



**Seventh Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
in the Asia Pacific
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
May 25-26, 2008**

Chairmen's Report

The seventh meeting of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Asia Pacific was held in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam May 25-26, 2008. Forty participants from 17 member committees attended, as well as several observers and 17 members of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders program. The meeting was co-chaired by CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP; outstanding logistical support was provided by CSCAP Vietnam and the staff at the Institute of Foreign Policy and Strategic Studies, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in Hanoi. This report provides the views of the co-chairs; while it is being circulated among participants for comments, it is not a consensus document.

The conference began with an assessment of **recent developments impacting the global nonproliferation regime** (GNR). Mitsuro Kurosawa (*CSCAP Japan*) provided a presentation on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference process and highlighted several themes that have emerged in the context of the preparatory committee (Prepcom) meetings. Kurosawa reported that the second Prepcom, which was held April 28-May 9 in Geneva and chaired by Ambassador Volodymyr Yel'chenko of the Ukraine, once again focused on the three pillars of the NPT (nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy); as in the past, there were considerable differences in perception, emphasis, and priority among the participants. There was a growing consensus, led by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) participants that the focus should shift to nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

On the subject of disarmament, the nuclear weapons states (NWS) highlighted their record of arms reductions but the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) felt the reductions were not enough and the pace was too slow. Some Prepcom delegates expressed concern that nuclear weapons were playing a larger role in the military doctrines of NWS and these governments continue to replace and modernize their nuclear weapons. Another complaint, often made by NAM members, was that the NPT should have universal application of all three pillars. This was used to highlight the inalienable rights of states to pursue the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes based on articles I, II, and III of the NPT. Not surprisingly, these states also oppose making the Additional Protocol a requirement and question the appropriateness of multilateral controls on nuclear technology without assurances of fuel supply.

Looking ahead to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Kurosawa argued that progress toward ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty are key indicators of the presence of political will to move forward on disarmament issues. While expressing pessimism about the likelihood of success, he suggested that U.S. policies remained the key to success. There is a perception that the U.S. has become less antagonistic toward the NPT

process. A willingness to address the disarmament issue, acceptance of the CTBT, moves to reduce strategic nuclear weapons, and progress on a post-START framework would send a clear signal that a shift to a more cooperative approach was underway.

Rajesh Basrur (*CSCAP Singapore*) next assessed the impact of the India-U.S. nuclear agreement and the Iranian nuclear program on the GNR. The so-called “123 agreement” between India and the U.S. is stuck in domestic Indian politics, but it continues to generate considerable debate within the international community. Those who back the agreement argue it strengthens the GNR because it places India’s civilian facilities under safeguards, makes India part of the NPT system, and promotes greater cooperation with the international community. Those opposed to the deal argue that it would treat India as an exception to the rule and would enable India to produce more weapons-grade fissile material. Basrur countered that India has enough weapons-grade material and seems satisfied with its current number of nuclear weapons. Also, India has been a responsible state and given no indication that it would proliferate, especially given the security environment in the region. It is unlikely that the deal will affect nuclear capacities in other states and would not spur other states to develop nuclear weapons. Finally, Basrur pointed out that India’s stand on disarmament has not changed: Delhi continues to insist that delinking the CBTB from universal disarmament is discriminatory. Movement toward universal disarmament would give India an opportunity to play an active role in the process and increase the likelihood of a reconsideration of the CTBT and full participation in the GNR.

Turning to the Iranian nuclear program, Basrur, citing the examples of Israel and North Korea, argued that it was unlikely that a nuclear Iran would unravel the GNR. Given the unstable security environment in the Middle East and assuming Iran acts responsibly and does not attempt to proliferate to nonstate actors such as Hezbollah, the response from the U.S. and Israel is likely to be muted. Nevertheless, both the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs strained the NPT. While a serious international disarmament movement might mitigate the effects of the Indian program, the Iranian program will be driven by the political situation in the Middle East.

