

**Chairmen's Report of the First Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific
Singapore, May 27-28, 2005**

Rising concern about the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) spurred the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) to form a Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific, co-chaired CSCAP Singapore and USCSCAP. More than 35 experts and officials from CSCAP member countries convened in Singapore, May 27-28, 2005 to examine the threat posed by the spread of WMD, instruments to check this regional and global menace, and avenues available to CSCAP to help develop multilateral approaches and solutions aimed at addressing this problem. Participants were joined by a group of Young Leaders from throughout the region, as part of a program sponsored by USCSCAP/Pacific Forum CSIS, to involve the next generation of security specialists in policy-oriented deliberations. (More information on the Young Leaders program is available on the Pacific Forum website, www.csis.org/pacfor) The report that follows summarizes the discussions of that meeting. As in the past, this is not a consensus document; it merely represents the views of the co-chairs and the rapporteur.

Status of Global Nonproliferation Norms

The meeting began with an overview of the WMD threat and the nonproliferation regime that has been designed to counter it. Wu Xingzuo from CSCAP China acknowledged that WMD is a regional concern. Since “stopping WMD proliferation is a key mission for the international community,” the Asia Pacific region has responded on several levels: a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) has been established; the issue has been a priority at international meetings such as the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); multilateral programs have been initiated, such as the Six-Party Talks to address the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); Japan has hosted senior-level talks on nonproliferation (ASTOP); and track-two efforts, such as this one, have been initiated.

Each faces obstacles and challenges, as do all attempts to enforce nonproliferation regimes. An overriding concern is the need to adopt to regional norms: the unique characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region, in particular its diversity and the preference for informal, consensual programs, constrain any response. Governments are slow to embrace restrictive nonproliferation regimes as they worry about sovereign prerogatives they might have to give up, as well as the economic cost of such measures. Many regional states lack the capacity to implement effective non- and counter-proliferation programs. Finally, there is concern about the policies of nuclear weapons states (NWS), and especially those of the U.S., which seem hypocritical as they demand that non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) adopt tighter controls on nuclear programs yet refuse to take concrete measures to eliminate their own arsenals.

Many measures can be adopted to strengthen the global nonproliferation order. The key to success is that they must be – and be seen to be – legitimate. They must be firmly

grounded in international law. To ensure such legitimacy, Wu argued that nonproliferation (as opposed to counter-proliferation) should be the core of WMD nonproliferation efforts, and the NPT should assume the primary role. To that end, he called on the U.S. to formalize its current nonproliferation efforts and engage other countries to get them adopted. The U.S.' "dual standard" must end: it must subject itself to international regimes and begin to permanently dismantle its own arsenal.

As we met, the news from New York was bleak. It appeared as though the 2005 Review conference of the NPT would end without success. (In fact, it ended without even issuing a document.) Larry Scheinman of USCSCAP assessed the talks, arguing that the results might not be as bad as feared. The NPT is a dynamic document and it has grown and adapted to various challenges. He traced the evolution of the NPT regime and demonstrated how it has coped with crises since it first went into force. From the first Indian nuclear tests to the current North Korean crisis, the nonproliferation regime has proven remarkably resilient. It has added mechanisms, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Additional Protocols, to name the best known.

The world has grown increasingly cognizant of the fact that "civil and military atoms are Siamese twins; there are not two atomic energies." As a result, there is increasing attention to programs designed to close off opportunities for nations determined to cheat on their NPT commitments. There is as yet no international consensus on how to reconcile the twin goals of strengthening the nonproliferation regime and maintaining access to nuclear energy. But optimism prevailed; the NPT is not a stand-alone proposition. It can be built upon and reinforced.

Therefore, we should not think of the Review Conference outcome as critically important. The failure to reach agreement represents differences in opinion, not a fatal flaw in the process. The indefinite extension agreed in 1995 continues. It is better to think of the 2005 Review Conference as the first preparatory conference for 2010. It is not an endpoint, but a foundation for future action.

Tsutomu Ishiguri from the UN Centre for Peace and Disarmament in the Asia Pacific provided a closer look at the Review Conference proceedings. He suggested that the failure of the conferees to quickly agree on an agenda left little time for discussion of key issues. The problem was manifest in each of the three committees for the Review Conference: disagreements were so profound that none could agree on substantive documents to send to the main committee. That might not necessarily be the worst outcome: some argue that the failure to produce a document is better than producing a flawed or weak one.

