



**Ninth Meeting of the CSCAP Study Group on  
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass  
Destruction in the Asia Pacific,**

**Beijing, China June 29-30, 2009**

**Chairmen's Report**

The ninth meeting of the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific was held in Beijing, China June 29-30, 2009. Over 50 participants from member committees or regional governments attended; an additional 20 members of the Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders program were present to contribute next generation perspectives on these issues. This meeting was larger than a usual CSCAP WMD Study Group meeting: it was held immediately prior to the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Intersessional Meeting (ISM) on Nonproliferation and Disarmament and participants at that track-one meeting were invited to join the WMD Study Group. The co-chairs, CSCAP Vietnam and USCSCAP, want to extend their thanks to CSCAP China for excellent work organizing this meeting. The summary that follows represents the views of the chair; while it has been circulated to participants to ensure its accuracy, it does not purport to be a consensus document.

The meeting began with an assessment of *developments affecting the global nonproliferation regime* (GNR) since the study group last met in January 2009. Mitsuru Kurosawa (*CSCAP Japan*) focused on events that have influenced preparations for the 2010 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. He emphasized U.S. President Barack Obama's address in Prague, which he viewed as an important acknowledgement by the nuclear weapon states (NWS) of the commitment to disarmament as a key part of the GNR, along with nonproliferation and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. Another positive sign was the agreement at the Preparatory Conference held in May 2009 of an agenda for the Review Conference.

Kurosawa argued that progress will be needed on five issues for the review conference to be a success. They are: an initial framework for a U.S.-Russia nuclear reduction treaty, a statement of commitment to disarmament by the five NWS, at least some progress toward resolving the current stand-off regarding the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs, indication that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be ratified by the 44 required states, and substantive progress on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Kurosawa predicted that the review conference will focus on updating of the 13 steps toward disarmament, strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), improved verification and safeguard mechanisms, improved enforcement of compliance measures, and movement toward multilateral control of the fuel cycle. He closed by emphasizing that a strong commitment by all parties to the three pillars of the NPT (disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy) was needed if the momentum created by the Prague speech was to be maintained.

Discussion focused on the likelihood of progress toward disarmament, ratifying the CTBT, and reaching an agreement on the FMCT. While there was no consensus within the group, several participants agreed that there were reasons for optimism: the NWS appear serious about disarmament and there is renewed hope for complete disarmament as expressed in the notion of “global zero.” For one participant, recent support for “global zero” and disarmament brings the world closer to realizing the elimination of nuclear weapons than at any previous time. Other participants focused on the obstacles to substantive progress.

Optimists pointed to statements by President Obama in Prague and during his presidential campaign as critical to realizing progress toward disarmament. Other positive examples included the Conference on Disarmament’s agreement on a work program for a new treaty and agreement on the agenda for the 2010 Review Conference. A Russian participant reminded the group that Obama was not the only leader pushing ahead: President Medvedev has expressed support for disarmament. Our Russian colleague also highlighted other considerations involved in achieving “global zero.” They include preventing the militarization of outer space, avoiding attempts to compensate for reduction in nuclear systems with strategic conventional systems, and ensuring nuclear capabilities are not recoverable. There was concurrence that all states had work to do and that political statements needed to be translated into meaningful actions soon to sustain the current momentum.

Pessimists in the group marshaled ample evidence of their own. One of the more pessimistic assessments suggested that negotiations over eliminating nuclear programs in both Iran and North Korea seemed to be dead, which would halt further discussion on disarmament among the NWS. According to this view, even ratification and coming into force of the CTBT wouldn’t yield reductions in nuclear arsenals, nor would agreement on the Review Conference agenda guarantee its ultimate success.

We also explored whether proliferation in one region had an impact on another or whether these were discrete phenomena. Several participants argued that there were strong links – both positive and negative – and events in one region affected developments in another; this was especially true in the Iranian and North Korean cases. Other participants noted that Pyongyang and Tehran were both keenly attuned to developments in South Asia, and the treatment received by governments in India and Pakistan shaped their thinking, although their situation with respect to the NPT was different.

Whatever encouragement that can be taken from recent political commitments to disarmament, discussion revealed continuing gaps over how to deal with violators of the nonproliferation regime. There has been a reluctance to penalize violators and a general lack of capacity to monitor fissile material and dual-use technology. The challenge today is restoring a consensus on how to penalize governments that contravene NPT obligations and eliminate any ambiguity in the message to nuclear aspirants that proliferation is unacceptable. In this context, divisions continued over how to interpret the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement, with one participant insisting that it set a bad precedent, while others argued the deal ensured better control over the Indian nuclear program because it introduced safeguards in the civilian nuclear facilities.

