storage issues also invite consideration of assured supply of fuel since supply agreements usually include arrangements regarding used materials. Russia could play a key role here, given its interest in serving global markets and its seeming readiness to take back spent fuel and provide storage. The earlier suggestion by this working group that states consider a regional or sub-regional Reprocessing and Enrichment Free Zone initiative to close NPT “loopholes” and reassure neighbors of long-term peaceful intent was once again tabled and debated.

Southeast Asia is, concluded one participant, close to a “green field” when it comes to nuclear energy. But as many governments contemplate the nuclear energy option, it is important that they get those decisions right. That means ensuring that they are informed about all the key issues and that there is an effective regulatory mechanism in place. Given what appear to be a number of nuclear regulatory initiatives already underway, it is vital that they be complementary rather than redundant, and that all key concerns are covered. Membership should be as inclusive as possible and inspection, verification, and compliance mechanisms must have teeth. (This is problematic for Southeast Asia, given the sensitivities that surround any surrender of sovereignty.) Transparency should be mandated.

This is also an opportunity for track two and the private sector. They can raise awareness among publics and the government, as well as raise issues that might not otherwise get the attention they deserve. Track two can push the envelope to ask difficult questions and explore new options.

The meeting concluded with a look ahead. The group is currently assessing a draft memo that focuses on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Readers are reminded to provide comments and suggestions – again actual wording is always helpful – so that we can move that process forward. We also hope to have a final draft of the handbook ready at the next study group meeting. That meeting, the study group’s 12th, was anticipated to be held back to back again with the next ARF ISM on Nonproliferation and Disarmament. In fact, it looks as though that ARF meeting will not occur until early in 2011; the next WMD Study Group meeting will instead be held in Vietnam in mid-December. It is likely to focus on follow-up items from the many nuclear policy meetings discussed in Singapore, such as exploring the 64 action items identified at the NPT RevCom and finalizing a “Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” CSCAP Memorandum.
The eleventh meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) WMD Study Group was held on July 3-4, 2010 in Singapore, involving over 50 security specialists from throughout the Asia-Pacific region, including selected members from the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ARF ISM/NPD), who attended in their private capacities. Discussion focused on recent disarmament and nonproliferation initiatives and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Key findings and recommendations from this off-the-record meeting include:

- While the likelihood of nuclear war has diminished substantially, the possibility of singular occurrences of nuclear weapons use have increased. This adds a new sense of urgency to global and regional NPD efforts.

- The first Nuclear Security Summit was an important and perhaps even transformational event in the effort to create international consensus on the need to ensure the safety and security of nuclear materials. More stakeholders should be included in these discussions, especially countries and private sector actors involved in nuclear power generation.

- The 2010 NPT Review Conference was a success when compared to the 2005 meeting, principally in being able to agree on a Final Document. There was a general sense of disappointment in its accomplishments, however, given higher expectations and the growing need for deeper cooperation on NPD issues. The 64 action items laid out in the RevCon final document, based on the three pillars of the NPT and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, provide both a roadmap and a means to measure future progress in achieving NPT goals.

- A regime of entitlements and corresponding obligations should be developed for states residing outside the NPT aimed at assuring that global nonproliferation and disarmament standards will be honored; simply demanding that they join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states accomplishes nothing.

- The New START agreement sends an important signal that Russia and the US are committed to reducing the size of their arsenals. However, follow-up discussions between the two should begin soon, with an eye to bringing other nations into nuclear arms control and reduction talks. Some believed it unrealistic to expect significant additional deep US/Russia arsenal cuts (i.e., to 500 warheads each, as prescribed in the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament report) without involvement by other recognized and declared nuclear weapons states. Other important issues that must be addressed include missile defenses, non-deployed warheads, and conventional capabilities.
- Real progress on disarmament will require the inclusion of all nuclear weapons-capable nations at an appropriate stage as well as those that are part of the US extended deterrent umbrella.

- Moving toward zero is different from getting to zero. We should not let the obstacles involved in achieving the latter prevent progress in the former.

- In order for the disarmament process to continue and make substantial progress, it is necessary to institutionalize the movement. This will require the development of a regime for addressing issues such as verification and transparency.- Given the centrality of nuclear weapons to the existing structure of the international order, it was argued that the elimination of nuclear weapons requires the creation of an alternative means to ensure peace, security, and stability. The current impasse on the Korean Peninsula epitomizes this dilemma.

- There are currently contending views among the countries involved regarding the causes of instability in Northeast Asia. There is little prospect for progress on any discussion on denuclearization in Korea until the current impasse over the sinking of the ROK Navy ship is resolved.

- Nonetheless, all sides profess a commitment to the denuclearization of the peninsula and to the provisions of the September 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, which can provide a basis for future discussions once/if the Six-Party Talks resume.

- The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review is a step in the right direction toward reducing the importance of nuclear weapons and in providing negative security assurances to states in full compliance with their NPT obligations. While some see the exclusion of the DPRK and Iran from these assurances as threatening or potentially destabilizing, others stress the opportunity for all states to enjoy security assurances if full compliance is achieved.

- There is growing reliance on nuclear energy in Northeast Asia and growing interest or intention to pursue nuclear energy alternatives in Southeast Asia. This raises safety, security, and proliferation concerns that lend themselves to greater multilateral cooperation and will be addressed in a forthcoming CSCAP Memorandum.

- The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) and ASEAN Charter recognize the right of ASEAN states to pursue nuclear energy but also the responsibilities for transparency and attention to nonproliferation concerns. The opportunity exists for greater cooperation in areas dealing with safety and security standards, reliable access to nuclear fuel, spent fuel and low-level waste management, nuclear forensics, and the development and implementation of emergency response procedures.

- Regional organizations (such as the ARF, EAS, etc.) and sub-regional organizations and initiatives (such as ASEAN, the Six-Party Talks, etc.) are encouraged to consider the establishment, in appropriate areas, of Reprocessing and Enrichment Free Zones or other
methods or restrictions that would reassure one another and others that current NPT “loopholes” would be closed or not abused.

- States using or considering the use of nuclear power must remind themselves of the requirements and guidelines outlined in UNSCR 1540 regarding the necessity of keeping nuclear materials and technology out of the hands of non-state actors and the requirement for halting or stemming proliferation.

- The CSCAP Handbook on Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia-Pacific, while still a work in progress, provides a useful source of reference material and is available on line at http://www.cscap.org.

For more information, please contact CSCAP WMD Study Group co-chairs Ralph Cossa [RACPacForum@cs.com] or Son Hun Nguyen [nguyenhunson2005@yahoo.com]. These findings reflect the view of the seminar chairmen; this is not a consensus document. A full summary of the workshop proceedings is being prepared and will be available upon request shortly.