Much of our discussion session focused on disarmament. Several participants commented on the recent editorials (provided as preparatory reading material for study group participants) by the so-called “four horsemen” (Kissinger, Nunn, Schultz, and Perry) regarding the need to move forward on disarmament. Generally, participants viewed the willingness of senior members of the U.S. policy community to push for disarmament as a positive step. There was skepticism whether these former officials reflected current U.S. policies, while others argued that it evidenced a growing recognition in NWS of the need to re-establish the linkage between disarmament and nonproliferation to sustain the GNR.

Noting that proliferation has continued despite significant reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals, one participant warned of the growing tendency to see disarmament as a solution to the nonproliferation problem rather than as a way of reinforcing the linkage between the two. Several participants argued that skepticism about NWS intentions would prevail until active members of their policy communities engage in similar debates about disarmament. Still others warned that a failure to follow through with Article VI commitments would ultimately undermine trust in the GNR. It was suggested that the best way to demonstrate a willingness to address the issue was

through transparent steps such as de-alerting, reducing arsenals, and stopping research on new weapons. Greater transparency regarding nuclear arsenals and intentions was also needed. Others pointed to signs of a renewed commitment to disarmament in other nuclear weapons states, specifically France and the UK.

This raised, again (as in previous meetings), the role of the U.S. in pushing the disarmament process: is leadership from Washington a necessity for meaningful progress or can the U.S. be pulled forward? There was consensus that the NWS must move forward with Article VI obligations – and that means reconciling nuclear modernization efforts with real signs of weapons reductions – with their call for increased transparency among NNWS states. Trust remains central to the credibility of the NPT regime and as one speaker noted, “P5 vertical proliferation discredits them.”

Participants had mixed views on the prospects for the 2010 NPT Review Conference as well as the impact of the Iranian and Indian nuclear programs. Several expressed optimism over the prospects for the review conference. Two participants pointed to the joint statement issued by the UNSC Permanent 5 members (not so coincidentally, also the nuclear weapons states) at the end of the most recent Prepcom as a positive sign. Another speaker noted with optimism that there has been informal discussion on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. One theme that threaded through the conversation was the need to think more clearly about threats and security concerns. Nuclear weapons states may (or are likely to) find that the reduction of their nuclear arsenals is in their self interest; failure to consider the security concerns of potential proliferators is likely to push them over the edge toward nuclear weapons acquisition. In short, while there are grounds for greater optimism than in the past, there is no room for complacency: the GNR remains under considerable strain and current trends could stretch it to the breaking point.

Session two focused on **recent developments on the Korean Peninsula and the Six-Party Talks** with presentations by representatives from three of the countries at the table. Yang Yi (*CSCAP China*) reviewed recent progress in the talks and expressed optimism that the process would move forward. He highlighted progress since October 2007, including the cooperation between the U.S. and the DPRK on disabling the facilities at Yongbyon and providing economic assistance. The delivery of documents regarding past activity at Yongbyon is a positive sign that a full and complete declaration of North Korea’s nuclear programs will be delivered soon. As the process moves to phase 3 of implementation, he recommended an increase in mutual understanding between relevant parties; continued patience, sincerity, and flexibility regarding the concerns of all parties; and proactive efforts to meet partners half way.

Hong Kyu-dok (*CSCAP Korea*) acknowledging that momentum was building, but was not as optimistic as he outlined the Lee Myung-bak administration’s approach to the denuclearization issue. South Korea still demands the DPRK’s compliance with the Feb. 13, 2007 agreement and expressed concern that the Bush administration is too eager to make a deal. While convinced that U.S.-ROK confidence would continue as long as there was sufficient coordination, Hong felt that the U.S. had done a better job of coordinating its action with China than with the ROK and Japan. Expressing concern that the North Korea deal could set a bad precedent for other potential proliferators, he asked whether the Six-Party Talks were ready for phase 3 given an apparent lack of consensus on:

- the amount of plutonium the North was willing to include in its declaration;
- the lack of information regarding the highly enriched uranium program;
- the potential for the North to build smaller nuclear bombs based on tests between 1983 and 2002;
- the lack of verification procedures; and
- the possibility that even after disablement, the North might be able to resume producing fissile material in less than one year rather than five years, as originally anticipated.