The discussion emphasized the important role of U.S. policy in this debate. One U.S. participant felt that there was a significant shift underway in Washington that would result in ratification of the CTBT and stockpile reductions. This is driven by growing recognition that serious discussion of – and progress toward – disarmament is the best way to generate support for a more rigorous nonproliferation regime. Another speaker cautioned that U.S. rhetoric isn't enough; the new administration won't be taken seriously until there is a shift in nuclear doctrine. While much of the U.S. discussion is quiet, it will become much more public as the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and other strategic dialogues between the U.S. and its allies get underway in coming months.

An informal poll among participants regarding President Obama's Prague speech revealed only one hard-core "business as usual" skeptic. The room was roughly split between those who thought the gesture was sincere but prospects for progress low as there was no change in basic positions and those who thought a "window of opportunity" had truly been opened with the optimistic enjoying the slight edge.

Several participants agreed that the best way to gain momentum on both the CTBT and the FMCT is for the U.S. to show support for both treaties. U.S. ratification of the CTBT would push others in the list of 44 required ratifications to sign on too. That won't be easy, however: there remains significant opposition in the U.S. Congress to ratifying the CTBT and India remains reluctant in the absence of an adequate link between the CTBT and disarmament. It is also not prepared to be pressured to sign an international treaty, which is its sovereign decision.

The session closed with acknowledgement that a strong commitment to disarmament by the U.S. and Russia would change the picture, offer new opportunities for creating political will, and be critical if the momentum to "global zero" is going to be sustained. But building a safer world requires actions by all states. There needs to be better enforcement, which can be achieved by strengthening the IAEA, improving the ability of states to deal with proliferators and non-state actors, and universalizing a criteria-based nondiscriminatory approach to nonproliferation. Some felt that the time is quickly approaching when the other NWS must join Washington and Moscow if the denuclearization effort is to be sustained.

Session two focused on *recent developments on the Korean Peninsula* and the Six-Party Talks with presentations by representatives from three of the countries at the table. Yang Yi (*CSCAP China*) emphasized that the recent nuclear test by the DPRK negatively affected the situation on the Korean Peninsula and undermines NPT nonproliferation norms. He pointed to increasing regional tensions and argued that United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874 was the expression of the world's dissatisfaction with DPRK behavior. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has strongly urged the DPRK to honor its commitment to denuclearization on the Peninsula because it wants to safeguard peace and stability in Northeast Asia and sustain the viability of the Six-Party Talks. Yang felt the biggest accomplishments of the Six-Party Talks have been preserving peace in Northeast Asia, providing a forum for communication, and building trust in the region. While firmly opposed to recent DPRK actions and fully supportive of UNSC Resolution 1874, China continues to support a balanced reaction: China recognizes that the DPRK is a sovereign country with security and development interests that must be respected by other members of

the Six-Party Talks. Therefore diplomatic means and dialogue are the only effective way to resolve the crisis. China continues to support the DPRK's right under the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear energy after it returns to the NPT. While the second nuclear test by the DPRK has led many to question the DPRK's sincerity in denuclearization, he felt that pressure by the U.S., ROK, and Japan would aggravate tensions, block dialogue, and discourage the DPRK from ending its nuclear weapons program. He concluded by encouraging the DPRK to recognize that UNSC Resolution 1874 offers the choice for peaceful dialogue and an unconditional return to the Six-Party Talks.