Ishiguri explained his institution's support for the efforts to produce a Central Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, which bore fruit this year after seven years of negotiations. The new NWFZ is the first among land-locked nations, and the first in the northern hemisphere. It is especially important since the states share borders with Russia and China, two nuclear weapons states, and because of its attention to environmental issues, a key concern given the effects such weapons programs have had on the affected territory.

Three NWS – the U.S., Britain, and France – have complained about the text of the treaty, claiming they weren't sufficient consultations with them. The next task is signing the treaty, which could occur as soon as July. The international community was urged to recognize the treaty.

Raymond Quilop from CSCAP Philippines provided a Southeast Asian view of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. While the nuclear threat is real – it only takes 25 kg of highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear bomb and there is 1,900 tons available worldwide – he argued that Southeast Asian nations don't take the WMD threat seriously. This is a fundamental challenge for the nonproliferation regime.

Quilop takes solace in the existence of institutions such as ASEAN and the ARF, which can provide a framework for action, although he questioned whether such bodies, with their operating procedures and norms, could be obstacles to tackling the problem. He nonetheless revealed himself an optimist, arguing that these institutions provide platforms for information sharing and proposed that ASEAN contemplate the development of an arms register that includes WMD.

Our discussion focused on several topics. The first was the reluctance of the U.S. and the other NWS to take more seriously their Article VI obligations to disarm. One participant countered that some of the charges against the U.S. are exaggerated. It has not begun a program to develop new weapons and it is unlikely to do so: a Republican Congress has thus far refused to provide funds for such weapons development. Another participant agreed that there were valid complaints about U.S. policy, but U.S. concerns were equally real. Moreover, the international community had failed to take action to meet those concerns – which were not just those of the U.S. In short, the world had abdicated responsibility to the U.S. yet complained when Washington tried to take up the challenge.

Another observer of the Review Conference provided several explanations for its failure. First, there is the thorny issue of Israel and its role as a “gray state.” Then there was the failure of groups such as the Non Aligned Movement and the New Agenda Coalition that had previously helped craft compromises to repeat that success. That failure was compounded by the refusal of the NWS or the UN to fill the leadership vacuum.

Another participant chided the study group for focusing too narrowly on nuclear weapons and neglecting other WMD, such as chemical and biological weapons. Several other speakers echoed that concern. The issue of radiological dispersal devices (RDDs, sometimes called “dirty bombs”) is another rising concern. The IAEA has confirmed 540 cases of trafficking in radiological materials and more than 300 others are unconfirmed.

There was discussion of A.Q. Khan and his role in demonstrating holes in the nonproliferation regime. The existence of his network and the seeming impunity with which it worked are problematic. But the idea that it is merely one man's work and that his arrest somehow solves the problems is mistaken. He is “the poster boy of a bigger problem.” The treatment he has received after his arrest and the perception that larger

geostrategic interests played a role in the response have damaged the nonproliferation regime. One of the Young Leaders, Justin Hasting, provided a brief overview of his own research on the A.Q. Khan network.

It was suggested that recognizing that there is a distinction between the nuclear nonproliferation *treaty* and the nuclear nonproliferation *regime* would be useful. This allows outliers to adopt components of the regime – and further its intent – without being forced to accept the NPT itself. This distinction also takes some of the sting out of the Review Conference failure. (Nonetheless, one participant reminded the group that joining the NPT was an important symbol: it demonstrates the national will to tackle the problem as well as the centrality of the treaty to international efforts to fight the spread of WMD.) The trick is to focus on programs that work and can be adapted to wider use. One participant said the PSI was one “viable, innovative, collaborative approach” and could be a starting point. Similarly, it was suggested that the Container Security Initiative (CSI) could be adapted to cover all regional trade, instead of just one-way trade between member countries and the U.S.

There was also support for UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which obliges all nations to take steps to counter the proliferation of WMD. This is a potentially powerful tool in the fight against the spread of WMD. It is an obligation of all UN member states, not a component of the NPT, and all must respond. Member states are obliged to report on their compliance with UNSCR 1540. CSCAP could assist in evaluating those reports and perhaps assist in developing a standardized format.

By the end of the first session, there was general agreement that any effective nonproliferation regime would have to be flexible, both to accommodate divergent capabilities among states and to adapt to changing threats and the ability of determined nonproliferators (both states and nonstate actors) to identify and exploit loopholes in the nonproliferation framework. There also had to be a sound legal and technical basis to any counter-proliferation efforts. Finally, there was acceptance of some link between nonproliferation and the need for the NWS to show more progress on their Article VI obligations. The nuclear haves could not tighten restrictions on access to nuclear technology without moving forward on their pledge to eliminate their own arsenals.