He concluded by suggesting that the process should move forward, but only after careful coordination between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. Within that framework, Hong was optimistic that the Lee Myung-bak administration would fully support the Bush administration's efforts and seize the opportunity to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

Finally, Ro Thae Ung (*CSCAP DPRK*) argued that the DPRK supports denuclearization of the entire Korean Peninsula and wants to promote peace in Northeast Asia. He emphasized the importance of following the principle of "action for action" and suggested that this was the reason for the delay in completing Phase 2 of the Six-Party Talks implementation agreement. Ro outlined the actions the DPRK has taken to demonstrate its sincere desire to implement the agreement, and applauded the U.S.-DPRK meeting in Singapore that broke the stalemate between the two. Still he insisted that the U.S. should take action to remove its hostile policy against the DPRK. He suggested that the Six-Party Talks were not designed to bring about unilateral disarmament by the DRPK, but aimed to create a peaceful atmosphere in Northeast Asia. Thus, the U.S. should, said Ro, remove all nuclear materials from the Peninsula and "around it," halt training exercises with the ROK, remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and terminate application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, and provide physical compensation for the DPRK, including a light-water reactor. He also called for Japan to take steps to improve relations with the DPRK: in particular, Tokyo should drop the "abduction issue," as it is, said Ro, not relevant to the Six-Party Talks. He concluded by warning that South Korea should avoid escalating tension on the Peninsula, specifically condemning participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and the U.S. missile defense program.

Ralph Cossa (*USCSCAP*) began the discussion with a recap of the statement of principles for a draft charter for a Northeast Asia peace and security framework that were agreed at the sixth meeting of the study group and informed the group that they had been passed on the Russian Chair of the Six-Party Talks Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanisms Working Group. He went on to warn about the recent tendency to conduct bilateral talks in an effort to break the logjams in the Six-Party Talks, explaining there is a risk of losing transparency if agreements reached in bilateral sessions are not fully explained in subsequent multiparty talks. He also pointed out that there was a general lack of understanding regarding the full scope of what Phase 3 of the implementation includes and a risk that the North Korean declaration at the end of Phase 2 might be less than "complete and accurate."

There was skepticism about the completeness of the DPRK's declaration: participants argued that it should include information about proliferation activities – especially involving Syria and Pakistan -- and worried about a potential lack of clarity regarding

verification measures. Several participants urged the DPRK to do more to help expose black market nuclear activities. An American participant suggested that the DPRK fight the impulse to wait out U.S. domestic politics: failure to move the six-party process forward is likely to harden sentiment against it in the U.S. Progress would make support for the negotiations almost obligatory for the next U.S. president. The session concluded on a somewhat positive note: despite the current difficulties, there appears to be momentum in the process – eight of the 11 specific technical actions pertaining to Yongbyon dismantlement outlined in phase two have been completed – and all parties remained committed to the long-term goal of verifiable, peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Session three shifted focus to **the role of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in promoting the GNR**. Brad Howlett, an expert from the UN 1540 Committee, provided an overview of the resolution and the status of its implementation. He began by highlighting that the resolution was created to specifically prohibit proliferation and requires member states to adopt and enforce laws that prohibit the manufacture, acquisition, possession, development, transportation, transfer or use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery. Forty-six of the 56 countries in the “Asia group,” which includes much of the Middle East, have submitted their first report and 27 have provided additional information.

Over half the states in Asia have requested further assistance in meeting their obligations under UNSCR 1540 (and subsequent resolutions 1673 and 1810), making clear the importance of facilitating assistance to countries in the region so that they can fully implement the resolutions. The 1540 committee has been actively developing a variety of tools to assist states with implementation of the operative paragraphs of the resolution: the first requires development of a legal framework that prohibits proliferation activities and the second deals with enforcement measures to ensure that framework is effectively implemented. UNSCR 1810, which was passed in 2008, has extended resolution 1540 for three years and will facilitate technical assistance to member states, will increase connectivity with assistance providers -- other states, nongovernmental organizations and International Intergovernmental Organizations – to promote sharing of experiences and lessons learned, and provide opportunities for the full implementation of UNSCR 1540. Howlett explained how the committee has developed a matrix of 313 questions that helps parse the various declarations. This assessment helps guide future work by the 1540 Committee and its experts.