So Ki-Sok (*CSCAP DPR Korea*) countered that interpretation, insisting that the underlying cause of tension on the Peninsula was the unchanging hostile policy of the U.S. against the DPRK. By denying respect, sovereignty, and equality to the DPRK, he argued the U.S. aimed to eliminate the DPRK and that the DPRK would never rejoin the Six-Party talks and never give up its nuclear weapons until the U.S. had given them up. For So, the DPRK tested a nuclear weapon to defend itself from U.S. hostile policies, which he identified as: a series of military exercises and reinforced U.S. military presence on the Peninsula, Washington's characterization of the recent satellite launch by the DPRK as a violation of UNSC Resolution 1718, and plans to introduce a wide range of sophisticated weaponry. In his view, the only way to prevent tensions was for the U.S. and other antagonists to end their pressure on the DPRK. Otherwise, the DPRK would continue to take retaliatory measures. Since the DPRK has a self-reliant national economy and has accelerated economic reconstruction, So disagreed that Pyongyang was acting to draw attention from anyone or to gain some advantage from dialogue, but was merely doing so to strengthen its security and maintain its sovereignty. So also argued that even though the U.S. says it is developing a new policy, the DPRK does not see tangible change. He concluded by suggesting that the U.S. should end the double standard evident in its nuclear policy as well as its human rights and terrorism policies. The U.S. should give up its supremacy in nuclear weapons and move toward universal dismantlement. If Washington wants a world free of nuclear weapons, it should go first and dismantle its own arsenal.

Hong Kyudok (*CSCAP Korea*) disagreed with that assessment. Instead, he argued that the DPRK was creating a regional arms race by testing missiles and nuclear devices. In his view, it was a strategic blunder for Pyongyang to miss the opportunity afforded by the change in administrations in the U.S. After explaining why the U.S. would not use military force against the DPRK, Hong concluded that it was unwise to keep testing the Obama administration because Washington was unlikely to yield to DPRK efforts to extract an advantage through these measures. In addition, Hong argued that DPRK behavior had undermined support for the "Sunshine Policy" in South Korea. The DPRK had to realize that the U.S. and the ROK will not keep paying for compliance with existing agreements. However, the ROK strongly supports resumption of the Six-Party Talks if Pyongyang agrees to honor its commitments to dismantle its nuclear facilities and accept a verification regime that is acceptable to all parties. The next important step was gaining regional consensus on how to proceed and the ROK was interested in evaluating ways to improve the dialogue process and forge a single voice among the other five parties on how to deal with a belligerent DPRK. While recent events challenge the global nonproliferation regime, the ROK remained confident in the effectiveness of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent. He

insisted, however, that the effectiveness of the GNR requires that the DPRK not be accepted as a nuclear weapon state. Finally, he argued that the ARF could play an important role in this effort by persuading the DPRK that it was wasting time and resources while working with states in the region to develop a vision for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

The discussion provided an interesting mix of perspectives on this issue. Several participants reiterated the view that the DPRK decision to test a nuclear device was a clear violation of the NPT and a serious challenge to the GNR. The importance of UNSC Resolution 1874 as a universal condemnation of the DPRK nuclear test was also highlighted. Several also articulated the view that the best solution was dialogue and negotiation through the Six-Party Talks. There was also a sense of disappointment by some at the failure of the Six-Party Talks process, while others underscored the need to acknowledge the DPRK's sense of insecurity and the need to find a mechanism for addressing it and ending the history of confrontation on the Peninsula. Participants called on the DPRK to flesh out the details of Washington's "hostile policy": what specific aspects of U.S. policy threaten its security and what should Washington do to eliminate those concerns?

A U.S. participant suggested that the current U.S. strategy was focused on both short- and long-term goals. In the short term, the U.S. seeks to protect Seoul from artillery strikes and provide it with missile defense capabilities while preventing minor conflicts from escalating. The U.S. also wants to prevent and restrain proliferation by closing loopholes in the NPT and through strict adherence to UNSC Resolution 1874. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) adds to this effort by focusing on "effects based sanctions." In the longer term, the U.S. will continue to engage the DPRK on nonmilitary issues in an effort to create an environment that will encourage Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party Talks. The overriding goal remains denuclearization.

Other states are affected by DPRK behavior. Some participants suggested that Japan would develop preemptive military capabilities for self-defense. Others noted that the ROK has formally joined the PSI and expressed renewed interest in reassurance concerning the U.S. extended deterrent. Participants from both Japan and the ROK acknowledged that public opinion in both countries has been strongly influenced by DPRK actions in a very negative way and had resulted in pressure in both countries for the governments to respond by enhancing military capabilities.

One response to the DPRK withdrawal from the six-party process is a call for the other five parties to meet without the DPRK. This process would not replace the Six-Party Talks, but would serve as a mechanism to develop a coordinated approach to find a way forward out of the current impasse.