Regional Efforts to Enforce Global Norms

Our second session looked more closely at regional attempts to support global norms. Hee-song Kwon from CSACP ROK provided a look at ROK efforts to backstop the global nonproliferation regime. Noting that the regime rests on three pillars -- nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy – he argued that strengthened nonproliferation obligations go hand in hand with moves toward disarmament. At the same time, high confidence in compliance with nonproliferation obligations is the key to expanded use of nuclear technology.

The ROK supports universalization of the NPT Additional Protocols and the objective and spirit of the PSI. Although South Korea’s “unique geopolitical condition” precludes

its membership in the PSI right now. Seoul will cooperate on a case-by-case basis. Kwon called UNSCR 1540 an important tool to fight the regional security threat and said Japan's ASTOP program – a director-general level discussion of nonproliferation threats and responses – was valuable in deepening understanding of major nonproliferation instruments throughout the region. He called for more engagement by the ARF and APEC in nonproliferation activities, and advocated coordination between CSCAP and those institutions.

Yeo Bock Chuan from CSCAP Singapore gave a Southeast Asian perspective. He focused on the evolving legal framework for countering proliferation, noting the obligations created by UNSCR 1540. International law is developing more tools to give nations the ability to halt the transport of WMD. Those include the Law of the Sea and the draft Suppression of Unlawful Activities (SUA) protocol, both of which demonstrate an evolving approach that no longer characterizes the passage of ships carrying WMD through national waters as “innocent.”

Ilango Karuppannan of CSCAP Malaysia extended that analysis. He argued global norms are being challenged because of an erosion of confidence in the NPT. Perceptions of double standards, unfair treatment of all nonnuclear weapons states (all being punished for the actions of a few “bad apples”), and the war in Iraq – which was based on the need to eliminate seemingly nonexistent weapons of mass destruction – have all damaged the moral force of the NPT.

Nonetheless, the region has taken steps to support global norms. The Malaysian list of particulars includes the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, the 11th statement of the ARF that outlined the obligations of members to cooperate and monitor progress on steps to stem the spread of WMD, working-level discussions of confidence building measures for WMD, regional efforts within the ASEAN + 1 framework, in particular Japan's efforts to promote practical programs of cooperation, and the ASEM and ARF dialogues. Questions were raised about the efficacy of a multiplicity of nonproliferation regimes, but there appeared to be agreement that redundancy was good and allowed for a division of labor.

Those efforts reflect general support within the region to strengthen IAEA safeguards, although there are concerns about the creation of nontariff barriers. The best option, argued one Southeast Asian, is a depoliticized nuclear nonproliferation export regime, independent of the NPT framework and rationalized to fundamental provisions of the NPT. This approach – negotiated multilaterally, universal, comprehensive, and nondiscriminatory – would ally many regional concerns. Most important, it would diminish anxiety about the legality of such measures.

Our discussion devoted considerable attention to the PSI. As in the past, there was concern about its consistency with international law, but each objection was countered by noting that the PSI principles call for the program to be grounded in both domestic and international law. Several speakers applauded it as an important attempt to fill loopholes in the existing nonproliferation framework. Another pointed out that it is an activity, not a

formal mechanism, and those features make it a better fit with Asian norms of cooperation. Although CSCAP has examined the PSI in the past (see “Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: the Role of the Proliferation Security Initiative,” Pacific Forum CSIS *Issues & Insights* series, Vol. 5-04, July 2004, available at the Pacific Forum website), it may be time to reexamine developments and evolving regional attitudes since our last assessment.

As noted in session 1, a problem for the region is the lack of urgency regarding the WMD threat, especially in Southeast Asia, along with a tendency to equate WMD with nuclear proliferation and overlook chemical, biological and other radiological threats. One participant asked whether the changing energy environment – and the prospect of continuing high energy prices – could change the regional calculus. Northeast Asia is committed to the development of nuclear power and a number of Southeast Asian states – Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar – are either studying or actively pursuing nuclear power. These developments could reshape regional thinking about the WMD threat and its response to it.

Several speakers noted regional – at least Southeast Asian – shortcomings in the application of nonproliferation mechanisms. Japan in particular was applauded for its efforts to raise regional consciousness of the WMD threat and to build capacity to cope with it. One participant argued that it would be better for regional organizations and countries to step up to help overcome these deficiencies than to depend on a distant country, such as the U.S., to remedy these problems.