Our discussion focused on the utility of UNSCR 1540 and its progeny. Declarations are merely statements of fact – it is unclear how they are being used to shore up national capabilities or halt proliferation. While UNSCR 1540 is a UN mandate – states “must” comply – there is no enforcement mechanism. (Other treaties and conventions would have to provide sanctions.) Moreover, the focus to date has been on the report itself, not its content. Howlett believed that would shift and UNSCR 1810 will focus more on implementation.

Many of the problems surrounding implementation are familiar to study group members (and readers of this report). WMD proliferation continues to be a relatively low priority for Southeast Asian governments. For some, the problem is lack of capacity rather than a lack of will– and that is compounded by “UNSC resolution

fatigue”: there are too many reporting requirements for overburdened bureaucracies.

Several participants were encouraged by the adoption of UNSCR 1810 and its focus on implementation of resolution 1540 through outreach, dialogue, and assistance to individual states. Organizations like CSCAP should work with the 1540 committee to fulfill this objective. It was recommended that the committee keep CSCAP (and other track two organizations) informed of its activities (particularly outreach) and there be better coordination among the two. Several participants emphasized the need for “whole of government” responses to the problem of proliferation. This issue cuts across multiple bureaucracies and effective efforts to fight WMD proliferation will require coordination among agencies and bureaucracies and the effective and efficient use of a wide array of resources.

The session concluded with one participant urging the group to think about “confidence” broadly. The issue is not merely the fear that nations will acquire nuclear weapons: if that is the only problem, then WMD proliferation should be a relatively low priority in East Asia. Rather, there must be confidence that trade in strategic materials, components, and know-how will not be diverted or misused. “Confidence” in the ability of trading partners to control this information is equally critical, especially as states develop industrial capacity, turn to nuclear energy, and as the region integrates. Regional organizations such as CSCAP and the ARF can play a role in helping build state capacity in these areas. Finally, Howlett noted that the UN is currently engaged in discussions with Thailand to host a regional workshop on “shared experiences” in building capacity to implement UNSCR 1540. It was recommended that CSCAP could contribute to this process by exploring why states have not implemented various international treaties and agreements, identifying best practices to overcome national limits, and providing opportunities for governments to discuss these concerns.

Our fourth session provided an in-depth discussion on **the role of regional safeguards arrangements in supporting IAEA safeguards**. The first presentation by David Saltiel (*USCSCAP*) focused on the role of international nuclear safeguards. He emphasized that safeguards are a very specific technical piece of the GNR. The technical objective of traditional safeguards is to detect the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities for an unknown purpose. This is a critically important function and the safeguards regime has performed extremely well. We should not, however, expect more from the safeguards regime than it was designed to deliver.

Saltiel explained how the IAEA’s experience with safeguards (and especially the cheating by Iraq prior to the first Persian Gulf War) compelled the agency to expand their role. The original focus on the correctness of reporting is no longer sufficient: now the completeness of declarations is important as well. This has been accomplished through the use of the so-called Additional Protocol. Given the already overburdened IAEA staff, the prospect of expanded use of nuclear energy and increasing inspections as a result of additional safeguards is daunting. Regional safeguards arrangements such as EURATOM and ABACC could ease that load, but they have to be both consistent with IAEA arrangements as well as nonduplicative. If they merely increase bureaucratic and industry workloads, such arrangements are likely to be resisted and ineffective.

Other challenges associated with safeguards include the incomplete adoption of the Additional Protocol, the fact that confidence in the system relies on political commitments by member states, and expectations often exceed the mandate provided by the legal bases for safeguards. Ultimately, the IAEA must rely on the UN Security Council for enforcement of its conclusions. Saltiel concluded by suggesting that the future credibility of the IAEA depends on the Additional Protocol and suggested that its adoption become universal. Safeguards are the cornerstone of the GNR and require a significant amount of international cooperation to be successful.