In session 3, focus again returned to *developments in the disarmament movement*. Lew Dunn (*USCSCAP*) argued that disarmament was re-emerging as an important element of the multinational arms control agenda, but in a new way. The new seriousness with which the NWS are approaching disarmament is driven by a new concern with proliferation and greater expectations of real progress toward nuclear disarmament. While recognizing that there are still important political, military, cultural, and psychological impediments to achieving dramatic reductions in the size

of nuclear arsenals, the focus is currently on exploring different pathways and requirements to achieve “global zero.” Yet, continued pursuit of disarmament by NWS also demands equal attention to nonproliferation.

Against that backdrop, Dunn argued that many of the building blocks for steady progress toward nuclear disarmament are in place. The U.S. and Russia continue to make progress in rolling back their Cold War arsenals, although it will be difficult to reach new agreement given the ongoing dispute over missile defense. Uncertainties surrounding Chinese and U.S. views regarding the other’s strategic intentions mean that it will be important for those two governments to engage in strategic discussions even as the U.S. and Russia enter negotiations on the follow-on treaty to the START-1 framework.

As noted in the opening session, there has been progress on the multilateral arms control agenda (i.e., ratification of the CTBT, moving forward with the FMCT, and a new work program in the CD). Dunn argued that it is critical to sustain dialogue between NPT NWS and nonnuclear weapon states (NNWS) to examine pathways and key issues involved with moving toward nuclear “global zero.” While the primary responsibility for progress currently lies with the U.S. and Russia, sustained progress demands close cooperation and understanding among all NWS and engaging non-NPT NWS (India, Pakistan, and Israel). Ultimately, all states have an important role to play in developing the building blocks and developing coordinated action plans to address the three pillars of the NPT. This will make a new “grand bargain” possible.

Andy Rachmianto (*CSCAP Indonesia*) offered his perspective on these issues. Noting a series of setbacks over the last decade, especially the failure to reach agreement at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, he argued that the existence of more than 25,000 nuclear weapons and the fact that some NWS continue to develop arsenals represent a serious threat to progress toward disarmament. This danger should be ameliorated through security assurances and work to criminalize the use of nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, he agreed that today’s disarmament momentum represents a historic opportunity. Positive developments include statements on disarmament by the “four horsemen” and political leaders’ commitment to disarmament as well as the joint U.S.-Russia pledge to move beyond the Cold War mentality. He agreed with Dunn that priorities now include establishment of achievable and desirable goals along with a roadmap, benchmarks, and timetable for disarmament. While the U.S. and Russia should lead, all states have roles to play to sustain momentum through urgent and tangible actions. The starting point should be a renewed commitment to the 13 principles expressed in the 1995 NPT Review Conference along with a transparent and viable agreement on U.S.-Russia cuts that includes permanent elimination of warheads. In addition, progress on CTBT ratification and steady progress in the CD are needed. He expressed the belief that if the U.S. would ratify the CTBT, other governments would follow suit. Finally, he argued that the NWS should establish confidence-building measures, including a declaration against testing, a no-first-use policy, reducing alert times, and a systematic reduction of reliance on nuclear weapons in military doctrines.

Discussion began with a U.S. participant suggesting that it was critical to get all NWS into the dialogue and to recognize that NNWS have nonproliferation obligations, too.

China should join the dialogue on arsenal reduction at an early point. A Russian participant agreed that all states have obligations and roles to play to encourage movement toward “global zero.” A Chinese participant argued that the U.S. has a moral responsibility to lead and should take a more constructive role in pursuing disarmament. Some felt that, given the comprehensive nature of security, it was important to recognize that any discussion of nuclear disarmament must include the entire security context and issues like missile defense and conventional military capabilities. One speaker even felt that movement on disarmament will also include measures to prevent the weaponization of outer space, eliminating capacity to rapidly restore nuclear weapon capabilities, active support for nonproliferation through national legislation and adherence to existing regimes, a verifiable cessation of the development of conventional capabilities that can be used to substitute for nuclear weapon capabilities, and universalization of the U.S.-Russia treaty on short- and medium-range missiles.

We also focused on doctrinal issues related to the use of nuclear weapons, in particular the use of a no-first use policy as a confidence-building measure. While several speakers argued that U.S. refusal to establish a no-first use policy created uncertainty, others insisted that a no-first policy means nothing in the absence of trust between antagonists. A U.S. participant went further, noting that the failure to have a no-first use policy was not the same as “a first use policy” and questioned how adoption of such a policy would change state behavior. Some felt that failure to establish a no-first use policy spurred other countries to develop nuclear weapons as a hedge. One participant suggested that ambiguity encourages states to engage in the nuclear weapon planning process, which was destabilizing. Another argued that all nations should reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in their military doctrines. A Chinese participant insisted that no-first use was an absolutely defensive and peaceful foreign policy that would maintain deterrence and help build an anti-nuclear culture. He felt that China’s primary role at this point was to help build a moral commitment to disarmament.