Yet another speaker suggested that Southeast Asian norms are evolving and that ASEAN might be reinventing itself as it moves toward more a formal, structured, and institutionalized mode. This could facilitate the adoption of more effective nonproliferation mechanisms, as well as facilitate the study of other models, such as programs adopted by the EU. This process is proceeding in parallel with (and could be aided by) the evolution of international law noted earlier.

Participants suggested several roles for CSCAP to support nonproliferation regimes. It could assess and evaluate regional UNSCR 1540 filings, perhaps with a view to creating standardized reports. CSCAP could create tabular reports of regional countries’ treaty membership and capacities. It could also provide information on the panoply of capacity building programs. It was suggested that CSCAP join the next meeting of the ARF intersessional meeting on counterterrorism and transnational crime (ISMCTTC) as an observer.

Developments on the Korean Peninsula

Our third session focused on developments on the Korean Peninsula. Kyu-dok Hong from CSCAP ROK began by noting his country’s concern about the effects of isolation of North Korea which could result from a nuclear test. Seoul has offered a substantial aid package to induce Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks and agree to abandon its nuclear weapons program and arsenal. He worried that Pyongyang was trying to drive a

wedge between the U.S. and South Korea; he argued that this strategy could backfire as it would eliminate Seoul's influence on Washington. Moreover, he suggested that this approach would not work as there is increasing skepticism in the ROK about North Korean intentions. Crossing the nuclear test "red line" would damage public sympathy in the South for their counterparts in the North. Instead, Pyongyang should prepare for a return to the talks and prepare "bold initiatives," on its own terms.

Kim Sam Jong from CSCAP DPRK provided his perspective on the current logjam in negotiations. For him, there are two main obstacles to progress in the Six-Party Talks: differences in views between the U.S. and the DPRK, and the U.S. security strategy toward Northeast Asia.

All participants – including North Korea – agree that the goal of the Six-Party Talks is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through negotiations. Pyongyang blames the U.S. for the failure of the talks because it has "damaged the negotiating environment" with inflammatory rhetoric – calling the North "an outpost of tyranny" – and by naming North Korea as a target for a preemptive nuclear strike. Pyongyang challenges the U.S. claim that the North must move first – and give up its nuclear program and weapons – before the U.S. will respond. Pyongyang demands bilateral talks with the U.S., dismissing the claim that the nuclear crisis is a regional issue. Instead, North Korea believes that the nuclear problem is the result of a half-century of confrontational relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. Therefore, they should be the main actors in any negotiation. The North also blames the U.S. security strategy: Washington's reliance on military alliances requires an enemy and North Korea plays that role.

Still, North Korea remains ready to respond if the U.S. changes its stance. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's statement saying North Korea is a "sovereign state" was a positive sign. Subsequent comments criticizing the North still create confusion among North Koreans about U.S. intentions, however.

Ralph Cossa from USCSCAP responded by noting that the U.S. is committed to a multilateral solution because, among other things, it promised Seoul after the Agreed Framework that it would not cut a deal again over the head of South Korea. He decried the rhetoric on both sides, while noting that the U.S. has never declared a "preemptive nuclear attack" strategy. He noted that the U.S. and North Korea don't have to like each other to conduct negotiations; indeed, if the bilateral relationship was good, there would be no need for talks. While he did not support the DPRK contention that the U.S. was deliberately creating a crisis environment to support its own military presence strategy, he noted that, if it were true, Pyongyang's current stonewalling and frequent threats were playing into the hands of such a U.S. hardline approach. He called on Pyongyang to challenge the U.S. to take "yes" for an answer, and demand that the U.S. engage. He also noted the need for both incentives and disincentives for North Korean behavior. There have to be costs to Pyongyang for not cooperating with the international community, as well as rewards for cooperating. No such incentive structure currently exists.

Lin Huisheng of CSCAP China argued the Six-Party Talks deserved more credit as a result of the previous talks. All the parties agree that the goal is a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, that a peaceful resolution is required, that should be a gradual, step-by step one, and that no party should take steps to increase tensions before the eventual resolution is reached. He suggested that the main reason contributing to the current stalemate was uncertainty around the U.S. election campaign, which gave the North hope for “regime change” in Washington and a new approach to the problem. To break the deadlock, he suggested that the U.S. be more realistic, patient, and stop saying bad things about the DPRK, such as calling it “an outpost of tyranny.” Washington should change its tactics and be more focused on the nuclear issue. It should stop talking about conventional weapons, missiles, or human rights. Those issues can be handled later when relations improve. Moreover, the U.S. should stop believing that the North will give up its nuclear weapons for nothing. It has to get serious about crafting a compensation package that meets the DPRK’s security and energy needs. It should also be prepared to move first.