David Santoro (*Center for Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Macquarie University and Pacific Forum Young Leader*) elaborated on the role of regional safeguards arrangements by focusing on EURATOM and examined it as a model for Southeast Asia. EURATOM was created to strengthen European integration. Administered by the European Commission, it is based on the need to prevent nuclear proliferation and the belief that use of nuclear technology for peaceful uses should be promoted. Those conditions exist in ASEAN today. ASEAN does require, however, a nuclear power authority within the region to manage nuclear-related activities. Santoro suggested that this arrangement could provide for legal ownership of fissile material, encourage the development of a centralized fuel processing capability, provide a mechanism for regional safeguards, create cost savings for IAEA safeguards, and promote a common approach to research and a safety culture in the region.

Discussion focused on the need for a political organization such as the European Commission to establish an effective regional safeguards mechanism. Opinions were mixed about the appropriate level of action. Some argued that a small group of nations could take the lead and create a mechanism based on a specific safeguards agreement. Others insisted that ASEAN was the only proper authority (although they conceded that the group was not ready to create such a bureaucracy), while others suggested that even a larger grouping, such as the ASEAN Plus Three, APEC, or the ARF might be best.

One participant raised Japan's experience with integrated safeguards and suggested it might be applicable to the region, but most other speakers felt that Japan was a unique case. Moreover, given the limited experience with integrated safeguards it would not be wise to implement them more broadly too quickly. Nonetheless, Japan's reprocessing capacities suggest that it could play a role in any effort to develop a Southeast Asian nuclear infrastructure.

There were several suggestions about the role CSCAP could play as the region contemplates a "nuclear renaissance." It could help identify and promote a set of principles for states contemplating nuclear energy that would promote safe use of such technology. The WMD Handbook and Action Plan's guiding principles could provide a basis to begin. CSCAP could outline a course of action to build confidence among states as they develop a nuclear infrastructure; key features could include an emergency response and management plan for the region. The currently dormant CSCAP Nuclear Energy Experts Group could be revitalized to help drive this effort.

In session five, the study group examined **regional WMD strategies**. Our list included the European Union WMD strategy, ASEAN's experience with the Southeast Asia

Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and Oceania's experience with the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

Christophe Carle (*EUCSCAP*) provided an overview of the EU WMD strategy. He started by noting that until recently, it would have been unlikely – “laughable” even – that the EU would take a leading role in the nonproliferation campaign. Nonetheless, the desire for enhanced integration in Europe, a rift with the U.S. and within Europe itself following the Iraq war, and the Iran crisis created the impetus to draft the strategy in 2003. The essential elements of the strategy include: a common threat assessment, the establishment of guiding principles, and an action plan. The strategy, the “first line of defense against proliferation,” has quickly become the basis for consensus among member states regarding WMD. A nonproliferation clause is now a precondition of EU cooperation agreements with outside partners. Implementation is monitored by the European Commission, which publishes regular progress reports to ensure transparency among members.

Carle drew several lessons from the European experience. They include the need to base strategy on shared interests in technical and functional areas of cooperation and the need to be responsive to domestic political opinions in developing the strategy. He concluded by suggesting that the EU has realized real benefits from the cooperative approach. These include the ability to hold down costs, a stronger hand in negotiating for materials, better safety practices, and multilateralization of the fuel cycle among member countries. Although originally focused on nonproliferation, the approach also makes sense in the context of developing nuclear energy programs as well.

Next Raymund Quilop (*CSCAP Philippines*) and Cornelis Luhulima (*Indonesia CSCAP*) presented perspectives on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), or Bangkok Treaty, as a WMD strategy in Southeast Asia. Both presenters highlighted the importance of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (ZOPFAN) signed by the original five ASEAN members in 1971, which provides the basis for the Bangkok Treaty, signed in 1995. While ZOPFAN focused on the states in the region, the Bangkok Treaty anticipated that all nuclear weapons states would accede to the treaty. The fact that they have not was seen by both presenters as a major cause for concern. While neither was optimistic about the likelihood of nuclear weapons states acceding to the treaty, both felt it was important to pursue individual and collective commitments from NWS to avoid contributing to any act that would violate the treaty or its protocol. Luhulima argued that a package deal with all nuclear weapons states is preferable for ASEAN. Quilop worries that the role of nonstate actors is not adequately addressed in the treaty.