It was noted that the U.S. is in a unique position because of its commitment of extended deterrence to allies. The U.S. could find itself in the worst of all worlds if its commitment to disarmament (and no-first use) is seen by allies as reneging on its extended deterrence commitment at the same time that others dismiss statements about disarmament as mere rhetoric and others expand their nuclear arsenals. Therefore, while the U.S. is willing to take the initiative in disarmament, it is important for other governments to show support for the initiative and take a part in the disarmament process.

Another participant cautioned that nuclear weapons were embedded in Cold War thinking and this perspective created a form of “tunnel vision”: it encouraged analysts to think about how “perfect” the world had to be before states would consider abandoning their nuclear weapons. Moving forward, it will be important to identify roadblocks and ensure that verification measures are consistent and foolproof.

The group was also reminded of the costs and obligations of developing an effective disarmament regime. Detection technologies and verification mechanisms are intrusive and very expensive. Monitoring the fuel cycle and storage and destruction of

nuclear weapons are difficult, expensive, and time consuming. Who will pay and how much to reach and verify “nuclear zero”?

In closing the discussion, a Southeast Asian participant reminded the group that an indefinite extension of the NPT is not a blank check to the NWS to retain nuclear weapons. At some point – and soon – there must be substantive progress on disarmament. There needs to be a balanced commitment between both NNWS and NWS and the recognition that multilateral agreements and institutions will be critical to any success in the future. A U.S. speaker acknowledged that adoption of a no-first use policy by the U.S. would be viewed as a symbol of reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. This could be positive, but it could also alarm allies who depend on its extended deterrence. As an operating principle, then, Washington should follow a policy of “do no harm” and consult carefully with its allies as it moves forward with disarmament. In this context, the best immediate steps are extending the timelines before weapons can be used by reducing operational readiness of nuclear arsenals. We should also recognize that missile defense is viewed by others as a forcing event and requires that China be brought into discussions sooner rather than later.

The fourth session focused on *the role of regional organizations in implementing UNSC Resolution 1540*. Lawrence Scheinman (*USCSCAP*) started with a description of the institutional framework associated with the resolution. It is unique in that it was developed to address all types of WMD and is specifically focused on risks posed by nonstate actors. It is binding on all UN members and requires them to refrain from supporting any attempts by nonstate actors to gain access to WMD materials, technology, or expertise. Scheinman argued that regional organizations such as ASEAN and the ARF are well-suited to help implement the resolution because Chapter 8 of the UN Charter identifies regional organizations as important actors in protecting regional peace and security and the 1540 Committee Chair has strongly encouraged regional organizations to help implement the resolution. Such institutions have a high degree of political legitimacy among their members, play an important role in developing common understanding of and agreement on steps to take, can remedy inconsistencies among members, and have mechanisms for resolving disputes among members. He recommended that each organization establish a dedicated unit to deal with the 1540 agenda and focus on its implementation. States that see 1540 issues as unimportant need to recognize that failure to ensure full implementation will undermine their security and that of other member states of the organization.

Raymund Quilop (*CSCAP Philippines*) offered a perspective on ASEAN’s role in UNSCR 1540 implementation. He argued that ASEAN could play an important role in the implementation process by verifying and endorsing the 1540 reports provided by member states. He also felt that both ASEAN and the ARF could urge member states to honor 1540 obligations and could provide templates to expedite implementation of national legislation such as by following the recommendations offered in CSCAP Memorandum #14 on Management of Trade in Strategic Goods. ASEAN must move from tacit recognition of nonproliferation as an issue that requires attention to explicit actions. Initial steps could include a UNSCR 1540 implementation assistance program, building a constituency for nonproliferation norm among states, and encouraging member states to seek assistance to increase capacity to counter proliferation.