For its part, the DPRK should abandon the idea that it needs nuclear weapons for national security. It should become more cooperative, less confrontational, more transparent, and more predictable. It should give up brinkmanship since crossing the brink may make it impossible to recover. The DPRK should also be more precise about the terms of the compensation package it wants.

Finally, he suggested that Japan should take the hostage issue off the six-party agenda and discuss it bilaterally with the North. It should be prepared to make contributions to any eventual compensation package when the U.S. is ready to make a deal. In addition, the international community should not push the North too hard, or push China to push the DPRK.

There was debate about China’s role in the talks. Chinese colleagues maintained that their government played the role of host or organizer, not a mediator. Others said the idea of Beijing remaining neutral was unrealistic and that it should be more proactive.

We probed key questions surrounding the Six-Party Talks. The most important issue was DPRK motivations for developing a nuclear arsenal. One participant noted that the North’s security environment had been transformed in the early 1990s with the loss of its two main protectors, China and the USSR. In this post-Cold War world, Pyongyang could not imagine a future without nuclear weapons. Another speaker called for more critical assessment of the precise nature of the North Korean threat. Is the primary concern that of purposeful proliferation (i.e., transferring nuclear weapons or materials to third parties), the prospect of a nuclear attack (unlikely given the consequences), “nuclear dominoes,” or the impact of state party withdrawal on the NPT? Each threat requires a different response.

One discussant suggested the world look to the experience of former Soviet republics, such as Kazakhstan, which gave up the nuclear arsenals they inherited, for guidance on

how to provide the North with security assurances. Another called for examining the space between the NPT treaty and the nonproliferation regime for possible solutions.

Several speakers acknowledged the need for the U.S. and the ROK and China to speak with one voice to send a clear message to Pyongyang about the advantages of compliance and the penalties for noncompliance.

We debated the proper framework for discussing the issue. Pyongyang insists the nuclear question is a bilateral concern to be settled between itself and Washington. It denies that the ROK has a role to play in these talks; the lesson of the failure of inter-Korean talks in the early 1990s is that the U.S. must be involved. Several other participants countered that the nuclear issue has security implications for all the DPRK's neighbors as well as the global nonproliferation regime.

Developing an East Asian Action Plan for Nonproliferation

In Session 4, we took up the European Union Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD to see if it might provide a guide for East Asia. Two outside specialists, Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut of the University of Georgia's Center for International Trade and Security, provided a brief summary of the strategy, its structure, purpose, and its components. Significantly, the document is sui generis; while it is not legally binding, it isn't just another political declaration; and there is a provision for review, meaning that there is to be follow-up on agreed measures. Most important for our purposes, the strategy is an attempt to reconcile two potentially conflicting objectives: halting the spread of WMD technology and know-how and maximizing opportunities for trade. It is designed to ensure that security concerns do not conflict with economic growth.

The key components of the strategy are its definition of the threat, general principles that guide the Union's response -- effective multilateralism, promoting a stable international and regional environment, and cooperation with key trade and political partners -- and concrete measures.

Discussion focused on regional sensitivities about the utility and applicability of a European strategy to Asia. A constant refrain in our meeting was the need for any program to be sensitive to regional norms. Calling attention to the support such mechanisms provide for universal norms and regional practices should take some of the sting out of such criticism. Since some regional countries are trying to position themselves as exceptions to global standards, CSCAP could play a valuable role in reinforcing those norms.

The economic logic of this strategy -- that it is trade enabling and trade maximizing -- is a strong point in its favor. This does raise questions, however, about the need to work with APEC, since it is more focused on economic concerns.

Several speakers emphasized that there is no attempt to adopt a "one size fits all" strategy. Any successful program must be well fitted to the contours of the Asia-Pacific

political, economic, and psychological landscape. We can, however, study other efforts to tackle these important problems, avoid the mistakes of others, and identify common elements that might nicely fit into a regional template.

Export Controls

Our final session honed in on a component of the EU strategy and a core element of any WMD nonproliferation strategy: export controls. Export controls are laws, procedures, and institutions that regulate trade. They are intended not to stop but to filter trade. By promoting confidence among trade partners about the eventual use of products, they are trade enabling. Thus, they promote both trade *and* security.