Tanya Ogilvie-White (*CSCAP New Zealand*) provided an overview of the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SPNWFZ or Rarotonga Treaty) as a WMD strategy in the states of Oceania and offered several lessons from the experience. Those states were concerned about the environmental impact of weapons tests and the dumping of nuclear materials in the region. While the treaty provisions are tough – they go beyond IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol – they do not apply to ships passing through international waters and the ban on aircraft and ships carrying nuclear materials is left to individual states. More troubling, three territories (Palau, Micronesia, and Marshall Islands) have not ratified the treaty and it has not been implemented at the regional level. This was attributed to

priorities rather than doubts about their commitment to a nuclear weapons free zone. Also, three of the major nuclear weapons states have not ratified treaty protocols (and are unlikely to). Ogilvie-White concluded by suggesting that the treaty is valuable: it fences off the region from nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, it has strengthened the normative structure of the GNR in the region, and reinforces environmental and economic security among the microstates. However, given the lack of a formal implementation framework, an open challenge to the treaty could create some difficulties.

Discussion focused on the relevance of weapons free zones in today's strategic security environment. Several discussants argued that the shift in emphasis from nuclear weapons themselves to the proliferation of components and materials, made weapons free zones less relevant than they were during the Cold War. "Yesterday's answers to yesterday's problems," was one dismissive retort. While acknowledging that shift, others argued that nuclear weapons free zones continue to be relevant primarily because they provide a normative basis for discouraging proliferation within the region and serve as a confidence building measure among members. To make them more relevant, several participants suggested expanding their ambit to address proliferation and other issues such as reprocessing, enrichment, and transshipment. Others identified dangers such as radiological and biological threats that need to be addressed in any WMD strategy for the region. One ambitious soul suggested linking the two weapons free zones in the Southern Hemisphere or extending SEANWFZ to Northeast Asia: the consensus view was that this would be difficult and unlikely given different emphases in the two treaties and the different strategic environment in Northeast Asia. Ultimately, we could not find a consensus whether it would be better to build new institutional mechanisms to deal with today's threats or improve existing mechanisms to address these issues.

A progress review and discussion of the Asia-Pacific WMD handbook and action plan was the focus of session six. Carl Baker (*USCSCAP*) presented an overview of the chapter on the threat posed by WMD and the chapter on global treaties and compliance mechanisms. He proposed that the threat be characterized in six manifestations: protection of weapons stockpiles and component materials, the proliferation of weapons, delivery systems, component materials, and technology and expertise. Twenty-three different treaties, conventions, and protocols were summarized in the chapter on global treaties in an initial attempt to determine the scope of existing mechanisms that address the issue of WMD in the region.

The presentation was followed by a lively discussion on the content of both chapters with several excellent recommendations on how to improve them both. Participants were asked to provide written comments so that they can be systematically addressed and incorporated into the next draft, which will be presented at the next study group meeting. There was an extended discussion on the need to revise the general outline of the handbook itself to better capture the range of mechanisms that comprise the global nonproliferation regime. It was noted that the three core treaties of the regime are the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and Biological Weapons Conventions. Given the interest in all aspects of WMD, they should be treated as equally important, despite the tendency to focus on the nuclear component of the threat. There was also some discussion on the value of adding a chapter in the handbook on "alternative approaches toward disarmament" and on UNSCR 1540 given

their growing importance.

During the wrap-up session, several individuals agreed to develop other chapters of the handbook in preparation for the next study group meeting. We are still looking for more volunteers to take up particular topics. It was also agreed that the different approaches to disarmament would be further examined during the next meeting. It was also suggested that the study group try to have chapters three and five of the Asia Pacific WMD Handbook and Action Plan ready and available to the ARF ISG on proliferation when (or if) it begins. One participant felt the recommended principles for peace and security in Northeast Asia the study group developed during the sixth meeting and forwarded to the head of the Six-Party Talks Working Group should be modified to better address the issue of proliferation. He agreed to provide specific language for the proposal and the study group co-chairmen agreed to present it to the group during the next meeting. We anticipate the next meeting will be held in the October-November timeframe.

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