Tom Wuchte (*USCSCAP*) reviewed the progress that has been made by the UNSCR 1540 Committee in institutionalizing reporting by UN member states. He highlighted the fact that many governments have discovered that the most important element of 1540 implementation is the ability to establish relationships among government bureaucracies and enhance legal and regulatory frameworks, especially in managing trade in strategic goods. The implementation process has allowed states to elevate their dialogues and expand cooperation to address the nexus between nonstate actors and WMD. He concluded by noting the next big step for the 1540 Committee will be the comprehensive review planned for later in 2009. It will be an opportunity to move beyond reporting and further institutionalize efforts to deny nonstate actors access to WMD-related materials.

In the discussion, a Vietnamese participant noted that there had not been much discussion in ASEAN about UNSCR 1540 implementation. He argued that it is important to incorporate the provisions of the resolution into regional policy through mechanisms such as the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation, the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and vision statements. While recognizing that 1540 implementation should focus on national-level policy formulation, he suggested that ASEAN should do more in developing closer regional cooperation on export controls by controlling porous borders and preventing cross-border smuggling. ASEAN should also be more involved in multilateralizing the nuclear cycle and investing in training and equipment to build enforcement capacity to prevent proliferation.

Some agreed on the need for further institutionalization of the 1540 regime and there was some optimism that the review process would be helpful in ensuring that 1540 is effectively implemented and meets the needs of all nations. One participant suggested that the review process could serve as a basis for establishing a Secretariat, which would greatly improve capacity to evaluate 1540 submissions. Others questioned the viability of existing standards given the problems that even countries with strong export control regimes, like China and Japan, have keeping up with the requirements of UNSCR1540. Several participants warned that while regional organizations can assist, implementation of the resolution first and foremost remains a state responsibility. Others cautioned that the resolution was the product of a careful compromise that could fail if reporting requirements and oversight became too onerous in the eyes of the more skeptical states. Although the 1540 requirements are legally binding, they can be undermined if governments lack the political will to fully implement the provisions of the resolution. Therefore, some participants felt that action plans were needed and that it was important to build capacity to ensure continued implementation.

While potentially helpful, regional organizations should be viewed as complementing, and not duplicating, the work of the 1540 committee. They should provide assistance, partners, and share experiences. Finally, several agreed that the purpose of UNSCR 1540 was to raise standards of behavior and not to point fingers at others. It should be viewed as a device that defines “appropriate” behavior, not one that punishes bad behavior. Care must be taken to avoid using domestic legislation under the guise of the resolution to “punish” other states.

The second day of the meeting began with a *review of the CSCAP handbook on preventing the proliferation of WMD* by Carl Baker (*USCSCAP*). The group agreed

to modifications to the document, including an expanded table of contents, additional information on disarmament, and the inclusion of the CSCAP Memorandum on the Management of Trade of Strategic Goods as an appendix. Participants were reminded that it is intended to be a “one stop” reference tool and not an ARF document. As such, some felt changes are required in the text of chapters 1 to 3 to avoid making judgments and assessments of perceived threats and concerns. The handbook, while nearly complete, will remain a work in progress.

The remainder of the meeting was devoted to breakout sessions designed to provide suggestions for the development of the *CSCAP Action Plan*. Breakout groups included: Promoting Disarmament, Promoting Civilian Nuclear Energy Safety and Security, Enhancing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ), Developing Outreach and Capacity-Building Programs, and Enhancing Global Nonproliferation Regime Compliance and Implementation. Upon completing the breakout sessions, the plenary resumed and each group provided a synopsis of its discussion, including specific recommendations for consideration in the subject area of the particular sessions. The following observations and recommendations are the result of brainstorming sessions during break-out group discussions and are compiled here to stimulate thinking on the identified subjects. They will provide a starting point for more in-depth discussion on these topics at future WMD Study Group Meetings.

### ***Promoting Disarmament***

-ARF/CSCAP members should: sign and ratify CTBT and urge all other countries to do likewise; urge all countries to participate in good faith in FMCT negotiations; urge all countries to take verifiably irreversible, legally binding steps toward universal nuclear disarmament; and urge Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to take actions to reduce perceptions of the utility and usability of nuclear weapons, to include possible adoption of “no first use” policies, ending policies of “calculated ambiguity,” and changing military postures to reflect reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

-The U.S. and Russia should consider discussions on doctrine with smaller nuclear powers to explore the rationale behind smaller nuclear arsenals and minimal deterrence policies and consider extending the time of nuclear decisions (through “de-alerting” or other measures) as part of the process of delegitimizing the use of such weapons.