Hirofumi Tosaki from CSCAP Japan and Sophia McIntyre of AUSCAP provided overviews of their governments' efforts to promote export controls in Asia. Both have been working bilaterally and multilaterally to raise awareness of the WMD problem among trade partners and the significance of export controls to meet that threat, and helping to raise capacity among nations that need assistance. The rising sophistication of Asian economies, their integration, and their growing role in international trade and production mean that the region can play a more important role in either advancing or stopping WMD proliferation. Both speakers agreed that export controls are a key tool in this fight, and that further outreach is needed to improve legal and technical infrastructures, to build capacity, share information, and coordinate efforts. Ultimately, national efforts have to be harmonized if export controls are to be successful. Best practices need to be identified, explained, and disseminated.

We then looked at the European approach to see if it provided benchmarks for an East Asian program. The two regions share economic, security, and technological rationales for a coordinated framework. Both are increasingly integrated and seek to create unified legal infrastructures to facilitate trade and development. Both must comply with UNSCR 1540 obligations and various international treaties to help fight terrorism. Both are threatened by WMD proliferation and by concerns about the unchecked diffusion of technology. Both need to retain the confidence of trading partners. The EU export controls effort provides for easier identification of items under control, improved channels of communication between member states, a formal dialogue for industry, guidelines to formalize implementation, and the peer review of participants. As agreed upon during the WMD Study Group's initial planning meeting in Kunming last December, an Export Controls Experts Group will now be formed in order to better define the WMD Study Group's approach to dealing with this particular aspect of counter-proliferation.

Developing a Nonproliferation Action Plan and an Export Controls Experts Group

There was agreement that a CSCAP effort to design, help develop and ultimately promote an East Asian Action Plan for Nonproliferation makes sense. To be successful, several prerequisites have to be met. First, as always, sensitivity to regional concerns is a must. Any program has to reflect regional norms, modes of interaction, and has to

accommodate the wide range of national capabilities. Second, it has to be cognizant of the bilateral and multilateral initiatives underway to avoid duplication and maximize value added.

Several speakers reminded the study group that a regional strategy generally and export controls specifically serve East Asian interests. They promote regional consciousness, contributing to a sense of community and shared concerns. They facilitate regional integration by taking a sequence of steps toward common standards and harmonizing institutions, mechanisms and procedures. And they enhance regional competitiveness by building capacity and building confidence among trade partners.

One early step in the process is to develop an overall outline for an East Asian Nonproliferation Action Plan that would identify regional norms and concerns and current involvement of Asia-Pacific nations in global and regional nonproliferation initiatives and regimes. An approach similar to the one taken to construct a Working Definition and Statement of Principles for Preventive Diplomacy was seen as one way to begin: namely, several CSCAP committees will be tasked to develop annotated outlines of an Action Plan, which can then be reviewed, edited and consolidated at the next WMD Study Group meeting. This outline will provide the broader context within which study of various non- and counter-proliferation elements, such as compliance with UNSCR 1540, the NPT and its Additional Protocols, PSI, etc, can occur.

Concurrent with this effort, it was proposed that WMD Study Group look at 1540 filings and try to assess them. The goal would be to create a possible template for future filings and tools to evaluate national capacity and efforts by looking for common features among current 1540 filings and seeing if the WMD Study Group can develop a framework to evaluate them. That analysis will be presented at the Fall 2005 meeting, along with a matrix that identifies which Asia-Pacific countries currently participate in the various regional and global nonproliferation initiatives and regimes. Follow-on work will focus on the concerns and apprehensions of nonparticipants.

Meanwhile, the Export Controls Experts Group will assess the viability of a regional export controls regime for East Asia. It will collect data on existing laws and regulations, the government agencies responsible for such work, their institutional capacity, and priority sectors for implementation and enforcement. The experts group will consist of government officials in charge of export controls implementation, former officials with experience and information in this field, nongovernment experts, and experts in other relevant fields. This group will analyze areas of maximum convergence and divergence, the challenges to harmonization, and strategies to meet those challenges.

The experts group's work will feed into the larger WMD Study Group's effort and will help to develop the export control portion of the overall Action Plan. Nonproliferation-related efforts and actions undertaken by the ARF, APEC, ASTOP, and others will be duly noted. The WMD Study Group will, at a minimum, closely coordinate its work with other ongoing governmental and nongovernmental efforts in order to complement and augment, and not duplicate, the work of others.