-NWS and non-NWS should together study steps to achieve the goal of global denuclearization. In support of this effort, CSCAP member committees and ARF member governments should pursue public outreach and education on the threats posed by WMD proliferation and the value of nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.

-NWS should provide assistance to non-NWS to ensure they have the ability to safely disarm and disable a nuclear weapon they may capture on their own territory, and should ensure that their own disarmed weapons are safely and securely destroyed, not just disabled.

-The International Court of Justice opinion on the use of nuclear weapons should be referred to the United Nations Security Council for its adoption and decisions to

authorize the use of nuclear weapons should be determined to be a crime against humanity, conferring jurisdiction on the International Criminal Court to rule on such acts.

### ***Promoting Civilian Nuclear Energy Safety and Security***

-Examine the prospects for establishing sub-regional or regional “Reprocessing and Enrichment Free Zones” (perhaps starting with ASEAN) to reduce the prospects of emerging peaceful nuclear energy programs serving as a stepping stone for a nuclear weapons program.

-Encourage countries with developed nuclear energy sectors to help others develop and implement national strategies on nuclear energy. Specific areas to be considered include: resources; facility safety and security; nonproliferation risks; the rationale for such efforts (focusing on cost effectiveness); nuclear fuel procurement; and spent fuel management.

-Explore the creation a regional low-level waste repository as well as a regional information collection and dissemination capability as well as a regional information collection and dissemination capability (*a regional center for excellence*) with the goal of sharing expertise/training/best practices.

-Promote human resources capacity development focusing on nuclear reactor operators and nuclear engineering and regional coordination of emergency responses to nuclear incidents (possibly through table top exercises).

-Promote greater transparency measures through the adoption of regional safeguards, possible to include development of multinational inspection teams, to complement, not supplant, IAEA inspections.

-Renew, update, and promote CSCAP’s Nuclear Energy Experts Group (and its [www.cscap.nucltrans.org](http://www.cscap.nucltrans.org) web site) to promote transparency, build confidence, share expertise, and best practices throughout the Asia Pacific region and examine the prospects for a regional multinational fuel cycle option.

### ***Enhancing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ)***

ASEAN can set an example for enhancing other NWFZs by: promoting public education on the role and meaning of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANFWZ); establishing a permanent SEANFWZ secretariat within ASEAN and providing this secretariat with a mandate to coordinate national capacity to monitor export/import of strategic goods of member states; promoting closer coordination between the SEANFWZ secretariat and the IAEA; making automatic referrals to the UNSC for any violations of SEANFWZ; establishing a regional register of exports/imports for all activities related to WMD which will be kept within the secretariat; creating a code of conduct for managing strategic trade within ASEAN that includes sanctions for violations; promote regular information sharing among SEANFWZ members; making ratification of the IAEA Additional Protocols a condition of membership in SEANFWZ; encouraging all nuclear weapon states to accede to the Protocol of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; considering the

establishment of a nuclear fuel depository; and adding a provision to SEANWFZ that bans all enrichment and reprocessing activity.

### ***Developing Outreach and Capacity-Building Programs***

-CSCAP and/or the ARF should facilitate/support WMD nonproliferation outreach by: identifying existing activities and efforts in the region to create linkages, maximize resources, and raise awareness; conducting needs assessments to help focus outreach efforts; and by identifying local and contact technical and subject matter expertise to address particular needs.

-CSCAP and/or ARF should also: identify and compile best practices and lessons learned on WMD proliferation prevention for the region and further promote regional harmonization; organize table top exercises to build relationships and share information; organize and conduct track-two “1540-like” regional workshops; make basic educational information on WMD proliferation prevention (like that available in the CSCAP WMD Handbook); promote and facilitate public-private partnerships to prevent WMD proliferation; and ensure that relevant outreach is provided to the right partners.

### ***Enhancing Global Nuclear Compliance and Implementation***

-Develop and implement universal enforcement provisions for each regime, with the goal of creating universal acceptance of the goal of nonproliferation (through compliance) and gaining acceptance of enforcement activities, starting with national legislation and building up through regional level to global; enhance existing verification measures by urging CSCAP/ARF members to adopt IAEA Additional Protocol and Comprehensive safeguards and to join the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism.

### **Future Agenda**

Future meetings will explore the ideas developed during these sessions and expand them into specific action plan recommendations. It was agreed to include disclaimers that these documents are meant to serve as stimulus for track-one action in dealing with the threat and challenges of WMD. Although the date for the next study group meeting has not been set, it will occur before the end of the year. It was also agreed that the group would continue to try to meet in conjunction with the ARF Intersessional Meeting on Disarmament and Nonproliferation.

### ***Key Findings***

A summary of key findings and recommendations were also prepared to highlight, from the co-chairs perspective, the most important conclusions and observations for review by ARF ISM participants. They included:

-The international consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons needs to be revitalized. The world must speak with one voice and condemn departures from the nuclear status quo.

-The advent of the Obama administration and a series of specific suggestions by the Russian government present an opportunity to rejuvenate efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime (GNR). Progress is not assured as many points of contention remain, but assumption of a leading role by Moscow and Washington in arms control and disarmament provides new momentum for talks.

-There is a tendency to focus on progress by the U.S. and Russia in reducing their strategic arsenals before other states take up their burdens. However, while Washington and Moscow must lead the way, all governments should work to move the nuclear disarmament agenda forward without further delay and irrespective of their nuclear status.

-Success at the NPT PrepCon and the Conference on Disarmament will be a real test and all states have a stake in strengthening the GNR.

-Priority targets are ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and agreement on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Promoting the “universality” of the NPT should also be a priority.

-The world is enjoying a “nuclear disarmament moment.” While disarmament has long been an international agenda item, its prospects are more real than ever before.

-Serious consideration of disarmament obligations by nuclear weapon states helps generate support for nonproliferation measures. There is no agreement on what “the road to zero” entails or how to get there, but nonproliferation is a critical part of this path. Getting to, sustaining, and verifying “zero” will likely be an expensive proposition requiring intrusive verification procedures for all nations.

-Success on the road toward nuclear disarmament demands a sustained dialogue both among the nuclear weapon states and between nuclear and nonnuclear weapon states.

-Nonproliferation and disarmament must be considered within the context of a broad conception of security. Causes of state insecurity must be addressed. Motivations that push states to acquire nuclear weapons should be reduced or eliminated.

-There are strong calls to states possessing nuclear weapons to reduce the role of such weapons in their military doctrines as a step toward “delegitimizing” their use. While a “no first use” policy may have limited military significance, its political/moral value should not be underestimated.

-Regional organizations can play a critical role in strengthening the GNR. Such organizations have legitimacy, authority, and the confidence of members. They play an important role in creating shared understanding and agreement on steps to take in support of shared goals, provided they do not compromise the role and responsibilities of the 1540 Committee.

-ASEAN and the ARF can provide key assistance to member states to fulfill their UNSCR 1540 obligations, with the understanding that countries bear individual responsibility for compliance. Working through regional organizations can minimize sensitivities attached to the receipt of assistance to build national capacity.

-The situation on the Korean Peninsula presents a serious challenge to the GNR. While the DPRK is a sovereign country with its own security concerns, its nuclear and missile tests violate UNSC resolutions and increase tensions in Northeast Asia. UNSCR 1874 reflects “the anger of the international community” over the DPRK nuclear test.

-The DPRK feels threatened by the United States and U.S.-ROK alliance activities and by U.S. efforts to protect its interests and allies. But, the DPRK should identify specific elements of U.S. policy that create insecurity; demanding an end to U.S. “hostile policy” is too ambiguous.

-Negotiation and dialogue currently represent the only viable means of resolving the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Even if the DPRK is not prepared to resume the Six-Party Talks, the other five governments might consider proceeding without Pyongyang, in order to persuade the DPRK to resume dialogue and to address growing proliferation concerns.

-The ARF should call on all participants in the Six-Party Talks to honor their obligations and resume negotiations on the basis of the Sept. 19, 2005 Joint Statement. Regardless of progress on the talks, nuclear weapons, materials, and knowhow must not be allowed to proliferate from the Korean Peninsula.

-Areas open for future CSCAP and/or ARF study/recommendations include disarmament promotion, promoting civilian nuclear energy safety and security, enhancing nuclear weapons free zones, promoting “enrichment- and reprocessing-free zones,” developing outreach and capacity-building programs, and enhancing GNR compliance and implementation. Preliminary observations/recommendations on these topics drawn from WMD Study Group break-out sessions are provided as an attachment to this summary.

-The draft *CSCAP Handbook on Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, while still a work in progress, will hopefully serve as a useful source of reference material for those working on nonproliferation and disarmament issues.

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